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		Summary	
	 This	dissertation	centres	upon	the	learning	processes	and	social	norms	associated	with	two	distinct	strands	of	economic	thinking	–	one	loosely	heterodox	and	the	other	mainstream,	or	“neo-classical.”	My	intention	is	to	examine	the	learning	processes	and	consequent	beliefs	of	a	range	of	Canadian	economists,	especially	macroeconomists1.	To	achieve	this	goal,	I	have	undertaken	a	number	of	comparative	case	studies	within	the	Canadian	context.	These	have	generated	data	from	a	survey	of	100	academic	economists	as	well	as	a	series	of	in-depth	interviews	with	58	Canadian	economists	across	the	political	and	methodological	spectra.	My	results	have	drawn	from	the	contributions	of	a	total	of	158	respondents.				 	This	thesis	aims	to	examine	economics	education	in	the	Canadian	context,	charting	the	rise	of	neoclassical	economics	from	the	1970s	onwards	while	examining	the	educational	processes,	choice	of	language,	social	norms,	and	views	of	human	nature	to	be	found	among	a	variety	of	Canadian	economists	with	differing	political	orientations.	This	may	help	to	identify	the	role	economics	education	has	played	in	shaping	the	economic	landscape	in	Canada,	and	how	Canadian	economists’	learning	processes	have	emphasised	or	minimised	certain	assumptions	about	public	policy	and	human	nature	that	differ	from	what	is	taught	–	implicitly	or	explicitly	–	elsewhere.		 	In	a	field	that	is,	among	the	social	sciences,	by	far	the	most	resistant	to	knowledge	from	other	disciplines,	Canadian	academic	economists	are	by	all	appearances	global	outliers.	My	research	suggests	that	they	are	significantly	more	open	to	knowledge	from	other	disciplines	than	groups	of	economists	elsewhere;	relative	to	American	academic	economists,	they	are	almost	twice	as	likely	to	believe	that	
																																																								1	Macroeconomics	is	the	study	of	the	market	as	a	whole	–	internationally	and	at	the	national	level	–	as	opposed	to	the	study	of	individual	markets	(microeconomics).	
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interdisciplinary	knowledge	is	better	than	knowledge	generated	from	a	single	field,	and	the	older	cohorts	surpass	even	U.S.	sociologists	in	this	regard.		 My	research	also	suggests	that	social	norms	may	have	a	more	profound	effect	on	economists’	beliefs	than	their	formal	education	in	economics,	and	that	historical	and	institutional	factors	–	especially	during	economists’	formative	years	–	may	have	a	life-long	impact	on	Canadian	economists’	political	beliefs.	There	also	appear	to	be	educational,	geographical,	and	cohort-related	effects	on	economists’	beliefs	that,	together	with	the	effects	of	Canadian	social	norms,	combine	to	form	an	image	of	a	discipline	that	is	less	polarised,	more	pro-interdisciplinarity,	and	substantially	more	accepting	of	a	role	for	government	in	economic	policy	than	that	of	their	economist	brethren	in	the	U.S.		
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Preface	
	This	dissertation	is	the	result	of	my	own	work	and	includes	nothing	that	is	the	outcome	of	work	done	in	collaboration	except	as	specified	in	the	text.	It	is	not	substantially	the	same	as	any	that	I	have	submitted,	or,	is	being	concurrently	submitted	for	a	degree	or	diploma	or	other	qualification	at	the	University	of	Cambridge	or	any	other	University	or	similar	institution.	I	further	state	that	no	substantial	part	of	my	dissertation	has	already	been	submitted,	or,	is	being	concurrently	submitted	for	any	such	degree,	diploma	or	other	qualification	at	the	University	of	Cambridge	or	any	other	University	or	similar	institution.	It	does	exceed	the	prescribed	word	limit	for	the	Faculty	of	Education	Degree	Committee.	
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Guide	to	Canadian	Think	Tanks	
	
Name	 Description	 Political	Orientation	Canadian	Centre	for	Policy	Alternatives	(CCPA)	
Public	policy	think	tank	with	several	regional	offices;	largest	sources	of	funds	are	individuals	and	project	funding.	
Left-wing/heterodox	
C.D.	Howe	Institute	 Economics-focused	think	tank	with	the	most	influence	on	government;	largest	sources	of	funds	are	academic,	individual,	and	corporate	donations.	
Centre-right/mainstream	
Committee	on	Monetary	and	Economic	Reform	(COMER)	
Economics-focused	think	tank	with	limited	individual	membership	and	very	little	funding	(largest	funding	source	is	individuals).	
Left-wing/heterodox	
The	Conference	Board	of	Canada	 Public	policy	think	tank	with	a	fee-for-service	model;	largest	funding	source	is	private	research	commissions.	
Centre-right	
The	Fraser	Institute	 Public	policy	think	tank	with	a	few	regional	offices;	largest	funding	sources	are	individuals	and	corporations.	
Right-wing/free-market	
Institute	for	Research	on	Public	Policy	(IRPP)	
Public	policy	think	tank;	largest	funding	source	is	an	endowment	(largely	government-funded)	that	is	running	down.	
Centre	
Progressive	Economics	Forum	(PEF)	
Economics-focused	forum	(online	and	events-based);	largest	funding	sources	are	unions	and	individuals.	
Left-wing/heterodox	
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Introduction			 Easily	overlooked	as	the	mild-mannered	cousin	of	the	United	States,	Canada	has	enjoyed	an	unusual	amount	of	attention	in	recent	years	–	first	in	response	to	its	comparatively	strong	performance	in	the	wake	of	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	(Freeland,	2010;	The	Economist,	2010)	and	again	in	the	midst	of	the	refugee	crisis	and	controversial	“Muslim	ban”	enacted	by	the	Trump	administration,	with	global-reach	media	highlighting	the	Canadian	approach	–	and	attitude	–	towards	immigration	and	refugee	settlement.	The	Guardian,	for	example,	published	a	piece	celebrating	Canada’s	“post-nationalist”	identity	as	a	contrast	to	the	rise	in	nationalist	xenophobia	elsewhere	(Foran,	2017).	In	an	article	entitle	“Canada,	Leader	of	the	Free	World,”	The	New	York	Times’	Nicholas	Kristof	wrote:			 	Canada’s	leaders	nurtured	multiculturalism	into	a	sacred	part	of	the	country’s	identity.	As	the	rest	of	the	world	bangs	the	doors	shut,	Canadians	celebrate	their	openness	—	and,	polls	show,	now	take	more	pride	in	multiculturalism	than	in	hockey.		 “The	results	in	Canada	have	been	spectacular,”	noted	Jonathan	Tepperman	in	a	recent	book,	“The	Fix,”	which	explores	government	successes	around	the	world,	including	Canada’s	immigration	policy.	“They	turned	a	small,	closed,	ethnically	homogeneous	state	into	a	vibrant	global	powerhouse	and	one	of	the	most	open	and	successful	multicultural	nations	in	the	world.”	(2017)			 Yet	as	Canada	enjoys	its	rare	moment	in	the	sun,	it	is	in	corresponding	degree	ignored	by	academia	–	including	its	own	academics	–	and	has	been	for	some	time	(Emery,	Simpson,	&	Tapp,	2013).	In	an	era	in	which	the	world	continues	to	struggle	with	the	aftermath	of	the	financial	crisis	and	the	attendant	questions	of	banking	and	housing	sector	regulation,	and	with	xenophobic	politics	and	social	movements	on	the	rise,	Canada	represents	a	potential	counterpoint	to	other	Western	nations.				 Yet	the	Canadian	case	remains	significantly	under-studied,	as	are	its	policymakers,	many	of	whom	–	as	elsewhere	–	are	themselves	economists	or	defer	to	economists	for	the	purposes	of	policy	analysis	and	advice	(Ferraro,	Pfeffer,	&	Sutton,	2005;	French,	Leyshon,	&	Thrift,	2009).	Although	there	are	hundreds	of	studies	of	this	powerful	and	influential	group	–	economists	–	in	the	U.S.	context,	this	is	not	even	proportionally	the	case	in	Canada.	The	research	that	follows	aims	to	help	fill	this	important	research	gap	–	a	goal	that	may	be	particularly	timely,	given	the	intractable	issues	currently	facing	the	global	community	–	by	concentrating	attention	on	the	
	 18	
chronically	understudied	Canada	and,	arguably,	some	of	its	most	influential	thought	leaders	and	policymakers:	economists.		 This	research	centres	upon	the	nature	of	the	learning	processes	and	social	norms	associated	with	two	distinct	strands	of	economic	thinking	–	heterodox3	economics	and	mainstream	neoclassical4	economics.5	What	follows	compares	the	ideas	and	influences	of	self-taught	heterodox	economists,	as	exemplified	by	the	Committee	on	Monetary	and	Economic	Reform	(COMER),	with	highly-educated	heterodox	members	of	the	Progressive	Economics	Forum	(PEF);	academically	educated	right-wing	think	tank	economists,	such	as	those	employed	by	the	Fraser	Institute;	economists	from	centre	or	centre-right	think	tanks	such	as	the	C.D.	Howe	Institute,	the	Conference	Board	of	Canada,	and	the	Institute	for	Research	on	Public	Policy	(IRPP);	and	economists	from	the	Canadian	Centre	for	Policy	Alternatives	(CCPA),	a	left-wing	think	tank.6	Alongside	these	two	broad	groupings	–	the	self-taught	and	the	formally-educated	and	-trained	–	this	research	also	examines	more	closely	the	education	of	–	loosely	defined	–	‘mainstream’	and	‘heterodox’	economists,	
																																																								3	“Heterodox”	economics	refers	to	the	orientation	of	(often,	but	not	always)	socially	and	economically	progressive	economists	who	buck	the	neoclassical	trend	currently	dominating	economics	departments.	As	is	the	case	for	many	such	simplifying	terms	used	throughout	this	thesis,	it	is	imprecise	and	contested.	4	Some,	such	as	Tony	Lawson	(2013),	have	recommended	retiring	the	term	“neoclassical”	as	it	is	imprecise	and	is	often	employed	in	a	derogatory	fashion.	Throughout	this	thesis	I	occasionally	employ	the	term	“neoclassical”	to	refer	to	the	mainstream	among	Canadian	economists	–	the	loose	consensus	among	a	majority	of	economists	–	even	though	the	term	is	vague	and,	at	times,	somewhat	misleading;	this	is	because	it	is	the	term	used	in	many	discussions	of	the	topic,	and	indeed	the	term	recurs	in	many	conversants’	quotations	throughout	this	dissertation.	I	do,	however,	recognise	its	limitations	and	its	use	should	be	viewed	critically.	5	It	should	be	noted	that	the	use	of	descriptive	terms	such	as	“left-wing,”	“right-wing,”	“mainstream,”	and	even	“heterodox”	and	“neoclassical”	are	simplified	representations	of	what	is,	in	fact,	a	non-linear	arrangement	of	political	views	along	several	axes.	The	notion	of	a	political	spectrum	is	itself	suspect,	as	“left”	and	“right”	have	both	been	associated	with	a	variety	of	ideological	standpoints	along	social,	economic,	and	other	axes.	The	lack	of	terminological	exactitude	here	is	in	fact	a	reminder	of	the	need	for	research	of	this	kind	in	order	to	construct	a	more	nuanced	image	of	Canadian	economists’	beliefs.	Although	such	terms	are	simplistic,	and	in	ways	that	could	be	a	barrier	to	the	diversification	of	the	field	of	economics,	there	is	nevertheless	value	in	mapping	out	the	political	orientations	of	Canadian	economists	and	thus	it	is	necessary	to	use	language	–	even	inexact	language	–	to	identify	clusters	of	opinions	and	assumptions	among	groups	of	economists.	6	Please	refer	to	the	Guide	to	Canadian	Think	Tanks	table	for	reference	throughout	the	dissertation.	
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whether	in	academic	posts,	serving	as	the	chief	economists	of	Canada’s	largest	banks,	or	working	as	economists	at	the	Bank	of	Canada.				
Research	Questions	
	My	research	questions	are	as	follows:			 1.	How	do	Canadian	economists	differ	from	economists	in	other	countries,	especially	the	U.S.	and	the	UK?		 2.	To	what	extent	have	autodidactic7	and	institutional	approaches	to	learning,	at	both	the	secondary	and	post-secondary	level,	influenced	Canadian	economists’	political	orientations,	social	norms,	views	of	human	nature,	and	relationships	with	–	as	well	as	attitudes	towards	–	other	economists	across	the	political	spectrum?				 3.	Which	factors	–	education,	geography,	Canadian	and	American	social	norms,	the	historical	development	of	economics	as	a	discipline,	and/or	the	age	at	which	economists	were	first	exposed	to	the	field	–	appear	to	have	influenced	Canadian	economists’	political	beliefs,	views	of	human	nature,	and	social	norms?		 4.	How	do	Canadian	economists	view	the	discipline,	and	what	are	their	critiques	and	defences	of	the	way	it	is	currently	taught?			 I	have	explored	these	questions	by	way	of	a	systematic	documentary	analysis,	in-depth	interviews,	and	a	widely	disseminated	survey.	This	research	design	centres	on	the	educational	experiences	and	political	orientations	of	the	following,	which	together	comprise	my	eleven	case	studies:		
• A	group	of	self-taught	heterodox	economists	(COMER)	
• A	group	of	professed	progressive	economists	with	a	mixed	educational	background	(PEF)	
																																																								7	Self-taught.	
	 20	
• A	group	of	central	bankers	with	established	institutional	credentials	(Bank	of	Canada)	
• The	chief	economists	of	Canada’s	largest	private	banks	
• A	sample	of	academic	economists	from	the	12	top-rated	economics	departments	in	the	country	
• Economists	from	think	tanks	across	the	political	spectrum	(Fraser	Institute,	C.D.	Howe	Institute,	Conference	Board	of	Canada,	IRPP,	and	CCPA)	
• Two	journalists	who	cover	economic	and	financial	issues	in	Canada	–	one	from	the	Globe	and	Mail,	Canada’s	most	widely-read	national	newspaper,	and	one	from	The	Economist,	a	highly	influential	international	(UK-based)	publication.					 My	fieldwork	data	were	generated	through	interviews	with	my	conversants8	and	surveys	of	their	colleagues	within	the	broader	ecosystem	of	Canadian	economists.	This	research	was	informed	by	the	literature	on	economics	education;	Canadian	economists;	economic	geography;	and	autodidactic,	learner-centred,	and	extrinsically-motivated	learning.	My	theoretical	approach	draws	chiefly	from	critical	theory,	and	as	such	what	follows	is	dedicated	to	questioning	accepted	wisdom,	observing	prevailing	patterns	of	socialisation,	and	analysing	the	discourse	and	power	structures	underlying	societal	norms	and	beliefs.			 I	will	progress	through	this	thesis	as	follows:	first	with	an	exploration	of	the	relevant	literatures	informing	this	study,	then	an	examination	of	the	methodological	foundations	of	the	research,	followed	by	an	examination	of	results	from	the	58	in-depth	interviews	and	the	associated	survey	of	100	academic	economists.	The	discussion	section	to	follow	will	tie	together	themes	that	emerged	throughout	the	dissertation,	concluding	with	suggestions	towards	a	theory	of	economics	education	as	well	as	recommendations	for	future	research	in	the	field.		
																																																									8	I	use	the	term	“conversant”	throughout	this	thesis	–	from	the	obsolete	Oxford	English	Dictionary	definition:	“A	person	who	‘converses’	or	is	intimate	with	another;	a	familiar	acquaintance.”	(“‘Conversant,’”	2017)	–	as	it	is	the	only	term	that	captures	the	sense	of	equals	conversing;	other	options,	such	as	informant	or	interviewee,	imply	that	information	passes	in	one	direction	only	and/or	that	there	is	a	power	differential	present	in	the	conversation.	Thus	everyone	I	interviewed	is	a	conversant,	as	am	I.	
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Potential	Contribution	to	the	Field:	Why	Economists,	and	Why	Canada?	
		 This	thesis	seeks	to	investigate	the	ways	in	which	citizens	in	Canada	–	economists	and	otherwise	–	learn	about	economics,	especially	macroeconomics.	This	is	an	important	field	of	inquiry	because	the	nature,	extent,	and	efficacy	of	economics	learning	greatly	influences	citizens’	views	of	economic	policies	and	the	political	and	ethical	orientations	they	reflect.	Education	in	general,	but	especially	within	fields	imbued	with	social	legitimacy	and	political	power,	can	play	an	important	role	in	perpetuating	or	disrupting	certain	political	discourses	–	either	directly	or	through	the	legitimacy	it	confers	upon	certain	individuals,	groups,	ideas,	and	behaviours.			 The	level	of	citizens’	economic	literacy	helps	to	determine	the	extent	to	which	they	are	able	to	hold	their	leaders	to	account,	and	to	have	their	ideas	taken	seriously	by	what	C.	Wright	Mills	famously	referred	to	as	the	power	elite	(1959).	In	The	German	
Ideology,	Marx	and	Engels	declared	that,	“The	ideas	of	the	ruling	class	are,	in	every	epoch,	the	ruling	ideas”(Marx	&	Engels,	1974),	and	in	this	sense	this	research	is	also	a	critical	theoretical	and	institutional	examination	of	the	academic	context	that	informs	the	views	of	elite	economists	and	how	they	differ	from	those	of	self-taught	economists.	There	is	of	course	a	gap	–	in	both	power	and	knowledge	–	between	elite	economists	and	the	citizenry,	including	autodidact	economists,	and	this	itself	warrants	further	examination	and	explanation	given	the	problematic	way	in	which	mainstream	economic	thought	has	informed	policy	at	times.		 Mainstream	economics	has	traditionally	enjoyed	power	and	legitimacy	that	heterodox	economics	has	not	been	accorded.	The	intersection	of	these	two	poles	of	economic	thinking	–	heterodox	and	mainstream	–	occurs	along	the	political	spectrum,	of	course,	but	also	has	an	important	temporal	axis;	the	history	of	economics	education	during	the	Great	Depression	and	thereafter	–	its	evolution	through	Keynesian	economics	to	free-market	economics	and	beyond,	and	the	public	policy	that	flowed	from	such	academic	and	political	orientations	–	certainly	reflects	this.	In	this	case	history	charts	the	rise	of	the	power	and	legitimacy	of	free-market	economics	over	the	past	few	decades.		 This	historical	shift	has,	of	course,	affected	economists’	thinking	and	therefore	social	norms	more	broadly.	The	conscious	and	unconscious	ethical	orientations	adopted	by	economists	–	by	many	accounts	strongly	influenced	by	their	academic	experiences	(B.	Frank	&	Schulze,	2000;	R.	H.	Frank,	Gilovich,	&	Regan,	1993;	D.	
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Kahneman,	Knetsch,	&	Thaler,	1986;	Marwell	&	Ames,	1981;	Wang,	Malhotra,	&	Murnighan,	2011)	–	are	not	hermetically	sealed	from	the	rest	of	the	population.	Prosocial9	behaviour	can	follow	from	a	belief	in	humans’	tendency	towards	cooperation	as	opposed	to	selfishness	(Ghoshal,	2005),	and	a	lack	of	prosocial	beliefs	and	behaviour	on	the	part	of	the	purveyors	of	economic	wisdom	could	in	fact	influence	the	perceptions	and	actions	of	economics	students,	policymakers,	and	society	more	generally.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																								 An	investigation	into	how	economics	and	economic	issues	are	learned,	formally	or	informally,	offers	important	insights	into	the	ways	in	which	education	influences	beliefs.	Equally	important	is	the	differential	legitimacy	conferred	upon	some	forms	of	economics	education	and	not	others,	leading	to	questions	as	to	what	constitutes	academic	knowledge	in	economics,	and	how	it	is	legitimated	(Dumitrica,	2010).	Such	a	question	implicates	discourse	and	power	analyses,	necessitating	research	based	on	the	theoretical	frameworks	of	institutionalism	and	critical	theory.		 As	a	field,	economics	presents	three	advantages	for	a	study	of	this	kind.	First,	economics	education	directly	influences	students	in	other	fields	–	an	estimated	40%	of	all	undergraduates	in	the	U.S.	take	at	least	one	course	in	economics,	regardless	of	their	major	(Siegfried	&	Walstad,	2014);	that	figure	is	likely	similar	in	Canada,	although	exact	numbers	are	not	available.	Second,	economics	is	an	academic	discipline	almost	universally	attended	to	by	policymakers	(Ferraro	et	al.,	2005;	French	et	al.,	2009);	mainstream	economists’	discourse	and	worldview	are	often	dominant	among	the	media	and	within	the	political	realm.	Third,	both	groups,	academics	and	policymakers,	comprise	practitioners	with	broadly	similar	educational	backgrounds,	with	advancement	in	the	field	increasingly	dependent	on	institutional	legitimacy	and	external	qualifications	(Fourcade,	2006)	as	well	as	insider	knowledge	of	terminology	and	technology	(French	et	al.,	2009).	Studies	have	shown	that	a	large	majority	of	economics	graduates,	but	especially	business	school	graduates,10	are																																																									9	“Prosocial”	refers	to	cooperation,	generosity,	egalitarianism,	and	so	on	–	traits,	beliefs,	and	behaviours	that	are	associated	with	altruism	as	opposed	to	self-interest	or	selfishness.	10	Throughout	the	dissertation	I	refer	to	business	schools	on	occasion.	This	is	for	several	reasons:	first,	a	large	percentage	of	professors	with	expertise	(and	PhDs)	in	economics	are	now	to	be	found	in	business	schools	rather	than	economics	departments;	second,	the	rise	of	business	schools	has	had	a	significant	role	to	play	in	the	development	of	economics	education	(and	related	fields	such	as	finance)	as	well	as	in	terms	of	political	economy	and	legal	developments	that	have	had	wide-reaching	effects	on	politics,	the	law,	accounting,	and	more;	and	third,	two	of	the	top-ranked	economics	departments	in	
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educated	in	the	United	States	or	in	American-style	programs	abroad	(Pfeffer	&	Fong,	2004)	and	therefore,	as	students	of	an	international	field	of	study	and	policymaking,	have	an	even	more	standardised	educational	experience	than	in	other	academic	subjects.	The	increasing	opacity	and	insularity	of	the	discipline	of	economics,	globally	wide-reaching	as	it	is,	has	had	significant	implications	in	terms	of	public	scrutiny	of	national	and	international	financial	institutions	(Harvey,	2007)	and,	thus,	could	affect	democratic	decision-making	itself.			 Think	tanks,	on	the	other	hand,	directly	contribute	to	discussions	of	public	policy	and	may	be	necessarily	less	insular	than	their	academic	counterparts.	Thus	several	of	my	case	studies	include	think	tanks	of	various	political	orientations.	COMER11	occupies	the	loosely	social	democratic	wing	of	the	political	spectrum	in	Canada,	while	the	Fraser	Institute	occupies	the	opposite	–	loosely	libertarian,	market-oriented	–	end	of	the	spectrum.	It	is	precisely	these	organisations’	inverse	relationship	to	each	other	that	renders	them	instructive	case	studies	for	understanding	how	knowledge	about	economics	is	shaped	by	different	forms	of	learning	(Flyvbjerg,	2006).	A	comparison	between	the	two	permits	a	close	examination	of	the	limits	of	Canadian	economic	ideology;	unaffiliated	conversants	may	be	more	easily	assigned	to	points	along	the	political	spectrum	according	to	their	views	of	these	two	organisations.	This	is	especially	important	as	regards	the	case	studies	of	Bank	of	Canada	economists	and	academic	economists,	who	often	are	not	as	readily	classifiable	politically	as	are	their	counterparts	in	COMER,	the	Progressive	Economics	Forum	(PEF),	and	the	Fraser	Institute.	The	PEF	case	study	represents	a	more	formally	educated,	better-known	version	of	COMER,	which	helps	to	illuminate	some	of	the	effects	formal	economics	education	may	have	on	legitimacy	and	ideology,	even	among	heterodox	economists.	The	PEF	encompasses	“a	wide	range	of	
																																																																																																																																																																													Canada	are	in	fact	business	schools,	which	means	that	they	play	a	significant	role	in	the	ecosystem	of	economics	education	in	the	country.	For	these	reasons	it	would	be	distortionary	to	neglect	business	schools	as	a	part	of	the	field	of	economics	in	Canada.	Nevertheless	it	is	worth	emphasising	that	business	schools	are	very	different	from	economics	departments,	and	the	two	should	not	be	conflated	–	in	this	thesis	or	otherwise.	11	At	times	throughout	this	study,	when	one	of	my	conversants	had	not	heard	of	COMER	and	its	work,	I	substituted	COMER	for	the	Canadian	Centre	for	Policy	Alternatives	(CCPA)	or	the	Progressive	Economics	Forum	(PEF).	These	two	groups	are	much	better-known	among	economists,	and	the	CCPA	served	as	a	proxy	for	left-wing	economic	thought	in	economist	Stephen	Tapp’s	analysis	of	Canadian	economists’	political	orientations	(as	in	my	study,	the	Fraser	Institute	served	as	the	opposite	pole).	
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unorthodox	economists	from	institutionalist,	feminist,	Marxian	and	Post	Keynesian	perspectives”	(King,	2002,	p.	151).		 Of	course,	economists	from	within	my	eleven	case	studies	enjoy	differing	levels	of	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	one	another	and	among	policymakers	and	the	media.	It	would	appear	that	economists	from	academia,	government,	and	the	major	banks	enjoy	greater	legitimacy	than	others.	Formally	accredited	economists	also	tend	to	be	cited	more	often	in	the	media	and	have	an	easier	time	getting	their	ideas	accepted	as	the	basis	for	public	policy	than	do	academics	or	practitioners	in	other	fields	(Ferraro	et	al.,	2005).		 COMER	members,	and	other	non-traditional	economists,	do	not	enjoy	such	influence.	It	is	vital	to	my	study	–	and	to	any	such	study	based	in	critical	theory	–	to	question	mainstream	and	heterodox	economics	equally,	and	indeed	there	appear	to	be	reasonable	critiques	of	both	approaches.	The	COMER	group	has	largely	been	dismissed	by	the	mainstream	due	to	its	frequent	use	of	hyperbolic	language,	ill-advised	forays	into	organised	politics,12	and	reputational	issues	stemming	from	the	public	profiles	of	individual	members13.	Few	of	its	members	have	qualifications	deemed	legitimate	by	mainstream	academic	economists.	As	a	group	it	is	marginalised	to	the	extent	that	most	of	its	proposals	are	not	discussed	at	all	by	mainstream	economists,	and	in	fact	many	of	my	elite	interviewees	had	not	heard	of	COMER’s	main	arguments	and	policy	recommendations	nor,	indeed,	of	COMER’s	very	existence.	Media	coverage	of	COMER’s	court	case	against	the	Government	of	Canada14	has	been	almost	non-existent.	The	PEF	may	be	said	to	represent	a	less	strident	expression	of	the	ideas	propounded	by	COMER,	and	it	has	avoided	many	of	COMER’s	pitfalls.	But	like	COMER,	the	PEF	is	very	rarely	quoted	in	the	media,	and	its	ideas	appear	to	have	had	a	limited	impact	on	policy.	In	contrast,	the	ideas	and	proposals	of	mainstream	academic	economists	have	carried	great	weight,	both	in	Canada	and	abroad	(Ferraro	et	al.,	2005).		
																																																								12	Through	a	COMER	offshoot	called	the	Canadian	Action	Party,	for	example,	a	group	that	garnered	0.21%	of	the	popular	vote	nationwide	at	its	height.	13	Paul	Hellyer,	former	Cabinet	Minister	and	founder	of	the	Canadian	Action	Party,	was	famously	featured	in	a	VICE	Magazine	profile,	which	focused	on	his	belief	in	aliens.	14	COMER	members	Bill	Krehm	and	Ann	Emmett	–	both	conversants	in	my	study	–	sued	the	Government	of	Canada	for	its	underuse	of	the	Bank	of	Canada;	they	held	that	the	Bank	of	Canada	Act	allowed	–	even	obligated	–	the	federal	and	provincial	governments	to	borrow	from	the	Bank	of	Canada	at	low	or	no	interest.	
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	 The	need	for	study	of	this	kind	–	as	part	of	a	growing,	if	as	yet	still	modest,	trend	towards	critical	studies	of	elites,	and	as	a	still-rarer	examination	of	the	socialisation	of	economists	–	is	evident:	economists	play	a	large	role	in	influencing	policy	decisions	at	all	levels	of	governance	locally,	nationally,	and	internationally,	and	there	are	very	few	studies	of	this	group.	But	this	particular	study	seeks	to	be	distinctive	in	other	ways	as	well.	First,	there	are	almost	no	systematic	studies	of	contemporary	autodidacts,	let	alone	autodidact	economists,	aside	from	individual	biographies;	to	my	knowledge,	this	is	the	first	study	to	examine	any	of	the	world’s	many	alternative	economics	groups.		 Moreover,	economics	education	–	and	the	economics	profession	more	generally	–	has	come	under	fire	in	the	aftermath	of	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis;	student	groups	have	erupted	in	protest	all	over	the	world,	organising	around	demands	for	curricular	change	amidst	widespread	critiques	of	the	discipline	(Inman,	2014;	Schiffman,	2004).	Research	investigating	these	critiques	is	vanishingly	rare,	yet	may	be	increasingly	relevant,	especially	because	there	has	been	almost	no	coverage	of	the	economic	pluralism	movement	in	Canada	to	date.	What	follows	may	help	to	fill	that	gap.		 Indeed,	this	research	bucks	a	trend	that	has	seen	Canadian	issues	increasingly	ignored	by	Canadian	academics;	there	is	less	explicitly	Canadian	content	now	than	in	previous	decades	among	the	works	of	professors	and	graduate	students	alike	(Emery	et	al.,	2013).	This	study	can	claim	to	be	one	of	a	small	and	shrinking	number	of	works	on	Canadian	issues.	Within	this	ever-diminishing	field,	it	would	appear	that	Canadian	economists	have	rarely	been	subject	to	sustained	examination	–	especially	in	recent	decades	–	whereas	there	are	countless	studies	of	economists	from	the	U.S.,	the	UK,	and	various	European	countries.			 The	lack	of	research	into	Canadian	economists’	contributions	to	economic	thought	in	the	past	is	mirrored	in	the	dearth	of	work	on	the	current	economic	climate	and	discourse	in	Canada.	In	the	most	recent	federal	election	in	October	of	2015,	Canada	elected	a	party	whose	leader,	Justin	Trudeau,	had	made	an	explicit	argument	for	deficit	spending,	a	rarity	for	a	country	that	had	largely	avoided	critical	debate	about	austerity	economics	prior	to	the	election.	As	an	article	in	Institutional	Investor	put	it,	“The	Liberal	Party	of	Canada’s	landslide	win	over	the	Conservatives	was	a	massive	upset,	a	sign	that	voters	wanted	change	on	several	fronts,	including	Canada’s	stance	on	refugees,	the	environment,	international	diplomacy	and	–	most	significant	–	
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austerity	economics”	(MacLellan,	2015).	By	promising	to	run	modest	yearly	deficits	of	$10	billion	Canadian	(0.5%	of	GDP)	for	three	years,	Trudeau	had	“outflanked”	the	more	left-wing	New	Democratic	Party	(Geddes,	2015).	More	importantly,	he	appeared	to	have	been	successful	in	explaining	Keynesian	fiscal	policy	to	the	Canadian	public;	according	to	an	Abacus	poll,	“[t]he	consensus	of	Canadians	seemed	to	be	that	while	many	wished	the	government	had	spent	less	money	(67%	agree),	even	more	people	felt	that	while	they	‘would	rather	not	have	such	a	large	deficit,	it’s	probably	the	right	choice	for	now’.	(70%	agree)”	(Bruce	Anderson	&	Coletto,	2016).			 Such	data	seem	to	indicate	at	least	a	grudging	acceptance	of	deficit	spending,	and	of	the	logic	behind	Trudeau’s	proposal	to	stimulate	the	economy.	In	the	aftermath	of	such	a	stunning	election	upset	–	the	Conservatives	had	been	in	power	for	nearly	ten	years	at	the	time,	since	2006,	and	the	New	Democratic	Party	had	been	in	the	lead	for	a	majority	of	the	campaign	period	–	it	seems	a	particularly	apt	time	for	a	close	examination	of	the	development	of	economic	thought	and	opinion	in	the	Canadian	context,	and	an	apposite	moment	to	seek	to	rectify	the	relative	neglect	of	these	issues	in	the	scholarly	literature.				
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Literature	Review			 What	follows	is	an	exploration	of	the	literature	relevant	to	the	above	questions	–	those	concerning	economic	geography,	autodidactic	or	learner-centred	education,	economics	education,	research	involving	elites,	and	the	limited	existing	work	centring	on	Canadian	economists	and	their	educational	backgrounds.	The	literature	concerning	autodidacticism	and	learner-centred	education	directly	addresses	issues	relating	to	the	learning	processes	of	both	self-taught	and	institutionally	educated	economists.	This	is	doubly	important	because	of	the	ways	in	which	pre-university	education	may	affect	later	orientations	towards	economics	as	a	discipline	and,	indeed,	the	choice	to	study	economics	in	the	first	place.	Economic	geography	literature	is	important	because	it	situates	Canadian	economists	–	and	the	Canadian	economy	–	in	time	and	space,	illuminating	some	of	the	effects	of	Canada’s	particular	historical	trajectory	and	its	relationships	with	the	U.K.	and	the	U.S.,	as	the	two	most	significant	influences	on	Canada’s	economic,	historical,	linguistic,	cultural,	and	educational	development.	The	literature	concerning	economics	education	gets	at	the	core	of	my	research	questions.	It	suggests	that	economists’	educational	experiences	may	have	a	pronounced,	and	very	specific,	effect	on	their	view	of	human	nature	and	therefore	their	beliefs	and	behaviour,	as	well	as	their	political	and	ethical	orientations.	It	is	to	this	body	of	literature	that	my	research	may	contribute	the	most,	especially	as	it	relates	to	the	economics	education	literature	that	examines	the	extent	to	which	educational	socialisation	may	affect	baseline	assumptions	and,	indeed,	beliefs	and	behaviour.	Finally,	the	literature	concerning	research	among	elites	is	essential	to	any	study	of	highly-educated	and	-respected	professionals	whose	work	influences	public	policy.	There	are	considerations	specific	to	research	among	elites	that	are	necessary	to	gain	access	to,	and	collect	suitable	data	from,	economists	across	Canada.		 These	bodies	of	literature	come	together	in	several	ways.	Together	they	form	a	picture	of	economists	socially/societally,	intellectually/psychologically,	spatially/historically,	practically/methodologically,	and,	of	course,	educationally.	The	use	of	literature	from	a	wide	variety	of	academic	disciplines	recognises	that	economists,	and	indeed	communities	of	economists,	are	the	product	of	interacting	internal	and	external	influences	that	shape	their	learning,	socialisation,	and	political	orientations.			
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Economic	Geography			 If	academic	attention	has	not	been	applied	adequately	to	Canadian	issues	and	to	elite	economists	as	a	group,	this	is	especially	true	of	Canadian	economists.	Yet	Canadian	economists	may,	in	this	period	of	economic	history,	be	in	a	position	to	play	a	disproportionate	role	globally	due	to	nearly	universal	approbation	for	Canada’s	performance	during	and	after	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis.	It	is	useful	to	view	these	events	–	and	Canada’s	role	in	them	–	from	the	perspective	of	the	field	of	economic	geography,	an	approach	that	emphasises	the	role	of	time	and	space	in	the	spread	of	capital,	ideas,	and	social	norms.	It	is	also	important	in	exploring	the	ways	in	which	Canadian	national	identity	–	especially	that	which	is	based	in	geopolitical,	historical,	and	economic	relationships	with	powerful	allies	–	may	have	helped	to	shape	how	economics	is	conceived	of	and	taught	in	Canada.			 Financial	geography,	a	particularly	relevant	subset	of	economic	geography,	has	charted	the	rise	of	the	financial	sector	within	and	among	national	economies	and	the	regulatory	‘race	to	the	bottom’	between	the	U.S.	and	the	UK	(Gordon	L.	Clark,	2005;	French	et	al.,	2009),	whose	major	financial	centres	–	New	York	and	London,	respectively	–	achieved	dominance	in	global	finance	from	the	1980s	onwards	(Hall,	2007;	Wojcik,	2011b).	This	wholesale	deregulation	of	the	financial	industry,	starting	in	the	1970s	in	the	U.S.,	spread	sequentially	to	the	UK,	the	rest	of	Europe,	and	emerging	markets	in	the	ensuing	decades	(Wojcik,	2011),	while	Canada	remained	largely	on	the	sidelines	–	a	notable	exception	to	the	trend.				 This	was	an	international	trend,	after	all.	Neoclassical	economists	replaced	Keynesians	at	the	IMF	during	this	period	–	particularly	from	the	1980s	onwards	–	and	after	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	the	IMF’s	own	Independent	Evaluation	Office	concluded	that	the	IMF’s	failure	to	foresee	the	impending	financial	crisis	was	in	large	part	due	to	“groupthink”	(IEO,	2011,	pg.	17).	But	although	there	seems	to	have	been	an	ideological	and	discursive	shift	towards	market-oriented	thinking	and	policies	beginning	in	the	late	1970s	in	Canada	and	among	its	closest	allies	(Baragar	&	Seccareccia,	2008;	Dalton,	2009;	Goodhart,	2016),	the	results	turned	out	very	differently	in	terms	of	policy.	The	ensuing	deregulation	of	the	banking	industry	in	the	1990s	allowed	the	two	countries’	banking	systems	to	diverge	markedly;	in	Canada,	to	the	extent	that	deregulation	happened,	it	created	a	further	consolidation	of	the	sector,	whereas	it	resulted	in	the	shadow	banking	system	in	the	U.S.	(Bordo,	Redish,	&	
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Rockoff,	2015;	Knight,	2012).	And	while	the	governing	Liberals	followed	governments	elsewhere	in	implementing	their	“fiscal	revolution	of	the	1990s”	(Baragar	&	Seccareccia,	2008,	p.	63),	posting	fiscal	surpluses	–	at	the	expense	of	social	expenditures	(Dalton,	2009)	–	that	bolstered	the	financial	markets,	added	to	household	debt,	and	contributed	to	the	well-documented	shift	towards	financialisation	of	the	economy	more	generally	(Baragar	&	Chernomas,	2012;	Baragar	&	Seccareccia,	2008;	Eichengreen,	2016;	Seccareccia,	2012;	Walks,	2014),	the	Canadian	government	was	strangely	hyper-involved	in	the	process	of	financialisation,	especially	in	the	housing	market	(Walks	&	Clifford,	2015).15				 In	spite	of	significant	deregulatory	pressures	among	other	wealthy	nations,	over	the	course	of	decades	Canada	has	done	things	somewhat	differently.	Although	Canada’s	outsize	troubles	during	the	1980s	downturn16	should	be	accorded	its	share	of	explanatory	power,	it	is	also	possible	that	this	discrepancy	is	–	in	part	–	due	to	Canadians’	beliefs	about	economics	and	the	role	of	the	financial	sector.			 In	the	lead-up	to	the	crisis,	the	literature	shows	that	the	increase	in	relative	wealth	of	finance	workers	in	the	United	States,	the	epicentre	of	global	financial	activity,	far	outstripped	that	of	any	other	sector	in	the	previous	two	decades	and	constituted	the	largest	single	factor	contributing	to	national	income	inequality	(Wojcik,	2011).	This	was	not	true	in	Canada,	where	income	and	wealth	inequality	remained	markedly	lower	than	in	the	U.S.	(and	somewhat	lower	than	in	the	UK),	despite	having	risen	in	the	last	few	decades	(Veall,	2012).	Intergenerational	mobility	in	Canada	is	remarkably	high	relative	to	both	other	countries,	and	indeed	is	comparable	to	that	of	Scandinavia	(ibid.).				 Similarly,	technology	was	increasingly	used	to	bridge	time	and	space	(Harvey,	2007;	French	et	al.,	2009);	“spatial	fixes”	were	used	to	maintain	high	returns,	while	limits	were	converted	into	barriers	to	be	overcome	with	new	financial	instruments	(Harvey,	2011).	Some	of	these	instruments	were	used	to	allow	overseas	investors	to	diversify	their	holdings	in	mortgages,	dispersing	their	risk	through	securitisation17;																																																									15	The	Canada	Mortgage	and	Housing	Corporation	helped	securitise	mortgages	directly,	which	was	uncommon	for	a	government-owned	company.	16	The	recession	in	the	early	1980s	was	particularly	bad	for	Canada,	which	experienced	higher	interest	rates,	inflation,	and	unemployment	than	the	U.S.	at	the	time	and	Canada	itself	post-GFC	(IMF,	2010,	p.	36).	There	were	also	two	bank	failures	in	this	period,	the	first	in	Canada	since	1923	and	therefore	a	great	shock	(Crow,	2002,	p.	159).				17	Packaging	mortgages	together	and	slicing	and	dicing	them	such	that	each	investor	held	a	sliver	of	many	mortgages.	
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this	allowed	investors	to	invest	from	great	distances	without	the	fear	of	catastrophic	default,	or	so	it	was	thought	(Diamond	&	Rajan,	2009).	In	Canada,	again,	the	system	operated	very	differently;	because	all	of	the	country’s	largest	banks	already	held	a	mix	of	mortgages	across	the	country,	unlike	American	banks’	more	regional	holdings,	Canadian	banks	had	a	greatly	reduced	need	to	diversify	geographically	and	thus	tended	not	to	securitise	and	sell	off	the	mortgages	on	its	books.				 Although	it	is	generally	agreed	that	the	2007-2009	crisis	originated	in	the	United	States	(Kumhof	&	Ranciere,	2011;	Rajan,	2010;	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2008)	and	spread	elsewhere,	the	reach	of	the	crisis	and	its	aftermath	was	truly	international.	Much	has	been	written	about	many	of	the	affected	countries	–	Ireland,	Iceland,	the	United	Kingdom,	the	Netherlands,	Spain,	Italy,	and	Greece	in	particular	(Aalbers,	2009;	French	et	al.,	2009;	Martin,	2011;	Wainwright,	2012)	–	but	few	scholars	have	attended	to	the	question	of	how	Canada	escaped	relatively	unscathed,	especially	since	its	economy	was	and	is	so	deeply	dependent	on	the	United	States;	indeed,	throughout	its	history	Canada	has	always	followed	its	neighbour	into	economic	recessions	and	economic	booms	alike,	with	the	sole	exception	of	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	(Klyuev,	2008).18	Yet	academic	scholarship	has	largely	failed	to	address	the	question	of	why	Canadian	economists	and	policymakers	followed	such	divergent	practices	relative	to	their	British	and	American	counterparts.		 Indeed,	Canada’s	regulatory	regimes	and	institutions	have	endured	even	in	the	face	of	pressure	from	the	country’s	most	important	trading	partners	–	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom	–	to	follow	them	down	the	deregulatory	route.	A	recently	released	1997	memo	written	by	the	U.S.	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	at	the	time,	Lawrence	H.	Summers,	demonstrates	the	extent	to	which	the	deregulation	of	the	banking	industry	in	the	U.S.	was	viewed	as	dependent	upon	similar	changes	in	regulations	at	a	global	level	(Palast,	2013);	as	America’s	most	significant	trading	partner,	Canada	would	have	been	under	great	pressure	to	deregulate	its	banks.19																																																										18	My	MSc	thesis	in	the	Department	of	Geography	and	the	Environment	at	the	University	of	Oxford	explored	the	reasons	for	Canada’s	relative	success	during	and	after	the	financial	crisis,	concluding	that	a	constellation	of	factors	–	many	of	them	structural,	legislative,	and	supervisory	in	nature	–	contributed	to	the	country’s	resilience.	What	is	still	missing	from	the	picture,	however,	is	how	such	structures,	laws,	and	supervisory	arrangements	arose	in	the	first	place	and	how	they	have	persisted	despite	considerable	resistance.	19	As	confirmed	by	my	earlier	research:	“Asked	whether	they	had	been	pressured	to	follow	the	U.S.	in	deregulating	the	financial	industry,	former	Finance	Minister	Ralph	Goodale	laughed,	‘Any	speech	from	Alan	Greenspan	is	a	bit	of	pressure!’ (Quigley, 2012).	
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	 The	careers	of	economists,	investment	bankers,	and	financial	theorists	such	as	Robert	Shiller	(Shiller,	2003,	2005),	Frank	Partnoy	(Partnoy,	2009),	and	Nassim	Taleb	(Taleb,	2007),	all	of	whom	predicted	the	United	States’	housing	bubble’s	collapse	and	the	ensuing	mayhem,	have	met	with	great	acclaim,	even	as	the	reputations	of	most	economists	and	financiers	have	plummeted.	Canada	as	a	whole	may	have	experienced	a	similar	ascendancy,	viewed	as	a	country	whose	foresight	saved	it	from	the	worst	effects	of	the	fallout	from	the	market	crash	in	2007.	In	consequence,	its	global	voice,	in	favour	of	or	in	opposition	to	policy	prescriptions	on	the	international	stage,	is	accorded	disproportionate	weight.	Its	(now	former)	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	Canada,	Mark	Carney,	was	appointed	to	head	the	international	Financial	Stability	Board	and	then,	as	the	first	foreigner	to	occupy	such	a	position,	became	the	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	England.	Similarly,	former	banking	regulation	superintendent	Julie	Dickson	was	appointed	to	the	European	Central	Bank’s	oversight	panel,	and	so	on.	Canada’s	banking	system	has	also	been	cited	as	having	anticipated	some	aspects	of	the	international	Basel	III	agreement,20	having	already	implemented	some	of	the	guidelines	ahead	of	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	(Bordo	et	al.,	2015).	In	light	of	this	newfound	prominence	in	the	global	financial	realm	as	a	consequence	of	its	emergence	from	the	GFC	apparently	unscathed,21	it	is	an	apposite	moment	to	explore	the	cultural,	intellectual,	and	educational	milieu	from	which	emerged	now-global	leaders	such	as	Mark	Carney	and	others.					Autodidacticism,	Deschooling,	and	Learner-Centred	Education			 This	thesis	concerns	the	learning	processes	of	autodidactic	and	institutionally	educated22	economists	in	Canada,	at	the	secondary	and	post-secondary	levels,	and	presents	case	studies	representing	both	poles	of	the	autodidacticism/institutionalisation	spectrum.	As	such,	the	literature	concerning	
																																																								20	Guidelines	for	the	global	banking	sector.	21	Although	there	is	a	widespread	belief	in	Canada’s	resilience	during	and	after	the	crisis,	its	performance	was	in	fact	more	mixed	(Quigley,	2012).	22	“Autodidactic”	means	“self-taught,”	and	by	institutionally	educated	I	mean	formally	educated	in	economics	at	the	high	school	and/or	post-secondary	level.	
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autodidacticism,	deschooling,23	and	learner-centred	education	is	highly	relevant,	especially	as	it	relates	to	the	experience	of	COMER	members,	most	of	whom	lack	formal	training	in	economics.	Much	of	the	literature	on	deschooling	and	learner-centred	education	addresses	the	moral	dimension	of	the	learning	process,	which	is	also	deeply	relevant	to	the	question	as	to	whether	economics	education	–	independent	or	institutional	–	affects	learners’	moral	orientations,	attitudes	towards	human	nature,	and	prosocial	behaviour.				 Carl	Rogers,	one	of	the	preeminent	psychoanalysts	and	education	commentators	of	the	past	century,	was	centrally	interested	in	learning	that	influences	behaviour	–	what	he	called	self-discovered	learning	(Rogers,	1990a)	or	the	“person-centred”	mode	(Rogers,	1990c).	Learning	was	seen	to	be	a	process	rather	than	an	end,	with	the	goal	of	facilitating	one’s	evolution	as	a	person	and	inculcating	the	values	of	genuineness,	acceptance/trust,	and	empathetic	understanding;	the	goal	of	the	teacher	was	correspondingly	seen	as	the	facilitation	of	learning	rather	than	teaching	per	se	(Rogers,	1990b).	Rogers	argued	that	this	approach	resulted	in	better	educational	outcomes	as	well	as	an	improved	moral	sense	among	learners.		 Rogers’	propositions	have	found	support	in	the	literature	concerning	intrinsic	motivation	in	the	learning	process;	some	research	(Kohn,	1999	inter	alia;	Pink,	2009)	has	pointed	to	data	indicating	that	curiosity-driven	learning	produces	better	results	than	learning	based	on	extrinsically	motivating	factors.	Other	researchers,	however,	have	found	that	discovery-based	independent	learning	is	less	effective	than	traditional	guided	learning	except	in	the	case	of	already-proficient	learners	(Kirschner	&	Clark,	2006).	Such	disagreements	are	difficult	to	resolve,	as	it	may	be	possible	for	traditional	guided	learning	to	be	supplemented	in	such	a	way	as	to	spark	learners’	intrinsic	motivation,	or	at	least	not	inhibit	it.			 Critiques	of	institutionalised	education	and	its	effect	on	societal	beliefs	and	practices	have	formed	the	basis	of	much	work	in	this	area.	John	Holt’s	classic	“How	Children	Fail”	was	widely	circulated	among	practitioners	prior	to	its	eventual	publication	(1981);	it	critiqued	approaches	to	schooling	that	fostered	in	students	a	fear	of	failure,	a	preoccupation	with	finding	the	‘right’	answer	instead	of	engaging	in	real	learning,	and	the	resulting	disengagement	from	learning	and	loss	of	what	Holt	considered	to	be	children’s	natural	sense	of	curiosity.	Similarly	Paolo	Freire,	in	his																																																									23	“Deschooling”	is	defined	in	many	ways,	but	at	its	essence	it	involves	no	formal	curriculum,	hierarchy,	or	strictures;	students	are	driven	by	curiosity	and	learn	at	their	own	pace	and	direction.	
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widely-read	treatise,	advocated	for	the	co-creation	of	knowledge	between	learner	and	teacher	within	the	public	education	system	as	an	alternative	to	a	pedagogical	approach	that	helped	to	reinforce	existing	power	relations	(2000).		 Here	critical	theory	ties	in	with	critiques	of	universal	public	education;	Ivan	Illich,	in	his	1971	and	1973	works,	identifies	the	link	between	the	institutionalisation	of	education	and	the	institutionalisation	of	society	and	the	role	specialised	knowledge	plays	in	the	legitimisation	of	elites’	positions	in	society	(1971,	1973).	Similarly,	in	Schooling	in	Capitalist	America,	authors	Bowles	and	Gintis	maintain	that	education	helps	to	reinforce	and	justify	inequality	by	“integrating	new	generations	into	the	social	order”	(1976,	p.	102).	Henry	Giroux	(2006,	inter	alia)	and	others	within	the	critical	pedagogy	tradition	maintain	that	education	involves,	or	can	involve,	the	development	of	agency;	critical	pedagogy	examines	the	relationships	between	knowledge,	power,	and	authority.	These	authors	emphasise	learners’	roles	as	engaged	citizens	in	society	and	question	who	controls	the	production	of	knowledge,	elucidating	education’s	role	in	disrupting	or	reinforcing	social	realities.		 Indeed,	the	question	of	legitimacy	is	a	central	one.	“The	legitimacy	of	the	authority	of	superiors	flows	not	from	social	contrivance	but	from	Science	and	Reason,”	(Bowles	&	Gintis,	1976,	p.	105)	–	also	the	basis	of	legitimacy	in	economics	as	a	discipline,	as	it	relies	on	science	and	rationality	to	bolster	its	legitimacy	relative	to	the	other	social	sciences.	Economics	departments’	(and	business	schools’)	well-documented	shift	towards	positivism	and	econometrics	(Siegfried	&	Walstad,	2014)	could	be	considered	to	be	an	effort	to	boost	the	authority	of	the	field	within	the	academic	and	political	realms	(Augier	&	March,	2011;	Khurana,	2007).			 Illich	proposed,	instead	of	institutionalised	education,	“deschooling”	–	the	creation	of	informal	webs	in	which	learners	could	freely	exchange	knowledge	and	skills	with	one	another	(1971).	Illich’s	manifesto	aligns	with	the	autodidactic	approach	to	learning	–	curiosity-driven,	informal	education	undertaken	by	the	learner	him-	or	herself	and/or	in	groups,	as	is	the	case	for	most	COMER	members.	For	Illich,	the	de-institutionalisation	of	education	translated	into	the	de-institutionalisation	of	society.	While	formal	schooling	is	associated	with	authority,	control,	and	mandatory	structured	learning	(Sawchuk,	2003),	informal	learning	represented	a	means	of	questioning	society’s	base	assumptions	and	power	structures.	
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	 Informal	learning	is	difficult	to	study,	and	moreover	it	is	viewed	as	less	legitimate	than	formal	education;	for	this	reason	there	is	a	relative	dearth	in	academic	treatment	of	the	subject	(McGivney,	2006).	There	is,	however,	a	long	tradition	of	radical	adult	self-education	–	autodidacticism	–	from	the	early	19th	century	onwards,	especially	in	Britain	(Rose,	2001),	where	it	formed	an	element	of	the	class	struggle	that	characterised	that	era	(Crowther,	2006).	Informal	learning,	for	the	working	class,	was	a	way	of	challenging	elites’	interpretation	of	the	truth	and	of	questioning	unexamined	assumptions	about	capitalism	and	public	life	(Gallacher,	Edwards,	&	Whittaker,	2006)	–	a	tradition	along	the	lines	of	a	critical	theoretical	approach.			 Among	contemporary	economists,	especially	those	deemed	to	be	economists	by	their	peers,	autodidacticism	is	extremely	rare	–	almost	an	artefact	of	history.	Many	early	economists	were	not	formally	educated,	however;	as	the	well-known	economist	Kenneth	J.	Arrow	wrote:			 John	Stuart	Mill,	[.	.	.]	to	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	never	faced	a	class;	and	Mill,	of	course,	followed,	even	slavishly,	the	work	of	David	Ricardo,	not	a	professor	but	a	retired	businessman.	W.	Stanley	Jevons,	who	certainly	is	one	of	the	original	figures	of	neoclassical	economics,	was	essentially	self-taught.	Léon	Walras	had	an	economist	father;	but	he	seems	to	have	spent	his	youth	trying	to	find	some	other	occupation;	and	his	work	reflects	no	great	influence	from	his	father	[	.	.	.	].	Francis	Edgeworth,	Irving	Fisher,	Vilfredo	Pareto	and	Knut	Wicksell	all	seem	to	have	acquired	their	economic	knowledge	by	reading	[	.	.	.	]	(Arrow,	2004,	p.	xi).			 One	might	perhaps	add	Karl	Marx	to	Arrow’s	list,	but	in	any	event,	it	is	an	impressive	tally	of	self-taught	economists	–	and	one	that	could	not	be	replicated	in	the	present	day.	In	recent	years	a	doctorate	has	been,	in	all	but	the	rarest	of	circumstances,	necessary	to	attain	a	teaching	position;	higher	education	in	some	form	is	perceived	to	be	necessary	to	gain	a	position	as	an	economist	in	non-academic	institutions	as	well.	The	autodidact	economist	is	now	a	rare	breed,	and	is	thus	even	more	worthy	of	study.	
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Economics	Education	
		 The	literature	concerning	economics	education,	especially	at	the	post-secondary	level,	is	at	the	heart	of	this	study.	Formal	economics	education	has	undergone	significant	changes	in	the	past	several	decades.	Ideologically,	the	shift	from	Keynesianism	in	the	post-WWII	period	to	free-market	neoclassical	economics	from	the	1970s	onwards	charted	the	intellectual	zeitgeist,	while	structurally,	economics	came	to	occupy	a	privileged	position	in	academia	over	the	same	period.	This	is	particularly	evident	when	it	comes	to	business	schools,	especially	those	in	the	United	States.	Canada	experienced	a	similar	trend,	however,	and	my	conversants	represent	the	range	of	ideologies	that	have	accompanied	the	changing	zeitgeist	of	the	past	few	decades.		 Most	business	schools	in	North	America	were	established	in	the	early	1900s,	and	for	the	first	several	decades	“business	schools	were	seen	by	many	academics	as	using	poorly	educated	faculty	to	provide	intellectually	undemanding	vocational	training	for	students	of	limited	talent”	(Augier	&	March,	2011,	pg.	28).	Following	on	the	heels	of	influential	reports	from	the	RAND	Corporation	and	the	Ford	Foundation,	the	post-war	period	saw	the	development	of	several	overlapping	trends	meant	in	part	to	legitimise	business	schools	as	academic	institutions;	computational	methods	and	a	scientific	approach	began	to	dominate	economics	departments	and	business	schools	alike,	while	economics	and	finance	began	to	infiltrate	business	schools’	curricula	(Khurana,	2007;	Augier	&	March,	2011).	This	process	followed	a	pattern:	the	scientisation	of	business	education	began	not	at	the	top	institutions	but	at	lower-tier	universities	trying	to	make	a	name	for	themselves	(Fourcade	&	Khurana,	2013).			 For	economics	departments,	the	balance	of	the	curriculum	began	to	shift	substantially,	and	the	result	was	twofold:			 The	high	cost	of	learning	advanced	mathematics	has	tended	to	push	more	descriptive	and	factual	material	out	of	the	curriculum.	One	result	is	a	declining	level	of	empirical	knowledge	from	generation	to	generation.	Another	is	that	students	cannot	even	consider	that	the	tools	they	have	laboured	so	hard	to	master	might	not	be	the	best	tools	for	approaching	all	economic	problems	(Lipsey,	2001,	p.	18).			 The	trend	in	business	schools	was	similar;	indeed,	they	share	many	common	roots.	“The	impact	on	business	education	of	scholars	trained	in,	and	primarily	
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oriented	toward,	the	discipline	of	economics	went	beyond	the	particular	effects	of	the	perspective	they	brought	to	the	business	school	curriculum	and	business	school	research;	it	also	signified	the	growing	acceptance	of	the	legitimacy	of	economics	as	the	foundational	discipline	of	business	education”	(Khurana,	2007).	A	number	of	business	schools	even	came	out	of	economics	departments,	and	economics	and	finance	persist	to	this	day	as	dominant	disciplines	for	the	majority	(N.	Healey,	1993;	Pfeffer	&	Fong,	2004).	In	the	United	States,	concomitant	with	this	growing	domination	of	economics,	there	was	a	dramatic	rise	in	the	number	of	business	schools,	business	school	enrolment,	and	scholarly	business	journals	from	the	1960s	onwards	(Khurana,	2007);	this	was	in	addition	to	growth	in	economics	as	a	discipline	in	general	–	indeed,	“probably	over	90%	of	all	the	words	written	on	economics	have	been	written	over	the	life	times	of	some	living	economists”	(Lipsey,	2001,	p.	5).	Meanwhile	the	intellectual	gap	between	business	schools	and	other	professional	schools	such	as	law	and	medicine	started	to	close,	and	MBA	graduates	began	to	move	into	consulting	and	finance	instead	of	business	proper	upon	graduation	(ibid.).	At	the	same	time,	demand	for	MBA	graduates	rose	(Wojcik,	2011a)	along	with	supply;	by	the	year	2000,	fully	20%	of	all	American	undergraduate	degrees	were	in	business,	as	were	25%	of	Master’s	degrees,	while	a	staggering	85%	of	all	business	school	qualifications	worldwide	were	awarded	by	American	institutions	(Pfeffer	&	Fong,	2004).	The	MBA	degree	itself,	originally	almost	exclusively	an	American	trend,	is	“well	on	its	way	to	becoming	a	globalized	credential,”	with	programmes	in	over	100	countries	(Fourcade	&	Khurana,	2013,	p.	122).		 Indeed,	the	history	of	economics	education,	and	its	dominance	within	United	States	business	schools,	is	particularly	salient	because	of	its	effect	on	other	countries.	American	universities	have	exported	economists	all	over	the	world	(Harvey,	2007),	and	international	business	schools	increasingly	recruit	U.S.-based	professors	(Pfeffer	&	Fong,	2004).	Canada,	of	course,	did	not	escape	this	influence,	and	its	economists’	formal	educational	experiences	–	the	experiences	of	the	majority	of	my	conversants	–	were	no	doubt	shaped	by	American	economic	thought	and	practice.			 Within	economics	education	in	the	United	States,	the	influence	of	University	of	Chicago	economists	such	as	Milton	Friedman	was	significant.	At	Chicago,	from	the	1960s	onwards	“the	neoclassical	economics	perspective	was	dominant;	there	was	little	interest	in	trying	to	understand	actual	business	decision	making;	and	notions	of	business	social	responsibility	were	subordinated	to	the	maximization	of	stockholder	
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wealth”;	this	view	spread	rapidly	to	other	business	schools	(Augier	&	March,	2011,	pg.	170).				 In	macroeconomics,	Backhouse	and	Laidler	(the	latter	of	whom	was	one	of	my	conversants)	described	a	narrowing	of	the	intellectual	breadth	of	work	in	the	area	(2003);	Schiffman	describes	the	shape	of	their	historical	analysis	as		 	“.	.	.	.	an	hourglass	phenomenon	in	macroeconomics.	They	point	out	that,	during	the	1940s	to	1970s,	many	important	ideas	that	had	been	prominent	before	1936	were	virtually	forgotten	as	the	IS-LM	apparatus	rose	to	prominence.	Once	economists	were	trained	in	IS-LM,	they	were	conditioned	to	simply	ignore	ideas	that	did	not	fit	within	it	(including	some	of	Keynes’	own	ideas).	These	ideas	include	dynamics,	intertemporal	choice,	expectations,	policy	regimes	and	intertemporal	coordination	failures.	[.	.	.]	Some	of	the	neglected	ideas	have	been	rediscovered	recently,	but	others	remain	out	of	sight”	(2004).			 In	particular,	the	Chicago	school	ethos	influenced	cultural	views	of	morality	and	human	nature.	For	example,	fiduciary	duty	–	the	purported	responsibility	of	firms	to	maximise	returns	for	shareholders	–	can	be	used	to	justify,	and	has	been	used	to	legitimise,	a	superseding	obligation	to	increase	shareholders’	profit,	regardless	of	ethical	counterclaims	(Wang	et	al.,	2011).	The	rise	of	fiduciary	duty	in	the	preceding	decades	has	accompanied,	and	perhaps	precipitated,	a	shift	away	from	conceptions	of	the	firm	as	a	social	institution	and	towards	an	image	of	the	firm	as	a	profit-maximising	machine	unconcerned	with	morality	(Eisenberg,	1999).	However,	the	very	existence	of	companies	that	clearly	pursue	ethical	ends,	sometimes	at	the	expense	of	financial	considerations,	raises	questions	as	to	whether	fiduciary	duty	is,	in	fact,	as	strict	as	it	is	sometimes	claimed	to	be;	“[the	American	Law	Institute’s]	
Principles	of	Corporate	Governance	provides	that	a	corporation	‘may	properly	take	into	account	ethical	considerations	that	are	generally	recognized	as	relevant	to	the	conduct	of	business,’	even	if	corporate	profit	and	shareholder	gain	are	not	thereby	enhanced”	(ibid.,	p.	1265).	Besides	which,	fiduciary	duty	signified	more	in	a	legal	sense	and	less	in	a	social	sense	just	twenty	years	ago;	Eisenberg	observed	both	an	increase	in	directorial	attentiveness	to	fiduciary	duty	in	the	1990s	and	a	simultaneous	decrease	in	legal	liability	for	breaches	of	fiduciary	duty	(ibid.,	pp.	1266-7),	a	curious	negative	correlation.	He	identified	a	combination	of	media	publicity,	pressure	from	institutional	investors,	and	a	shift	in	social	norms	that	partly	arose	from	legal	clarity	concerning	the	roles	of	directors;	the	latter	factor,	he	claimed,	allowed	social	pressures	to	reinforce	certain	directorial	behaviour	in	turn	(ibid.	pp.	
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1268-69).	In	any	case,	it	is	clear	that	it	was	the	shift	in	perception	and	social	norms	that	changed	how	strictly	fiduciary	duty	was	interpreted,	rather	than	a	change	in	the	law	itself.		 More	important	even	than	its	indirect	effects	on	the	legal	interpretation	of	fiduciary	duty,	economics	education	–	and	the	Chicago	School	in	particular	–	has	had	a	significant	influence	on	perceptions	of	human	nature.	Homo	economicus,	the	rational	self-interested	man,	serves	as	the	default	decision-maker	in	many	economic	models	(Wang	et	al.,	2011).	Agency	theory,	which	formed	the	basis	of	Jensen’s	policy	recommendations	regarding	executive	compensation,	is	based	on	the	idea	that	managers	and	shareholders	have	fundamentally	divergent	self-interests	that	must	be	compensated	for	(Jensen	&	Meckling,	1976;	Jensen	&	Murphy,	1990);	yet	although	empirical	evidence	contradicts	agency	theory,	it	persists	(Ghoshal,	2005).	These	and	other	assumptions	have	spread	well	beyond	the	confines	of	economics	departments	and	business	schools.				 Furthermore,	it	would	appear	that	current	trends	in	economic	thought	are	slow	to	appear	in	economics	curricula.	Behavioural	economists	and	psychologists	such	as	Ariely,	Thaler,	Sunstein,	Kahneman,	and	Tversky	have	challenged	the	very	assumptions	upon	which	many	neoclassical	models	are	built	(Ariely,	2008;	D.	Kahneman	et	al.,	1986;	D.	Kahneman,	Slovic,	&	Tversky,	1982;	D.	Kahneman	&	Tversky,	2000;	Thaler	&	Sunstein,	2008).	Heterodox	economists	have	challenged	the	scientific	pretensions,	overreliance	on	mathematics,	ahistorical	analysis,	and	self-interest-based	assumptions	of	mainstream	economics	(Chang,	2010;	Fine,	2004,	2013;	Griffith-Jones,	Ocampo,	&	Stiglitz,	2010;	Krugman,	1995).	But	aside	from	some	uptake	of	behavioural	economics,	these	perspectives	are	rarely	found	in	economics	departments.	Instead,	neoclassical	economics,	including	its	quantitative	methodology,	has	colonised	other	social	sciences	(Fine,	2004).		 Of	course,	critiques	of	economics,	as	it	is	currently	taught	and	practised,	abound.	There	are	critiques	of	the	Washington	Consensus,	such	as	those	from	prominent	economists	like	Joseph	Stiglitz,	and	critiques	of	its	critiques	(Fine,	Lapavitsas,	&	Pincus,	2003).	Theories	and	thinkers	from	an	earlier	time	have	resurged	in	popularity	in	the	post-crisis	period;	the	work	of	Hyman	Minsky	has	gained	new	prominence,	for	
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example	(Wray,	2016).24	But	in	general	it	appears	that	not	a	great	deal	has	changed	in	the	classroom	in	response	to	these	critiques,	especially	within	the	core	curriculum.25			 Students	of	economics	have	formed	organisations,	organised	conferences,	and	published	critiques	of	their	education,	claiming	that	the	economics	education	of	today	is	out	of	date,	de-contextualised,	and	overly	narrow	(Inman,	2014).	In	September	1993,	a	group	of	academics	founded	The	International	Confederation	of	Associations	for	Pluralism	in	Economics	(ICAPE),	and	the	number	and	size	of	organisations	for	heterodox	economists	in	academia	has	grown	significantly	since	then	(Di	Maio,	2013;	Lee,	2009).	The	most	recent	push	for	pluralism	in	economics	education,	however,	has	been	led	largely	by	students:		 	In	June	2000,	a	group	of	French	students	signed	a	petition	calling	for	a	Post-Autistic26	Economics	(PAE).	They	demanded	an	end	to	the	use	of	mathematics	for	its	own	sake,	and	a	more	pluralistic	economics	curriculum	with	greater	sensitivity	to	social	and	institutional	realities.	They	were	soon	joined	by	a	group	of	French	professors,	who	amplified	their	argument.	The	debate	became	front-page	news	in	France,	prompting	the	Minister	of	Education	to	appoint	an	investigative	commission,	headed	by	the	distinguished	economist	Jean-Paul	Fitoussi.	Meanwhile,	the	PAE	movement	established	an	electronic	newsletter	and	web	site.	The	newsletter	has	developed	into	a	journal	known	as	the	PAE	Review;	it	claims	over	6900	subscribers	in	145	countries.	During	2001,	the	PAE	cause	was	taken	up	by	students	at	Cambridge	and	Oxford,	and	also	spread	to	the	United	States,	with	the	signing	of	the	“Kansas	City	Petition”.	This	was	followed	in	2003	by	a	“Harvard	Petition”(Schiffman,	2004).			 Amidst	this	flurry	of	activity	and	interest	among	students	and	professors	in	universities	the	world	over,	it	initially	appeared	that	Canadian	students	were	uninterested;	as	it	turns	out,	they	were	simply	late	to	the	party.	Although	one	students’	association	for	pluralism	emerged	at	the	University	of	Waterloo,	as	did	another	(French-language)	students’	association	in	Québec,	it	was	not	until	May	2015	that	a	Québécois	group	(le	Collectif	pour	un	enseignement	pluraliste	de	l’économie	au	Québec,	or	CEPÉQ)	launched	a	bilingual	website	and	umbrella	organisation	–	Main	Visible,	or	Visible	Hand	–	to	bring	together	pluralists	from	across	the	country.	The																																																									24	Minsky	argued	that,	over	time,	macroeconomic	stability	can	contribute	to	systemic	financial	instability	(Minsky,	1982,	1986),	an	implicit	critique	of	the	monetary	policy	pursued	in	the	lead-up	to	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis.	25	With	the	notable	exception	of	the	CORE	Project	(Curriculum	Open-access	Resources	in	Economics),	which	originated	in	the	UK	and	has	since	been	taught	to	many	thousands	of	students.	26	The	use	of	the	term	“autistic”	to	denigrate	the	mainstream	curriculum’s	approach	to	economics	was	rightly	criticised	and	has	now	fallen	out	of	common	usage.	
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website	lists	36	affiliated	faculty	members	in	Canada,	the	majority	of	whom	are	based	in	Québec.	A	minority	of	these	are	housed	in	their	respective	universities’	departments	of	economics,	4	of	whom	were	conversants	for	this	study,	while	the	rest	are	housed	elsewhere.	With	a	growing	interest	in	pluralism	among	members	of	the	academy,	this	research	will	seek	to	add	to	our	understanding	of	economics	education	–	and	the	role	of	pluralism	within	it	–	in	the	Canadian	context.			
From	Academia	to	Policy			 In	the	wake	of	the	financial	crisis,	debate	has	raged	over	austerity	policies	as	against	fiscal	stimulus	policies,27	with	academic	economists	playing	a	front-and-centre	role.	Carmen	Reinhart	and	Kenneth	Rogoff,	two	respected	Harvard	economists,	have	widely	published	on	the	financial	crisis,	its	causes,	and	its	links	to	past	financial	crises	in	countries	all	over	the	world	(Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2008,	2010,	2011	inter	alia).	Their	2010	publication	identified	a	strong	correlation	between	high	national	debt	and	slow	or	negative	economic	growth,	and	they	found	that	this	relationship	tended	to	intensify	once	a	country’s	debt	level	had	reached	or	exceeded	a	ratio	of	90%	to	its	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP).	Their	work,	in	turn,	was	widely	cited	after	it	was	published,	and	not	just	by	academics;	politicians	and	policy	advisors	in	many	countries	used	it	to	bolster	their	case	for	inaugurating	austerity	measures	at	the	domestic	and	regional	levels	in	several	European	countries	and	the	U.S.	(Krugman,	2013).			 In	the	spring	of	2013,	however,	a	graduate	student	identified	a	number	of	troubling	issues	with	Reinhart	and	Rogoff’s	data	in	the	pair’s	most	widely	cited	2010	paper,	sparking	a	media	storm	in	the	ensuing	weeks	and	months.	The	student	detailed	three	major	methodological	problems	in	Reinhart	and	Rogoff’s	work,	concluding	that	the	relationship	between	national	debt	and	economic	growth	was	far	from	the	prescription	for	austerity	that	many	policymakers	assumed	–	or	claimed	–	it	to	be	(Herndon,	Ash,	&	Pollin,	2013).	This	incident	is	both	an	example	of	the	reach	of	academic	economics	and	the	trust	that	policymakers	continue	to	place	in	–	or	the																																																									27	Austerity	refers	to	spending	cuts	to	social	programs,	while	a	fiscal	stimulus	involves	government	(deficit)	spending.	As	mentioned	above,	this	debate	seemed	to	have	been	–	strangely	–	confined	to	the	campaign	trail	in	Canada,	and	there	has	not	been	much	discussion	of	austerity	politics	before	or	since.	
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justifications	they	can	usefully	draw	from	–	the	work	of	well-regarded	institutionally	legitimated	economists	such	as	Reinhart	and	Rogoff.		 Although	this	serves	as	the	most	recent	example,	it	is	certainly	not	the	first.	The	work	of	Milton	Friedman	of	the	University	of	Chicago	is	widely	credited	with	a	shift	in	ideology	and	economic	practices	worldwide	in	the	1970s	and	1980s,	in	both	international	institutions	and	among	the	leaders	of	some	of	the	world’s	most	powerful	economies,	notably	in	the	U.S.	and	the	UK	(Harvey,	2007;	Starkey,	2011).	Michael	Jensen,	a	professor	at	the	University	of	Rochester	and	the	Harvard	Business	School,	wrote	a	1990	Harvard	Business	Review	article	entitled	CEO	Incentives:	It’s	Not	
How	Much	You	Pay,	But	How	co-authored	with	Kevin	J.	Murphy	(1990)	that	served	as	justification	for	a	law	passed	by	the	U.S.	Congress	in	1993	that	made	it	easier	for	companies	to	compensate	executives	with	stock	options.	Some	have	suggested	that	the	excesses	due	to	this	measure	in	part	led	to	abuses	such	as	the	Enron	scandal	of	2001	(Ghoshal,	2005).	Moreover,	the	line	between	academia	and	policymaking	is	sometimes	blurred;	there	has	been	a	recent	spate	of	articles	about	a	number	of	academic	economists	who	receive	funding	from	outside	interests	while	issuing	public	commentary	on	related	policy	issues	(Chan,	2010),	in	some	cases	resulting,	for	example,	in	mergers	and	acquisitions	that	may	not	have	happened	without	the	expert	testimony	of	economics	professors	from	some	of	the	top	universities	in	the	U.S.	(Eisinger	&	Elliott,	2016).	In	short,	economic	theories	developed	in	the	academic	realm	–	especially	within	well-regarded	institutions	–	can	carry	powerful	weight	in	the	political	realm,	fundamentally	altering	public	policy	as	a	consequence.				 Indeed,	economists	appear	to	have	more	influence	on	public	policy	than	other	social	scientists,	and	their	ideas	tend	to	shape	the	agenda	in	policy	circles,	affect	public	opinion,	and	establish	the	range	of	acceptable	policy	choices	among	experts	to	a	greater	degree	than	is	the	case	for	academics	in	other	fields	(Jelveh,	Kogut,	&	Naidu,	2014).	Such	influence,	according	to	Hirschman	&	Berman	(2014,	p.	35),	is	due	to	a	combination	of	“at	least	three	major	sources	of	power	that	they	can	help	to	create:	professional	authority;	institutional	position;	and	cognitive	infrastructure,	including	both	styles	of	reasoning	and	policy	devices.”	Analysis	of	the	power	accorded	the	institutions	conferring	such	legitimacy	on	those	they	educate,	and	of	the	economists	they	graduate,	is	therefore	essential.	
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Economics	Education	as	Socialisation	 			 Education	can	be	usefully	viewed	as	a	formal,	conscious	socialisation	process	undertaken	by	all	–	or	nearly	all	–	of	the	citizens	of	any	country	that	has	a	system	of	universal	primary	and	secondary	education.	Almost	all	of	my	case	study	conversants,	including	COMER	members,	attended	primary	and	secondary	schools,	but	most	of	them	–	excepting,	in	this	case,	the	majority	of	COMER	members	–	have	also	undertaken	several	years	of	formal	education	in	economics.	Economics	education	appears	to	have	a	particularly	strong	effect	on	students’	ethical	outlook	and	behaviour	(Carter	&	Irons,	1991;	B.	Frank	&	Schulze,	2000;	R.	H.	Frank	et	al.,	1993;	D.	Kahneman	et	al.,	1986;	Marwell	&	Ames,	1981;	Wang	et	al.,	2011),	even	though	they	are	usually	first	exposed	to	it	in	adulthood.			 The	form	that	economics	education	takes	has	implications	extending	far	beyond	the	eventual	beliefs	and	behaviours	of	students,	however.	Unlike	scientific	theories,	social	science	theories	are	vulnerable	to	what	Ghoshal	(2005)	terms	the	double	heuristic;	in	being	taught,	they	can	become	self-fulfilling	prophecies.	For	example,	the	infamous	Black-Scholes	equation	was	initially	wildly	inaccurate	in	doing	what	it	was	intended	to	do,	which	was	to	predict	stock	prices.	Within	a	few	years,	however,	its	widespread	use	among	financiers	made	it	highly	accurate	(Ferraro	et	al.,	2005).	What	this	means,	in	essence,	is	that	what	is	taught	in	economics	courses	can	become	reality	(Folger	&	Salvador,	2008);	economics	can	be	performative,	not	just	descriptive	(MacKenzie,	2005).	Ferraro	et	al.	(2005)	identify	three	mechanisms	that	affect	whether	the	double	heuristic	is	activated:	institutional	design,	social	norms,	and	language.	Institutional	design	and	social	norms	are	affected	by	the	educational	experiences	of	those	who	design,	and	operate	within,	the	institution,	while	language	infuses	all	of	the	above	with	assumptions	and	worldviews	that	can	be	difficult	to	question.	My	thesis	therefore	pays	particular	attention	to	economists’	use	of	language	and	narratives.			 Aside	from	language,	Ghoshal	(2005)	identifies	the	dominance	of	positivism28	and	a	pessimistic	view	of	human	nature	among	business	schools	and	economics	programs	as	the	two	most	significant	trends	contributing	to	unethical	reasoning	and	behaviour	among	graduates.	Positivist	trends	within	the	academy	in	general	may																																																									28	The	view	that	facts,	or	truth,	must	be	based	on	scientifically	generated	evidence	or	mathematical	proof.	
	 43	
have	a	particularly	pronounced	effect	on	economics	education,	as	seen	in	the	increasing	use	of	econometrics	and	the	mathematisation	of	the	field	(G.	Hodgson,	2011;	Romer,	forthcoming).	Several	experiments	“suggest	that	a	calculative	mindset	leads	people	to	focus	more	on	numbers	rather	than	on	the	social	aspects	of	their	decisions,	resulting	in	less	consideration	of	the	consequences	of	their	behavior	on	others	and	greater	self-interested	and	unethical	action”	(Wang	&	Murnighan,	2012,	p.	26),	rather	a	concern	for	a	discipline	that	is	implicated	in	public	policy.	Other	studies	suggest	that	individuals	behave	more	cooperatively	in	non-economic	situations	than	in	economic	situations	(Pillutla	&	Chen,	1999).	The	redefinition	of	economics	as	a	science	heavily	infused	with	mathematics	could	therefore	have	itself	helped	to	shape	the	ethical	orientations	of	students	of	economics	over	the	past	few	decades.		 Ghoshal’s	second	concern,	that	of	economists’	pessimistic	view	of	human	nature,	could	be	similarly	significant	in	terms	of	shaping	economics	students’	beliefs	and	behaviour.	The	oft-used	“representative	agent”	in	economics,	homo	economicus,	is	a	rational,	self-interested	being	meant	to	represent	the	average	human.	Humans	in	fact	can	be	a	great	deal	more	cooperative	than	the	self-interest	model	predicts,	however,	even	when	such	behaviour	is	costly	to	the	individual	–	context	and/or	socialisation	often	determine	whether	people	think	and	behave	in	a	self-interested	or	cooperative	manner	(or	some	combination	thereof)	(Hammerstein	&	Hagen,	2005;	D.	Kahneman	et	al.,	1986;	Daniel	Kahneman,	2011).	Many	academics	are	aware	of	this	research,	yet	the	curriculum	rarely	reflects	the	growing	evidence	of	a	more	complex	conception	of	human	nature,	thought,	and	behaviour.				 Recently	the	rise	of	behavioural	economics	has	helped	to	change	the	discussion	in	economics	departments.	Thaler	and	Sunstein’s	“Nudge,”	the	bestseller	on	which	the	UK	government’s	MINDSPACE29	documents	were	based	(2008),	and	the	work	of	psychologists	Kahneman	and	Tversky	and	economists	such	as	Ariely	and	Thaler,	among	others,	have	helped	to	challenge	the	conception	of	homo	economicus	as	the	basis	of	some	economic	models	(Ariely,	2008;	D.	Kahneman	et	al.,	1986,	1982;	D.	Kahneman	&	Tversky,	2000;	Daniel	Kahneman,	2011,	inter	alia).				 As	I	learned	in	the	course	of	my	study,	however,	many	students	still	do	not	encounter	behavioural	economics	in	the	course	of	their	economics	education,	and	its																																																									29	MINDSPACE	is	a	British	government	programme	that	used	insights	from	behavioural	psychology	and	behavioural	economics	to	guide	citizens’	unconscious	biases	and	defaults	towards	decision-making	that	prioritises	long-term	planning,	retirement	savings,	pro-environmental	behaviours,	and	so	on.	
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insights	may	be	mostly	confined	to	the	study	of	microeconomics,	leaving	macroeconomics	largely	untouched.	Some	of	my	conversants	claimed	that	behavioural	economics	is	not	relevant	to	much	of	the	work	of	microeconomists	in	any	case;	they	are	in	the	midst	of	an	information	revolution	that	is	more	likely	to	benefit	from	new	and	better	datasets	than	from	changes	in	the	definition	of	the	“representative	agent.”	Others	told	me	that	few	professors	still	believed	in	a	narrow	conception	of	humans	as	a	self-interested	species.	However,	little	of	this	insight	appears	to	have	trickled	down	to	undergraduate	economics	education	in	particular,	and	it	does	seem	that	some	of	the	new	research	in	evolutionary	biology	–	and	by	extension,	behavioural	economics	–	may	be	relevant	to	the	study	of	microeconomics	and	macroeconomics	alike,	especially	where	it	contributes	to	public	policy	decision-making.30		 After	all,	research	has	shown	that	people	are	consistently	more	fair-minded	than	the	self-interest	model	would	predict;	they	are	surprisingly	generous	in	studies	measuring	payouts	to	anonymous	strangers,	and	they	are	willing	to	punish	unfair	behaviour	even	to	their	own	detriment	(Folger	&	Salvador,	2008;	Ghoshal,	2005;	Hammerstein	&	Hagen,	2005;	D.	Kahneman	et	al.,	1986;	Rabin,	1991	inter	alia)	and	reward	prosocial	behaviour	in	others,	even	if	they	are	not	the	direct	beneficiaries	(Keltner,	Kogan,	Piff,	&	Saturn,	2014).		 “The	past	20	years	have	seen	startling	discoveries	that	support	the	supposition	that	humans	have	an	intuitive,	default	tendency	towards	some	degree	of	prosociality”	(Keltner	et	al.,	2014,	p.	25.6),	not	just	self-interest.	Prosociality	has	been	linked	to	releases	of	powerful	neurochemicals	including	oxytocin,	serotonin,	and	dopamine,	and	has	been	shown	to	benefit	human	physical	and	mental	health	according	to	numerous	indicators	such	as	stress	(cortisol)	levels,	life	expectancy,	immune	response,	and	relationship	satisfaction	(ibid.).	Cooperative	behaviour	may,	in	fact,	benefit	and	motivate	humans	in	myriad	ways	that	are	difficult	for	the	dominant	economic	models	to	capture	or	account	for.					 Moreover,	there	is	evidence	that	the	variation	in	prosocial	and	competitive	perspectives	and	behaviours	is	likely	both	genetic	and	environmental,	and	can	be	substantially	influenced	by	socialisation.	Some	research	suggests	that	between	25%	and	65%	of	personality	traits	are	heritable	(Jang,	McCrae,	Angleitner,	Riemann,	&	Livesley,	1998).	In	other	words,	humans’	socialisation	–	social	context	–	can	induce																																																									30	By	taking	into	account	social	norms	and	institutions,	for	example.	
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prosocial	or	competitive	modes	of	behaviour.	Hence	the	role	of	economics	education	
for	economists	may	constitute	a	turning	point	in	moral	orientation	for	some	people	–	especially	because	it	happens	at	what,	for	many,	is	a	particularly	impressionable	age.			 Economics	and	economics-focused	business	school	programs	appear	to	play	a	role	in	shaping	students’	political	and	ethical	orientations,	and	their	view	of	human	nature,	in	other	ways	as	well.	This	is	perhaps	unsurprising;	there	is	less	required	instruction	in	ethics	and	social	responsibility	in	business	schools	than	in	medicine	and	law	schools	(Pfeffer	&	Fong,	2004).	Moreover,	game	theory	–	a	mainstay	in	economics	–	tends	to	emphasise	unemotional	rational	thought	rather	than	social	emotions	such	as	empathy,	guilt,	and	so	on,	which	could	contribute	to	the	devaluation	of	outcomes	that	contribute	to	the	wellbeing	of	society	as	a	whole	(Wang	et	al.,	2011).		 A	growing	body	of	research	takes	this	much	further,	however.	Scores	of	studies	suggest	that	economists	tend	to	“free	ride”	to	a	significantly	greater	extent	than	other	groups	(Marwell	&	Ames,	1981),	while	other	research	showed	that	economics	students	were	more	likely	to	join	the	Republican	party	after	five	courses	in	economics	(Allgood,	Bosshardt,	van	der	Klaauw,	&	Watts,	2012),	that	they	appeared	to	change	their	opinions	towards	an	“individual	freedom”	orientation	in	the	course	of	their	degree	(Hammock,	Routon,	&	Walker,	2016),	and	that	they	were	significantly	less	likely	to	cooperate	in	the	context	of	controlled	experiments	than	were	non-economics	majors	(R.	H.	Frank	et	al.,	1993).	The	latter	was	true	of	Canadian	economics	students	as	well	(Kahneman	et	al.,	1986).	A	survey	of	undergraduate	business	students	in	the	UK	found	that	final-year	students	had	less	moral	awareness	than	they	had	had	prior	to	a	full	year	of	study	in	business	ethics	(Lowry,	2003).	A	study	comparing	undergraduates	(economics	and	non-economics	majors)	at	the	beginning	and	the	end	of	their	first	semester	at	university	found	that	the	self-interest	model	propounded	by	economics	courses	negatively	influenced	economics	students’	tendency	to	respond	prosocially	in	experimental	scenarios	(R.	H.	Frank	et	al.,	1993).	Although	cooperative	behaviour	among	the	student	population	tends	to	increase	with	every	additional	year	in	university,	this	does	not	appear	to	be	true	for	economics	majors	(ibid.).			 There	are	some	indications,	however,	that	economics	students	behave	differently	due	to	self-selection	effects	rather	than	indoctrination31,	according	to	Frank	&	Schulze	(2000);	another	study	suggested	this	as	well,	although	it	had	a	small	
																																																								31	Their	term.	
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sample	size	and	some	other	methodological	problems32	(Carter	&	Irons,	1991).	A	more	recent	review	of	studies	in	this	field	concluded	that	both	selection	and	indoctrination	effects	may	be	at	play	(Etzioni,	2015).	These	effects	may	be	exaggerated	due	to	differential	gender	responses;	in	experimental	scenarios	women	tend	to	be	more	likely	to	cooperate,	and	economics	students	are	more	likely	to	be	men	(R.	H.	Frank	et	al.,	1993).		 The	widely	referenced	study	produced	by	Wang	et	al.	(2011),	however,	specifically	aimed	to	tease	out	these	effects	by	examining	whether	research	participants	were	influenced	by	even	brief	exposures	to	concepts	derived	from	the	field	of	economics,	such	as	agency	theory	and	self-interest.	From	the	results	of	three	different	experiments	the	researchers	concluded	that	economics	students,	having	self-selected	to	pursue	economics	in	the	first	place,	are	more	likely	to	act	less	prosocially	from	the	outset;	however,	this	tendency	is	exacerbated	by	the	competitive	socialisation	endemic	to	economics	programs	–	especially	exposure	to	justifications	of	self-interest	and	the	primacy	of	shareholder	value.	Indeed,	as	Pfeffer	&	Fong	point	out,	“[t]he	Aspen	Institute’s	(2001)	survey	of	MBAs	found	that	during	the	two	years	in	the	programme,	student	priorities	shifted	away	from	customer	needs	and	product	quality	to	an	emphasis	on	shareholder	value,	a	change	which	is	not	surprising	considering	the	content	of	business	school	curricula”	(2004,	p.	1505).			 These	studies	point	to	the	effects	of	economics	education	on	students’	beliefs	and	social	norms,	but	further	evidence	suggests	that	these	could	in	turn	affect	behaviour	as	well.	Business	school	students	are	more	likely	than	students	of	other	fields	to	view	their	education	as	the	means	to	achieve	a	higher	salary	and	better	employment,	and	there	is	evidence	that	viewing	one’s	education	primarily	as	a	means	correlates	strongly	with	a	tendency	to	devalue	social	justice	concerns,	to	tolerate	cheating,	and	to	otherwise	cut	corners	(Pfeffer	&	Fong,	2004).	Says	Colander,	“Individuals	are	not	born	as	economists;	they	are	molded	through	formal	and	informal	training.	This	training	shapes	the	way	they	approach	problems,	process	information	and	carry	out	research,	which	in	turn	influences	the	policies	they	favor	and	the	role	they	play	in	society”	(2005,	p.	175).		 Prosociality,	however,	appears	to	be	as	easily	induced	as	is	self-interested	behaviour.	Here,	too,	institutional	design,	social	norms,	and	language	seem	to	play	an																																																									32	The	“before”	economics	students	–	economics	freshmen	to	be	compared	with	upper-year	economics	students	in	order	to	check	for	an	indoctrination	effect	–	in	fact	had	had	two	months	of	macroeconomics	training	prior	to	testing,	for	example.	
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important	role.	While	“[t]he	language	of	economics	makes	it	especially	difficult	to	differentiate	self-interest	from	greed”	(Wang	et	al.,	2011,	pg.	644),“[m]aking	prosociality	more	salient	in	narratives,	stories,	conversations,	and	concepts	[.	.	.]	increases	prosociality”	(Keltner	et	al.,	2014,	pg.	25:19).	Priming	study	subjects	to	employ	“I”	versus	“we”	may	lead	to	endorsing	individualistic	and	collectivistic	points	of	view,	respectively	(Bargh,	2006),	for	example.			 Efforts	to	prime	people	towards	a	positive	view	of	self-interest,	or	greed,	however,	may	just	as	effectively	change	thoughts	and	behaviours.	“Greed	[.	.	.]	is	a	robust	determinant	of	unethical	behavior	[.	.	.]	Greed	leads	to	reduced	concern	for	how	one’s	behavior	affects	others	and	motivates	greater	unethical	action”	(Piff,	Stancato,	Côté,	Mendoza-Denton,	&	Keltner,	2012,	p.	4086).				 Strikingly,	differences	in	unethical	behaviour	among	social	classes	(often	significant,	with	upper-class	people	thinking	and	behaving	in	more	unethical	ways	than	lower-class	people	on	average)	disappear	when	researchers	control	for	attitudes	towards	greed	–	that	is,	lower-class	people	primed	with	a	‘greed-is-good’	message	behave	just	as	unethically	as	upper-class	people	(Kraus,	Piff,	Mendoza-Denton,	Rheinschmidt,	&	Keltner,	2012;	Piff	et	al.,	2012).	Attitudes	towards	greed	are	therefore	a	better	predictor	of	unethical	behaviour	than	is	social	class	(Piff	et	al.,	2012),	although	a	positive	view	of	greed	is	more	readily	found	among	the	upper	class	(Piff,	Kraus,	Côté,	Cheng,	&	Keltner,	2010).	Priming	can	also	work	in	the	opposite	direction;	lower-class	people	tend	to	hold	a	communal	worldview,	whereas	upper-class	people	tend	to	hold	to	a	more	individualistic	worldview	(Kraus	et	al.,	2012),	but	compassion	priming	largely	erases	social	class	differences	vis-à-vis	prosociality	(Piff	et	al.,	2010).	These	studies	point	to	the	significant	role	socialisation	can	play	in	the	development	of	individuals’	attitudes	towards	greed.	Combined	with	research	demonstrating	the	influence	of	economics	education	on	students’	development	of	a	positive	attitude	towards	greed	(Wang	et	al.,	2011),	and	the	preponderance	of	financiers	among	earners	in	the	very	highest	income	bracket	(Wojcik,	2011b),	it	seems	possible	that	economics	education	could	play	an	outsized	role	in	the	diminishment	of	prosocial	behaviours	among	the	most	well-resourced	members	of	society.33																																																										33	Interestingly,	there	are	indications	that	prosociality,	while	normally	a	crucial	trait	in	terms	of	advancement	in	a	wide	variety	of	organisational	settings,	may	be	less	of	an	advantage	in	those	fields	in	which	economics	and	MBA	graduates	are	likely	to	find	themselves.	A	meta-study	of	the	role	prosociality	plays	in	individuals’	rise	through	the	
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	 The	social	implications	of	such	findings	are	significant.	The	very	wealthy	are	more	likely	to	have	been	exposed	to	self	interest-oriented	priming,	either	directly	through	formal	economics	education	or	through	coworkers	and	superiors	in	the	institutions	in	which	they	work.	A	positive	view	of	greed	among	members	of	the	upper	class	may	itself	contribute	directly	to	intra-societal	income	inequality,	as	anti-greed	sentiments	among	the	lower	classes	contribute	to	redistribution	among	the	lower	ranks	and	high	incomes	become	even	further	concentrated	at	the	top	than	they	otherwise	would,	due	in	part	to	the	relative	tendency	of	the	wealthy	not	to	redistribute	their	resources	(Piff	et	al.,	2012a).		 A	further	feedback	loop	is	at	work	as	well;	cultural	values	and	group	norms,	within	and	among	societies,	also	appear	to	contribute	to	the	degree	to	which	people	engage	in	prosocial	behaviours,	so	that	individualistic	societies	and	institutions	produce	individuals	who	are	less	likely	to	cooperate	with	others	than	are	collectivist	societies	and	institutions;	egalitarian	values	robustly	predict	prosocial	behaviour	(Piff	et	al.,	2010).	“Social	institutions	that	value	prosocial	behavior	–	be	they	religious	or	civic	–	significantly	enhance	prosocial	behavior	within	collections”	(Keltner	et	al.,	2014,	pg.	25:19),	whereas	many	of	those	institutions	–	academic	and	corporate	–	in	which	elites	find	themselves	may	socialise	participants	towards	devaluing	prosocial	attitudes	and	behaviour	and	instead	endorsing	a	positive	view	of	greed.		 This	tendency	among	elites	may	be	further	intensified	by	the	increased	preponderance	of	sociopathy	among	their	ranks;	although	their	findings	may	be	controversial,	robust	studies,	such	as	that	of	Babiak,	Neumann,	&	Hare,	for	example,	have	suggested	that	sociopathy	is	four	times	as	common	among	corporate	executives	than	it	is	among	members	of	the	general	population	(2010),	rendering	the	challenge	more	salient	in	the	business	world.	Perhaps	in	part	because	sociopaths	are	particularly	motivated	by	status	and	power	(McWilliams,	1994,	p.	158),	they	are	to	be	found	with	increasing	prevalence	the	higher	up	the	social,	political,	and	financial	ladder	one	looks.	Combined	with	the	‘greed-is-good’	socialisation	that	many	receive	in	business	schools	and	economics	education	more	generally,	and	the	increasing	concentration	of	sociopathy	within	positions	of	power	and	influence,	it	is	not	difficult																																																																																																																																																																														ranks	of	schools,	military	hierarchies,	and	organisations	found	that	prosociality	correlated	strongly	with	higher	positions	of	power	in	a	school	setting	but	that	there	was	no	correlation	between	prosociality	and	power	in	businesses	or	the	military	(Judge	et	al.,	2002,	in	Keltner	et	al.,	2014),	suggesting	that	the	hierarchies	in	organisations	such	as	financial	firms	confer	no	professional	advantages	on	prosocial	individuals.			
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to	see	how	conditions	favourable	to	the	perpetuation	of	norms	of	self-interest	might	be	multiply	reinforced.		 Interestingly,	greed’s	inverse	–	generosity	–	can	contribute	to	a	positive	social	feedback	loop	as	well	–	one	in	which	the	recipient	of	a	generous	act	feels	gratitude	and	is	more	likely	to	act	generously	towards	others	(Keltner	et	al.,	2014),	in	turn	confirming	their	belief	that	people	are	generally	cooperative,	whereas	those	who	engage	in	uncooperative	behaviours	are	likely	to	induce	uncooperative	behaviours	in	others,	in	turn	confirming	their	belief	that	people	are	generally	uncooperative	(Ferraro	et	al.,	2005).	“Humans	are	a	highly	mimetic	species,	disposed	to	imitate	and	take	on	the	tendencies	of	others	in	their	surroundings	and	social	networks”;	this	“contagious	prosociality”	means	that	even	witnessing	a	prosocial	task	increases	the	likelihood	that	a	person	will	behave	prosocially	herself	(Keltner	et	al.,	2014,	pg.	25.12).			 It	is	possible,	then,	that	the	dominant	form	of	economics	education	over	the	past	few	decades	has	been	teaching	economics	students	self-fulfilling	theories	that	reinforce	a	conception	of	humans	as	self-interested	beings,	which	may	in	turn	have	activated	multiple	anti-social	feedback	loops,	thereby	potentially	affecting	social	norms	among	economists	–	indeed,	a	growing	body	of	evidence	suggests	that	this	has	happened.	Given	that	economists	play	a	significant	role	in	the	development	of	public	policy,	this	phenomenon	is	worth	exploring	further.	
	
	
Canadian	Economists				 Over	the	course	of	the	past	few	decades,	economists	and	their	political	views,	education,	and	behaviour	have	been	the	subject	of	academic	inquiry;	the	vast	majority	of	these	studies	centre	on	the	U.S,	however,	with	some	examination	of	the	UK,	the	rest	of	Europe,	and	more	occasionally	other	countries.34		 There	have	been	some	studies	of	Canadian	economists	as	well,	but	these	are	rare	and	becoming	ever	rarer.	This	reflects	a	general	decline	in	economics	research	on	Canadian	topics.	In	a	survey	of	3,000	articles	by	250	Canadian	economics	professors,	Emery,	Simpson,	and	Tapp	documented	a	decline	that	was	especially	
																																																								34	See	the	“Surveys”	section	of	the	Methodology	chapter	for	a	list	of	these	studies.	
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pronounced	for	the	top	10	economics	departments	in	the	country	(2013).	This	trend	was	clear	even	in	the	period	1967-1992	(Fortin,	1993),	but	it	has	clearly	intensified.		 There	have	been	exceptions.	These	include	an	exploration	of	Canadian	economists’	research	productivity	and	publication	rates	from	1967	to	1992	(Helliwell,	1993);	an	examination	of	Canadian	economists’	publications	and	citations	(Grubel,	1981);	a	survey	of	Canadian	economists	who	had	moved	to	the	U.S.	(McKee	&	Woudenberg,	1980);	an	article	on	the	decline	in	Canadian	economists’	migration	to	the	U.S.	in	the	1970s	(Woudenberg,	Mckee,	Eastern,	Journal,	&	Jan,	2016);	a	survey	of	Canadian	economists’	political	and	ethical	views	(Block	&	Walker,	1988);	and	an	analysis	of	Canada’s	rather	surprising	third-place	showing	in	rankings	of	economics	research	–	behind	the	U.S.	and	the	UK	(B.	S.	Frey	&	Pommerehne,	1988).	Previously,	however,	Harry	Johnson,	one	of	Canada’s	most	famous	economist	expatriates,	had	written	a	comparison	of	economics	research	styles	in	the	U.S.,	the	UK,	Canada,	and	a	number	of	European	countries;	his	assessment	of	the	economics	profession	in	Canada	was	casually	and	at	times	almost	brutally	dismissive	(1973).		 Some	of	the	above	body	of	research,	slim	as	it	is,	points	to	trends	that	continue	to	this	day.	Canadian	economists	still	rank	third	internationally	–	behind	the	U.S.	and	the	UK	–	in	terms	of	economics	research	(Davies,	Kocher,	&	Sutter,	2008),	and	Scott	noted	that	“there	is	a	fraction	(almost	40	per	cent)	of	the	profession	whose	members,	sometimes	with	their	spouses	and	children,	lived	in	the	United	States	or	Europe	(or	elsewhere)	while	acquiring	their	highest	degrees.	This	foreign-trained	group	is	larger	than	those	in	other	Canadian	disciplines”	(1993,	p.	27).	This	confirms	the	earlier	assertion	by	Scott	and	his	colleague	Grubel	that,	indeed,	the	proportion	of	foreign-	(especially	U.S.-)	educated	academic	economists	was	higher	than	in	other	fields	(1969).	The	biggest	differences	between	Canadians	and	Americans,	in	the	Scott	survey	of	American	Economic	Association	(AEA)	and	Canadian	Economic	Association	(CEA)	membership,	was	that	Canadians	appeared	less	likely	to	specialise	in	macroeconomics	and	business	administration	and	more	likely	to	specialise	in	labour	economics	and	international	economics	(A.	Scott,	1993).	This,	too,	still	seems	to	be	true.	In	any	event,	then	as	now,	for	the	purposes	of	academic	inquiry	Canadian	economists	are	often	grouped	with	U.S.	economists	if	they	are	considered	at	all.	North	American	economists	are	in	turn	sometimes	compared	with	their	European	peers,	who	appear	to	be	more	concerned	with	teaching	(especially	undergraduate	teaching)	
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and	less	concerned	with	publishing	than	are	either	Americans	or	Canadians	(Bruno	S	Frey	&	Eichenberger,	1993).		 Studies	of	Canadian	economists	in	the	past	20	years	have	been	yet	more	sparse.	There	have	been	comparisons	of	trends	in	economics	enrolment	in	the	U.S.,	Canada,	Germany,	and	Australia	in	the	1990s	(Siegfried	&	Round,	2001);	rankings	of	Canadian	economics	departments	(Bodkin,	2010;	Lucas,	2010	inter	alia);	and	examinations	of	the	inclusion	of	Canadian	departments	in	international	rankings	(Coupé,	2003	inter	alia).	There	has	also	been	some	coverage	of	the	various	Canadian	think	tanks	(D	E	Abelson,	1999;	Donald	E.	Abelson,	2000,	2007;	Donald	E.	Abelson	&	Carberry,	1998)	as	well	as	think	tank	ideology	(Tapp,	2014).	The	most	recent	of	a	small	number	of	articles	examining	Canadian	academic	economists’	publication	records	is	a	study	showing	that	Canadian	economists	authored	4.8%	of	articles	published	in	the	world’s	top	ten	economics	journals	and	55%	of	articles	appearing	in	the	Canadian	Journal	of	Economics	from	1980-2000	(for	comparison,	U.S.	economists	authored	77%,	and	UK	economists	authored	5.1%,	of	top-ten	journal	articles);	the	total	for	top-ten	economics	journal	articles	written	by	researchers	from	outside	those	three	countries	is	13%	combined	(Davies	et	al.,	2008).35				 Most	of	what	has	been	written	in	this	area	has	largely	failed	to	consider	Canadian	economists’	political	views	and	education.	One	noteworthy	exception	is	Milkman	and	McCoy’s	comparative	study	of	economics	Master’s	programs	in	the	U.S.	and	Canada,	which	concluded	that	the	curricula	and	faculty	composition	were	comparable	but	that	the	departmental	location	of	the	programs	constituted	the	greatest	difference	–	in	Canada	83%	of	programs	were	located	in	Arts	and	Sciences	faculties,	whereas	in	the	U.S.	fully	28%	were	housed	in	business	colleges	and	another	26.7%	in	agricultural	colleges	(2008).	In	addition,	Milkman	and	McCoy	noted	that	many	more	U.S.	programs	were	established	in	private	institutions,	especially	at	elite	universities	(ibid.).	Their	analysis	also	found	that	Canadian	programs	were	less	likely	to	use	a	standardised	entrance	exam	(13%,	compared	to	38%	of	U.S.	programs),	but	where	this	was	the	case,	Canadian	schools	appeared	without	exception	to	require	a	minimum	score.	Canadian	programs	also,	on	average,	required	a	higher	grade	point	average	(GPA)	for	admission	(3.2	compared	to	2.8	for	the	U.S.	programs)	and	were	significantly	more	likely	(45%	compared	to	23%	in	the	U.S.)	to	require	two	calculus																																																									35	For	further	context,	the	Canadian	population	is	a	tenth	of	that	of	the	U.S.	and	a	little	more	than	half	that	of	the	UK.	
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courses	as	an	admissions	standard.	A	further	difference	was	that	Canadian	graduates	of	economics	Master’s	programs	were	significantly	more	likely	to	work	for	government	(35.6%	compared	to	21.4%	for	U.S.	Master’s	graduates	in	economics)	and	significantly	less	likely	to	be	employed	in	the	private	sector	(29.7%	compared	to	44.2%	of	U.S.	graduates).	A	later	analysis	by	Woolley	showed	that	nearly	half	of	full	professors	in	economics	departments	in	Ontario	(by	far	the	largest	academic	market	in	Canada;	the	province	of	Ontario	represents	around	40%	of	the	population)	hold	PhDs	from	the	U.S.,	despite	in	most	cases	having	earned	first	degrees	in	Canada	(2013).			 Other	data	have	been	harder	to	find.	For	the	year	2009-2010,	the	last	year	for	which	full	information	is	available,36	there	were	1,002	Economics	teachers	and	2,757	Commerce,	Management,	Business	Administration	teachers	at	Canadian	post-secondary	institutions	(Canadian	Association	of	University	Teachers,	2010).	There	are	about	15,000	economists	and	economic	policy	researchers	and	analysts	in	Canada,	according	to	the	2011	National	Household	Survey	(Statistics	Canada,	2011);	that	figure	represents	an	increase	from	about	11,000	in	the	2006	census	(Statistics	Canada,	2006).	Beyond	these	broad	national	indicators,	it	is	difficult	to	find	detailed	information	about	Canadian	economists.		 Canada	appears	to	have	a	slightly	higher	profile	when	it	comes	to	heterodox	economists	and	pluralist	education,	however.	There	is	a	short	section	on	Canada	in	King’s	history	of	Post-Keynesian	economics	in	which	he	noted	that	many	of	Keynes’	best	students	in	the	1930s	were	Canadian,	one	of	whom	–	Robert	Bryce	–	went	on	to	work	for	the	Department	of	Finance	back	in	Canada,	augmenting	the	Keynesian	influence	there	(2002).	King	mentioned	that	the	Canadian-born	and	-raised	John	Kenneth	Galbraith	was	a	famous	Keynesian	and	named	my	conversant	Marc	Lavoie,	“the	author	of	the	first	really	comprehensive	and	systematic	Post	Keynesian	textbook,”	as	one	of	the	three	most	prominent	Keynesians	in	Canada	(2002,	p.	150).	Among	13	major	international	heterodox	economics	organisations	and	journals,	Lee	found	231	Canadian	members	compared	to	233	UK	members	and	1026	American	members.	In	Lee’s	sample,	Canadians	accounted	for	fully	9%	of	all	listed	heterodox	economists	(40%	of	the	total	were	from	the	U.S.	and	9%	from	the	UK),	which	is	a	disproportionate	number	considering	the	much	smaller	Canadian	population.																																																											36	To	the	consternation	of	my	conversants	(and	a	great	many	others),	the	Stephen	Harper	government	cancelled	the	long	form	census	in	2010,	resulting	in	a	5-year	gap	in	the	collection	of	such	data.	
	 53	
	 However,	as	King	further	noted,	“The	great	majority	of	Canadian	economists	were	always	neoclassicals”	(2002,	p.	150).	There	were	Keynesian	pockets	at	Dalhousie	University,	the	University	of	Manitoba,	l’Université	du	Québec	à	Montréal,	the	University	of	Waterloo,	McGill	University,	Carleton	University,	York	University,	and	the	University	of	Toronto,	along	with	a	small	influx	of	British	economists	with	Keynesian	leanings	in	the	1970s.	Before	1998,	leaving	COMER	to	one	side,	there	was	no	formal	organisation	for	Canadian	heterodox	economists;	the	Progressive	Economics	Forum	(PEF)	was	the	first	of	its	kind	in	that	sense.				 	“It	is	clear	that	there	was	never	a	distinct	national	Canadian	tradition	of	Post	Keynesian	economics,	of	the	type	that	can	[.	.	.]	be	identified	in	France	or	Italy.	Canada	is	too	close	to	the	United	States,	both	geographically	and	culturally,	for	that	to	have	been	possible.	But	Canadian	Post	Keynesians	seem	to	have	been	more	open	than	their	colleagues	south	of	the	border	to	the	influence	of	both	Cambridge	economics	(especially	that	of	Joan	Robinson)	and	of	other	schools	of	heterodox	analysis.	This	was	especially	true	of	the	Francophone	theorists	in	Québec	(and	the	proudly	bilingual	University	of	Ottawa),	where	monetary	circuit	theory	and	the	work	of	the	French	regulation	school	left	their	mark”	(King,	2002,	pp.	151–2).				 Beyond	such	limited	treatments,	there	has	been	little	sustained	or	detailed	examination	of	Canadian	economists,	especially	in	terms	of	educational	and	ideological	trends	in	Canadian	economic	thought.	Where	such	work	has	been	attempted,	it	has	suffered	from	significant	methodological	issues;	Block	and	Walker’s	1988	survey	of	Canadian	economists’	political	views,	for	example,	was	distributed	with	a	Fraser	Institute	imprint	on	the	envelopes,	which	surely	could	have	influenced	the	composition	of	the	group	of	economists	who	chose	to	respond.			 As	studies	of	Canadian	economists	are	so	rare,	this	thesis	will	hopefully	help	to	create	a	more	complete	picture	of	this	group,	their	education,	and	the	opinions	they	hold.	Canada,	as	a	possible	outlier	among	its	allies,	represents	a	particularly	distinctive	and	important	case	study,	not	least	because	it	has	emerged	as	at	least	a	minor	source	of	wisdom	and	guidance	for	other	nations	in	the	wake	of	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	and	in	the	midst	of	the	growing	trend	towards	populist	xenophobia	taking	hold	across	the	Western	world.	It	is	within	the	context	established	by	the	above	literatures	that	I	situate	my	study.		
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Methodology			 My	research	questions	call	for	a	multifaceted	methodology,	one	that	integrates	elements	from	a	variety	of	fields	and	intellectual	traditions	–	from	oral	history	to	combined	quantitative	and	qualitative	surveys,	case	study	methodology,	critical	theory,	and	institutionalism.	Most	of	these	methods	have	been	widely	in	use	among	researchers	for	many	decades	(Ellis,	Adams,	&	Bochner,	2011),	while	my	attempted	revival	of	“old”	institutionalism	incorporates	a	somewhat	forgotten	approach	into	more	common	methods.				 Qualitative	methodology	literature	stresses	the	importance	of	triangulation	–	using	methodological	verification	techniques	–	in	order	to	support	or	challenge	research	data,	be	it	through	field	notes,	images,	corroborating	documents,	and	so	on	(Duncan,	2004;	N.	L.	Holt,	2003);	as	such,	triangulation	techniques	have	been	built	into	the	research	design	throughout.	The	methodological	orientation	and	approach	of	the	research	draws	principally	from	the	tradition	of	critical	theory.		
	
Critical	Theory,	Institutionalism,	and	a	Critique	of	Social	Network	Analysis			 The	myriad	strands	of	critical	theory	centre	on	questioning	and	exposing	the	hidden	assumptions,	power	structures,	and	discourses	that	shape	society.	There	is	no	single	monolithic	theoretical	approach	that	defines	critical	theory,	however;	the	term	encompasses	several	divergent	streams	of	concepts,	methodologies,	and	intellectual	lineages	that	have	developed	over	the	past	hundred	years.	My	own	approach	has	been	shaped	by	a	number	of	critical	theory	traditions,	including	institutionalism	–	which	I	will	explore	more	fully	below	–	and	Bourdieusian	sociology,	which	offers	particularly	fruitful	insights	for	a	study	of	this	sort.			 Critical	theory	emerged	out	of	the	work	of	the	Frankfurt	School	in	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century	(Jay,	1973),	later	forming	the	basis	of	many	critiques	of	conformity	and	ideology	in	the	post-World	War	II	period	–	along	with	critical	understandings	of	colonialism,	institutionalised	racism	and	sexism,	and	heteronormativity	(Benedict	Anderson,	1983;	Bhabha,	1994;	de	Beauvoir,	1989;	Fanon	&	Markmann,	1967;	Foucault,	1990;	Said,	1979	inter	alia).	Critical	theory	is	fundamentally	shaped	by	Marxism	in	its	origins,	although	its	tenets	no	longer	always	reflect	the	views	of	Marx	himself;	many	critical	theorists	do,	however,	continue	to	
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emphasise	an	ethical	imperative,	and	much	critical	theory	continues	to	focus	on	questions	of	alienation	and	reification37	(Bohman,	2013).				 Critical	theory,	in	most	of	its	incarnations,	is	meant	not	just	to	describe	or	prescribe	but	to	change	society	and	individuals’	orientation	towards	it;	as	such	my	thesis	aims	to	contribute	to	tools	to	do	just	that.	The	precondition	for	such	an	endeavour	is,	necessarily,	to	identify	and	examine	dominant	ideological	claims.	This	means,	in	Marxist	terms,	to	concentrate	primarily	on	the	superstructure38	rather	than	the	base.39				 In	practice	this	means	following	Bourdieu	in	making	the	invisible	visible	–	identifying	and	critiquing	ideologies,	discourses,	and	power	structures	that	elites	themselves	may	not	be	aware	they	benefit	from	(Mills,	1959).	This	is	what	Bourdieu	called	the	habitus	–	common-sense	beliefs,	predispositions,	tastes,	and	so	on,	much	of	which	is	unconsciously	acquired	and	perpetuated	(Bourdieu,	1991).	The	habitus	aligns	with	institutionalists’	definition	of	institutions,	which	are	defined	“not	in	terms	of	the	narrow	sense	of	formal	organizations,	but	in	the	broad	sense	of	socially	habituated	behaviour”	(G.	M.	Hodgson,	1994,	p.	64)	–	habits.	My	research	attempts	to	reveal	some	of	the	assumptions,	habits,	routines,	social	norms,	and	ways	of	being	that	operate	among	elite	and	non-elite	economists	in	Canada,	as	“[t]he	ruling	ideas	are	the	ideas	of	those	who	rule”	(Brecht,	1932).	Indeed,	the	ruling	ideas	and	the	language	elites	use	to	perpetuate	them	tend	to	become	dominant.	Foucault	refers	to	this	as	the	“regime	of	truth”	–	the	truth	is	what	is	uttered	by	societally	legitimated	actors	operating	within	the	confines	of	societally	acceptable	ideological	beliefs;	regimes	of	truth	within	society	are	based	on	dominant	understandings	and	are	inseparable	from	questions	of	power	and	legitimacy	(Foucault,	1977).			 Although	critical	theory	is	widely	(and	variably)	employed	within	academia,	it	may	be	particularly	useful	at	the	intersection	of	education	and	economics.	Formal	education	is	one	of	society’s	foremost	tools	for	socialising	citizens	into	a	particular	habitus,	and	indeed	this	has	been	a	central	critique	from	those	concerned	with	critical	pedagogy	(Bowles	&	Gintis,	1976;	Freire,	2000;	Giroux,	2006;	Illich,	1971,	1973).	Economics,	on	the	other	hand,	implicates	both	base	and	superstructure;	assumptions																																																									37	Alienation	involves	disconnection	from	other	humans,	from	human	nature,	and	from	the	means	of	production;	reification	is	the	instrumentalisation	of	humans	and	other	living	beings.	38	Government,	culture,	ideas,	relationships,	et	cetera.	39	The	forces	and	relations	of	production	–	division	of	labour,	working	conditions,	et	cetera.	
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as	to	the	behaviour	of	the	market,	of	participants	within	it,	and	of	the	appropriate	role	of	government	are	centrally	important	at	both	the	micro	and	macro	scales.	For	example,	one	of	the	issues	about	which	heterodox	and	neoclassical	macroeconomists	tend	to	disagree	is	implicated	in	the	work	of	many	critical	theorists	–	namely	Marx’s	assertion	that	capitalism	would	eventually	consume	itself,	because	capital	would	tend	to	concentrate	in	the	hands	of	the	wealthy	few	and	workers	would	no	longer	be	able	to	purchase	the	goods	they	manufactured.	Interestingly,	modern	Western	capitalist	societies	have	seen	a	dramatic	rise	in	income	inequality	from	the	1970s	onwards	(Keeley,	2015),	in	tandem	with	the	growth	of	neoclassical	economists’	influence	in	academia	and	international	institutions	(Harvey,	2007).	Income	inequality	has	even	accelerated	in	some	countries	since	the	financial	crisis	(Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	2013).	The	argument	among	policymakers	as	to	the	wisdom	of	reducing	income	inequality	as	a	way	of	boosting	economic	growth	is	a	key	point	of	contention	among	various	strains	of	economic	thought,	not	always	neatly	aligned	with	the	mainstream	or	heterodox	camps.				 The	field	of	economics	was	once	itself	steeped	in	what	could	be	considered	a	form	of	critical	theory:	the	institutionalism40	of	a	hundred	years	ago	(in	contrast	with																																																									40	Hodgson	has	offered	a	useful	summary	of	the	central	tenets	of	institutionalism:		 1.	Institutionalism	eschews	atomism	and	reductionism	in	economic	analysis,	typically	positing	holistic	or	organicist	alternatives.	2.	Instead	of	the	rational,	calculating	agent	of	neoclassical	theory,	institutionalism	sees	human	behavior	as	normally	driven	by	habit	and	routine,	but	occasionally	punctuated	by	acts	of	creativity	and	novelty.	3.	Instead	of	an	exclusive	focus	on	individuals	as	units	of	analysis,	institutionalism	regards	self-reinforcing	institutions	as	additional	or	even	alternative	analytical	units.	4.	The	conception	of	the	economy	is	of	an	evolving,	open	system	in	historical	time,	subject	to	processes	of	cumulative	causation	–	instead	of	approaches	to	theorizing	that	focus	exclusively	on	mechanical	equilibria.	5.	Institutionalism	sees	individuals	as	situated	in	and	molded	by	an	evolving	social	culture,	so	that	their	preference	functions	are	not	given	and	fixed	but	in	a	process	of	continuous	adaptation	and	change.	6.	Likewise,	technology	is	regarded	as	evolving,	and	as	a	primary	motive	force	in	socioeconomic	development	–	in	contrast	to	a	theoretical	framework	that	takes	technology	as	fixed	and	exogenous.	7.	There	is	a	pervasive	concern	with	the	role	and	significance	of	power	and	the	conflict	between	both	individuals	and	institutions	in	socioeconomic	life.	8.	Instead	of	a	utilitarian	framework	that	evaluates	human	welfare	in	terms	of	individual	utility	or	pleasure	and	separates	considerations	of	means	from	those	of	ends,	there	is	a	focus	on	the	identification	of	real	human	needs	and	on	the	design	of	institutions	that	can	further	assist	their	identification	and	clarification.	
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New	Institutionalism,	which	has	been	enjoying	a	revival	in	recent	years)	concerned	itself	with	power;	instincts,	routines,	social	norms,	and	habits;	and	the	individual	as	a	socially	constructed	being	who	both	affects	and	is	affected	by	institutions	and	other	human	beings.	This	involved	a	complex	view	of	human	nature;	an	emphasis	on	change	and	the	process	of	change,	as	opposed	to	analyses	of	states	of	equilibrium;	an	acknowledgement	of	the	power	of	inertia	and	path	dependence	–	for	example,	the	continued	use	of	the	QWERTY	keyboard	despite	the	disappearance	of	the	initial	need	for	that	particular	configuration	(Schwartz,	2004);	and	an	understanding	of	abduction	as	the	intellectual	process	of	invention	as	opposed	to	deduction	or	induction,	abduction	conceived	as	“the	spark	of	intellectual	creativity	or	intuition,	kindled	in	the	tinder	of	assimilated	facts”	(G.	M.	Hodgson,	1994,	p.	61).		 This	conception	of	the	learning	process	can	be	recognised	in	the	work	of	early	educational	theorists	such	as	John	Dewey	and	George	Herbert	Mead,	who	maintained	that	learning	and	knowledge	are	fundamentally	shaped	by	social	relations.	Social	context	–	habits,	beliefs,	social	norms,	and	institutions	–	affect	and	are	affected	by	one	another,	and	learning	cannot	exist	outside	that	context.	Indeed,	John	Dewey	later	joined	with	Thorstein	Veblen,	a	central	figure	in	institutionalism,	to	found	the	New	School.			 Institutionalism	is	an	approach	that	is	enjoying	a	resurgence	in	the	study	of	economics.	Richard	Lipsey,	perhaps	one	of	Canada’s	best-known	economists,	has	not	explicitly	labelled	himself	an	institutionalist.	Yet	he	has	said	the	following,	which	helps	to	illustrate	the	importance	of	institutions	in	the	study	of	economics:		 	Growth	is	a	largely	path	dependent,	co-evolution	of	technology	and	institutions	in	a	time-irreversible	process.	The	absence	of	a	time	dimension	is	being	addressed	in	some	of	today’s	non-main-stream,	evolutionary	theorising.	The	study	of	path	dependency	and,	more	generally,	the	whole	evolutionary	branch	of	economics,	seeks	to	put	time	into	theories	in	meaningful	ways.	[.	.	.]	The	best	economists	always	knew	that	market	systems	require	an	underpinning	of	good	institutions,	some	of	them	quite	complex.	But	the	importance	of	institutions	is	not	routinely	taught	in	theory	courses	and	it	is	debatable	how	many	economists	understood	the	importance	of	institutions	at	any	one	time.	An	important	test	seemed	to	come	with	the	marketisation	of	the	former	USSR.	Many	US	economic	advisors	said	in	effect:	“Just	free	up	the	markets	and	privatise	all	industries	and	all	will	be	well.”	This	advice	was	profoundly	a-temporal	and	non-institutional.	Russian	privatisation	was	a	fiasco	and	well-functioning	capitalism	has	proved	to	be	unachievable	without	institutions	to	secure	such	important	things	as	effective	intellectual	property	protection,	security	of	private	property,	orderly																																																																																																																																																																														(1994,	pp.	68–69).	
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bankruptcy,	the	rule	of	law,	and	reliable	banks.	It	also	remains	to	be	seen	if	the	necessary	institutions	can	grow	spontaneously	in	ground	uncultivated	by	effective	government	policy.	Possibly	as	a	result	of	these	unhappy	experiences,	an	increasing	number	of	economists	are	today	turning	their	attention	to	formal	analyses	of	institutions − better	late	than	never.	(Lipsey,	2001,	p.	16)			 Loosely	institutionalist	explanations	for	the	performance	and	resilience	of	the	Canadian	banking	system	already	abound	–	for	example,	its	path	dependence	(Walks	&	Clifford,	2015),	partly	in	the	form	of	its	oligopolistic	structure	(Bordo	et	al.,	2015;	Knight,	2012;	Seccareccia,	2012)	and	banking	culture	(Freeland,	2010;	Longworth,	2014;	Ratnovski	&	Huang,	2009),	is	frequently	cited	in	popular	and	academic	explorations	of	Canada’s	performance	during	and	after	the	crisis.		 Importantly,	such	an	analysis	is	lacking	when	it	comes	to	the	education	and	social	norms	of	economists.	I	had	initially	planned	on	undertaking	some	of	this	analysis	via	a	Social	Network	Analysis	(SNA)	of	Canadian	economists,	but	decided	against	it	on	the	basis	of	critique	inspired	by	critical	theory	and	institutionalism;	in	other	words,	my	theoretical	framework	fundamentally	altered	my	methodology.			 SNA	would	have	been	used	to	map	out	graphically	the	network	of	Canadian	economists	under	study.	From	what	was	considered	to	be	the	first	such	analysis,	Davis	et	al.’s	1941	study	of	Southern	belles’	attendance	at	balls	(Davis,	Bradford	Gardner,	&	Gardner,	2009),	SNA	has	become	increasingly	mathematical,	and	data	analysis	often	involves	the	use	of	computer	programs	designed	to	calculate	the	extent	to	which	networks	are	dense,	interconnected,	and/or	dominated	by	central	figures	and	cliques	(J.	Scott,	1991).				 SNA	is	considered	to	be	especially	useful	for	relational	data	–	data	regarding	ties	and	interactions	among	people	(Scott,	1991).	This	approach	can	be	problematic	in	many	ways,	however,	as	it	reduces	communities	to	networks	of	individuals	and	has	no	way	of	integrating	norms	and	power	into	the	analysis.	For	example,	some	researchers	seek	from	SNA	information	that	could	serve	as	a	proxy	for	power	relations	–	namely,	centrality	measures	(Carolan,	2014).	But	centrality	is	in	fact	not	a	good	proxy	for	power	relations;	the	correlation	may	even	run	the	other	way	in	some	cases.	If	I	were	to	determine	centrality	partly	on	the	basis	of	attendance	at	conferences,	for	example,	I	would	be	likely	to	inflate	the	importance	of	younger	scholars	and	underestimate	the	power	of	their	elder	colleagues,	as	the	latter	are	less	likely	to	attend	as	many	events.		
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	 There	are	many	similar	pitfalls	associated	with	an	SNA	approach.	My	chief	critique,	however,	was	one	that	emerged	in	the	course	of	reflecting	on	critiques	of	the	scientisation	of	economics	as	a	field.	There	are	parallels	here	in	the	field	of	ethnography;	SNA	is	a	mathematisation	of	social	relations	that	reduces	relationships	to	“data	matrices”	designed	to	show	relationships	among	conversants	and	among	institutions,	events,	etc.	(Scott,	1991).	The	simplification	of	complex	social	relationships	–	obscuring	power	structures	in	the	process	–	is	only	one	potential	result.	Perhaps	more	importantly,	the	“calculative	mindset”	induced	by	the	presentation	of	the	data	and	the	“mathematisation”	of	the	dataset	itself	could	contribute	to	some	of	the	harms	identified	in	many	critical	studies	of	economics	education.	In	short,	had	my	chosen	methodology	included	SNA,	my	research	design	might	have	served	to	undermine	the	intellectual	contribution	of	the	study	itself.		 SNA	studies	have	become	popular	in	the	social	sciences,	as	have	many	other	“scientised”	methods.	There	are	SNA	studies	on	the	U.S.,	Germany,	Great	Britain,	and	Japan,	(Knoke,	2011),	most	of	which	emphasise	institutions	(but	not	their	role	or	character)	rather	than	individual	actors	within	them.	Unsurprisingly,	Canada	has	largely	been	left	to	the	side	of	this	trend.	Perhaps,	given	the	dangers	of	this	approach	for	my	research	objectives,	that	is	not	a	bad	thing.			
Case	Studies			 Case	study	methodology	is	useful	as	a	research	strategy	that	brings	together	a	number	of	methods	(Ryan	&	Lewer,	2012).	Flyvbjerg	(2006)	recommends	several	tactics	in	the	selection	of	cases,	one	of	which	involves	the	use	of	extreme/deviant	cases	–	in	this	instance,	the	Fraser	Institute	and	COMER	can	be	seen	as	representatives	of	two	ideological	poles	(loosely	right-wing	and	left-wing,	respectively)	in	the	Canadian	economic	realm,	with	the	PEF	(largely	comprising	institutionally-educated	heterodox	economists)	as	an	additional	case	in	order	to	isolate	the	role	of	autodidactic	versus	institutional	economics	education	among	Canadian	heterodox	economists.	The	examination	of	other	think	tanks	along	the	spectrum	–	and	economists’	views	of	them	–	similarly	helps	to	identify	which	ideas	are	associated	with	(loosely)	the	left-	and	right-wing	politics	in	Canada,	and	which	of	those	ideas	are	able	to	become	acceptable	to	those	in	the	middle	of	the	political	
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spectrum.	The	Canadian	Centre	for	Policy	Alternatives	on	the	left,	the	Institute	for	Research	on	Public	Policy	in	the	centre,	and	the	centre-right	Conference	Board	of	Canada	all	help	to	flesh	out	the	picture.		 The	choice	of	macroeconomists	in	my	sample	of	academic	economists	was	similarly	motivated	by	the	intention	to	include	extreme/deviant	cases.	As	explained	more	fully	below,	macroeconomists	as	a	group	tend	to	display	more	differences	of	opinion	than	do	microeconomists	(Rodrigo,	2012).	Although	my	random	sampling	did	produce	one	truly	heterodox	academic	economist,	I	supplemented	that	part	of	my	sample	by	seeking	out	several	other	well-known	heterodox	academic	economists	in	order	to	flesh	out	the	extreme/deviant	case.		 The	Bank	of	Canada	and	the	C.D.	Howe	Institute,	central	institutions	among	Canadian	economists,	can	each	be	considered	to	be	more	paradigmatic	cases	as	they	“highlight	more	general	characteristics	of	the	societies	in	question”	(Flyvbjerg,	2006,	pg.	232).	In	the	case	of	the	Bank	of	Canada,	their	economists	have	each	been	vetted	by	academic	and	governmental	institutions	multiple	times	and	as	such	may	represent	something	of	a	consensus	among	Canada’s	elite.	The	C.D.	Howe	Institute,	while	viewed	as	sympathetic	to	–	and	aligned	with	–	business	interests	and	as	such	is	usually	identified	as	right-of-centre	on	the	Canadian	political	spectrum,	seems	to	have	built	its	credibility	on	affiliations	with,	in	particular,	economists	from	top	economics	departments,	the	Bank	of	Canada,	and	the	federal	Department	of	Finance.	Finally,	the	chief	economists	of	the	largest	banks	in	Canada	are	a	paradigmatic	case	study	if	the	banking/finance	community	is	the	unit	under	study.	These	economists	are	powerful	players	in	a	relatively	small	community	of	influential	economists	tied	to	finance	and	banking	(and	are	some	of	the	few	remaining	chief	economists	in	the	private	sector).			 The	choice	of	these	eleven	cases	conforms	to	the	conception	of	case	studies	as	an	opportunity	to	engage	in	analytic	induction	–	the	selection	of	cases	capable	of	producing	data	that	can	challenge	emerging	hypotheses	(Manning	in	Huberman	&	Miles,	1994).	The	research	design	therefore	followed	an	iterative	process	in	which	conversants	from	all	eleven	cases	were	able	to	shape	the	study’s	conclusions	as	they	developed	throughout	the	data	collection	process.	Indeed,	I	ensured	that	I	interviewed	a	selection	of	conversants	from	various	cases	in	each	phase	of	my	fieldwork	experience	in	order	for	conversants	from	all	cases	to	play	a	role	in	my	growing	understanding	–	and	questioning	–	of	Canadian	economists	and	their	education,	ethical	orientations,	and	role	in	public	policy.	
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Interviewing	Elites			 A	growing	number	of	interview	studies	on	elites	have	emerged	in	the	past	20	years	(Cook,	Faulconbridge,	&	Muzio,	2012;	Hertz	&	Imber,	1995;	Ho,	2009;	Jackall,	1988;	Schwartzman,	1993;	Tett,	2009),	but	elites	in	general	remain	understudied	in	an	ethnographical	and	sociological	sense	(Aguiar,	2012;	Hunter,	1995	in	Mikecz,	2012).	This	is	yet	more	true	of	elites	in	the	realm	of	economics	(Stephens,	2007),	and	there	is	no	such	coverage	of	elite	Canadian	economists	at	all.	“Understanding	the	external	conditions	and	interests	that	promote	and	sustain	local	or	national	elites	must	also	be	matched	with	an	analysis	of	the	norms,	values	and	shared	interests	that	characterise	or	unite	such	elites”	(Shore,	2002,	p.	13),	and	these	–	in	addition	to	lifelong	access	to	contacts	in	the	upper	echelons	of	society	–	are	often	products	of	individuals’	background	and	education.	Indeed,	“[s]tudying	how	elites	ensure	their	survival	requires	close	attention	to	their	kinship	structures	and	networks,	as	well	as	to	the	institutions	for	their	selection	and	socialisation,	which	[.	.	.]	means	a	focus	on	schooling	and	the	structures	of	elite	education”	(ibid.,	pg.	13).	The	emphasis	of	this	research	is	therefore	placed	squarely	on	the	educational	and	learning	processes	that	feed	certain	conceptions	of	economics	among	the	elite	–	not	only	because	this	constitutes	a	particularly	important	topic	at	this	time,	and	not	only	because	there	is	a	dearth	of	literature	in	this	area	–	especially	among	economists,	and	especially	in	Canada	–	but	also	because	the	educational	lens	is	one	that	can	uniquely	serve	the	end	of	understanding	how	a	particular	group	of	elite	economists	came	to	learn	what	they	know	and	believe	what	they	believe.				 Interviewing,	with	elite	and	non-elite	populations	alike,	is	not	a	positivist	exercise;	perspectives,	as	opposed	to	facts,	are	the	data	being	sought,	and	indeed	elites’	perspectives	are	uniquely	useful	in	generating	data	on	the	outlooks	of	those	who	may	have	shaped	some	of	the	political	and	discursive	realities	under	study	(Richards,	1996).	As	is	the	case	here,	interviews	with	a	society’s	elites	are	sometimes	the	sole	method	for	gaining	certain	types	of	information	(ibid.).	I	drew	from	Carmichael	et	al.’s	(2006)	work	in	asking	conversants	about	their	own	impressions	of	
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the	perceived	legitimacy	of	Canadian	economists	from	various	institutions;	this	information	would	have	been	impossible	to	glean	in	other	ways.41		 As	indicated	by	Schoenberger	(1991),	key	conversant	interviews	with	elites	may	be	particularly	useful	in	periods	of	significant	economic	and	social	change.	Schoenberger’s	assertion	became	increasingly	apposite	in	the	course	of	my	research;	I	could	never	have	fully	understood	the	changing	nature	of	the	field	of	macroeconomics,	for	example,	had	I	attempted	to	restrict	my	study	to	survey	data.	Although	I	did	not	have	a	full	grasp	of	the	tenets	of	macroeconomics	prior	to	the	onset	of	my	study	–	indeed,	I	was	and	continue	to	be	lacking	in	formal	economics	education	–	it	clearly	was	essential	that	I	learn	enough	about	economics	to	be	able	to	formulate	appropriate	questions	for	my	study	and	to	discuss	them	meaningfully	with	my	interlocutors.		 Such	systematic	preparation	on	my	part	improved	the	quality	and	depth	of	the	questions	I	was	able	to	ask	of	my	conversants,	and	played	a	crucial	role	in	gaining	access	–	and	establishing	strong	trust	relationships	–	with	conversants	in	the	first	place	(Stephens,	2007).	In-depth	prior	knowledge	of	conversants’	professional	field	and	life	experience	is	crucial	in	gaining	their	respect	as	well	as	their	co-operation;	this	is	true	for	any	in-depth	interviewer,	but	it	is	especially	important	in	interviewing	elites	(Mikecz,	2012;	Ryan	&	Lewer,	2012)	who,	in	the	case	of	my	research,	accounted	for	a	significant	majority	of	my	list	of	interviewees.	In	the	event,	many	of	my	conversants	demonstrated	the	degree	of	their	assurance	by	offering	recommendations	and	introductions	to	other	economists	to	interview.		 Thorough	preparation	is	an	important	defence	against	the	potential	for	elite	conversants	to	patronise	a	researcher	who	may	be	perceived	as	a	novice	or	intellectual	outsider	(M.	Healey	&	Rawlinson,	1993).	This	was	a	particular	issue	for	me	as	a	young	woman	mainly	interviewing	older	men.	In	this	respect,	the	quality	of	my	data	depended	on	the	best	tactical	use	of	any	and	all	defences	against	the	possibility	of	condescension.	Because	economics	as	a	field	supports	an	even	smaller	proportion	of	women	than	many	other	elite	fields,	this	was	a	particularly	important	consideration.				 This	research	could	be	viewed	as	part	of	a	growing	trend	of	academics	studying	academia	itself;	there	now	exist	a	number	of	significant	studies	of	academic																																																									41	Such	difficult-to-elicit	information	was	made	all	the	more	so	by	the	fact	that	interviews	with	elites	are,	for	obvious	reasons,	likely	to	be	particularly	affected	by	time	constraints	(Berry,	2002;	Richards,	1996).	
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departments	and	their	occupants	(Fox,	2004;	Hernandez,	Sancho,	Creus,	&	Montane,	2010;	Pelias,	2003;	Strathern,	2000;	Williams,	2002).	Anthropologist	Cathy	A.	Small,	operating	undercover	and	using	the	pseudonym	Rebekah	Nathan,	enrolled	as	a	university	student	and	studied	academic	culture	from	that	perspective	(Nathan,	2005).	This	is	a	relatively	new	research	approach,	however,	and	again,	even	within	such	a	trend	economics	as	a	discipline	is	as	yet	underrepresented.		 Perhaps	the	particular	dearth	of	studies	of	Canadian	economists	is	a	function	of	its	particular	local	and	historical	context,	because	‘‘in	the	greater	scheme	of	things,	those	working	in	Canadian	institutions,	on	the	periphery	of	empire,	may	even	constitute	a	subaltern	class	of	intellectuals’’	(Young	&	Meneley,	2005,	in	Reed-Danahay,	2009,	pg.	38).	Yet	Canada	in	fact	constitutes	a	compelling	case	study,	and	not	only	because	of	its	comparatively	unorthodox	approach	to	finance,	central	banking,	and	economics	more	generally;	besides	a	third-place	global	ranking	in	economics	behind	countries	with	populations	double	and	ten-fold	larger	(the	UK	and	the	U.S.),	Canada	was	also	a	pioneer	of	inflation	targeting,	was	the	first	to	drop	out	of	the	Bretton	Woods	Accord	(Crow,	2002),	and	–	so	the	story	goes	–	avoided	the	worst	effects	of	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	(Ratnovski	&	Huang,	2009).			 As	a	research	topic	the	Canadian	case	is	especially	interesting	from	an	educational	perspective.	Canadians	have	the	highest	average	tertiary	educational	attainment	in	the	world,	with	51%	of	the	population	boasting	tertiary	educational	certification,	and	the	country	stands	among	the	highest	in	university-level	educational	attainment	(Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	2012).	Unlike	its	nearest	neighbours	culturally,	linguistically,	and	structurally,	Canada	does	not	have	the	equivalent	of	the	Oxford-Cambridge	domination	of	higher	education	in	the	UK	nor	of	the	Ivy	League	in	the	U.S.,	hierarchies	that	tend	to	shape	students’	access	to	power	and	wealth	later	in	life	(Ho,	2009;	Mills,	1959;	Tett,	2009	inter	alia).	In	contrast,	Canada’s	universities	are	almost	all	public,	and	although	they	are	routinely	ranked,	there	has	been	no	clear	frontrunner	over	time.				 My	previous	research	showed	that	there	is	a	preponderance	of	Harvard	degrees42	among	the	biographies	of	upper	executives	in	major	Canadian	banks,	which	likely	exposed	them	to	the	same	enthusiasm	for	the	free	market	that	is	widespread	among	American	bankers;	yet	the	Canadian	system	as	a	whole	has	tended	to	function																																																									42	It	is	worth	noting	that	Harvard’s	economics	department	is	far	from	the	most	free	market-oriented	among	its	peer	institutions,	however.	
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outside	of	a	strictly	free	market	framework,	and	indeed	most	prominent	Canadians	in	the	financial	sector	appear	to	have	been	educated	in	Canada,	at	least	initially,	and	their	degrees	are	from	a	variety	of	institutions	all	over	the	country	(Quigley,	2012).	This	is	significant	in	terms	of	“studying	up,”	as	it	indicates	that	Canada’s	elites	have	not	been	socialised	in	the	same	handful	of	institutions	as	is	largely	the	case	in	the	U.S.	and	the	UK;	the	Canadian	community	of	economic	elites	appears	to	have	formed	in	other	ways,	as	its	constituents	were	socialised	in	a	much	broader	set	of	educational	institutions.	But	this	is	also	noteworthy	because	formally	educated	Canadians	from	a	great	diversity	of	educational	institutions	constitute	the	majority	of	the	population	of	the	country	as	a	whole,	as	is	the	case	nowhere	else	in	the	world.	This	unique	circumstance	could	have	significant	implications	for	the	future	of	financial	literacy	and	economics	education,	as	indeed	we	may	have	seen	in	Justin	Trudeau’s	unexpectedly	successful	pitch	for	deficit	spending	in	the	most	recent	Canadian	federal	election.			
Interviews			 My	58	interviews	were	semi-structured	in	format	and	ranged	from	36	to	181	minutes	in	length;	56	were	conducted	in	person	and	2	by	telephone	(Skype).	Erica	Schoenberger,	in	her	extensive	experience	with	corporate	interviews,	emphasises	the	utility	of	“an	unstandardized	format	with	a	predominance	of	open-ended	questions”	(Schoenberger,	1991,	p.	180),	which	can	also	improve	the	validity	of	responses	(Aberbach	&	Rockman,	2002).	All	of	the	interviews,	including	the	two	conducted	by	telephone,	were	recorded	with	a	hand-held	voice	recorder	with	the	prior	consent	of	the	conversants.	Based	on	the	literature,	it	was	clearly	important	to	record	additional	impressions	immediately	after	each	interview	in	order	to	capture	non-verbal	communications	such	as	tone	of	voice,	posture,	gesticulations,	and	so	on	(Crang,	1997;	Mikecz,	2012),	although	of	course	such	data	are	subjective	and	cannot	properly	replicate	the	interview	experience	nor	erase	my	privileged	position	as	the	original	interviewer	(Gardner,	2010).	Some	of	these	experiential	data	are	surprising	to	look	back	on	now;	one	of	my	more	high-profile	conversants	was	clearly	drunk	during	our	post-lunch	interview;	two	other	conversants	directed	the	majority	of	their	comments	to	my	chest.	As	a	group	my	conversants	were	highly	professional,	however.	
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	 There	is	a	preponderance	of	special	instructions	from	academics	who	have	conducted	interviews	with	elite	conversants;	these	include	dress	(conservative),	awareness	of	elites’	tight	time	constraints,	the	importance	of	choosing	a	neutral	location	in	which	to	conduct	the	interview	(Ryan	&	Lewer,	2012),	and	the	need	to	be	insistent	that	it	is	the	person	sampled	who	must	be	interviewed	(Aberbach	&	Rockman,	2002).	It	is	also	essential	to	be	aware	of	conversants’	potential	loyalty	to	colleagues	and	awareness	of	outside	audiences	(Ryan	&	Lewer,	2012).	Indeed,	there	is	a	particular	need	to	be	aware	of	the	possibility	that	elites	will	feel	the	need	to	defend	their	reputation,	industry,	or	colleagues	in	an	interview	setting,	and	as	such	their	claims	should	be	met	with	some	healthy	scepticism	(G.L.	Clark,	1998;	McDowell,	1998).	One	way	to	counteract	this	risk	is	to	build	in	verification	checks	to	ensure	that	conversants’	responses	are	internally	consistent	–	a	practice	I	maintained	throughout.	It	was	also	important	to	emphasise	my	educational	credentials,	in	my	written	requests	for	interviews	in	particular,	as	they	constitute	the	only	source	of	“elite”	status	I	have	to	offer	and	were	therefore	an	essential	element	in	gaining	the	respect	of	my	elite	conversants	(Mikecz,	2012).	Equally	important,	in	terms	of	maintaining	friendly	and	trusting	relations,	was	to	invoke	third-party	criticisms	rather	than	voicing	my	own	reservations	in	order	not	to	alienate	the	conversant	(Berry,	2002).	Finally,	I	followed	the	advice	of	Mikecz	in	sending	‘thank-you’	messages	after	my	interviews	–	in	genuine	thanks	for	the	time	and	energy	of	conversants	(2012).		 The	complement	of	58	individual	interviews,	along	with	mixed	quantitative-qualitative	surveys,	form	the	foundation	of	this	thesis.	The	results	of	these	interviews	also	shaped	the	design	of	the	surveys	to	follow;	my	conversants	provided	me	with	insights	I	could	not	otherwise	have	gained.	The	advantages	of	qualitative	research	became	apparent	several	times	in	the	course	of	the	data	collection	process,	as	detailed	below.		 I	employed	a	sampling	frame	for	selecting	conversants	within	each	of	the	case	studies	where	this	was	appropriate,	and	in	the	remaining	cases	I	sampled	different	proportions	of	each	so	as	to	achieve	a	balance	of	conversants.	These	procedures	accorded	with	the	principles	of	theoretical	sampling,	in	which	the	aim	in	this	instance	is	to	gain	an	understanding	of	the	attitudes	of	economists	across	the	political	spectrum,	rather	than	to	interview	a	strictly	representative	sample	of	Canadian	economists.	This	could	also	be	considered	to	be	a	form	of	stratified	sampling,	in	that	I	
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sampled	randomly	from	a	list	of	possible	conversants	within	some	of	the	cases	under	study.				 Among	certain	groups,	on	the	other	hand,	I	simply	sought	out	as	many	conversants	as	possible	–	among	the	COMER	(Committee	on	Monetary	and	Economic	Reform)43	members,	as	my	only	sample	of	autodidact	economists,	and	also	among	the	chief	economists	of	the	major	banks.	As	a	small	group	in	each	case,	it	was	possible	to	interview	nearly	all	of	the	relevant	actors;	the	most	significant	issue	in	these	instances	concerned	questions	of	access.				 In	the	case	of	the	chief	economists	of	the	major	banks,	I	simply	contacted	all	five	of	them	as	many	times,	and	in	as	many	ways,	as	was	conceivably	possible.	In	the	event,	I	was	able	to	interview	four	of	the	five	current	chief	economists	and	two	other	former	(and	particularly	well-known)	chief	economists.	As	for	COMER	members,	I	simply	interviewed	as	many	active	members	(members	who	attend	meetings	regularly	or	were	long-time	regular	attendees	over	the	course	of	several	years	previously;	the	latter	category	is	included	because	many	formative	COMER	members	are	elderly	and	may	have	not	been	physically	able	to	participate	in	recent	years)	as	possible,	via	a	snowballing	sampling	technique	beginning	with	the	COMER	members	known	to	my	grandfather.	This	process	yielded	a	total	of	6	COMER	conversants	(7,	if	the	lawyer	in	the	COMER	Bank	of	Canada	case	is	included)	across	the	country,	mostly	in	Toronto,	with	one	conversant	each	in	Saskatoon	and	Vancouver.				 One	of	the	Torontonian	conversants	was	COMER	co-founder	and	co-litigant	of	the	COMER	case	against	the	Government	of	Canada,	William	Krehm,	who	was	101	years	old	at	the	time	of	our	interview.	Sadly,	in	recent	years	he	has	declined	significantly	and	I	reportedly	saw	him	on	one	of	his	bad	days;	he	was,	as	a	result,	confused	at	times	and	unable	to	answer	the	bulk	of	my	questions	(he	answered	a	few	of	them	by	happenstance	along	the	way,	however),	although	he	was	unfailingly	warm	and	charming	and	his	repeated	attempts	to	give	me	books	and	ask	about	which	musical	instruments	I	played	belied	his	lifelong	curiosity	and	love	of	music.	Fortunately	his	remarkable	life	has	been	documented	elsewhere,	which	allowed	me	to	fill	in	enough	gaps	to	feel	comfortable	including	his	testimony	in	my	study,	although	I	fully	acknowledge	that	this	interview	differed	greatly	from	the	others.	
																																																								43	For	clarity,	refer	to	the	Guide	to	Canadian	Think	Tanks	table	for	a	list	of	think	tanks	and	their	political	orientations.	
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	 Aside	from	conversant	Kateri	Pino,	whom	I	have	known	for	years	as	one	of	my	grandfather’s	fellow	COMER	members	in	my	hometown	of	Saskatoon,	Saskatchewan,	I	reached	COMER	conversants	via	William	Krehm’s	assistant,	Rita;	she	answered	my	unsolicited	email	to	the	address	listed	on	the	COMER	website,	provided	me	with	the	email	addresses	and	phone	numbers	of	active	members,	added	me	to	the	COMER	mailing	list,	and	even	mailed	me	a	box	of	books	on	monetary	reform.			 In	selecting	conversants	from	the	CCPA	(Canadian	Centre	for	Policy	Alternatives),	I	simply	contacted	the	two	people	who	had	authored	the	most	work	on	economic	issues;	the	Executive	Director	there	is	not	an	economist,	and	the	hierarchy	is	quite	flat,	so	I	did	not	take	the	same	approach	as	I	did	with	the	other	think	tanks	in	my	sample.			 I	had	initially	planned	to	select	conversants	from	among	PEF	(Progressive	Economics	Forum)	economists	by	using	their	21-member	online	list	of	authors	as	a	sampling	frame.	I	soon	discovered	that	I	had	unwittingly	included	several	PEF	members	in	my	sample	already,	however;	both	of	my	CCPA	conversants	were	PEF	members,	as	were	all	four	explicitly	heterodox	academic	economists	I	interviewed,	in	addition	to	two	of	the	few	microeconomists	who	ended	up	in	my	sample.	Because	I	had	specifically	targeted	the	upper	echelons	of	other	organisations	from	which	I	sought	conversants	–	especially	among	the	think	tanks	and	major	banks	–	and	since	several	other	conversants	in	my	sample	had	recommended	interviewing	him	in	any	case,	I	decided	to	cap	off	this	unexpectedly	long	list	of	PEF	conversants	by	interviewing	the	founder	of	the	PEF,	Jim	Stanford,	then-Chief	Economist	of	Unifor,	Canada’s	largest	private-sector	union.	In	total,	then,	the	PEF	members	in	my	sample	totalled	nine.				 This	means	that	my	sample	likely	skews	disproportionately	heterodox	relative	to	Canadian	economists	as	a	group;	the	best	available	numbers	(which	are	certainly	not	representative;	formal	membership	in	a	heterodox	organisation	will	not	reflect	all	heterodox	sympathies	among	the	whole	population	of	economists)	show	that	there	are	231	Canadian	economists	who	belong	to,	subscribe	to,	or	are	on	the	mailing	list	of	the	13	heterodox	organisations	or	journals	the	authors	included	in	their	study.	These	numbers	are	from	2006,	the	same	year	the	census	identified	11,000	economists	and	
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economic	policy	researchers	working	in	Canada	(Statistics	Canada,	2006);44	the	Canadian	Association	of	University	Teachers	(CAUT)	identified	1,002	of	these	as	academic	economists	in	2009/2010	(2010).45	For	reasons	I	explain	below,	my	sample	would	likely	have	skewed	towards	both	ends	of	the	political/ideological	spectrum	in	any	event,	not	least	because	think	tank	economists	account	for	fully	12	of	my	conversants	(in	addition	to	7	COMER	members),	figures	that	are	not	representative	of	Canadian	economists	as	a	whole.		 Among	Fraser	Institute	economists,	it	proved	relatively	straightforward	to	select	from	among	17	senior	staff	members,	52	senior	fellows,	and	5	senior	research	staff	not	cross-posted	in	the	“Senior	Staff”	section	of	the	website.	I	began	by	contacting	the	founder	and	first	president	of	the	Fraser	Institute,	Michael	Walker,	and	its	current	president,	Niels	Veldhuis.	I	was	fortunate	to	interview	Michael	Walker,	but	despite	repeated	attempts	I	was	unable	to	secure	an	interview	with	Niels	Veldhuis;	I	therefore	contacted	the	other	economist	on	the	senior	executive	team,	Executive	Vice-President	Jason	Clemens,	who	granted	me	an	interview.		 To	ensure	that	I	had	spoken	with	at	least	two	academic	researchers	affiliated	with	the	Fraser	Institute,	I	surveyed	the	list	of	senior	fellows	for	academics	–	macroeconomists	–	from	one	of	my	target	economics	departments.	Somewhat	surprisingly,	there	were	only	two	suitable	candidates	on	this	basis	–	John	Chant,	professor	emeritus	of	Simon	Fraser	University,46	and	Bill	Watson	of	McGill	University.47	Bill	Watson	was	already	in	my	sample	as	an	active	macroeconomist	at	McGill,	so	I	added	John	Chant	to	my	list	and	subsequently	interviewed	him.	On	the	Fraser	Institute	website	overall,	there	was	only	one	professor	from	the	University	of	Toronto48	(an	Associate	Professor	of	Geography);	two	education	professors	from	the	University	of	British	Columbia;49	a	small	number	of	professors	from	SFU	and	the																																																									44	This	had	risen	to	15,000	economists	and	economic	policy	researchers	by	2011	(Statistics	Canada,	2011),	a	rather	dramatic	increase	–	to	be	examined	further	in	the	discussion.	45	The	PEF	told	me	that	15	of	the	29-member	steering	committee	are	tenured	professors	(not	all	in	economics,	however);	3	are	graduate	students;	and	11	are	with	NGOs,	institutes,	and	unions.	They	have	169	(or	153	Canadian,	3	American,	2	UK,	and	7	international)	members	in	total.	46	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“SFU”	instead	of	“Simon	Fraser	University.”	47	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“McGill”	instead	of	“McGill	University.”	48	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“UToronto”	instead	of	“University	of	Toronto.”	49	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“UBC”	instead	of	“University	of	British	Columbia.”	
	 69	
University	of	Calgary50	in	economics,	political	science,	and	public	policy;	and	no	representation	whatsoever	from	Queen’s	University,51	the	University	of	Western	Ontario,52	Université	de	Montréal,53	or	York	University54	–	very	few	from	any	of	the	top	universities	in	Canada,	and	of	the	Americans	listed,	the	academics	hailed	from	institutions	I	was	unfamiliar	with	(which	was	surprising,	as	I	had	lived	and	studied	in	the	U.S.	for	four	years).		 From	my	interviews	with	think	tank	economists	at	either	end	of	the	political	spectrum,	I	determined	which	so-called	centrist	think	tanks	were	most	often	mentioned	by	economists	from	both	poles;	I	weighed	the	centrist	institutions’	relative	importance	on	the	basis	of	mentions	from	fellow	economists,	the	number	of	employees	listed	on	their	websites,	and	their	volume	of	research	output.	The	C.D.	Howe	Institute,	the	Conference	Board,	and	the	IRPP	were	mentioned	the	most	by	economists	in	my	sample,	although	the	IRPP	was	considerably	smaller	and	had	a	more	modest	research	output	than	the	other	two.			 I	selected	C.D.	Howe	Institute	conversants	on	the	basis	of	seniority	and,	as	before,	with	an	emphasis	on	macroeconomists.	I	approached	the	President	and	Chief	Executive	Officer,	Bill	Robson	(an	impressive	number	of	my	other	conversants	had	recommended	speaking	to	him),	initially	with	no	result	–	more	on	that	below.	I	also	approached	Vice	President	of	Research	Daniel	Schwanen	(introduced	to	me	by	Don	Brean,	a	UToronto	professor)	and	Associate	Director	of	Research	Ben	Dachis	(whom	several	of	my	academic	conversants	recommended	as	well).		 I	submitted	a	request	on	the	Conference	Board	of	Canada	website	to	interview	President	and	Chief	Executive	Officer,	Daniel	Muzyka,	and	Glen	Hodgson,	Senior	Vice-President	and	Chief	Economist	at	the	time.	As	detailed	below,	I	ended	up	being	in	a	position	to	interview	both	of	them,	but	as	there	was	some	uncertainty	as	to	whether	I	would	be	able	to	interview	Daniel	Muzyka	I	opted	to	interview	the	Deputy	Chief	Economist,	Pedro	Antunes,	as	well.			
																																																								50	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“UCalgary”	instead	of	“University	of	Calgary.”	51	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“Queen’s”	instead	of	“Queen’s	University.”	52	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“Western”	instead	of	“University	of	Western	Ontario.”	53	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“UMontréal”	instead	of	“Université	de	Montréal.”	54	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“York”	instead	of	“York	University.”	
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	 At	the	IRPP	I	simply	interviewed	Research	Director	Stephen	Tapp,	who	is	a	macroeconomist	and	who	was	recommended	multiple	times	by	fellow	economists;	by	this	point	I	already	had	accumulated	too	many	conversants	and	there	were	no	other	macroeconomists	on	staff	(the	IRPP’s	research	covers	more	than	just	economic	policy,	whereas	the	other	centrist	and	right-of-centre	think	tanks	I	examined	were	more	focused	on	economic	policy	issues).		 I	adopted	a	slightly	different	approach	with	the	Bank	of	Canada	as	there	were	a	great	deal	more	possible	conversants	in	the	Economics	division	there.55	I	initially	intended	to	engage	in	systematic	sampling	of	the	221	candidates	listed	on	the	website	until	a	total	of	15	conversants	had	been	selected.	Unfortunately,	as	I	discovered,	the	Bank	of	Canada	website	does	not	list	contact	information	for	individual	employees.	Because	I	had	received	messages	from	a	Bank	of	Canada	email	address	for	my	Master’s	research,	I	deduced	that	the	Bank	would	use	the	same	formula	for	all	employees	(first	initial	+	first	name	@bankofcanada.ca)	and	proceeded	to	contact	members	of	the	Governing	Council	and	Senior	Management	that	way.	I	did	not	receive	a	single	direct	response	to	any	of	these	messages;	instead,	I	learned	about	the	presence	of	gatekeepers	within	the	Bank	of	Canada.	I	received	a	message	from	an	administrative	assistant	who	noted	that	I	had	contacted	several	employees	at	the	Bank	and	asked	for	further	particulars	as	to	what	I	was	studying,	to	whom	I	wished	to	speak,	and	so	on.	I	complied	with	her	requests	and,	as	detailed	below,	eventually	secured	one	interview.	I	was	unsuccessful	in	a	further	attempt	at	finding	so	much	as	a	second	current	Bank	of	Canada	employee	as	a	conversant,	also	detailed	below;	all	in	all,	then,	my	results	looked	nothing	like	a	stratified	sample.		 I	did,	however,	manage	to	interview	two	high-profile	former	employees	of	the	Bank	of	Canada.	Tiff	Macklem,	now	the	Dean	of	the	Rotman	School	of	Management	at	UToronto,	was	the	Senior	Deputy	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	under	Mark	Carney.	David	Dodge,	now	a	Bay	Street56	lawyer	at	Bennett	Jones	LLP,	was	the	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	from	2001	to	2008.	Perhaps	because	he	had	so	recently	been	a	part	of	the	Bank,	Tiff	Macklem	required	that	questions	be	submitted	in	advance	(from	which	he	selected	a	small,	and	distinctly	uncontroversial,	subset	to	answer)	and	seemed	somewhat	hesitant	to	be	interviewed.	
																																																								55	A	total	of	301	economists	(“with	a	regular	employee	status”)	worked	at	the	Bank	of	Canada	as	of	30	November	2016	(Prom,	2016).	56	Canada’s	Wall	Street	equivalent.	
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	 Finally,	I	selected	my	academic	conversants	on	the	basis	of	several	considerations.	First,	in	line	with	the	goal	of	determining	the	views	and	social	norms	among	elite	Canadian	economists,	I	surveyed	national	rankings	of	economics	departments	and	selected	those	that	most	consistently	appeared	in	the	list	of	the	top	ten;	there	were	eleven	of	these.	Most	were	housed	within	U15	universities.57	They	comprised:	UBC	(Vancouver	School	of	Economics	and	the	Sauder	School	of	Business	–	2	departments	in	the	top	ten);	UToronto	(Department	of	Economics	and	Rotman	School	of	Management	–	2	departments	in	the	top	ten);	Queen’s,	Western;	McGill;	UCalgary58;	and	UMontréal.	The	remaining	two	universities	(not	in	the	U15)	were	SFU	and	York.	Several	other	universities	could	reasonably	be	classed	as	being	in	the	top	ten;	the	rankings	were	less	than	consistent.	I	ended	up	with	conversants	from	two	of	these	institutions,	the	University	of	Ottawa59	and	Carleton	University,	for	other	reasons.	If	time	and	resources	had	permitted,	I	would	have	interviewed	professors	from	Dalhousie	University,	McMaster	University,	the	University	of	Manitoba,	and	the	University	of	Alberta	as	well.			 I	included	the	two	business	schools	for	two	reasons	–	first,	they	did	indeed	make	it	into	most	rankings	of	the	top	economics	departments	in	the	country.	Second,	as	mentioned	above,	business	schools	now	account	for	a	majority	share	of	economics	education	provision	in	some	universities.	Economics	–	and	related	fields	such	as	finance	–	is	now	a	dominant	discipline	in	business	schools	(Fourcade	&	Khurana,	2013),	and	in	Canada,	as	in	the	U.S.,	there	are	more	students	and	professors	in	business	schools	than	in	economics	departments	themselves	(Canadian	Association	of	University	Teachers,	2010).	Among	the	top	twenty	business	schools	and	economics	departments	in	the	U.S.,	there	are	nearly	as	many	economics	PhDs	teaching	in	the	former	as	there	are	in	the	latter.			 Within	the	eleven	institutions	I	prioritised	in	my	sample	(at	nine	universities),	I	targeted	full	professors	and	macroeconomists	initially.	I	targeted	the	former	due	to	my	intention	to	study	elite	economists’	views	and	norms,	and	full	professors	enjoy	the	esteem	associated	with	their	positions	(and	often	attain	those	positions	due	to	respect	for	their	work).																																																										57	A	consortium	of	Canada’s	large	public	research	universities.	58	I	should	note	that	the	University	of	Calgary’s	School	of	Public	Policy,	whose	founder	and	director,	Jack	Mintz,	I	interviewed,	could	be	classified	as	a	think	tank	by	many	measures;	in	my	analysis	I	take	this	into	account.	59	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“Ottawa”	instead	of	“University	of	Ottawa.”	
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	 I	targeted	macroeconomists	for	many	reasons.	First,	my	research	concerns,	in	part,	the	contrast	between	autodidact	and	institutionally	educated	economists;	the	COMER	group	is	a	rare	example	of	the	former,	and	they	are	chiefly	concerned	with	macroeconomics.	It	therefore	made	sense	to	make	this	the	basis	of	my	comparison.	Besides	which,	central	bankers,	the	federal	department	of	finance,	and	the	chief	economists	of	the	largest	banks	–	three	of	the	most	important	groups	of	economists	in	my	study	–	deal	in	macroeconomics	as	well.			 Second,	macroeconomists	as	a	group	do	not	appear	to	have	the	same	common	left-	or	right-wing	political	valence	as	do	economists	from	other	specialties	in	economics;	in	their	2000	study	Fuller	and	Geide-Stevenson	found	that,	unlike	propositions	in	microeconomics,		“macroeconomic	propositions	exhibit	a	lower	degree	of	consensus”	(2003,	p.	369),	with	macroeconomists’	views	representing	a	broader	range	of	points	along	the	political	spectrum.	In	contrast	with	microeconomics,	macroeconomics	has	been	termed	“heterogenous”[sic]	(Henriksen,	Seabrooke,	&	Young,	2016,	p.	2)	and	“always	the	hardest	and	most	controversial	part	of	the	subject”	(Coyle,	2009,	p.	271).	As	it	was	put	by	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	“There	are	no	competing	schools	of	thought	in	microeconomics	–	which	is	unified	and	has	a	common	core	among	all	economists.	The	same	cannot	be	said	of	macroeconomics	–	where	there	are,	and	have	been,	competing	schools	of	thought	about	how	to	explain	the	behavior	of	economic	aggregates	(Rodrigo,	2012).”	Although	some	claim	that	these	disagreements	are	lessening	over	time	(Blanchard,	Dell’Ariccia,	&	Mauro,	2010),	there	are	others	who	think	the	gap	has	widened,	speaking	of	“the	chasm	between	different	macroeconomists	in	the	early	2009	debate	about	the	scale	of	the	economic	stimulus	package	needed	to	respond	to	the	banking	crisis	and	the	onset	of	recession.	One	set	of	economists	turned	to	Keynes	for	analysis	and	solutions,	the	other	to	the	monetarists	of	the	Chicago	school.	An	ideological	fissure	which	had	narrowed	during	the	stable	1990s	has	reopened,	and	in	terms	which	have	changed	little	in	a	generation”	(Coyle,	2009,	p.	264).				 Both	the	literature	and	my	conversants	seemed	to	indicate	that	there	was,	indeed,	more	disagreement	among	macroeconomists	than	microeconomists.	Even	those	whose	findings	contradicted	this	assumption	–	Ricketts	and	Shoesmith	did	not	find	this	to	be	the	case,	for	example	–	still	found	that	“the	effects	of	personal	characteristics	on	response	patterns	was	most	evident	in	the	case	of	macro-normative	propositions”	(1992,	p.	212),	meaning	that	social,	educational,	and	other	
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factors	can	have	a	significant	effect	on	one’s	views	in	the	macroeconomics	sphere	to	an	extent	that	is	not	true	of	microeconomics.				 Third,	there	were	sound	methodological	reasons	for	targeting	macroeconomists.	Most	economists	are	microeconomists	(Coyle,	2009;	Woolley,	2013);	macroeconomics	is	the	largest	single	area	of	study	among	economists,	but	the	combined	number	of	microeconomists	vastly	outnumbers	macroeconomists	(Roeder,	2014).	Since	there	are	fewer	macroeconomists	and	they	are	much	less	likely	to	be	divided	into	subdisciplines,	it	was	easier	to	interview	a	viable	proportion	of	macroeconomists	in	Canada.	If	I	had	spread	my	sample	over	microeconomists	as	well,	I	would	have	had	a	much	less	complete	picture	of	any	given	subfield	of	economics.				 A	fourth	reason	is	also	methodological;	it	would	appear	that	the	data	revolution	in	economics	in	recent	years	has	mainly	helped	microeconomics	as	a	field;	macroeconomists	are	more	likely	to	still	be	working	with	models	and	theory,	which	is	where	“representative	agents”	and	the	like	may	play	a	role.	Indeed,	although	most	of	her	book	constitutes	a	defence	of	the	field	of	economics,	Coyle	writes:		 	Practising	macroeconomists	appear	to	be	relying	on	the	analysis	which	featured	in	my	textbooks	of	the	early	1980s;	meanwhile,	the	macroeconomics	taught	in	universities	is	the	blind	alley	of	“dynamic	stochastic	general	equilibrium”	models,	a	massively	technical	approach	which	has	taken	on	board	none	of	the	microeconomic	insights	described	in	the	earlier	chapters	of	this	book.	Why	does	modern	macroeconomics	not	make	more	use	of	multiple	equilibrium	models,	learning	from	the	insights	of	growth	theory?	These	do	exist,	for	example,	in	the	work	of	Roger	Farmer,	which	explains	“animal	spirits”	in	terms	of	self-fulfilling	expectations	(see	Farmer	1993).	Why	have	macroeconomists	not	incorporated	the	now-old	insight	that	the	structure	of	the	economy	changes	dramatically	from	time	to	time	and	there	are	periods	when	“normal”	models	will	not	apply?	Why	have	so	few	macroeconomists	incorporated	characteristics	such	as	imperfect	information?	I	do	not	know	the	answer,	only	that	the	failure	of	macroeconomists	to	learn	from	the	advances	of	microeconomists	explains	why	so	many	people	think	the	economic	crisis	is	also	a	crisis	of	economics.”	(2009,	p.	264).			 A	fifth	reason	is	perhaps	even	more	important:	macroeconomics	is	the	subfield	of	economics	implicated	in	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis.	“Economic	theory	based	on	monetarism	and	the	neoclassical	synthesis,	and	the	equilibrium	and	econometric	models	derived	from	them,	famously	and	spectacularly	failed	to	predict	the	crisis”	(Walks,	2014,	p.	258),	in	part	because	these	theories	and	models	largely	failed	to	include	debt	and	credit	(ibid.).	Market	crashes	at	the	national	and	international	level	fall	within	the	domain	of	macroeconomics,	and	“[t]he	fact	that	neoclassical	
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approaches	and	perspectives	predominate	among	economists	working	within	central	banks,	university	economics	departments,	and	the	private	financial	sector	as	a	whole,	helps	explain	why	the	dominant	trope	being	propounded	is	that	‘no	one	saw	this	coming’”	(ibid.,	p.	258).	Macroeconomics	is	also	implicated	in	the	current	debates	around	austerity,	quantitative	easing,	financialisation	of	the	economy,	and	inflated	asset	prices	–	all	hot	topics	at	the	moment.		 Finally,	there	is	good	reason	to	examine	a	discipline	that	is,	even	within	economics	as	a	field,	a	highly	geographically	concentrated	phenomenon.	Although	macroeconomics	famously	took	off	in	Cambridge,	UK,	and	Austria,	most	well-known	macroeconomists	now	are	American	and/or	teach	at	American	universities;	“In	micro,	while	American	universities	lead	the	field,	there	are	lots	of	other	world-class	hubs	too.	Mr	Tirole	and	Mr	Rochet	are	based	in	Toulouse,	and	Britain	is	still	an	excellent	place	to	do	micro.	Macroeconomics,	by	comparison,	is	an	all-American	affair”	(The	Economist,	2012).	If	this	is	true,	or	perceived	to	be	true,	there	is	a	good	reason	to	examine	this	in	the	Canadian	context,	as	so	many	Canadian	economists	are	U.S.-educated.		 If,	during	the	selection	process,	I	was	unable	to	find	two	professors	in	each	institution	who	were	both	macroeconomists	and	full	professors,	I	sought	out	full	professors	with	expertise	in	income	inequality	as	an	alternative.	I	picked	this	category	of	professors	because	of	the	underlying	intention	to	include	extreme/deviant	cases	in	my	sample;	professors	with	a	particular	interest	in	income	inequality	are	likely	to	be	concerned	about	the	issue	on	a	personal	level,	and	this	may	say	something	about	their	ideological	orientation.	I	believed	this	consideration	would	provide	an	instructive	contrast.		 If	unable	to	find	full	professors	in	either	of	these	two	areas,	I	would	resort	to	contacting	professors	lower	down	the	academic	hierarchy.	This	only	happened	only	rarely	in	the	event,	and	as	such	my	sample	skewed	older	than	average;	I	will	return	to	this	point	in	the	discussion	and	analysis	sections	of	the	thesis.		 Finally,	in	line	with	the	need	to	select	extreme/deviant	cases	in	order	to	provide	instructive	contrast,	I	sought	out	more	heterodox	economists	than	had	organically	made	it	into	my	sample.	In	fact,	only	one	of	the	academic	conversants	in	my	original	sample	was	an	avowed	heterodox	economist;	the	other	three	heterodox	academic	economists	in	my	sample	were	chosen	later,	on	the	basis	of	recommendations	from	their	economist	colleagues.	In	this	way	I	was	able	to	interview	four	out	of	the	five	
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best-known	heterodox	economists	in	the	country,	only	one	of	whom	teaches	at	one	of	the	eleven	target	institutions	(John	Smithin	at	York).	Two	of	the	others,	Marc	Lavoie	and	Mario	Seccareccia,	teach	at	UOttawa	(which	does	appear	on	some	top	ten	lists),	while	the	fourth,	Louis-Philippe	Rochon,	teaches	at	Laurentian	University.	The	interviews	with	these	economists	were	very	helpful	in	determining	the	place	heterodox	economists	occupy	within	the	academic	sphere,	and	in	learning	about	alternative	approaches	to	the	field	more	generally.		 As	alluded	to	above,	the	difficulty	in	securing	face-to-face	interviews	with	Bill	Robson,	President	and	CEO	of	the	C.D.	Howe	Institute,	and	Daniel	Muzyka,	President	and	CEO	of	the	Conference	Board	of	Canada,	necessitated	the	use	of	telephone	interviews	–	the	only	two	instances	in	which	I	resorted	to	such	an	option.	Stephens	–	who,	in	a	strange	parallel,	is	one	of	the	only	researchers	I	know	of	to	focus	on	elite	economists	–	points	to	a	number	of	potential	difficulties	associated	with	telephone	interviews:	the	risk	of	interruption,	the	difficulty	in	directing	the	topic	of	conversation,	a	lack	of	visual	cues	to	aid	in	communication,	the	need	to	articulate	questions	more	clearly,	lack	of	control	over	the	environment,	the	inability	to	hand	over	preparatory	materials	in	person,	and	complications	in	recording	interviews	(Stephens,	2007).	Of	these,	the	first	four	were	important	considerations,	although	they	did	not	turn	out	to	be	problematic;	both	conversants	were	respectful	of	pauses	and	did	not	interrupt	unduly,	the	sound	quality	was	good,	and	the	rapport	we	developed	was	scarcely	less	than	what	I	had	formed	with	other	conversants,	despite	the	seniority	of	the	interviewees	(they	represented,	respectively,	the	two	largest	and	most	influential	centre-	or	centre-right	think	tanks	in	the	country).	In	both	cases	I	asked	to	record	the	interview,	which	Robson	and	Muzyka	both	consented	to,	and	the	sound	was	miraculously	clear.	The	only	paperwork	I	had	used	in	other	interviews	were	consent	forms,	which	I	simply	emailed	to	both	conversants’	assistants.				 In	the	design	of	my	interview	questions,	I	included	a	number	of	background	questions	designed	to	induce	the	conversants	to	relate	a	narrative	of	their	economics	education	and	how	they	came	to	be	economists.	Herein	lies	the	importance	of	the	concept	of	narrative	identity,	the	narrative	construction	of	a	sort	of	“life	story”	that	lends	coherence	to	a	series	of	events	or	concepts,	which	can	be	applied	to	individuals	or	communities/nations	alike	(Gardner,	2010;	Ricoeur,	1991).	As	a	species,	humans	tend	towards	storytelling	(Wilson,	2012)	and	thus	are	more	willing	and	able	to	absorb	information	in	narrative	form;	they	also	construct	meaning	out	of	cohesive	
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narratives	(Hendel-Giller,	2010).	The	“narrative	turn”	in	the	social	sciences	in	the	past	two	decades	is	a	recognition	of	the	human	tendency	to	create	narratives	out	of	life	events	(Wyk,	2012)	and	in	fact	Canadian	economists’	narratives	turned	out	to	be	an	excellent	measure	of	the	evolution	of	their	perspectives	and	ideological	commitments	over	the	course	of	their	formal	or	autodidactic	economics	education.			 Some	of	my	conversants	–	especially	many	of	the	COMER	members	–	were	themselves	witnesses	to	major	events	in	economic	history.	Witnessing	the	economic	reality	of	World	War	II,	say,	or	the	stagflation	era	of	the	1970s,	has	the	potential	to	change	the	nature	of	one’s	assessments	of	these	events	and	their	aftermath	(Gardner,	2010);	I	made	sure	to	note	differences	between	my	older	conversants’	perceptions	and	those	of	conversants	whose	views	were	based	on	the	historical	record	and	second-hand	testimony.	I	also,	wherever	possible,	triangulated	my	conversants’	accounts	by	verifying	events,	trends,	and	statistics	revealed	in	my	conversants’	versions	of	history	by	way	of	consultation	with	Statistics	Canada,	official	documents,	and	contemporary	media	accounts	of	the	events	and	facts	in	question	(Duncan,	2004;	N.	L.	Holt,	2003).	Examination	of	various	groups’	historical	narratives	is	not	just	an	academic	exercise;	as	Karen	Ho	indicates:			 	One	of	the	ways	in	which	Wall	Street	investment	bankers	control	their	present	and	future	representations	is	to	strengthen	their	hold	on	the	past.	[In	my	book]	I	thus	examined	in	detail	how	Wall	Street	and	advocates	for	a	finance-centric	approach	to	corporate	America	interpret	and	use	history,	from	their	understanding	of	finance’s	role	as	the	“original”	fountain	of	capital	for	all	public	corporations	to	their	viewing	of	corporations	and	the	stock	market	through	the	lens	of	neoclassical	economic	and	private	property	values	(Ho,	2012,	pg.	40).					 In	essence,	Wall	Street	actors’	interpretation	of	history	allowed	them	to	project	an	image	onto	their	current	and	future	selves;	if	this	is	true	for	Canadian	economists,	their	historical	narratives	would	be	likely	to	continue	to	inform	their	beliefs	and	actions	on	an	ongoing	basis.	Furthermore,	economics	has	a	history	of	being	influenced	by	narrative	accounts	at	times;	the	strange	and	everlasting	popularity	of	Ayn	Rand’s	novels,	especially	Atlas	Shrugged,	helped	spread	of	the	idea	of	the	rational	man,	for	example.	Against	this	background	my	conversants’	narrative	histories	therefore	seemed	particularly	important	to	collect.		 The	other	two	major	components	of	my	interview	questions	were,	first,	those	that	identified	the	conversant’s	view	of	think	tanks	across	the	political	spectrum	and	of	other	economics	departments	in	the	country.	This	was	to	determine	how	legitimate	
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certain	individual	economists	and	groups	appeared	to	their	peers,	but	it	also	helped	place	each	conversant	on	the	political	spectrum	as	they	identified	which	think	tanks	they	trusted	and	why.60		 Finally,	several	interview	questions	probed	my	conversants’	views	of	specific	policy	issues	that	included	an	ethical	dimension	–	questions	relating	to	income	inequality,	tax	evasion,	usury	(a	loaded	term	that	I	used	purposely	in	order	to	elicit	a	response),	and	the	like.	This	was	helpful	in	determining	a)	how	economists	think	through	such	questions	and	b)	to	what	extent	their	ethical	orientations	are	related	to	their	education,	relevant	data,	or	other	factors.		 I	purposely	left	out	any	explicit	mention	of	climate	change,	gender,	and	race	until	the	end;	I	was	interested	in	finding	out	whether	my	conversants	would	bring	up	these	issues	without	my	prompting.	These	“silences”	in	academic	works	and	media	coverage	alike	are	particularly	interesting	in	a	field	like	economics,	which	is	almost	unique	among	the	social	sciences	in	being	dominated	by	men	(May,	McGarvey,	&	Whaples,	2014;	Robb	et	al.,	2006);	in	my	own	examinations	of	the	faculty	profiles	of	economics	departments	in	Canada,	there	is	a	similar	dearth	in	racial	diversity	(more	on	this	below).	I	was	interested	in	learning	to	what	extent	these	issues	concerned	economists,	or	even	occurred	to	them.	I	was,	in	my	very	presence,	a	prompt,	as	I	am	a	woman	myself	and	was	often	one	of	the	only	women	in	the	department	other	than	administrative	staff.		 I	was,	similarly,	interested	in	seeing	whether	climate	change	would	be	raised	spontaneously;	this	is	one	area	in	which	mainstream	and	heterodox	economists	alike	share	certain	proclivities.	Most	economists,	as	I	saw,	were	interested	in	correcting	the	“market	failure”	inherent	in	the	“externalities”	associated	with	pollution	and	climate	change;	the	vast	majority	were	in	favour	of	carbon	taxes.	Almost	all	of	them	only	mentioned	this	preference	if	I	brought	it	up	first,	however,	and	almost	all	macroeconomic	models	(all	mainstream	macroeconomic	models	and	nearly	all	heterodox	macroeconomic	models)	are	dependent	on	economic	growth	to	function;																																																									60	Throughout	this	research	I	refer,	when	relevant,	to	a	conversant’s	political	orientation	–	“a	right-wing	academic	economist	said	.	.	.”	for	example.	These	(necessarily	inexact)	categorisations	are	based	on	a)	my	conversants’	collective	labeling	of	the	think	tanks	along	the	political	spectrum	(these	were	remarkably	uniform)	and	b)	individual	conversants’	opinions	of	the	various	think	tanks.	I	was	usually	able	to	discern	their	political	orientation	this	way.	In	the	few	cases	in	which	this	was	not	possible,	I	checked	their	views	of	various	policy	issues	(income	inequality,	etc.)	against	the	views	of	conversants	I	had	been	able	to	categorise	via	the	think	tank	method.	
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this	poses	a	challenge	in	considering	finite	global	resources.	As	climate	change	is	one	of	the	most	pressing	issues	of	our	age,	I	was	interested	in	seeing	whether	it	was	salient	for	economists	and	whether	they	had	thought	about	economic	growth	and	its	apparent	incompatibility	with	long-term	environmental	sustainability.		 Finally,	I	should	mention	that	I	ended	each	interview	with	a	request	for	my	conversant	to	sign	a	consent	form	to	confirm	that	I	could	use	data	from	our	interview	and	to	determine	whether	they	wished	to	remain	anonymous.	One	of	my	conversants,	Professor	Emeritus	John	Helliwell	of	UBC,61	strongly	objected	to	the	practice.	He	viewed	the	time	he	spent	with	me	as	a	gift,	freely	given,	and	an	expression	of	cooperation	between	peers;	the	consent	form,	he	felt,	turned	the	experience	into	a	transactional	one	and	constituted	an	offensive	response	to	the	generosity	of	the	offer	of	one’s	time.	I	have	to	agree	that	it	did	feel	this	way;	I	enjoyed	a	great	deal	of	rapport	with	nearly	all	of	my	conversants,	and	almost	to	a	one	they	felt	like	conversations	that	both	participants	seemed	to	find	interesting.	To	end	off	on	the	note	of	a	legalistic	requirement	felt	gauche	and	it	detracted	from	the	sense	of	gratitude	and	reciprocity	I	otherwise	would	have	felt	post-interview.	Professor	Helliwell	pointed	out	that	our	exchange	rested	on	trust	anyway;	it	was	on	trust	that	I	had	secured	interviews,	that	people	told	me	things	they	trusted	me	to	keep	private	or	not,	and	that	my	faculty	assumed	I	was	getting	appropriate	consent	from	my	conversants.	He	noted	that,	when	he	interviewed	the	president	or	senior	financial	officer	of	the	largest	90	corporations	in	the	country	for	the	federal	government’s	Porter	Commission,	only	one	person	refused	to	talk	to	him.	Similarly,	my	response	rate	was	high,	and	I	was	certainly	the	beneficiary	of	a	generally	high	level	of	cooperation	and	trust	–	in	the	spheres	in	which	I	was	interviewing	and	in	Canadian	society	more	broadly.	Research	ethics	are	important	but,	like	Professor	Helliwell,	I	do	not	view	consent	forms	as	the	best	way	to	ensure	that	ethical	strictures	are	respected.	More	to	the	point,	research	is	itself	a	cooperative	enterprise;	to	inhibit	collaboration	in	this	way	is	a	loss	to	academia	and	to	knowledge	more	generally.	Furthermore,	as	per	the	research	on	prosociality	(Ferraro	et	al.,	2005;	Keltner	et	al.,	2014),	acts	of	generosity	can	induce	a	positive	feedback	in	both	the	giver	and	the	recipient	of	the	generous	act;	if	we	want	more	and	higher-quality	research	we	might	consider	doing	what	we	can	to	encourage	(or	at	least	not	hinder)	that	positive	feedback	loop.																																																									61	Incidentally	one	of	the	people	I	most	enjoyed	speaking	with;	his	answers	revealed	an	amazing	degree	of	breadth	and	depth	of	analysis.	
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Analysis	and	Within-Group	Anonymity			 In	analysing	the	interview	data,	I	listened	to	batches	of	interviews	–	and	even	parts	of	interviews	–	clustered	together	on	the	basis	of	one	or	more	similarities	among	the	conversants	in	that	batch.	This	technique	allowed	me	to	pay	particular	attention	to	commonalities	and	differences	among	individuals	grouped	according	to	certain	factors.	The	groupings	I	used	included	all	of	my	eleven	case	studies	as	well	as	interviews	with	women,	people	of	colour,	Francophones,	people	working	in	Québec,	people	working	in	the	prairies,	people	working	in	British	Columbia,	graduates	of	private	and	public	high	schools,	professors	and/or	graduates	of	a	particular	university,	macroeconomists,	heterodox	economists,	income	inequality	specialists,	people	with	financial	sector	experience,	and	people	with	past	Bank	of	Canada	or	Department	of	Finance	affiliations.	I	listened	to	some	interviews	several	times	in	this	way;	a	person	might	be	a	current	professor	with	experience	at	the	Bank	of	Canada	and	an	affiliation	with	a	couple	of	think	tanks,	for	example.	I	would	therefore	have	listened	to	her	interview	as	a	member	of	each	of	those	categories.	I	took	notes	during	and	after	listening	to	the	interview	each	time,	particularly	noting	themes	that	had	emerged	in	the	course	of	listening	to	interviews	in	a	particular	grouping.				 Separately,	I	coded	for	normative,	prescriptive,	proscriptive,	and	calculative	language,	and	noted	quotations	relevant	to	themes	that	had	emerged.	This	is	in	line	with	a	more	traditional	approach	to	textual	qualitative	analysis.	The	insistence	on	returning	to	the	recorded	versions	of	the	interviews,	however,	allowed	me	to	avoid	reading	transcripts	of	what	were	originally	spoken	data	–	in	the	style	of	the	hermeneutics62	of	old,	that	of	biblical	scholars	and	historians	(Crotty,	1998).	If	we	think	of	hermeneutics	in	the	modern	and	ever-evolving	sense,	however,	we	see	here	that	the	concept	of	a	“hermeneutic	circle”	(Gardner,	2010)	is	highly	relevant.	I	found	that,	in	the	course	of	the	process	of	data	analysis,	it	was	easy	to	become	absorbed	in	the	details	of	an	interview	if	I	had	a	textual	focus	–	while	transcribing,	perhaps,	or	while	extracting	a	quotation	for	comparative	use	in	the	dissertation.	Only	by	repeatedly	exposing	myself	to	the	original	recording	–	itself	stripped	of	some	of	the	context	of	an	in-person	interview,	including	the	setting,	non-verbal	communication,	and	the	like	–	could	I	take	stock	of	the	interview	as	a	whole,	and	thereby	contextualise	its	individual	parts.	By	listening	to	batches	of	interviews	in	a	sort	of	“interview																																																									62	The	study	of	interpretation,	predominantly	of	text.	
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immersion,”	it	became	easier	to	expose	the	Gadamerian	“prejudices”	each	economist	invariably	held	(Gardner,	2010);	conversants	with	certain	commonalities	used	language,	metaphors,	or	perspectives	to	communicate	that	only	became	apparent	in	the	aggregate.		 This	process	logically	extended	to	the	presentation	of	the	interview	data	in	this	dissertation.	A	small	number	of	conversants	requested	full	anonymity	(10	of	58),	and	ultimately	this	was	impossible	without	anonymising	all	members	of	that	conversant’s	group.	For	example,	only	one	of	the	bank	chief	economists	I	spoke	with	requested	anonymity,	which	was	complicated	by	the	fact	that	I	had	interviewed	all	but	one	of	the	current	big	banks’	chief	economists;	it	would	be	easy	to	identify	one	anonymised	conversant	in	this	case.	I	therefore	decided	on	a	policy	of	“within-group	anonymity”	in	my	discussion	and	analysis	chapters.	This	involved	discussing	the	views	of	conversants	within	their	respective	groups	(bank	chief	economists,	for	example,	or	heterodox	economists)	so	that	conversants	are	identified	with	their	roles	rather	than	their	names.	This	was	possible	because	particularly	singular	conversants	–	such	as	the	one	female	former	bank	chief	economist	–	did	not	request	anonymity,	and	thus	their	views	could	be	discussed	in	the	context	of	interview	data	from	both	chief	economists	and	female	economists	even	though	this	de	facto	made	the	conversant	easily	identifiable.		 There	are	special	considerations	that	come	to	the	fore	with	this	approach.	In	the	case	of	the	founders	and	executive	directors	of	the	think	tanks	in	my	sample,	anonymity	strips	analysis	of	power	and	status	from	the	discussion.	It	is	one	thing	to	quote	a	lower-level	employee	of	a	think	tank,	and	quite	another	to	quote	its	founder;	one	has	a	much	greater	role	in	shaping	the	ideological	and	strategic	orientation	of	the	organisation.	I	only	ever	interviewed	between	two	and	four	employees	or	executives	of	a	think	tank	in	my	sample,	however,	meaning	that	the	upper	echelons’	views	were	highly	represented	in	the	discussion	of	data	from	any	particular	think	tank.	In	the	case	of	the	Fraser	Institute,	for	example,	I	only	interviewed	the	founder	and	one	of	the	top	two	executives,	and	therefore	any	quotations	I	used	are	attributable	to	one	or	the	other	–	one	of	whom	requested	anonymity,	while	the	other	did	not.	Thus	it	is	clear	that	the	views	expressed	in	this	section	are	held	by	the	powers-that-be,	even	if	they	are	not	attributable	to	a	particular	individual.	Think	tanks’	purpose	is	to	spark	and/or	engage	in	public	discussions	of	ethical	issues	and	policy	recommendations,	and	the	views	of	their	founders	and	current	leadership	are	not	a	secret;	thus	the	goal	for	this	
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research	is	to	respect	the	wishes	of	individuals	not	to	be	quoted	directly,	while	at	the	same	time	allowing	for	a	discussion	of	the	attitudes	and	beliefs	held	by	the	leadership	of	these	organisations.				
Surveys			 To	supplement	data	from	58	qualitative	interviews,	I	created	and	circulated	a	survey63	among	academics,	the	large	banks’	economics	departments,	PEF	members,	and	COMER	members.	The	longest	version	included	90	questions	while	the	shortest	version	included	46,	several	of	which	were	basic	demographics	questions	and	many	of	which	were	duplicates	of	questions	from	a	large	number	of	surveys	of	economists	in	other	countries	(mainly	the	U.S.)	for	ease	of	comparability	(Alston,	Kearl,	&	Vaughan,	1992;	Caplan,	2002;	Dalen	&	Klamer,	1996;	B.	B.	S.	Frey,	Pommerehne,	Schneider,	&	Gilbert,	2016;	B.	S.	Frey	&	Pommerehne,	1988;	Bruno	S	Frey	&	Eichenberger,	1993;	D.	A.	Fuller,	Alston,	&	Vaughan,	1995;	D.	Fuller	&	Geide-Stevenson,	2003;	Gordon	&	Dahl,	2013;	Klein	&	Stern,	2007,	2005;	Maesse,	2015;	Pieper	&	Willis,	1999;	Ricketts	&	Shoesmith,	1992;	Sapienza	&	Zingales,	2013;	Siegfried	&	Round,	2001;	Slemrod,	1995;	Stock	&	Siegfried,	2014,	2015;	Wakeling,	2009).			 A	disproportionate	number	of	questions	in	my	survey	came	from	the	1988	Block	&	Walker	mail-in	survey	of	Canadian	Economics	Association	members	as	the	only	other	survey	of	Canadian	economists	of	this	kind.	Although	Block	and	Walker	made	every	effort	to	ensure	impartiality,	the	envelopes	respondents	received	all	bore	the	imprint	of	the	Fraser	Institute,	perhaps	the	most	controversial	and	polarising	economics	organisation	in	Canada.	This	is	a	group	of	which	one	of	my	conversants,	a	bank	chief	economist,	declared,	“The	Fraser	Institute	is	garbage.	Because	they’re	totally	following	an	agenda.”	He	went	on	to	say	that	the	organisation	did	“all	sorts	of	stupid	things”	such	as	committing	the	cardinal	sin	of	reversing	the	direction	of	causality.	Even	professors	who	had	worked	with	(or	even	served	as	Senior	Fellows	for)	the	Fraser	Institute	offered	judgments	such	as:																																																											63	With	adjustments	based	on	audience	–	the	longest	version	was	circulated	among	professors,	PEF	members,	and	COMER	members,	while	a	much	shorter	version	(at	their	request)	was	circulated	among	the	private	banks’	economics	departments.	
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“I	think	that	the	Fraser	Institute	is	viewed	as	more	biased	than	the	C.D.	Howe,	but	they	both	correspond	quite	closely	to	my	views.”			 “The	Fraser	Institute	does	actually	pretty	good	work.	But	they’ve	got	a	terrible	reputation	of	being	in	the	pocket	of	the	corporate	sector	and	they’re	too	right-wing.”					 Conversants	from	the	opposite	end	of	the	political	spectrum	were	somewhat	predictably	dismissive,	declaring,	for	example,	“The	C.D.	Howe	Institute	once	in	a	while	comes	up	with	an	interesting	study.	The	Fraser	Institute	I	think	is	the	worst.”	Even	those	on	the	fringe	of	economic	debate	perceived	the	Fraser	Institute	as	an	outlier;	as	one	COMER	member	put	it,	“They’re	sort	of	really	out	there.”	But	commentators	from	the	middle-of-the-road	or	right-of-centre	were	hardly	more	sympathetic;	one	Conference	Board	conversant	said,	“Fraser	is	viewed	as	an	outlier	in	Canada,	for	example,”	and	in	describing	one	of	their	top	executives,	“He’s	a	true	believer.	Sort	of	–	damn	the	facts,	this	is	what	I	believe.”	A	C.D.	Howe	Institute	conversant	agreed:	“You	know	that	their	entire	mission,	and	everything	they	publish,	will	say	‘The	solution	is	always	a	free-market	solution.	Less	government	is	best.’	If	you	see	something	from	them,	it’s	not	going	to	be	a	terribly	original	solution.”			 The	response	from	academics	was	mixed	but	largely	negative,	with	the	most	positive	comments	mainly	descriptive,	in	the	vein	of	describing	the	Fraser	Institute	as	“libertarian”	and	“not	wildly	influential”;	another	professor	said,	“when	you	know	it	comes	from	them,	you	discount	it	to	a	certain	extent.	[.	.	.]	But	that’s	true	of	all	think	tanks.”		 			 Most	professors	had	fewer	positive	things	to	say;	one	UBC	professor	was	not	aware	of	any	colleagues	affiliated	with	the	Fraser	Institute,	“and	I	think	at	UBC	we	would	kind	of	say,	‘Really?’”	Another	UBC	professor	had	been	approached	to	be	on	their	original	board	of	directors,	to	which	he	responded,	“Not	on	your	life.”	Others	were	equally	dismissive:		 “The	think	tank	that	I	don’t	rate	very	highly	is	the	Fraser	Institute.	[.	.	.]	My	perception	was	that	they	were	a	little	bit	iffy.	You	won’t	see	academic	economists	quoting	their	work	or	relying	on	it.”				 “I	would	never	be	affiliated	with	the	Fraser	Institute.	[.	.	.	They’re]	a	very	right-wing	group.”				 “They’re	garbage.”		
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	 This	is	all	to	say	that	Block	and	Walker’s	1988	survey,	the	only	such	survey	of	Canadian	economists,	may	not	have	elicited	responses	across	a	broadly	representative	group	of	economists.	Their	33%	response	rate	may	have	generated	a	disproportionate	number	of	respondents	with	strong	views	–	positive	or	negative	–	of	this	polarising	organisation,	which	could	have	affected	the	results.		 My	dissertation	aims	to	build	on	the	Block	and	Walker	survey	by	replicating	some	of	their	questions	–	along	with	questions	from	other	surveys	of	economists	around	the	world	and	a	small	number	of	new	questions	that	reflect	burgeoning	concerns	of	the	era.	There	will	surely	have	been	biases	in	the	response	to	my	survey	as	well	–	the	University	of	Cambridge	may	elicit	certain	associations	for	some	people,	for	example,	and	my	sample	is	not	representative	–	but	a	survey	from	an	academic	institution	will	probably	be	viewed	as	more	neutral	than	the	Fraser	Institute.			 I	was	not	quite	as	lucky	as	Block	and	Walker	in	terms	of	access,	however;	I	approached	the	CEA	and	the	Canadian	Association	of	Business	Economists	(CABE)	about	circulating	the	survey,	but	despite	a	lengthy	back-and-forth	in	both	cases,	the	attempt	was	unsuccessful.64	Of	the	large	banks’	economics	departments,	only	two	consented	to	circulate	the	survey,	which	generated	only	7	responses.	Survey	samples	for	PEF	members	was	similarly	small,	at	17	responses.	It	would	be	difficult	to	come	to	firm	conclusions	as	to	the	education	and	beliefs	of	these	groups	due	to	the	small	sample	size,	as	I	discuss	in	the	results	section.		 Academics	constituted	the	vast	majority	of	my	respondents	in	the	end.	I	circulated	the	survey	among	the	economics	departments	of	every	U15	university	plus	York,	SFU,	the	University	of	New	Brunswick,	and	Laurentian,65	as	well	as	the	two	business	schools	in	my	earlier	sample:	the	Sauder	School	of	Business	at	UBC	and	the	Rotman	School	of	Management	at	Toronto.	The	heads	of	department	circulated	the	survey	on	my	behalf	at	Alberta,	Saskatchewan,	Manitoba,	Toronto,	McGill,	Laval,	and	
																																																								64	Eventually	I	learned	that	both	organisations	had	later	been	approached	by	a	separate	group	of	researchers	hoping	to	circulate	a	survey	that	would	allow	them	to	update	Block	&	Walker’s	results.	CABE	allowed	their	survey	to	go	forward	but	not	mine,	which	was	initially	quite	disappointing	but	eventually	resulted	in	an	interesting	set	of	discussions	around	legitimacy	in	the	field.	Luckily	we	were	able	to	come	to	a	cooperative	resolution;	we	all	agreed	to	share	our	results,	and	CABE	agreed	to	discuss	appending	a	few	of	my	questions	to	one	of	their	upcoming	surveys.	65	I	added	the	University	of	New	Brunswick	and	Laurentian	because	they	are	both	small	departments	with	an	unusual	concentration	of	heterodox	economists.	
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SFU;66	for	the	rest	I	had	to	assemble	academics’	email	addresses	manually.67	Among	academics	I	received	99	responses	in	total,	approximately	10%	of	all	academic	economists	in	the	country.	As	this	thesis	concerns	the	education	of	economists,	it	was	fortuitous	that	the	response	rate	among	economics	educators	was	the	best	by	far.68			
	
	
Relational	Ethics/Access			 The	issue	of	access	is	a	potentially	problematic	and	time-consuming	one	in	conducting	elite	interviews.	This	is	one	of	the	reasons	sample	sizes	tend	to	be	smaller	in	research	examining	such	populations	(Richards,	1996);	however,	many	of	my	conversants	likely	had	not	fielded	many	interview	requests	from	researchers,	seeing	as	Canadian	economists	and	Canadian	issues	generally	are	under-studied,	which	may	have	contributed	to	a	better	response	rate	than	might	have	been	expected.				 Trust	between	the	researcher	and	conversants	is	chief	among	the	ethical	concerns	raised	by	this	study,	and	indeed	relational	ethics	is	a	common	concern	among	researchers	using	interviews	as	data	(Doloriert	&	Sambrook,	2012;	Ellis	et	al.,	2011).	Given	that	I	was	(and	still	must	be)	prepared	for	the	possibility	that	my	findings	may	not	please	any	of	the	groups	of	participants	I	am	studying,	the	initial	representation	to	potential	interviewees	of	the	purpose	of	my	research	was	a	delicate	matter.	In	terms	of	access	to	COMER	members,	I	have	the	advantage	of	being	the	granddaughter	of	a	respected	long-time	COMER	member	and	was	thus	probably	assumed	to	be	sympathetic	to	the	economic	and	political	orientation	of	the	group.	This	raises	a	further	ethical	conundrum,	however,	in	that	COMER	might	consider	my	findings	to	be	unfavourable	to	their	group	and	their	cause.				 Access	in	the	case	of	my	other	conversants	chiefly	raised	issues	specific	to	research	on	elites	and	elite	culture	(Goldman	&	Swayze,	2012;	Hertz	&	Imber,	1995;	Mikecz,	2012).	Members	of	elite	groups	typically	receive	many	more	requests	for																																																									66	I	am	grateful	to	these	Department	Heads	for	sparing	me	hours	of	mindless	(and	repetitive	strain-exacerbating)	labour!	67	This	may	have	affected	the	response	rate	and	the	distribution	of	responses,	as	economists	who	would	respond	to	the	source	of	one	appeal	may	have	not	responded	to	the	other	and	vice	versa.	68	The	distribution	of	these	responses	was	uneven,	however;	although	it	was	to	be	predicted	that	the	bulk	of	respondents	would	come	from	large	departments	(SFU	and	Toronto	together	accounted	for	44.4%	of	responses),	there	were	disproportionately	few	responses	from	McGill,	Laval,	and	UMontréal.	
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interviews	than	they	are	prepared	to	grant.	Moreover,	their	seniority	and	influence	places	them	in	an	elevated	position	relative	to	that	of	the	average	academic	researcher.	Elites	also	commonly	make	use	of	gatekeepers	whose	task	is	to	mediate	access	to	them.	For	these	reasons,	personal	connections	are	usually	required	to	arrange	elite	interviewees;	although	I	had	some	such	advantage	among	COMER	and	PEF	members,	I	had	no	relevant	personal	connections	among	the	others.	Access	therefore	remained	an	issue	even	with	my	so-called	“non-elite”	conversants,	although	for	different	reasons.								 For	COMER	members	trust	may	have	been	a	particular	issue:	because	they	have	been	so	thoroughly	ignored	–	even	maligned	–	by	the	mainstream	in	Canada,	it	was	possible	that	COMER	members	might	assume	that	a	researcher	would	only	approach	their	group	as	a	curiosity	or	as	a	gang	of	conspiracy	theorists.	Fortunately	I	had	suitable	credentials.	I	approached	COMER	leaders	and	cross-country	membership	through	the	friends	of	my	late	grandfather,	who	was	a	trusted	and	esteemed	member	of	the	local	chapter	in	Saskatoon,	Saskatchewan,	right	up	until	his	death	in	2008	at	the	age	of	95.69						 I	first	approached	my	grandfather’s	fellow	committee	member	Kateri	Pino,	who	had	already	shared	COMER	reading	materials	with	me;	Paul	Hellyer	(see	below),	for	whom	my	grandfather	organised	several	local	speaking	engagements	over	the	years;	and	William	Krehm,	one	of	the	co-founders	of	COMER	and	a	plaintiff	in	their	court	case.70	As	noted	above,	Krehm’s	assistant,	Rita,	helpfully	provided	contact	information	for	other	COMER	members.	Of	those,	Connie	Fogal,	Michael	Sinclair,	Stewart	Sinclair	(no	relation),	and	Rocco	Galati	(COMER’s	lawyer)	responded	promptly	to	my	queries.	I	spent	a	great	deal	of	time	tracking	down	William	Krehm’s	co-litigant	in	the	COMER	court	case,	Ann	Emmett,	as	she	does	not	use	email	and	was	otherwise	difficult	to	reach	due	to	health	issues.	Luckily	she	did	return	my	calls	at	long	last	and	invited	me	to	her	home	for	a	lovely	meal	and	an	interview	nearly	three	hours	long.	I	spent	at	least	as	much	time	attempting	to	track	down	former	Deputy																																																									69	My	grandfather	was	a	rural	politician	at	the	local	level,	a	life-long	farmer	and	autodidact	with	a	primary	school	education.	Even	as	a	farmer	my	grandfather	had	the	spirit	of	an	autodidact;	he	lived	in	agricultural	communes	in	Russia,	Cuba,	and	China	in	the	1960s,	1970s,	and	1980s	for	periods	of	weeks	or	months,	and	Raul	Castro	once	showed	him	around	the	former	Castro	estate	(which	we	only	discovered	due	to	a	casual	comment	my	grandfather	made	upon	Fidel	Castro’s	abdication).	70	The	COMER	court	case	against	the	federal	government	concerns	the	role	of	the	Bank	of	Canada;	COMER	argues	that	the	Bank	should	lend	to	the	federal	and	provincial	governments	at	no	interest.	
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Prime	Minister	and	founder	of	the	Canadian	Action	Party,	Paul	Hellyer,	for	an	interview;	although	he	at	one	point	responded	to	one	of	my	emails,	he	did	not	respond	thereafter	and	I	was	eventually	forced	to	abandon	the	effort.	As	he	is	now	93	years	of	age,	that	was	perhaps	unsurprising.		 I	had	a	few	entrees	to	the	PEF,	having	interviewed	several	contributing	authors	for	my	MSc	thesis	on	the	Canadian	banking	system,	and	as	I	had	hoped,	PEF	members	were	as	helpful	with	this	research	as	they	were	with	my	previous	project.		 On	the	central	banking	side,	access	was	a	great	deal	more	difficult.	Although	it	was	a	lofty	aim,	I	contacted	former	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	(and	current	Bank	of	England	Governor)	Mark	Carney	in	order	to	reach	high-level	employees	of	the	Bank	of	Canada;	I	had	interviewed	him	for	my	Master’s	thesis	and	still	had	his	personal	Canadian	cell	phone	number.71	Somewhat	predictably,	I	was	not	able	to	reach	him.	As	indicated	above,	I	guessed	the	email	addresses	of	the	current	Governor,	the	Senior	Deputy	Governor,	the	four	Deputy	Governors,	and	a	handful	of	other	employees	and	contacted	them	directly.	I	received	a	response	from	the	Bank’s	Director	of	External	Communications,	who	asked	for	further	details,	which	I	provided	prior	to	receiving	a	response	saying	that	Deputy	Governor	Lawrence	Schembri	had	agreed	to	be	interviewed,	and	that	he	was	“the	executive	sponsor	of	recruiting	for	the	Bank,	so	he	is	the	best	placed,	most	senior	person	for	you	to	speak	with.	Further,	he	is	a	former	professor	of	economics	at	Carleton	University.”	However,	the	interview	was	to	be	“on	background,	which	means	that	you	can	use	the	information	that’s	discussed,	but	you	can’t	quote	DG	Schembri	or	the	Bank.”	I	was	also	asked	to	provide	questions	in	advance,	which	I	politely	declined	to	do	for	methodological	reasons.	I	later	met	with	Craig	Wright,	chief	economist	of	the	Royal	Bank	of	Canada,	who	recommended	that	I	speak	with	Deputy	Governor	Agathe	Cote,	so	I	asked	the	Director	of	External	Communications	whether	that	might	be	possible.	This	request	was	declined	as	well.				 During	our	interview	Lawrence	Schembri	was	unable	to	comment,	even	as	background	information,	on	the	COMER	case	before	the	courts.	Because	of	the	prohibition	against	quoting	Schembri	or	the	Bank,	it	has	been	necessary	to	obscure	whether	my	Bank	of	Canada	conversants	are	current	or	former	employees;	in	this																																																									71	Amusingly,	a	chagrined	Carney	agreed	to	an	interview	for	my	MSc	thesis	after	accidentally	pocket-dialing	me	at	6	AM	Saskatoon	time	(I	believe	he	was	in	London	at	the	time,	perhaps	for	discussions	relating	to	his	later	appointment	to	the	position	of	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	England).	I	had	called	him	after	finding	his	phone	number	in	the	internal	listings	on	our	common	alma	mater’s	alumni	website;	I	assume	it	has	since	been	removed.	
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way	comments	from	the	two	other	Bank	conversants	could	be	mixed	with	Schembri’s	to	maintain	within-group	anonymity.		 Finally,	I	attended	an	event	in	London	featuring	Deputy	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	Carolyn	Wilkins,	at	which	I	slipped	a	message	to	her	assistant,	who	sincerely	promised	to	pass	it	along	to	her.	Perhaps	for	the	same	reasons	of	confidentiality,	I	did	not	receive	a	response.				 It	was	almost	as	challenging	to	gain	access	to	the	chief	economists	of	the	five	largest	private	Canadian	banks,	which	together	account	for	a	large	majority	of	the	Canadian	banking	sector	as	a	whole.	I	was	fortunate	to	come	across	a	notice	of	the	Canada-UK	Chamber	of	Commerce’s	6th	Annual	Canadian	Chief	Economists	Panel	Debate	&	Lunch	in	the	Canadian	High	Commission	newsletter.	The	event	had	a	hefty	price	tag,	but	I	wrote	to	the	organisers	to	ask	whether,	as	my	thesis	topic	concerned	Canadian	economists,	I	might	attend	as	a	guest.	The	event	coordinator	wrote	back	to	say	that	I	could	attend	if	I	helped	with	administrative	tasks	at	the	event,	to	which	I	readily	agreed.	After	the	panel,	I	quickly	approached	the	chief	economist	who	first	separated	himself	from	the	crowd;	this	was	Avery	Shenfeld	of	the	Canadian	Imperial	Bank	of	Commerce	(CIBC),	who	chatted	amiably	with	me	and	gave	me	his	card	so	that	I	could	follow	up.				 By	the	time	we	had	finished	speaking,	the	other	chief	economists	had	dispersed,	but	once	I	secured	an	interview	with	Avery	Shenfeld	I	mentioned	his	name	in	my	emails	to	the	other	chief	economists.	They	all	eventually	responded	positively	to	my	interview	requests	–	with	the	exception	of	Craig	Alexander	of	TD	Trust,	who,	as	it	turned	out,	was	in	the	midst	of	transitioning	into	retirement.	He	was	to	be	replaced	by	Beata	Caranci,	whom	I	attempted	to	contact	a	few	times.	In	one	instance	she	responded	to	say	that	she	was	busy	with	the	transition	but	would	be	available	during	a	specified	period,	but	when	I	contacted	her	during	that	period	she	did	not	respond.	This	was	particularly	disappointing	as	she	was	the	only	current	chief	economist	of	a	major	Canadian	bank	to	whom	I	did	not	speak.	She	was	also	the	only	woman	of	that	group,	and	TD	Trust	has	at	times	been	an	outlier	in	terms	of	its	behaviour	compared	with	other	Canadian	banks	(Livesey,	2012;	Quigley,	2012).	She	was	in	the	midst	of	a	major	career	transition,	however,	so	was	understandable	that	she	did	not	have	time	for	an	interview	with	a	PhD	student.	Fortunately	I	was	able	to	interview	former	TD	Trust	Chief	Economist	Don	Drummond	as	well	as	former	Executive	Vice-President	
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and	Chief	Economist	of	BMO	Financial	Group	Sherry	Cooper,	who	was	able	to	comment	on	the	experience	of	being	a	woman	in	such	a	position.				 As	an	aside,	I	had	attempted	to	contact	economists	at	the	major	Canadian	banks	for	my	Master’s	thesis,	with	extremely	limited	success.	It	was	clear	that	the	personal	conversation	with	Avery	Shenfeld	of	CIBC,	and	the	legitimacy	conferred	upon	my	other	requests	by	the	use	of	his	name,	made	all	the	difference	in	securing	such	an	outstanding	line-up	of	conversants	among	the	major	banks.	Indeed,	the	journalists	from	the	Globe	and	Mail	and	The	Economist	expressed	astonishment	that	I	was	able	to	speak	with	all	but	one	of	the	chief	economists.		 As	I	had	already	gleaned	from	media	commentaries	and	other	researchers,	the	Department	of	Finance	was	much	more	difficult	to	gain	access	to.	Initially	I	simply	sent	emails	and	made	phone	calls	that	were	not	returned.	After	Craig	Wright	of	the	Royal	Bank	of	Canada	specifically	recommended	speaking	with	Deputy	Minister	of	Finance	Paul	Rochon,	I	wrote	a	message	to	Rochon	in	which	I	mentioned	Wright’s	name	and	recommendation;	an	assistant	replied.	She	asked	a	couple	of	questions	about	my	research,	which	I	answered,	to	which	she	responded	by	declining	my	interview	request	–	citing	“calendar	conflicts”	for	the	unspecified	timeframe	in	which	I	had	hoped	to	schedule	the	interview.	I	replied	to	this	message	offering	to	visit	or	call	anytime	over	the	coming	several	months,	but	received	no	response.	After	the	Liberal	Party	won	the	2015	election,	I	again	attempted	to	contact	the	Department	of	Finance	(long	after	my	other	fieldwork	was	completed);	it	again	declined	to	grant	an	interview	with	Rochon	or	the	Minister	of	Finance,	Bill	Morneau.		 Among	the	think	tanks	access	was	much	easier.	At	the	CCPA	I	interviewed	David	Macdonald72	and	his	colleague	Armine	Yalnizyan,	both	of	whom	responded	swiftly	to	my	request.	The	CCPA	helpfully	sent	along	contact	information	for	Jim	Stanford,	founder	of	the	PEF,	who	was	also	willing	to	meet.			 The	C.D.	Howe	Institute	was	just	as	easy	from	the	second	tier	of	the	hierarchy	downwards,	but	securing	the	interview	with	President	and	CEO	Bill	Robson	was	a	challenge.	Vice	President	of	Research	Daniel	Schwanen	and	Associate	Director	of	Research	Ben	Dachis	both	responded	promptly	to	my	request.	Bill	Robson,	on	the	other	hand,	required	repeated	attempts	at	contact.	I	had	already	called	the	Institute,	to	no	avail,	but	later	emailed	him	directly.	In	my	first	written	message	I	mentioned	that	my	conversants	Michael	Trebilcock,	Chris	Ragan,	and	Angelo	Melino,	among																																																									72	Whom	I	had	interviewed	for	my	Master’s	thesis	as	well.	
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others,	had	recommended	that	I	speak	to	him.	Six	months	later,	I	wrote	a	follow-up	message	mentioning	that	I	had	interviewed	Jack	Mintz,	Michael	Walker,	almost	all	of	the	chief	economists	of	the	big	banks,	and	a	slew	of	academic	economists,	a	significant	number	of	whom	had	told	me	–	emphatically	–	to	speak	to	Bill	Robson.	His	assistant	responded	in	the	affirmative	that	time,	although	(as	above)	the	interview	had	to	be	conducted	by	telephone.		 This	experience,	among	others,	drove	home	the	importance	of	mentioning	the	names	of	other	influential	figures	in	any	attempt	to	contact	–	or	re-contact	–	high-profile	conversants.	Indeed,	securing	an	interview	with	one	or	more	influential	economists	makes	it	much	more	likely	to	speak	with	their	peers	in	this	elite	realm,	as	is	the	case	in	other	elite	realms	as	well.		 In	order	to	secure	conversants	at	the	Conference	Board	of	Canada,	which	did	not	have	individuals’	contact	information	listed	online,	I	first	submitted	a	website	comment	requesting	interviews	with	the	President	and	Chief	Executive	Officer,	Daniel	Muzyka,	and	Glen	Hodgson,	Senior	Vice-President	and	Chief	Economist.	Glen	Hodgson’s	administrative	assistant	responded	promptly	to	my	message,	agreeing	to	set	up	a	time	to	interview	Glen	Hodgson	and	suggesting	that	I	interview	Deputy	Chief	Economist	Pedro	Antunes,	which	I	did.	There	were,	unfortunately,	delays	in	scheduling	the	interview	with	Daniel	Muzyka	that	made	it	impossible	for	me	to	interview	him	in	person;	I	therefore	ended	up	interviewing	him	by	telephone	–	one	of	only	two	conversants	I	spoke	to	in	that	way.	Overall	access	at	the	Conference	Board	was	excellent.			 The	Fraser	Institute	was	almost	as	receptive	to	my	requests;	as	mentioned	above,	despite	repeated	attempts	I	was	unable	to	get	an	interview	with	the	current	President,	Niels	Veldhuis.	Executive	Vice-President	Jason	Clemens,	however,	was	a	willing	conversant	and	–	most	unexpectedly	–	the	founder	and	first	President	of	the	Fraser	Institute,	Michael	Walker,	wrote	one	of	the	most	charming	responses	I	received	in	the	course	of	my	fieldwork.73	
																																																								73	Dear	Ms.	Quigley,			I	am	very	pleased	to	receive	a	communication	from	one	with	such	a	distinguished	Irish	heritage.	My	fore-bearers	include	O’Sullivans	and	Collins.	I	have	not	seen	the	name	Quigley	since	growing	up	in	Newfoundland	where	they	were	family	acquaintances.	You	probably	know	that	Quigley	is	an	ancient	Gaelic	name.			
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	 Finally,	among	the	think	tanks	the	IRPP	was	also	highly	responsive.	Several	of	my	conversants	had	recommended	that	I	speak	to	their	Research	Director,	Stephen	Tapp;	he	responded	readily	to	my	request,	and	has	the	distinction	of	submitting	to	the	longest	interview	in	my	study	–	just	over	three	hours.	It	goes	without	saying	that	a	three-hour	interview	early	on	in	the	fieldwork	process	is	a	gift	beyond	measure;	many	of	my	later	strands	of	enquiry	can	be	traced	back	to	that	conversation.		 Among	academics,	my	single	largest	group	of	conversants,	access	was	mixed.	As	a	(loose)	rule,	access	was	more	difficult	at	universities	whose	economics	departments	were	higher	up	the	rankings.	This	was	particularly	true	of	UToronto	and	UBC.	At	UToronto	it	took	me	all	three	rounds	of	fieldwork	–	and	(repeated)	unsuccessful	attempts	at	contacting	around	a	dozen	professors	with	relevant	areas	of	interest	–	to	find	sufficient	conversants	in	both	the	economics	faculty	and	the	Rotman	School	of	Management.	In	the	end,	because	I	had	contacted	so	many	people	there,	I	had	more	than	enough	conversants	from	the	Rotman	School	of	Management;	there	I	interviewed	two	professors	and	the	Dean,	former	Senior	Deputy	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	Canada,	Tiff	Macklem.	None	of	the	first	few	people	I	contacted	at	the	department	of	economics	responded,	so	I	dropped	the	full	professor	and	macroeconomics	requirements	in	contacting	a	third	round	of	conversants;	finally,	a	full	professor	with	a	joint	appointment	to	the	law	school	responded.	At	UBC	I	had	trouble	initially,	which	led	to	an	increase	in	my	contact	rate,	which	resulted	in	overshooting	my	target	of	two	conversants	per	university;	I	ended	up	interviewing	three	professors	there.	At	the	UBC	Sauder	School	of	Business,	on	the	other	hand,	I	never	did	have	any	success;	there	were	very	few	professors	with	biographies	that	were	even	remotely	orthogonal	to	my	study,	and	none	of	them	replied	to	my	interview	requests.	Thus	this	was	the	one	department	among	my	target	institutions	in	which	it	appeared	that	I	would	have	no	conversants	at	all.	Luckily,	the	President	and	Chief	Executive	Officer	of	the	Conference	Board	of	Canada,	Daniel	Muzyka,	whom																																																																																																																																																																														I	would	be	happy	to	talk	to	you	about	the	development	of	Economic	understanding	in	Canada	–	even	if	your	name	was	not	Quigley	J.	You	can	reach	me	at	this	email	or	by	telephone…..I	live	in	Vancouver	now	and	there	is	a	seven	or	eight	hour	time	difference	so	please	take	that	into	account….[phone	number	redacted].			I	am	delighted	that	you	are	doing	an	analysis	of	economic	education.			Best	wishes,			Michael	Walker	
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I	interviewed	last	of	all,	turns	out	to	be	a	full	professor	at	the	Sauder	School	of	Business;	he	is	also	its	former	Dean.	Also,	because	my	repeated	attempts	at	the	UBC	department	of	economics	ended	up	yielding	more	results	than	planned,	I	at	least	ended	up	with	a	workable	number	of	UBC	conversants	overall.		 Queen’s	was	no	trouble	at	all;	I	ended	up	with	two	professors	there	with	very	little	prompting,	and	also	effectively	a	third:	Don	Drummond	of	the	School	of	Policy	Studies	at	Queen’s	was	also	the	Chief	Economist	at	TD	Bank	for	ten	years	(until	2010)	and	spent	almost	23	years	with	the	federal	Department	of	Finance,	and	thus	made	it	into	my	sample	for	other	reasons.		 Western	was	slightly	more	difficult,	but	I	was	extremely	fortunate	in	that	arguably	the	most	famous	academic	macroeconomist	in	Canada,	Professor	David	Laidler,	responded	almost	immediately	to	my	request.	Two	other	professors	either	did	not	reply	or	only	had	time	to	answer	emailed	questions.	After	a	second	email	to	a	fourth	professor,	I	was	able	to	find	another	conversant	to	interview	there.		 At	York	one	of	the	first	two	professors	I	contacted	responded	immediately,	while	it	took	me	months	(and	repeated	relaxation	of	my	search	requirements)	to	secure	my	second	York	conversant;	that	professor,	although	she	held	a	post	in	the	department	of	economics,	was	in	fact	housed	in	the	School	of	Public	Policy	&	Administration	there.				 At	McGill,	similarly,	my	first	conversant	was	relatively	painless	to	secure	but	the	second	appeared	not	to	be	forthcoming.	Because	I	ended	up	contacting	so	many	professors	in	hopes	of	finding	a	second	conversant,	several	of	whom	I	contacted	in	a	rather	large	batch	as	I	began	to	worry	about	running	out	of	time,	I	ended	up	interviewing	a	total	of	three	McGill	professors.				 SFU	was	a	severe	challenge;	had	I	not	approached	professor	emeritus	John	Chant	due	to	his	Fraser	Institute	affiliation,	and	if	Professor	Krishna	Pendakur	had	not	agreed	to	a	brief	interview	after	many	failed	attempts	among	his	colleagues,	I	would	have	struggled	to	represent	SFU	at	all.				 At	UCalgary,	access	was	excellent;	the	assistant	to	the	Founder,	Director,	and	Palmer	Chair	in	Public	Policy	at	the	School	of	Public	Policy	(a	pseudo-think	tank	housed	within	the	university),	Jack	Mintz,	responded	almost	instantaneously	to	my	request	for	an	interview,	while	the	first	and	fourth	professors	I	contacted	in	the	Economics	Department	both	consented	to	an	interview.		
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		 At	UMontréal	both	of	the	first	two	conversants	I	sought	out	agreed	to	an	interview;	so	did	all	of	my	heterodox	conversants	at	UOttawa	(two	professors),	Laurentian	University,	and,	as	mentioned	above,	York.	Both	of	the	professors	who	made	it	into	my	sample	on	the	basis	of	recommendations	from	other	professors	and	think	tank	economists,	from	Carleton	University	and	the	Université	du	Québec	à	Montréal,	both	promptly	and	positively	responded	to	my	requests.		 In	general,	I	can	only	be	very	grateful	for	the	responses	I	received	from	conversants	at	almost	every	institution,	in	all	geographic	regions,	at	all	levels	of	hierarchy,	and	across	the	political	spectrum.	I	have	no	way	of	knowing	whether	I	would	have	been	as	fortunate	had	I	based	my	study	in	another	country,	but	in	any	case	the	stereotype	of	the	‘nice	Canadian’	was	amply	confirmed	in	my	experience;	my	response	rate	was	high,	people	were	generous	with	their	time,	and	my	conversants	were	unfailingly	kind	and	helpful	when	I	met	them.					
Generalisability	
		 One	of	the	chief	challenges	for	the	small	number	of	researchers	of	financial	and	economic	elites	has	been	“how	to	discuss	dominance	and	influence	without	over-generalizing”	(Ho,	2012,	pg.	35).	Ho	notes	that	she	“was	faced	with	the	twin	challenges	of	attempting,	on	the	one	hand,	to	localize,	particularize,	and	culturalize	financial	actors	(especially	since	finance	and	the	markets	are	dominantly	naturalized	to	be	acultural,	neutral,	cyclical),	and,	on	the	other	hand,	to	demonstrate	their	generalizable	and	wide-reaching	effects	on	our	socio-economic	lives	and	institutions”	(Ho,	2012,	pg.	35).				 The	question	of	generalisability	is	interesting	in	this	case,	because	at	first	glance	generalisability	does	not	appear	to	be	strictly	necessary;	there	are	only	three	alternative	economics	organisations	of	any	considerable	size	and	reach	in	Canada,	and	this	research	encompasses	them	all.	There	is	a	particular	risk	of	unrepresentative	sampling	with	elites,	however,	due	to	access	issues	(Richards,	1996).	Compared	to	the	study	of	groups	nearer	to	the	ends	of	the	political	spectrum,	it	will	also,	of	course,	be	much	more	difficult	to	assemble	a	full	picture	of	mainstream	economic	discourse	in	Canada.	Generalisability	is,	here,	even	more	of	a	concern.	One	should	always	hesitate	to	generalise	from	qualitative	interview	data	(Aberbach	&	Rockman,	2002),	and	it	would	be	difficult	to	claim	that	I	interviewed	a	truly	representative	sample	–	but	the	
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qualitative	interviews	I	conducted	were	aimed	at	sampling	the	range	of	economic	thought	in	Canada.	Indeed,	I	specifically	targeted	outliers	among	Canadian	economists,	in	addition	to	my	attempt	to	interview	as	many	women	and	people	of	colour	as	possible.	Even	if	my	sampling	had	been	broadly	representative,	however,	the	sheer	numbers	would	not	have	warranted	generalising;	I	interviewed	29	out	of	1,002	academic	economists	in	Canada,	for	example	–	or	2.9%.	Of	approximately	15,000	economists	or	economic	policy	researchers	and	analysts	in	Canada,	I	only	interviewed	49	(plus	six	autodidact	economists,	two	journalists	specialising	in	economic	issues,	and	one	lawyer);	that	comes	to	0.33%	of	all	Canadian	economists.	I	interviewed	a	much	larger	proportion	of	academic	macroeconomists,	however,74	and	my	survey	reached	99	professors	–	approximately	10%	of	all	Canadian-based	academic	economists	–	the	group	with	the	most	influence	over	economics	education	in	Canada.		 I	also	interviewed	a	significant	proportion	of	think	tank	economists,	including	nearly	all	economists	at	the	leadership	level.	By	that	measure	my	sample	can	be	claimed	to	be	highly	representative	of	the	views	of	the	leadership	of	economic	think	tanks	in	Canada;	other	than	in	the	case	of	the	CCPA	and	the	IRPP,	whose	leaders	were	not	economists,	I	interviewed	the	founder	and/or	CEO	and/or	President	of	all	of	the	other	think	tanks	in	my	study.	Similarly,	I	was	fortunate	to	have	gained	access	to	so	many	of	the	chief	economists	of	the	five	largest	Canadian	banks	–	4	out	of	5.	I	thus	have	a	comprehensive	view	of	the	opinions	and	thought	processes	of	the	leadership	of	those	banks’	economics	departments,	a	rarity	indeed.				 True	generalisability	is	not	possible	given	the	limitations	of	my	research;	however,	my	research	design	allowed	me	to	compare	the	qualitative	results	from	my	interviews	with	the	qualitative	and	quantitative	results	from	my	survey.	Combined	with	the	status	and	influence	of	the	economists	in	my	sample,	I	may	be	in	a	position	to	draw	some	tentative	conclusions	as	to	the	orientations	of	Canadian	economists	as	a	whole.	In	fact,	due	to	the	current	lack	of	research	on	Canadian	economists	and	Canada	more	generally,	this	project	may	well	be	the	most	complete	mapping	of	economics	in	Canada	yet.																																																													74	Based	on	the	survey	results,	approximately	9.1%	of	academic	economists	in	Canada	are	macroeconomists,	and	almost	all	of	my	academic	conversants	were	macroeconomists.	
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Positionality	
		 As	regards	my	positionality,	my	identity	and	place	in	the	world	could	be	considered	more	of	an	advantage	than	a	drawback	for	the	study	at	hand,	bearing	in	mind	that	objectivity	itself	is	impossible.	Most	notably,	there	is	my	strong	family	tie	to	COMER	through	my	late	grandfather;	my	sympathy	for	COMER	members’	views	is	genuine.	Furthermore,	I	was	raised	in	a	context	of	autodidacticism	–	both	in	terms	of	my	personal	and	familial	context	as	well	as	the	culture	I	was	surrounded	by.		 I	was	raised	by	my	extended	family	in	addition	to	my	parents.	My	grandparents,	with	whom	I	probably	spent	the	most	concentrated	amount	of	time,	lacked	formal	education	to	varying	degrees75	–	yet	they	engaged	fully	in	informal	learning;	my	grandmother	insisted	upon	what	I	later	termed	“the	wonder	principle”	–	if	someone	asked	a	question	to	which	no	one	else	knew	the	answer,	she	would	clap	her	hands	enthusiastically	and	ask	the	questioner	to	run	to	the	encyclopaedia76	before	his	or	her	curiosity	had	waned.	Rather	uncommonly,	aside	from	my	sisters	and	me,	all	of	my	maternal	grandparents’	grandchildren	were	at	least	partly	homeschooled,	“unschooled,”77	or	both,	and	in	my	formative	years	I	failed	to	form	an	opinion	I	later	discovered	was	common	elsewhere	–	that	education	is	strongly	correlated	with	intelligence.	Indeed,	one	of	the	smartest	people	I	know	is	a	cousin	who	has	still	never	spent	a	day	in	a	classroom.		 Furthermore,	my	social	milieu	during	my	formative	years	reinforced	an	autodidactic	cultural	norm;	the	democratic	socialist	history	of	my	home	province	of																																																									75	None	of	my	grandparents	attended	university	during	their	working	lives,	but	my	maternal	grandparents	did	end	up	taking	university	courses	after	they	retired	–	during	their	70s,	80s,	and	even	90s.	My	grandmother	also	kept	up	a	lively	correspondence	with	various	university	departments	over	the	course	of	several	decades;	aside	from	Canadian	Broadcasting	Corporation	radio	shows	and	whatever	books	they	could	afford,	that	was	her	primary	intellectual	stimulation	for	many	years	on	the	farm.	76	The	encyclopaedia	was	itself	evidence	of	the	emphasis	my	grandparents	put	on	the	satisfaction	of	curiosity;	we	forget	this	in	the	age	of	Wikipedia,	but	encyclopaediae	were	a	significant	expense	for	a	family	of	modest	means.		77	Unschooling	involves	no	curricula	whatsoever;	it	is	driven	entirely	by	the	curiosity	of	the	child.	One	of	my	cousins	only	learned	to	read	at	the	age	of	9	because	she	had	previously	expressed	no	interest;	as	a	young	woman	she	later	became	the	Chief	of	Staff	of	the	Attorney	General	of	the	Province	of	Ontario.	My	uncle,	a	wonderful	(and	wonderfully	eccentric)	former	professor	of	Education	at	the	University	of	Saskatchewan,	inaugurated	the	unschooling	movement	in	Saskatchewan;	it	now	boasts	many	thousands	of	members.	He	has	been,	without	question,	one	of	the	greatest	influences	in	my	life;	it	is	therefore	no	exaggeration	to	say	that	the	unschooling	ethos	informed	part	of	my	intellectual	development.	
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Saskatchewan	could	be	considered	to	be	the	product	of	mass	autodidacticism	on	the	part	of	its	agrarian	population	in	particular.	Saskatoon,	Saskatchewan’s	largest	settlement	and	the	city	in	which	I	was	born	and	raised,	still	has	a	minuscule	private	school	enrolment78	and	boasts	an	annual	library	usage	rate	representing	70%	of	the	population.	It	is	a	culture	in	which	most	people	–	from	all	backgrounds	–	reads	and	discusses	books.	Formal	education	has	very	little	to	do	with	it.		 My	particular	interest	in,	and	concern	for,	economics	education	has	been	stimulated	by	a	number	of	sources,	but	prominent	–	and	earliest	–	among	them	was	the	influence	of	my	maternal	grandfather,	a	farmer	with	a	primary	school	education	and	a	self-taught	amateur	economist	and	COMER	member.	The	passion	with	which	I	approach	the	topic	finds	its	origins	in	fiery	dinner-table	speeches	about	the	role	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	throughout	my	childhood.	In	some	sense,	then,	my	familial	background	has	“primed”	me	to	take	note	of	two	very	different	approaches	to	economics,	a	rare	advantage	among	my	peers	in	undertaking	a	study	such	as	this.			 On	the	other	hand,	I	am	undoubtedly	the	product	of	a	traditional	elite	university	education,	and	with	that	comes	its	own	biases	and	assumptions.	Having	been	educated	as	a	young	adult	at	three	higher	educational	institutions	that	have	historically	served	as	primary	breeding	grounds	for	some	of	the	world’s	most	influential	economists,	financiers,	and	financial	consultants	–	Harvard	College,	the	University	of	Oxford,	and	the	University	of	Cambridge	–	I	have	been	steeped	in	rhetoric,	data,	and	baseline	assumptions	that	are	very	much	at	odds	with	the	logic	and	evidence	put	forward	by	my	grandfather	and	his	COMER	compatriots.	Put	simply,	I	am	likely	predisposed	towards	thinking	that	at	least	some	elements	of	mainstream	economics	make	good	sense;	I	consider	it	unlikely	that	so	very	many	highly	intelligent	people	are	wholly	wrong.	In	this	sense,	I	am	more	than	prepared	to	approach	my	education	in	mainstream	economics	with	some	credulity	as	well,	although	I	will	also	likely	benefit	from	the	in-built	scepticism	that	my	family	background	affords	me.			 In	terms	of	autodidacticism,	it	is	certainly	true	that	I	cannot	compensate	for	my	privileged	educational	background.	My	experience	of	learning	about	economics	in	the	course	of	my	fieldwork	helped	me	to	sympathise	with	the	self-education	process	that	many	COMER	members	have	undergone,	but	in	reality	our	experiences	have	been	
																																																								78	There	are	three	Montessori	schools,	two	Christian	Kindergarten-to-Grade-12	schools,	and	an	Islamic	school	that	runs	until	Grade	9;	the	overwhelming	majority	of	students	attend	public	schools	in	Saskatoon,	especially	at	the	high	school	level.	
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incomparable.	However,	I	do	lack	a	formal	education	in	the	field	of	economics,	which	in	this	case	is	at	least	something	of	an	advantage.		 In	another	sense	entirely,	I	could	be	considered	an	insider	among	both	COMER	and	mainstream	Canadian	economists;	I	have	the	right	accent,	idioms,	and	manner	of	speech,	as	all	of	these	are	surprisingly	uniform	in	the	Canadian	context.	I	also	have	the	right	pedigree	–	working	class	and	agrarian,	on	both	sides	of	the	family,	until	the	1980s	–	and	some	additional	legitimacy,	should	I	need	it,	via	Harvard,	Oxford,	and	Cambridge.	I	am	white	and	educated	(as	are	almost	all	of	my	conversants);	I	had	pre-existing	ties	to	some	of	the	groups	I	studied;	and	I	know	the	regional	and	historical	rules,	behaviours,	and	attitudes	that	can	subtly	shift	the	discussion	in	many	parts	of	Canada.	In	fact,	I	am	particularly	attuned	to	regionalism	due	to	having	been	raised	many	thousands	of	kilometres	outside	the	major	centres	of	power	and	commerce.				 Aside	from	all	of	this,	I	remain	a	genuine	outsider:	I	am	young,	female,	and	have	almost	no	training	in	economics.	Prior	to	my	fieldwork	experience	I	did	not	know	a	single	mainstream	Canadian	economist	personally,	nor	did	I	have	the	linguistic	and	conceptual	basis	on	which	to	have	a	reasoned	conversation	with	one.	As	Hayano	rightly	points	out,	there	are	“hazards	of	intimate	familiarity”	(Hayano,	1979,	p.	102),	as	well	as	grave	difficulties	that	accompany	great	distance	between	the	conversant(s)	and	the	researcher.	All	of	this	is	true	in	my	case;	I	am	both	familiar	to,	and	distant	from,	my	conversants,	in	ways	that	could	be	advantageous	but	are	not	necessarily	so.	As	is	always	the	case	for	research	of	this	kind,	the	only	protection	–	incomplete	as	it	is	–	is	to	be	aware	of	one’s	positionality	at	the	very	least.			
Researching	“Back	Home”			 I	am	among	a	growing	wave	of	academics	who	are	heading	“back	home”	for	data	collection	(Karra	&	Phillips,	2008),	and	I	am	fortunate	in	that	my	“back	home”	is	a	particularly	fruitful	research	subject	at	this	point	in	time.	Interestingly,	the	trend	towards	studies	of	elites	and	towards	studying	“back	home”	appear	to	have	merged	in	many	cases;	some	of	the	studies	to	gain	public	prominence	in	recent	years	were	conducted	by	“natives”	of	a	country	who	have	decided	to	study	the	elite	within	their	homelands.	Kate	Fox’s	magnificent	ethnography	of	her	countryfolk,	Watching	the	English,	features	frequent	detailed	treatments	of	the	upper	classes	in	England.	
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Participant-observation	studies	of	the	financial	sector	–	those	of	Karen	Ho	and	Gillian	Tett	(both	2009),	most	notably	–	have	afforded	the	public	some	of	the	few	available	glimpses	into	a	cadre	of	investment	bankers	in	London	and	New	York;	these	are	elite	studies	par	excellence,	and	all	the	more	intimate	having	been	conducted	by	“natives”	of	the	culture	at	large.			 Cross-cultural	communications	can	pose	significant	problems,	relationally	and	methodologically,	as	has	been	widely	documented	in	the	academic	literature	(Mikecz,	2012);	as	a	“native,”	in	this	sense,	I	was	able	to	sidestep	some	of	these	issues	in	much	the	same	way	as	Ho	and	Tett	were	able	to	do.	It	is	for	these	reasons	–	my	Canadian	heritage	and	knowledge	of	cultural	mores;	Canada’s	unexpected	resilience	in	the	face	of	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis,	despite	its	economic	reliance	on	the	United	States,	no	less;	and	the	newfound	respect	Canada	has	been	accorded	as	a	global	economic	advisor	–	that	this	project	is	so	appropriate	to	my	background,	that	this	subject	is	so	unexpectedly	timely,	and	that	I	am	in	at	least	somewhat	of	a	position	to	observe	from	the	midpoint	between	expert	and	novice	economists,	between	Canadians	and	foreigners,	and	between	elites	and	the	layperson.			
Plain	Language			 My	dissertation	is	itself	meant	to	be	a	resource	for	non-economists	to	learn	about	economics,	and	therefore	my	intention	has	been	to	write	clearly	and	plainly;	it	is	nearly	impossible	to	bring	the	world	of	central	bankers	and	macroeconomists	to	a	larger	audience	otherwise.	This	is	not	because	central	banking,	finance,	and	monetary	and	fiscal	policy	are	somehow	inherently	difficult	to	understand.	Criminologists	and	teachers	need	to	study	for	years	to	gain	professional	accreditation,	yet	the	public	is	able	to	discuss	crime	and	education;	economics	is	not	brain	surgery.	Economists	are,	however,	prone	to	using	jargon	that	makes	it	difficult	for	non-economists	to	participate	in	discussions	of	economics,	regardless	of	whether	they	are	otherwise	intelligent	or	well-educated.	Jonathan	Fullwood	of	the	Bank	of	England,	for	example,	has	performed	an	analysis	of	financial	communications	from	the	Bank	and	others;	he	shows	that	these	communications	are	usually	at	a	Grade	12	reading	level	or	higher,	significantly	above	the	reading	level	required	to	read	newspapers	and	classic	works	
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of	fiction	and	well	out	of	the	grasp	of	most	citizens	(2016).79	Although	some	may	think	jargon	makes	ideas	look	more	impressive,	in	fact	the	opposite	may	be	true.	In	the	comically	titled	“Consequences	of	Erudite	Vernacular	Utilized	Irrespective	of	Necessity:	Problems	with	Using	Long	Words	Needlessly,”	Daniel	Oppenheimer	of	Princeton	shows	that	professors	view	the	needless	use	of	big	words	quite	negatively;	in	his	study	they	viewed	writers	of	a	plain	language	piece	as	more	intelligent	than	the	writers	of	convoluted	text,	regardless	of	the	quality	of	the	actual	content	of	the	writing	(2006).		 Some	have	suggested	that	breaking	down	economic	jargon	is	a	matter	of	financial	literacy,	to	be	addressed	in	the	classroom	(like	civics,	perhaps).	In	most	cases,	however,	financial	literacy	is	taught	with	an	eye	towards	benefiting	the	individual	rather	than	society	as	a	whole	(Arthur,	2012);	the	focus	is	usually	on	protecting	oneself	from	overpaying	for	basic	services,	for	example,	rather	than	learning	how	to	participate	in	public	policy	debates	about	fiscal	policy	or	taxation	rates.	Even	if	more	students	take	financial	literacy	courses,	there	may	be	no	positive	effect	on	the	discussion	of	economics	in	public.	Although	economics	has	taken	front	stage	since	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis,	central	banking	and	finance	are	still	largely	a	mystery	for	all	but	a	small	group	of	specialists.	This	is	despite	the	fact	that	central	banking	and	finance	direct	the	flow	of	funds	that	determine	the	health	and	wellbeing	of	society	at	a	fundamental	level.	Academics	such	as	Burdell	and	Swadener	(1999)	have	noted	that	scholars’	“hyper-theoretical”	writing	has	been	criticised	for	making	certain	discussions	inaccessible	to	anyone	outside	academia,	and	economics	certainly	deserves	the	same	criticism.	In	what	follows,	I	aim	to	use	–	as	much	as	is	possible	–	plain	language,	in	line	with	George	Orwell’s	classic	essay	“Politics	and	the	English	Language”	(1968).	Given	the	importance	of	debates	in	this	area,	and	the	great	potential	for	economics	to	be	more	widely	studied	and	discussed	among	citizens	of	all	levels	of	education,	there	is	a	clear	need	to	bridge	the	gap	between	the	economist	and	the	layperson.80	For	this	reason,	this	dissertation	aims	to	bring	non-academic	voices	into	the	academic	discussion	of	economics,	and	the	views	of	all	of	my	conversants	–	formally	and	informally	trained	–	have	been	assigned	equal	value.	“A	crucial	reason																																																									79	It	is	true	that	many	of	these	communications	were	not	meant	for	widespread	public	consumption,	and	that	economics	blogs	and	popular	articles	are	likely	to	be	easier	for	most	people	to	understand.	80	This	is	particularly	necessary	now	that	English	has	become	the	most	common	language	in	academia	and	in	international	discussions,	for	native	speakers	and	non-native	speakers	alike.		
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for	studying	the	powerful	is	to	analyze	how	and	why	certain	actors,	groups,	and	institutions	have	greater	influence	over	claims	about	the	truth,	and	to	articulate	why	and	how	their	interpretations	of	the	world	come	to	be	dominant”	(Ho,	2012,	pg.	39).	As	such	my	work	aims	to	examine	the	work	and	learning	processes	of	a	group	of	self-taught	economists	alongside	–	and	as	equal	to	–	those	of	traditional	mainstream	economists.		 My	hope	is	that	what	follows	will	contribute	to	a	more	complete	and	accessible	picture	of	the	views	of	economists,	and	of	academic	and	autodidactic	(self-taught)	approaches	to	economics	in	Canada.	My	conversants’	perspectives	on	policy	issues	such	as	capital	gains	taxes	or	guaranteed	annual	income,	and	their	views	on	human	nature	and	economics	more	generally,	affect	the	development	of	public	policy	in	Canada,	and	their	beliefs	are	not	adequately	understood	or	scrutinised	by	the	public	at	this	time.	This	thesis	aims	to	help	to	change	that.			
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Results			 What	follows	is	an	account	of	my	fieldwork	results	in	the	form	of	a	series	of	short	direct	quotations	from	conversants	alongside	some	longer	indented	quotations	and	summarising	statements	meant	to	draw	attention	to	consistencies	or	discontinuities	among	the	responses	my	conversants	gave	to	particular	questions.	I	have	systematically	removed	filler	phrases	and	words	such	as	“I	mean”	and	“you	know”	for	the	purposes	of	clarity,	except	where	they	contribute	meaningfully	to	the	content	of	a	quotation.	In	cases	in	which	conversants’	open-ended	responses	overlapped	with	the	set	responses	from	my	survey	of	academic	economists,	I	have	included	an	addendum	to	the	relevant	section	in	which	I	compare	qualitative	and	quantitative	results	from	the	interviews	and	the	survey.		 As	per	my	methodology	section,	the	data	drawn	from	both	the	interviews	and	the	survey	are	analysed	more	fully	in	the	discussion	section,	where	I	attempt	to	answer	my	research	questions;	thus	in	what	follows	I	aim	to	assess	how	Canadian	economists	may	differ	from	their	British	and	American	colleagues,	how	autodidact	economists	may	differ	from	their	formally	educated	colleagues,	how	Canadian	social	norms	and	other	factors	may	affect	economists’	political	views	and	ethical	orientations,	and	how	Canadian	economists	conceive	of	critiques	of	the	discipline.		 My	qualitative	work	aims	to	complement	the	survey	results,	which	do	not	allow	for	elaboration,	nuance,	or	complexity.	The	following	results	section	comprises	a	direct	comparison	between	my	work	–	a	broad-based	qualitative/quantitative	survey	and	58	qualitative	interviews	–	and	existing	surveys	and	studies	of	economists.	Most	of	the	latter	concern	American	economists,	which	may	be	especially	useful	in	teasing	out	the	particular	composite	character	of	the	Canadian	economist.	I	proceed	topic	by	topic	in	the	sections	that	follow.		
	
Economists’	Formative	Years			 There	was	almost	no	pattern	to	my	conversants’	answers	to	my	questions	about	their	formative	years.	True,	individuals	with	experience	of	poverty	early	in	life	generally	displayed	greater	understanding	of	the	detail	of	certain	policy	issues	–	regarding	payday	lenders,	inequality,	or	guaranteed	minimum	income,	for	example.	But	several	conversants	who	were	raised	in	privileged	environments	had	also	
	 101	
managed	to	acquire	elements	of	this	understanding.	One	professor	said	he	had	attended	a	public	school,81	yes,	but	in	the	wealthiest	neighbourhood	in	the	country	at	the	time,	and	his	father	was	himself	an	academic	economist.	Throughout	the	interview	he	referred	to	his	own	circumstances	as	having	been	borne	of	privilege;	he	feared	we	could	miss	out	on	future	Mozarts	if	we	held	back	people	who	grow	up	on	the	“wrong	side	of	the	tracks”	as	opposed	to	“where	I	was.”	As	a	general	rule	he	was	to	the	left	of	many	of	my	other	conversants.82		 Another	academic	economist	was	the	son	of	a	trade	negotiator	(and	economist)	for	the	federal	government	who	had	studied	at	a	private	high	school	in	France.	As	a	heterodox	economist	he	was	clearly	embarrassed	to	admit	that	he	had	been	privately	educated;	when	I	commented	on	this,	he	explained	it	was	because	he	was	a	supporter	of	the	public	education	system.	He	was	one	of	the	most	progressive	economists	I	spoke	with.83		 Another	mainstream	–	yet	broadly	left-leaning	–	academic	economist	had	been	raised	in	a	rarefied	community	of	physicists,	of	whom	his	father	was	one.	A	few	other	conversants	had	been	raised	with	academics	as	parents;	the	father	of	one	was	the	vice	president	at	a	small	university,	and	the	father	of	another	was	a	psychology	professor	and	Dean.	One	professor’s	father	had	taught	accounting,	another	had	“a	family	full	of	engineers	and	physicists,”	and	another’s	father	was	a	chemist.	There	was	a	bank	chief	economist	whose	father	had	worked	in	banking,	and	an	academic	whose	father	was	a	dentist.	The	most	left-wing	among	these	was	likely	the	child	of	a	chemist,	while	the	most	right-wing	were	quite	clearly	the	children	of	the	psychology	professor/Dean	and	the	dentist,	respectively.	Another	mainstream	academic	professor	told	me	that	her	parents84	were	educated,	left-wing,	and	from	the	UK,	which	influenced	her	decision	to	go	into	economics;	“I	went	into	economics	probably	to	understand	why	
																																																								81	In	Canada,	in	contrast	to	the	UK,	a	“public	school”	is	publicly	funded,	not	private.	82	As	per	the	explanation	on	page	16	of	this	thesis,	and	working	in	part	from	Tapp’s	(2014)	Twitter	study	of	Canadian	think	tank	ideologies,	I	was	usually	able	to	glean	conversants’	political	orientations	on	the	basis	of	their	views	of	think	tanks	along	the	political	spectrum.	In	a	few	cases	I	had	to	triangulate	on	the	basis	of	their	answers	to	questions	regarding	policy	issues	with	a	particular	political	valence.	83	He	mentioned	that	he	had	decided	to	study	in	France	for	university	in	order	to	pursue	fencing;	Wikipedia	later	informed	me	that	he	had	been	an	Olympic	fencer.	84	It	is	worth	noting	that,	among	the	group	of	economists	with	more	privileged	backgrounds,	only	this	academic	referred	to	her	“parents”	–	all	of	the	others	(including	another	woman	academic),	of	all	political	persuasions,	only	referred	to	the	profession	of	their	father.	
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some	people	are	rich	and	some	people	are	poor,”	she	said,	even	though	her	research	has	not	centred	on	this.		 In	short,	especially	among	the	academics,	it	was	not	possible	to	discern	any	links	between	a	privileged	or	upper-middle-class	upbringing	and	a	particular	political	orientation;	in	general	this	group	may	even	skew	slightly	to	the	left	among	my	sample.85	Two	possible	exceptions	stand	out:	two	Bank	of	Canada	conversants	attended	private	schools,	among	the	most	exclusive	in	the	country;	one	came	from	an	upper-middle-class	family,	the	son	of	a	businessman,	and	the	other	was	the	son	of	the	chief	financial	officer	of	a	major	jewellery	chain.	One	of	the	two	asked	to	vet	my	questions	in	advance	of	the	interview,86	and	deleted	the	policy	questions	–	on	income	inequality,	capital	gains	taxes,	and	so	on	–	from	the	approved	list,	so	I	was	unable	to	get	a	sense	of	his	political	beliefs.	The	other	had	presided	over	some	of	the	most	massive	cuts	to	social	programs	in	Canadian	history	as	the	deputy	finance	minister	in	the	1990s	(Yakabuski,	2002),	with	some	suggesting	that	he	had	been	the	primary	driver	behind	the	drive	to	slash	spending	(Olive,	2007)	–	although	he	later,	as	deputy	health	minister,	pushed	to	restore	some	of	the	healthcare	funding	he	had	earlier	helped	to	cut	(Yakabuski,	2002).	In	our	interview	he	was	difficult	to	pin	down	in	terms	of	ideology,	although	he	expressed	an	academic	interest	in	income	distribution	and	seemed	perplexed	by	low-income	groups’	tendency	to	vote	against	their	interests	during	periods	of	economic	turmoil.		 One	of	these	two	conversants	seemed	to	share	the	aforementioned	heterodox	economist’s	embarrassment	over	his	attendance	at	a	private	school.	When	asked	about	his	high	school	education,	he	paused	before	saying	that	it	was	partly	publicly	funded	but	private	(as	private	schools	generally	are	in	Québec),	and	when	asked	whether	it	was	an	Anglophone	school,87	he	seemed	uncomfortable	answering	in	the	affirmative.	The	other	conversant	was	unabashed,	plainly	describing	his	alma	mater	as	a	private	boys’	boarding	school.			 Of	all	my	conversants,	only	six	had	attended	a	private	school	for	any	period.	The	heterodox	professor	and	the	two	Bank	of	Canada	economists	were	joined	by	a	C.D.																																																									85	One	academic	economist	mentioned	a	questionnaire	his	student	had	circulated	among	3rd-year	students	at	Queen’s	studying	economics,	business,	biology,	math,	and	English;	interestingly,	economics	students	had	the	highest	average	parental	income	(and	by	a	significant	margin).		86	One	of	only	two	conversants	to	request	this.	87	This	is	somewhat	of	an	indicator	of	privilege	in	Québec,	where	Anglophones	have	traditionally	formed	a	majority	of	the	upper	class.	
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Howe	conversant	who	had	capped	off	a	public	education	with	a	private	religious	Cégep,88	a	Fraser	Institute	economist	who	attended	a	school	the	year	it	transitioned	from	semi-private	to	public,	and	a	British-born	academic	who	attended	a	private	day	school.89	It	thus	seems	fair	to	say	that	the	members	of	Canada’s	economics	profession,	as	represented	in	my	sample,	are	overwhelmingly	the	product	of	the	Canadian	public	school	system,	particularly	as	two	of	the	six	private-school	attendees	were	educated	outside	the	country	and	two	others	were	almost	entirely	public	school-educated.	This	dominance	of	public	school	education	holds	for	the	larger	sample	of	academic	economists	in	my	survey	as	well;	78	of	100	academic	economists	attended	public	schools,	while	only	18	attended	private	schools,	and	most	of	the	latter	economists	were	from	other	countries.		 None	of	my	conversants	from	middle-	or	working-class	backgrounds	attended	a	private	school.90	Within	my	sample,	only	five	people	self-identified	as	middle	class,91	but	a	significant	number	did	not	mention	their	family	background	at	all,	and	as	a	middle-class	background	is	considered	rather	unremarkable	–	typical,	even	–	it	is	likely	that	most	of	these	fell	into	this	category	as	well.	Of	those	who	made	specific	mention	of	their	middle-class	background,	one	mentioned	that	his	mother	was	a	consumer	debt	counsellor	and	that	he	had	read	her	budget	books	as	a	child	(his	brother	is	currently	an	economics	professor	at	Northwestern	with	a	PhD	from	Princeton);	one	mentioned	that	his	father	was	a	schoolteacher	and	his	mother	was	an	administrator;	one	American-born	conversant	mentioned	a	lawyer	father	and	a	homemaker	mother;92	another	said	that	his	father	was	a	social	worker	and	his	mother	was	a	math	teacher	and	guidance	counsellor;	and	another	did	not	specify	his	parents’	occupations.	Ideologically	these	conversants	ranged	from	quite	far	left	to	mildly	right-of-centre,	although	this	likely	represents	a	small	subset	of	the	middle-																																																								88	In	Québec	high	school	is	followed	by	two	years	of	Cégep,	the	first	year	of	which	replaces	the	last	year	of	high	school	and	the	second	year	of	which	replaces	what	is,	in	the	rest	of	Canada,	the	first	year	of	university.	A	Cégep	is	a	vocational	college	of	sorts.	89	He	was	the	first	in	his	family	to	attend	both	secondary	school	and	university,	however,	so	this	is	not	so	much	a	marker	of	privilege.	90	With	the	possible	exception	of	the	British-raised	conversant	who	attended	a	private	school	but	whose	parents	were	uneducated.	91	In	the	UK,	“middle	class”	usually	refers	to	the	upper	middle	class	in	Canadian	terms;	in	Canada,	the	“middle	class”	includes	everyone	who	would	not	be	considered	upper-class	or	lower-class	(so,	most	people).	92	She	also	mentioned	that	her	grandparents	had	all	run	small	stores,	and	that	her	grandmothers	both	worked,	which	influenced	her	own	decision	not	to	follow	in	her	mother’s	footsteps	as	a	homemaker.	
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class	conversants	in	my	sample	–	and	my	sample	will	not	be	an	adequate	representation	of	economists	from	middle-class	families	in	any	case.		 Interestingly,	there	were	only	two93	professors	who	self-identified	as	having	come	from	a	working-class	background.	One	bank	chief	economist	and	a	mainstream	economics	professor	(who	nevertheless	leaned	left	on	many	issues)	both	mentioned	that	their	families	were	“not	well-off,”	and	a	Conference	Board	economist	referred	to	his	background	as	working-class.			 Of	the	five	conversants	who	had	been	raised	in	poverty,	only	one	worked	in	academia.	This	professor,	the	child	of	immigrants,	is	a	heterodox	economist	who	went	into	the	profession	in	part	because	of	the	experience	of	being	“terribly	poor”	growing	up	–	he	“wanted	to	make	sense	of	that.”	Of	the	others,	one	was	a	lawyer,	one	was	a	CCPA	economist	(“I’m	a	child	of	an	immigrant;	we	had	no	money”),	one	was	a	teacher,	and	one	was	affiliated	with	the	Fraser	Institute.	As	a	group,	the	conversants	who	were	raised	in	poverty	diverged	most	wildly	from	one	another	ideologically.	Two	were	COMER	members	(from	one	of	them,	a	teacher:	“My	father	was	a	charming	ne’er-do-well	who	couldn’t	hold	a	job”),	easily	among	the	most	left-wing	of	those	I	interviewed,	while	the	Fraser	Institute	conversant	held	the	most	right-wing	views	of	anyone	in	my	sample	(reportedly	his	mother	would	say,	“We’re	not	poor.	Sometimes	we	don’t	have	enough	money	but	we’re	not	poor.”).	All	of	the	COMER	members	in	my	sample	came	from	a	working-class,	middle-class,	or	lower-class	background,	and	this	was	true	of	the	PEF-affiliated	and	CCPA-affiliated	economists	as	well.	As	mentioned	above,	two	of	the	academic	heterodox	economists	I	spoke	with	came	from	more	privileged	backgrounds.			 In	short,	family	socioeconomic	background	did	not	appear	to	have	anything	close	to	a	uniform	effect	on	economists’	later	career	trajectories	or	political	beliefs,	and	indeed,	one	mainstream	professor	identified	her	relatively	privileged	background	as	a	motivation	for	learning	about	the	factors	that	shape	socioeconomic	phenomena,	while	a	heterodox	academic	had	the	same	motivation	having	been	raised	in	a	poor	immigrant	family.			 Other	mentions	of	family	influence	were	mainly	evidence	of	parental	involvement	in	educational	decision-making,	aside	from	one	mainstream	professor	who	claimed	he	attended	the	University	of	Victoria	because	his	three	older	brothers																																																									93	With	a	possible	third:	a	professor	who	mentioned	that	he	had	taken	part	in	a	co-op	program	in	order	to	make	university	affordable.	
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had	attended	the	University	of	Alberta.	Three	mainstream	economists	mentioned	their	families’	attempts	to	influence	their	choice	of	study;	one	said	his	family	believed	he	could	only	teach	if	he	studied	English	or	math,	another’s	family	encouraged	her	to	do	science,	and	another’s	father	suggested	that	he	study	economics	alongside	history.	A	Bank	of	Canada	conversant	mentioned	that	his	parents	had	pushed	him	to	go	to	law	school,	which	he	agreed	to	do	if	he	did	not	receive	a	suitable	offer	for	graduate	school	in	economics	(he	did).	Finally,	a	C.D.	Howe	economist	catalogued	a	series	of	fights	with	his	father	about	his	course	of	study.94	As	a	group	these	economists	were	relatively	privileged	and	high-achieving,	which	is	perhaps	unsurprising	given	the	unprompted	mentions	of	high	levels	of	parental	involvement.		 There	did	not	appear	to	be	a	link	between	the	political	leanings	of	economists’	families	and	the	beliefs	that	the	conversants	in	my	sample	espoused,	either.	For	example,	of	the	two	Fraser	Institute	conversants	one	had	a	father	who	was	a	union	activist	and	the	other	declared	that	his	family	is	“predominantly	liberal,	left-of-centre.”	The	children	of	these	families	diverged	quite	markedly	from	the	political	views	of	their	home	environments	–	possibly	partly	in	reaction	to	them.	However,	one	CCPA	economist	said	that	his	family	leaned	towards	progressive	politics,	and	a	PEF-affiliated	economist,	when	asked	where	his	political	orientation	came	from,	replied:	“I	guess	it	was	sort	of	a	family	influence?	Not	that	my	family	was	activist,	but	my	mother	in	particular	had	a	very	strong	social	conscience,	sort	of	an	idea	that	morality	involved	community	solidarity	and	equality.”	At	both	ends	of	the	political	spectrum,	therefore,	there	were	individuals	who	had	grown	up	in	progressive	or	left-leaning	families.			 Within	my	sample,	the	age	at	which	one	took	her	or	his	first	economics	course	was	far	more	predictive	of	subsequent	political	beliefs	than	any	of	the	above	factors	relating	to	family	socioeconomic	status	or	political	orientation.	None	of	the	left-wing	economists	I	spoke	with	had	taken	economics	in	high	school,	and	indeed	that	opportunity	was	not	available	in	most	cases.	Of	58	conversants,	nine	took	economics	before	university,95	and	of	these	only	one	could	be	considered	left-leaning,96	and	he	did	not	take	economics	in	high	school	per	se;	he	took	a	modicum	of	business	studies.																																																									94	His	father	wanted	him	to	study	math,	and	the	compromise	was	social	sciences	and	math.	Later	his	father	wanted	him	to	study	business,	while	the	compromise	was	economics.	95	One	in	Cégep	and	two	in	Grade	13,	so	only	six	conversants	were	exposed	to	economics	before	the	age	of	18.	96	The	mainstream	professor	whose	family	growing	up	was	“not	well-off.”	
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Three	other	mainstream	professors	had	some	exposure	to	economics	in	high	school	–	one	took	commerce	in	Cégep,	another	took	economics	in	his	home	country,	and	a	third	took	economics	in	a	regular	public	school.	The	political	views	of	each	were	largely	slightly	right-of-centre,	although	the	latter	professor	had	eclectic	views	(he	had	written	papers	for	the	Fraser	Institute,	but	also	favoured	raising	taxes	on	the	top	income	bracket).	Of	the	others,	the	conversant	who	had	taken	the	most	economics	courses	(two	economics	courses	starting	in	grade	11,	plus	5	or	6	business	courses)	was	one	of	the	most	right-wing	economists	in	my	sample,	a	Fraser	Institute	economist.	One	bank	chief	economist,	who	was	centrist	or	slightly	right-of-centre,	was	alone	among	my	conversants	in	having	known	that	he	wanted	to	be	an	economist	from	a	young	age;	he	took	one	high	school	economics	class	that	was	“a	bit	Mickey	Mouse.”	A	Bank	of	Canada	conversant,	broadly	centrist,	took	a	Grade	13	economics	course,	as	did	an	IRPP	economist,	also	broadly	centrist.97	Finally,	a	C.D.	Howe	conversant,	quite	clearly	right-of-centre,	took	a	basic	economics	course	in	grade	10	and	then	his	first	“real”	economics	course	in	Grade	13.				 My	sample	was	too	small	to	come	to	firm	conclusions	about	causation,	but	the	subset	of	economists	who	had	been	exposed	to	economics	earlier	in	their	lives	skewed	markedly	to	the	right	of	the	majority	of	my	conversants,	those	who	were	first	exposed	to	economics	at	the	undergraduate	level	or	later.	That	said,	there	may	be	other	factors	behind	this	correlation	–	broader	curricular	offerings	in	schools	in	wealthier	neighbourhoods,	so	that	children	from	well-off	homes	disproportionately	had	an	opportunity	to	take	economics	in	high	school,	for	example,	or	an	extreme	self-selection	effect	at	the	leadership	level	of	economics	think	tanks	and	the	major	banks	such	that	extremely	competitive	roles	disproportionately	attracted	economists	who	had	committed	early	and	fully	to	the	field.			
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																									97	Grade	13,	now	obsolete,	was	an	artifact	of	the	Ontario	educational	system;	technically	students	would	have	taken	these	courses	at	the	age	at	which	their	peers	would	have	started	university	(18),	so	this	does	not	really	count	as	early	exposure	to	economics.	
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Peers’	and	Teachers’	Influence			 Although	peers	likely	played	a	role	in	many	of	my	conversants’	lives,	their	influence	arose	in	conversation	in	only	a	few	cases.	One	bank	chief	economist	said	that	his	friends	were	thinking	of	becoming	lawyers,	doctors,	and	accountants	and	the	like,	and	he	“didn’t	want	to	do	what	everyone	else	was	doing”	as	he	was	a	bit	“rebellious.”	A	COMER	member	noted	that	no-one	paid	attention	to	economics	when	he	was	at	university,	and	none	of	his	friends	were	interested	in	it.	An	academic	economist	started	with	an	undergraduate	degree	in	history,	but	discussed	economic	issues	with	peers	who	were	in	commerce	and	eventually	elected	to	switch	to	economics	for	his	doctoral	degree.	A	Conference	Board	economist	listened	to	his	roommates	discuss	economics	during	his	undergraduate	degree,	but	noted	that	his	awareness	of	the	subject	grew	after	he	graduated.	Finally,	a	mainstream	professor	described	hearing	his	undergraduate	roommate	talk	about	money	created	“out	of	thin	air”	in	his	first	year	of	undergraduate	study	and	thought	that	it	“sounds	important;”	after	the	two	roommates	each	agreed	to	take	a	class	in	the	other’s	domain,	this	professor	said	of	his	switch	to	economics	that	“it	was	a	complete	conversion.”		 Teachers	came	up	much	more	frequently	as	a	major	influence.	Twenty-one	of	the	people	I	spoke	with	declared	unprompted	that	teachers	had	had	a	significant	effect	on	their	lives.	For	three	conversants	–	a	professor,	a	COMER	member,	and	a	Fraser	Institute	affiliate,	these	were	high	school	teachers.	Indeed,	a	teacher	had	essentially	arranged	the	COMER	member’s	adoption	by	a	well-off,	highly-educated	family,	thereby	fundamentally	altering	her	life	trajectory,	while	the	professor	ended	up	dedicating	a	textbook	to	his	high	school	teacher	decades	after	the	fact.		 Three	professors,	two	think	tank	economists,	and	a	Bank	of	Canada	economist	cited	professors’	encouragement	as	a	factor	behind	their	decision	to	attend	graduate	school.	Nine	conversants	credited	a	professor	with	sparking	an	interest	in	economics	in	the	first	place;	one	heterodox	professor	said	of	his	first	economics	teacher	that	“she	just	made	me	love	economics”	and	that	a	second	professor	“revolutionised”	his	thinking,	while	a	bank	chief	economist	recalled	that	his	first-year	economics	professor	“probably	changed	my	life.”	A	PEF-affiliated	economist	said	in	relation	to	an	“eclectic”	and	“critical”	class	he	took	that	“I	suspect	if	I’d	gone	into	the	regular	macro/micro	intro	course	with	300	students	and	charts	and	graphs	I	probably	never	would	have	become	an	economist.”		
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	 Others	remembered	a	professor	who	“blew	me	away”	(a	CCPA	economist),	a	“quite	idiosyncratic	course”	that	was	“mind-expanding	–	mind-blowing”	taught	by	someone	who	is	still	a	friend	(a	Bank	of	Canada	economist),	a	teaching	assistant	who	took	extra	time	to	help	her	with	the	subject	and	who	introduced	her	to	“people	who	had	a	much	broader	notion	of	what	economics	is”	(a	PEF-affiliated	professor),	and	a	professor	so	influential	that	“he’s	in	my	brain”	(a	bank	chief	economist).			 Yet	others	declared	that	certain	professors	had	changed	their	approach	to	economics	after	several	years	of	studying	the	subject.	During	his	PhD	program	one	professor	“had	a	great	supervisor”	and	“he	was	an	engineer,	so	I	guess	he	taught	me	to	be	one.”	A	heterodox	professor	said	that	before	the	class	he	took	with	a	particular	professor,	“I	was	just	like	the	ordinary	student;	I	didn’t	have	a	clue	whether	what	I	was	learning	was	neoclassical	or	not.”	This	one	class	appeared	to	have	launched	an	alternative	career.			
	
Time	Off			 Interesting	patterns	emerged	among	the	conversants	who	took	time	off	before	or	between	degrees.	Of	58	conversants,	24	took	at	least	one	year	off.	Of	these,	five	worked	at	the	Bank	of	Canada,	one	worked	in	the	Finance	Department,	and	another	worked	for	the	Economic	Council	of	Canada.	Another	worked	as	a	graduate	trainee	at	General	Electric,	one	took	a	year	to	save	money	for	his	Master’s	program	and	did	not	mention	where	he	worked	in	that	time,	and	one	served	as	a	Naval	officer	for	3	years	after	undergraduate	study.98	All	of	these	were	mainstream	economists	to	varying	degrees.	Two	professors	took	time	off	between	degrees	due	to	their	fathers’	respective	serious	illnesses,	and	both	maintained	links	to	academia;	one	took	courses	in	math,	statistics,	and	economics,	while	the	other	lectured	in	his	home	city	(and	said	that	that	interlude	was	fortuitous	for	him	intellectually).	Another	academic	was	an	adjunct	professor	for	three	years	before	starting	his	doctorate.		 The	majority	of	the	men	in	my	sample	did	not	take	time	off.	Of	the	women,	only	one	professor	and	one	chief	bank	economist	did	not	take	time	off	–	and	the	latter	has	engaged	in	an	unusual	amount	of	continuing	education	following	her	doctorate.	One	professor	“worked	for	a	bit,	drifted	for	a	bit”	after	high	school,	ending	up	at	a	museum	next	door	to	UToronto	–	so	she	enrolled	in	a	class	there.	Another	professor	worked	in																																																									98	“I	was	never	a	military	person,”	he	said,	but	it	made	his	education	affordable.	
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Papua	New	Guinea	as	an	economist	for	Canadian	University	Students	Overseas	(CUSO)	for	a	couple	of	years	after	her	Master’s,	which	was	apparently	formative;	the	experience	turned	her	off	development	economics,	and	she	realised	that	if	you	wanted	to	help	a	country	like	that,	“you	wanted	to	be	a	political	scientist	and	not	an	economist.”	A	third	professor’s	experience	working	at	a	family	planning	centre	in	India	between	degrees,	similarly,	changed	her	thinking	on	population	growth	and	women’s	role	in	society.	A	CCPA	economist	worked	and	traveled	for	ten	years	after	high	school,	then	realised	she	would	need	a	career	of	sorts;	“I	just	wanted	to	get	a	piece	of	paper	so	I	could	make	more	money;	that	was	my	only	rationale.”	One	COMER	member,	a	former	leader	of	the	Canadian	Action	Party,	had	four	degrees,	with	varying	periods	of	time	off	between	each.	Another	COMER	member,	a	teacher,	worked	and	travelled	around	the	country	for	three	years	before	commencing	her	undergraduate	degree.		 Such	a	pattern	was	particularly	common	among	the	COMER	members.	COMER’s	co-founder,	Bill	Krehm,	dropped	out	of	a	math	degree	at	UToronto	before	consorting	with	the	likes	of	George	Orwell	and	Leon	Trotsky	all	over	the	world	(see	below).	Another	COMER	member	went	to	Zambia	and	Tanzania	with	CUSO	after	high	school	“for	what	turned	out	to	be	five	years,”	worked	for	two	years	in	the	midst	of	his	undergraduate	program,	and	took	a	job	with	the	Ontario	government	while	studying	for	his	doctorate.	Another	COMER	member	“blew	all	my	Christmas	exams	working	on	a	by-election”	for	the	New	Democratic	Party99	during	his	undergraduate	degree	and	eventually	dropped	out	altogether	to	work	in	a	factory	and	engage	in	political	organising	–	to	“make	history	instead	of	just	studying	it.”		 Two	heterodox	academic	economists	took	time	off	as	well.	One	worked	for	the	civil	service	in	the	UK	department	of	health	and	social	security	right	after	high	school,	entering	university	at	the	age	of	21;	another	dropped	out	of	a	Master’s	program	at	UMontréal	and	later	returned	to	academia	at	McGill.	A	PEF-affiliate	economist	worked	for	a	union	in	Ottawa	(CUPE)	between	his	Master’s	and	PhD.			 Almost	all	women	and	COMER	members	–	and	most	left-wing	economists	–	in	my	sample	had	come	to	economics	later	in	life	and/or	had	taken	time	off	between	or	before	degrees.	This	was	in	stark	contrast	to	a	large	number	of	conversants	who	had	
																																																								99	The	NDP	is	Canada’s	national	social	democratic	party;	it	usually	comes	in	third	in	terms	of	the	popular	vote,	behind	the	Liberals	and	the	Conservatives.	
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taken	no	time	off,	and	several	who	had	even	stayed	at	the	same	institution	for	much	or	the	whole	of	that	time.100			
	
Undergraduate	and	Graduate	School			 My	sample	was	surely	not	representative	of	Canadian	economists,	but	the	patterns	of	their	educational	trajectories	is	nevertheless	instructive.	Of	the	28	academics	in	my	sample,	fully	half	of	them	had	completed	a	PhD	in	the	U.S.,	a	rather	remarkable	figure	(a	further	six	of	my	conversants	–	mainly	central	bankers	and	bank	chief	economists	–	also	held	PhDs	from	the	U.S.).	This	is	not	uncommon	among	economics	professors	in	Canada,	as	Woolley	&	Sen’s	data	show:		
		Ontario	accounts	for	44%	of	Canadian	postsecondary	enrolment	on	average	(Canadian	Association	of	University	Teachers,	2010)	and	is	the	home	of	six	of	the	economics	departments	consistently	listed	among	the	top	ten	in	the	country.	Thus	even	if	American	PhDs	are	significantly	less	common	in	the	rest	of	Canada,	the	dominance	at	the	top	end	of	the	profession	is	still	remarkable.	
																																																								100	One	conversant	started	Cégep	at	McGill	at	the	age	of	16	or	17	and,	aside	from	a	PhD	at	Yale,	spent	the	rest	of	his	long	career	there.	
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	 Another	four	professors	completed	a	PhD	or	DPhil	in	the	UK	–	one	at	Oxford,	one	at	Essex,	and	two	at	the	London	School	of	Economics	(LSE);	four	conversants	completed	an	undergraduate	degree	in	the	UK;	and	six	completed	Master’s	degrees	there.	In	all,	21	of	my	conversants	had	completed	at	least	one	degree	in	the	U.S.	and	13	had	completed	at	least	one	degree	in	the	UK;	20	of	the	former	had	completed	an	American	PhD	while	only	four	of	the	latter	emerged	with	UK	PhDs;	UK	exposure	was	much	more	concentrated	in	Master’s	degrees,	while	U.S.	exposure	was	overwhelmingly	concentrated	in	doctoral	degrees	–	only	the	two	American-born	conversants	completed	undergraduate	degrees	there.		 Among	Canadian	institutions,	the	most	commonly	attended	university	was	UToronto,	somewhat	unsurprisingly	as	it	is	by	far	the	largest	university	in	Canada;	15	conversants	completed	at	least	one	degree	there,	although,	interestingly,	only	three	of	these	were	academics	(three	of	six	bank	chief	economists	were	educated	there)	and	8	of	15	degrees	were	not	in	economics	itself	(although	two	of	these	were	in	business).		 Of	all	other	universities	represented	in	my	sample,	Queen’s	appeared	to	have	the	largest	role	in	educating	economists;	12	conversants	garnered	an	economics	degree	there,	nine	of	whom	completed	a	Master’s	degree	specifically.	This	was	an	unusual	concentration	at	the	Master’s	level,	comparable	only	to	the	pattern	of	conversants	who	had	disproportionately	studied	in	the	UK	for	Master’s	degrees.	At	the	undergraduate	level	Queen’s	is	known	as	Canada’s	blueblood	university,	and	indeed,	the	only	two	substantially	privately-educated	conversants	I	interviewed	were	also	the	only	two	Queen’s	undergraduates	in	my	sample.	Of	those	who	completed	a	Master’s	degree	at	Queen’s,	one	academic	and	one	IRPP	economist	stayed	on	for	a	PhD,	one	bank	chief	economist	entered	the	workforce,	as	did	a	Conference	Board	economist	and	a	C.D.	Howe	economist,	and	four	academics	went	on	to	PhDs	at	MIT,	Yale,	LSE,	and	Essex,	respectively.			 Despite	Western’s	dominance	among	central	bankers,	only	six	conversants	in	my	sample	had	studied	there	–	three	at	the	undergraduate	level,	four	at	the	Master’s	level,	and	three	at	the	PhD	level,	with	four	of	these	having	completed	two	degrees	at	Western.	These	six	conversants	were	variously	academics	(2),	think	tank	economists	(2),	a	bank	chief	economist,	and	a	central	banker.		 Seven	of	my	conversants	attended	UBC	but,	like	Toronto,	most	of	that	number	attended	as	undergraduates	(one	COMER	member	held	a	law	degree	from	UBC,	while	one	academic	continued	on	to	a	Master’s	there).	The	only	other	Canadian	institution	
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with	a	critical	mass	of	graduates	among	my	sample	was	McGill,	which	seven	of	my	conversants	attended	–	four	at	the	undergraduate	level,	two	at	the	Master’s	level,	and	two	at	the	doctoral	level.	Among	all	of	the	Canadian	schools,	UBC	and	McGill	were	the	only	two	whose	graduates	appeared	to	have	a	common	political	valence;	both	were	broadly	more	left-leaning	than	average,	although	one	conversant	with	a	McGill	undergraduate	degree	was	one	of	the	most	right-wing	academics	in	my	sample,	as	was	one	conversant	with	a	UBC	undergraduate	degree.		 Of	the	20	conversants	with	PhDs	from	the	U.S.,	three	attended	Princeton,	three	attended	Harvard,101	two	attended	Yale,	two	attended	MIT,	two	attended	Stanford,	two	attended	the	New	School,	and	one	each	attended	Chicago,	Berkeley,	Duke,	Rochester,	Johns	Hopkins,	and	Pittsburgh.	Aside	from	the	two	who	attended	the	New	School	and	the	professor	who	attended	Berkeley,	all	of	whom	were	clearly	left-wing	or	left-leaning,	and	two	professors	with	a	PhD	from	Princeton	and	Stanford,	respectively,	who	were	both	mildly	left-leaning,	the	others	were	all	centrist,	right-leaning,	or	significantly	to	the	right	politically.		 Of	the	four	conversants	(all	academics)	who	received	a	doctoral	degree	from	the	UK,	three	were	to	the	left	of	my	sample	as	a	whole,	while	one	was	significantly	to	the	right.	The	other	PhDs	in	my	sample	came	from	McMaster	(two	professors)	and	Université	de	Paris	1	(one	professor).	The	doctoral	degrees	of	the	heterodox	academic	economists	in	my	sample	were	variously	awarded	by	the	Université	de	Paris	1,	McMaster,	McGill,	and	the	New	School.	Almost	all	of	the	COMER	members	attended	university	at	UBC,	Toronto,	or	the	University	of	Saskatchewan,	although	one	with	a	degree	from	the	latter	also	attended	the	Royal	Conservatory	of	Music	and	Ryerson	University	(one	COMER	member	dropped	out	of	UBC	and	another	dropped	out	of	UToronto,	while	another	held	four	degrees,	yet	another	held	three	degrees,	and	the	last	held	three	degrees	including	a	PhD	from	UToronto).		 At	the	undergraduate	level,	only	a	few	Canadian-raised	conversants	were	educated	outside	of	Ontario,	Québec,	and	Vancouver;	two	attended	the	University	of	Saskatchewan,	two	attended	the	University	of	Manitoba,	two	attended	UCalgary,	two	attended	the	University	of	Victoria,	one	attended	the	University	of	Alberta,	and	two	were	educated	in	Nova	Scotia.		
																																																									101	One	of	these	was	a	DBA,	not	strictly	a	PhD.	
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Diversity	in	the	Economics	Profession			 Several	studies	have	pointed	to	a	dearth	of	diversity	in	economics,	many	of	them	noting	the	lack	of	women	relative	to	other	social	sciences	(and,	indeed,	most	hard	sciences)	(Fourcade,	2009;	Fourcade,	Ollion,	&	Algan,	2015;	Robb	et	al.,	2006).	This	is	a	particularly	significant	question	for	economists	in	Canada,	as	it	is	an	ethnically	diverse	country	with	a	respectable	relative	level	of	women’s	equality	according	to	a	variety	of	metrics	(Ipsos,	2017).	The	field	of	economics	in	Canada,	however,	does	not	appear	to	reflect	either	of	these	facts	–	in	2012,	for	example,	visible	minorities	accounted	for	a	mere	15.14%	of	Ontarian	economists	(Woolley,	2017),102	and	a	2001	report	found	that	12.7%	of	full-time	tenured	or	tenure-track	professors	and	only	5.4%	of	senior	economics	faculty	were	women	(Dooley	et	al.,	2001).	And	despite	attempting	to	skew	my	sample	towards	women	and	minority	groups,	in	the	end	all	of	my	female	academic	conversants	were	white,	all	of	the	heterodox	economists	were	white	males,	and	all	but	one	of	the	think	tank	economists	were	white	men.	For	a	country	as	diverse	as	Canada,	this	is	a	puzzle.		 As	mentioned	previously,	I	specifically	avoided	mention	of	gender	or	race	in	the	interviews,	instead	noting	whether	and	when	the	topics	arose	unprompted.	In	interviews	with	women,	if	there	was	time	at	the	end	I	often	asked	about	their	experience	as	a	woman	in	economics.	I	also	noted	how	often	women’s	names	came	up	among	the	economists	I	interviewed,	and	whether	conversants’	language	was	gendered,	whether	they	referred	to	my	gender	at	any	point,	and	whether	they	said	anything	offensive	or	insensitive.	I	did	all	of	the	above	for	race	as	well,	although	I	did	not	question	my	non-white	conversants	about	their	experiences	in	that	regard	as	it	felt	inappropriate	to	do	so.	The	principal	minority	groups	mentioned	were	First	Nations	and	immigrants.	I	also	took	note	of	references	to	Francophones	and	Québec,	and	often	asked	my	Francophone	conversants	about	their	experience	if	time	permitted.	Finally,	I	was	careful	to	note	any	further	mention	of	minority	groups,	which	yielded	a	single	mention	of	people	with	disabilities.		 Gender	was	mentioned	by	far	the	most	frequently,	although	even	then	it	came	up	less	than	might	be	expected	given	that	a	woman	was	conducting	the	interviews.	Of																																																									102	In	my	own	examination	of	photos	of	economics	professors,	I	found	no	First	Nations	economists	and	only	a	handful	of	Black	economists,	so	the	level	of	diversity	is	lower	than	even	this	number	would	indicate.	Furthermore,	although	I	did	not	conduct	a	thorough	study,	there	appeared	to	be	significantly	fewer	full	professors	who	were	members	of	visible	minority	groups.		
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58	conversants,	fewer	than	a	third	mentioned	gender	at	all,	and	a	majority	of	these	were	women.103	In	general,	I	should	note	that	I	was	overwhelmingly	treated	with	respect	and	kindness	by	my	conversants.	Even	in	the	two	cases	in	which	I	felt	uncomfortable,104	I	still	felt	that	my	questions	were	taken	seriously	and	that	I	was	treated	as	an	equal	by	all	conversants.		 It	is	worth	laying	out	the	demographics	of	my	conversants.	Among	think	tank	economists,	only	one	was	a	woman.	Of	the	academics,	only	four	were	women.	One	former	bank	chief	economist,	both	financial	journalists,	and	three	out	of	seven	COMER	members	were	women.	There	were	no	conversants	with	a	visible	disability,	and	everyone	was	white	other	than	two	non-white	professors	and	one	mixed-race	professor.105	There	were	six	Québécois	Francophones	in	my	sample,	four	of	whom	were	professors,	one	of	whom	worked	for	the	Conference	Board,	and	one	for	the	C.D.	Howe	Institute,	as	well	as	a	further	few	bilingual	conversants.		 As	a	rule,	women	were	much	more	likely	to	mention	the	names	of	other	women,	but	in	general	men	predominated	among	the	economists	and	public	figures	conversants	mentioned.	Of	the	women	mentioned	by	name,	Armine	Yalnizyan	came	up	seven	times,	Margaret	Thatcher	was	mentioned	five	times,	Joan	Robinson	four	times,	Anna	Schwarz	thrice,	Wendy	Dobson	twice,	Frances	Woolley	twice,	Lindsay	Tedds	twice,	Tammy	Schirle	twice,	Sherry	Cooper	twice,	Sylvia	Ostry	twice,	and	Ayn	Rand	twice.	A	few	other	women	came	up	once	each.	As	a	comparison,	eleven	conversants	mentioned	Milton	Friedman,	six	mentioned	Richard	Lipsey,	and	so	on;	at	least	two	dozen	men’s	names	were	mentioned	more	than	those	of	Armine	Yalnizyan	and	Margaret	Thatcher.	This	is	true	even	though	my	very	presence	as	a	woman	interviewer	–	a	minority	in	all	of	the	academic	departments	and	office	buildings	in	which	I	conducted	interviews	–	may	itself	have	been	a	prompt,	influencing	some	conversants	towards	mentioning	female	economists’	names	more	often	than	they	might	otherwise	have	done.		 Several	times	I	was	very	obviously	a	prompt.	One	conversant	mentioned	a	“guy”	buying	a	pickup	and	then	added	sheepishly,	“I	bet	there	are	a	lot	of	women	who	buy	pickups.”	Another	said,	as	an	aside,	“Boy	.	.	.”	and	then,	looking	at	me,	“girl	–	woman!”	These	corrections	were	relatively	common;	another	conversant	said,	“the	guy	–	the	person	–	who’s	writing	it	.	.	.”	at	one	point,	and	another,	in	discussing	trade	unionists																																																									103	Almost	all	of	my	11	female	conversants	did	so.	104	See	page	57.	105	Of	those	three	professors,	only	one	had	not	been	raised	in	Canada.	
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in	his	father’s	generation,	said	they	“were	not	ideological	men,”	adding	after	a	pause,	“and	women.”	Many	of	these	conversants	were	of	an	older	generation,	and	I	wondered	whether	they	had	often	discussed	economic	matters	with	a	woman.	They	were	clearly	aware	enough	to	correct	themselves,	however.		 Ten	of	my	conversants,	on	the	other	hand	–	nearly	a	quarter	of	the	men	–	seemed	unaware	of	their	language	in	this	respect,	speaking	of	single	moms	as	opposed	to	single	parents	and	using	“he”	in	referring	to	a	hypothetical	lender,	Finance	Minister,	or	potential	employee.106	One	conversant	made	the	comment	that	because	his	was	an	all-boys’	school	it	had	more	of	a	focus	on	math	and	science.	Another	older	conversant	talked	about	“proposing	some	young	guy”	for	tenure	and	“[having]	to	be	on	very	good	terms	with	the	immigration	ladies	from	downtown”	when	bringing	in	U.S.	scholars.		 There	were	regular	mentions	of	“guys.”	For	example,	all	the	“guys”	in	the	Department	of	Finance	and	the	Bank	of	Canada,	or	in	answering	who	the	best	economists	were,	“I’ll	start	with	two	old	guys.”	Others	fairly	peppered	their	speech	with	the	term;	one	said	“these	guys”	and	“those	guys”	dozens	of	times	in	the	hour	and	a	half	in	which	we	spoke,	then	said	at	one	point,	“well,	you’re	a	female	graduate	student	in	Cambridge,	so	at	some	point	you’re	going	to	come	across	[name	redacted].”107	Another	conversant	said	“guy”	and	“guys”	to	such	an	extent	that	it	amounted	to	a	verbal	tick;	as	one	example,	he	said,	“I	would	say	[name	redacted]	is	Canada’s	guy	on	–	in	terms	of	academic	guys	who	study	seriously	income	inequality.	[.	.	.]	Both	of	these	guys	are	just	really	nice	guys.	Very	smart	guys.”	He	later	deemed	departmental	rankings	a	“macho”	exercise,	which	somewhat	surprised	me.		 Even	more	surprising,	perhaps,	was	that	some	of	my	most	“conservative”	conversants	used	predominantly	gender-neutral	language.	One	conservative	C.D.	Howe	conversant	listed	“herself”	before	“himself”	once	–	perhaps	for	my	benefit	–	and	a	seemingly	right-wing	academic	used	“congressperson”	in	discussing	U.S.	politics.	Quite	remarkably,	given	right-wing	critiques	of	identity	politics,	the	most	consistently	gender-conscious	conversant	was	from	the	Fraser	Institute;	he	used	“partner”	and	“their”	throughout	the	interview	without	seeming	to	think	about	it.	
																																																								106	Interestingly,	in	the	latter	case	the	same	person	referred	to	academics’	“partners”	as	considerations	during	the	hiring	process	at	universities.	107	He	then	insisted	–	and	later	reiterated	–	that	I	not	attribute	that	to	him	in	my	dissertation.	
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	 Others	brought	up	gender	explicitly,	but	in	a	neutral	or	factual	way;	one	mentioned	gender	in	terms	of	the	nature-versus-nurture	debate,	while	another	mentioned	women’s	studies	as	an	example	of	a	specialty	they	do	not	offer	in	the	McGill	economics	department.	Others	raised	gender	as	an	issue	of	concern,	either	in	passing	or	explicitly;	one	spoke	of	women’s	education	as	an	example	of	how	quickly	“modern	trends”	had	taken	hold	in	Québec,	while	another	observed	that	there	were	more	women	in	labour	economics	in	the	course	of	lamenting	the	dearth	of	women	in	the	field	in	general.108			 Another	conversant	complained	that	Japan	“is	doing	absolutely	nothing	about	getting	females	into	the	workforce”	and,	in	citing	the	high	percentage	of	child	support	payments	that	are	in	arrears,	“I’m	going	to	be	sexist	and	say	it’s	the	man”	who	is	delinquent.	One	academic	had	asked	a	“small	older	woman”	to	help	students	understand	what	was	appropriate	professional	behaviour	in	terms	of	workplace	sexual	harassment,	and	he	was	amused	because	she	finished	by	saying,	“Don’t	be	an	asshole.”	He	later	talked	about	conducting	a	homeless	count	as	“part	of	a	team	that	knew	what	they	were	doing	–	they	were	three	women,	actually”	and	said,	laughing,	that	“sexism	raises	its	.	.	.”	and	he	had	to	be	the	one	to	go	check	under	the	bridge	late	one	night.			 Another	conversant	–	a	heterodox	academic	economist	–	said	that,	as	the	editor	of	a	journal,	he	would	have	a	particular	interest	in	accepting	a	paper	on	income	inequality	from	a	gender	and	race	perspective,	and	he	felt	there	needed	to	be	more	analysis	of	gender,	class,	and	race	in	economics.	This	was	more	in	line	with	the	women	I	spoke	with,	many	of	whom	felt	there	needed	to	be	more	women	and,	separately,	more	gender	analysis	in	the	field.	One	academic	said	of	the	economics	community	in	Canada,	“It’s	a	small	group,	you	know.	Of	boys,	mostly.	[.	.	.]	I	went	through	my	whole	career”	without	a	woman	as	an	instructor	or	mentor.	As	opposed	to	in	other	disciplines,	she	said,	“women	in	economics	do	not	recognise	it’s	a	problem,”	citing	literature	suggesting	that	where	a	certain	threshold	of	diversity	is	reached,	people	are	more	aware	of	a	“chilly	climate,”	but	until	that	threshold	is	reached	there	is	very	little	awareness.	She	co-wrote	a	2001	report	on	women	in	economics	in	Canada,	which	she	said	was	“not	well-received,”	and	had	complained	about	CEA	interviews	being	held	in	hotel	rooms,	for	which	she	was	called	a																																																									108	This	conversant	went	on	to	mention	that,	since	most	bloggers	in	economics	are	men,	one	of	my	other	conversants	–	an	academic	economist	and	a	rare	woman	in	the	blogosphere	–	brings	a	different	perspective.	
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“feminazi.”	There	are	more	women	in	chemistry	and	physics	than	economics,	she	pointed	out;	their	study	showed	that	in	2001	only	5%	of	full	economics	professors	were	women.			 Another	conversant,	the	only	female	bank	chief	economist	I	spoke	with,	concurred:	“Women	are	more	underrepresented	in	economics	than	in	engineering,	math,	science	–	so	–	how	can	that	be?”	The	finance	sector	has,	if	anything,	regressed	in	this	regard;	“the	percentage	of	women	in	finance	has	fallen	significantly	–	significantly	–	since	the	mid-80s.”	She	cited	hazing,	hockey,	golf,	and	other	activities	that	exclude	everyone	outside	the	“old	boys’	club”	and	noted,	as	an	American,	that	this	dynamic	was	more	typical	of	the	finance	sector	in	Canada	than	in	the	U.S.,	in	part	because	it	is	smaller	and	more	concentrated.	“As	multicultural	as	this	city	is,	if	you	look	at	the	senior	executives	across	all	the	banks,	it’s	basically	a	bunch	of	white	guys	with	a	smattering	of	white	women.”	She	felt	we	needed	more	outside-the-box	thinking,	and	more	diversity	among	decision-makers	in	terms	of	age,	experience,	culture,	and	gender;	“we	need	men	and	women	in	equal	ratios	in	all	areas	of	the	bank.”	She	cited	an	American	Economics	Association	(AEA)	study	demonstrating	that	women	write	more	refereed	papers	than	men	do,	even	when	they	have	children,	so	the	idea	that	they	publish	less	because	of	childcare	responsibilities	is	just	not	accurate.	The	same	study	ranked	Berkeley	as	number	one	among	U.S.	universities	in	terms	of	female	professors,	and	she	pointed	out	that	it	was	Berkeley	that	produced	Janet	Yellen;109	“people	need	role	models.”	When	Yellen	was	a	student,	8%	of	economics	PhDs	went	to	women;	it	was	11%	during	my	conversant’s	graduate	school	years,	and	it	is	now	20%	–	“which	is	ridiculous!”	She	believed	there	would	be	enormous	benefits	for	the	system	if	it	had	more	women	in	it,	and	that	the	financial	crisis	would	not	have	happened	–	“there	are	a	lot	of	alpha	males	out	there.	And	yes,	there	are	women	who	are	on	that	end	of	the	spectrum,	but	on	average	women	[.	.	.]	are	much	more	capable	of	empathy.”	She	laughed.	“You	can	tell	I’m	on	a	mission.	I	try	to	encourage	women	–	because	it’s	a	great	field.”		 Another	woman,	a	left-wing	economist,	discussed	her	introduction	to	economics:			As	a	27-year-old	woman,	I	felt	like	it	was	insane,	the	founding	assumptions	were	insane	–	about	rational	expectations	and	that	the	essential	trade-off	for	an	
																																																								109	The	first	woman	Chair	of	the	U.S.	Federal	Reserve.	
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individual	was	the	work-leisure	trade-off,	and	I’m	thinking:	where’s	the	third	axis	that	is	about	unpaid	labour,	if	you’re	a	woman?		She	had	worked	as	a	bilingual	research	assistant	for	Sylvia	Ostry,110	“who	had	been	my	hero	as	an	undergraduate”:			[Ostry]	was	at	one	time	an	inescapable	name	of	an	economist	in	this	country.	[.	.	.]	She	was	like	an	international	harvester	machine	–	what	she	went	after	in	terms	of	what	she	was	reading	to	advance	her	thinking	on	what	was	happening	globally.	I	don’t	know	if	she	trained	to	be	a	labour	economist,	but	she	was	a	labour	economist.	She	literally	wrote	the	book	that	I	studied,	called	Labour	Economics	in	Canada.	And	she	talked	about	women	as	a	transformative	element	of	the	Canadian	labour	market.		This	economist	went	on	to	describe	20th-century	economic	history	from	a	gender	standpoint,	saying,	“in	every	recession	it’s	a	he-cession”	–	men	lose	well-paying	jobs	and	have	a	high	reservation	wage,111	so	women	take	lower-paying	jobs	for	the	good	of	the	household:	“So	you’re	seeing	this	massive	shift	in	the	wake	of	every	recession.	Women’s	labour	force	participation	rates	tick	up	and	they	never	go	back	down.	Those	women	don’t	go	back	home.”112			 She	and	several	others	lamented	the	lack	of	this	sort	of	analysis	in	economics.	One	of	the	journalists	I	spoke	with	observed	that	women	tend	to	look	at	different	topics.	“I’m	always	aware	of	gender,”	she	said;	she	had	written	about	the	dearth	of	female	economists,	and	often	sees	whole	panels	composed	entirely	of	men.	But	she	said	that	it	is	becoming	easier	to	find	female	economists,	especially	on	Twitter,	where	she	sees	women	helping	one	another	find	data	sources	and	the	like,	and	that	“the	Bank	of	Canada	has	changed	a	lot,”	a	change	that	“seems	like	it’s	fairly	recent.”	She	went	on	to	mention	that	“Mark	Carney	has	four	or	five	daughters”	and,	when	asked	who	would	be	the	next	Bank	of	Canada	governor,	Carney	had	said,	in	French,	“I	don’t	know	who	she	will	be.”	She	also	singled	out	TD	Trust	as	“a	progressive	bank”	on	the	gender	front.	
																																																								110	Former	Chief	Statistician	at	Statistics	Canada	and	the	Head	of	the	Department	of	Economics	and	Statistics	at	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	(OECD),	among	other	distinctions.	111	Meaning	they	are	unwilling	to	go	back	to	work	for	significantly	less	than	what	they	used	to	be	paid.	112	She	went	on	to	say:	“So	recessions	are	transformative	–	until	now.	And	what	we’re	seeing	now	is	that	the	only	reserve	army	of	labour	to	add	to	family	income	is	over-55-year-olds,	[as	now	.	.	.]	that	group	adds	hours	and	stays	in	the	workforce	longer.”	
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	 Concern	over	gender	issues	was	the	norm	among	most,	but	not	all,	of	the	women	I	spoke	with.	One	prominent	female	academic	economist	employed	a	gender	lens	in	describing	her	work	at	a	family	planning	centre	in	India,	during	which	she	concluded	that	family	planning	was	a	bandaid	and	that	it	was	more	important	to	get	women	working	–	thereby	delaying	the	age	of	marriage,	spacing	out	generations,	and	bringing	down	population	growth.	But	when	asked	about	her	own	experience,	she	seemed	somewhat	irritated	by	the	question:			 It’s	never	bothered	me.	I	have	three	brothers.	I	often	have	said	to	myself,	my	goodness,	I’m	the	only	woman	in	the	room.	But	what	can	I	do	about	it?	So	I	do	my	best,	and	stand	up	for	being	a	woman	and	being	smart.	That’s	what	I	can	do	day	to	day.	And	helping	–	I’m	delighted	to	see	[.	.	.	that]	everyone	is	recruiting	women	right	now.	It’s	almost	a	reverse	gender	bias.	[.	.	.]	It’s	really	a	hard	world	for	young	men	with	no	particular	credentials	or	talent.			She	added,	“It’s	a	different	world	from	what	I	grew	up	in,	and	that’s	great,”	but	that	she	had	received	financial	assistance	to	go	to	an	Ivy	League	institution	because	she	was	a	woman,	and	she	may	have	been	hired	by	the	Department	of	Finance	in	part	because	she	was	a	woman.	Mentors	were	another	major	factor	in	her	success,	she	said,	and	in	her	case	“every	one	of	them	was	male.”	She	was	glad	she	could	be	the	first	woman	in	my	sample,	however	(we	spoke	early	on	in	my	fieldwork	process).		 A	similarly	mixed	response	came	from	another	female	academic	economist	who	had	been	working	with	a	majority-female	administration113	in	the	last	two	years	for	almost	the	first	time	ever:		 I	gotta	say	.	.	.	I	think	there’s	a	.	.	.	It’s	very	much	a	matter	of	personal	preference.	There	are	frustrations	with	working	in	a	mostly	male	environment;	there	can	definitely	be	a	devaluation	of	certain	kinds	of	research	[.	.	.	and]	sometimes	I	find	it	hard	to	get	my	economist	colleagues	to	take	me	seriously.	[.	.	.]	But	at	the	same	time,	female	politics	can	be	so	complicated	–	it’s	like	high	school.	[.	.	.]	Hierarchy	and	status	is	really	important	to	people	[.	.	.	and]	if	you’re	one	of	one	or	two	women	in	a	mostly	male	environment	you	don’t	really	have	to	worry	very	much	about	your	social	status	–	because	you’re	the	only	woman,	so	you	have	your	own	little	status.	[.	.	.]	You’re	outside	the	hierarchy	–	because	power	hierarchies	are	intrinsically	gendered.			 Finally,	I	asked	one	of	the	COMER	members	about	gender	in	COMER	and	other	activist	groups,	and	she	said,	“Men	defer	to	women	now.”	When	asked	whether	she	
																																																								113	She	noted	that	there	seemed	to	be	an	unusual	number	of	women	in	the	field	who	ended	up	becoming	administrators,	which	is	an	important	trend	to	monitor.		
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thought	this	was	true	in	most	economics	organisations,	she	averred,	“No.	Absolutely	not.”		 First	Nations	were	by	far	the	most	commonly	mentioned	minority	group,	yet	came	up	only	eight	times	(seven	times	as	“Aboriginals”	or	“Aboriginal”	and	once	as	“indigenous”),	all	in	a	sympathetic	fashion	with	one	exception	–	a	C.D.	Howe	conversant	mentioned	that	it	was	unfair	for	teacher	assessments	not	to	take	into	account	demographic	information,	as	educational	attainment	tends	to	be	lower	in	First	Nations	communities.	In	almost	all	other	cases,	First	Nations	communities	came	up	in	the	course	of	discussions	about	inequality,	social	mobility,	and	poverty.	One	former	bank	chief	economist	said	of	First	Nations	poverty:	“It’s	just	a	travesty,”	pointing	to	a	30%	education	funding	gap	on	reserves.	When	asked	whether	Canada	had	an	inequality	problem,	one	academic	said,	“Yeah.	Yeah.	And	it’s	partly	a	general	issue	but	it’s	also	related	to	specific	sub-groups	of	the	population.	So	the	problem	of	Aboriginal	poverty	is	incredible.”	He	said	it	was	a	complicated	problem,	but	that	“we	need	to	provide	more”	and	“ramp	[funding]	up	a	bit.”	I	was	surprised	to	hear,	from	an	older	conservative	academic,	the	following:		 	One	of	the	reasons	I	hate	Stephen	Harper	with	a	passion	is	I	think	he’s	been	so	careless	with	the	federal	government’s	goodwill	among	Aboriginals	and	environmentalists,	et	cetera,	that	just	when	we’re	going	to	need	some	of	those	guys	to	cut	some	slack,	it’s	not	going	to	happen.			 Immigrants	were	by	far	the	next	most	commonly	mentioned	group,	with	four	references	to	immigration	and	four	references	to	foreign	students.	Two	of	the	latter	comments	specifically	referred	to	Chinese	students	coming	to	Canada,	while	another	referred	to	North	African	students	studying	in	Québec;	there	was	neither	a	positive	nor	negative	valence	to	these	comments.	A	fourth	conversant	commented	that	a	lot	of	economics	PhDs	were	foreign	students	who	tended	to	be	math-oriented	and	had	some	difficulties	with	language	and	Canadian	public	policy	knowledge.	One	comment	that	bordered	on	racist	arose	as	a	conversant	opined	about	the	quality	of	the	public	high	school	to	which	he	had	sent	his	children:	“It’s	where	all	the	Asians	try	and	send	their	kids.”		 Immigration	was	mentioned	four	times	–	in	passing	by	a	C.D.	Howe	economist,	by	a	mainstream	academic	economist	who	noted	the	poverty	among	Aboriginal	communities	and	immigrants,	and	by	two	bank	chief	economists.	One	of	the	latter	pointed	out	that	we	make	immigrants	start	all	over	again	in	their	field	of	expertise	if	
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they	lack	a	single	educational	credit,	and	that	language	was	a	big	issue	for	immigrants	trying	to	enter	the	workforce.	Another	bank	chief	economist	said,	“Immigration	is	not	as	left-right	wing	as	people	think	it	is.	If	you	care	about	low-wage	Americans,	do	you	want	to	let	in	more	low-wage	Mexicans?”		 Race	came	up	twice	in	interviews	with	academic	economists	who	felt	it	was	often	overlooked	or	inadequately	integrated	into	economic	analyses.	Another	bank	chief	economist	once	referred,	more	generally,	to	“disenfranchised	groups.”	Finally,	the	sole	remark	about	people	with	disabilities	came	unprompted	from	a	mainstream	UCalgary	economist:	“The	science	model	doesn’t	allow	for	disabled	people.”		 Finally,	fully	a	quarter	of	Canada’s	population	is	Francophone,	and	the	country	is	officially	bilingual,	a	feature	that	distinguishes	it	from	the	U.S.	The	fraught	relationship	between	English	and	French	Canada	has	played	a	significant	role	in	Canadian	history,	moreover,	and	there	are	enormous	cultural	differences	between	Québec	and	the	rest	of	Canada.	For	one	thing,	Québec	tends	towards	public	policy	–	and	voting	patterns	–	to	the	left	of	Canada	as	a	whole.	The	history	of	the	oppression	of	the	Québécois	and	the	suppression	of	their	language	and	culture,	combined	with	the	upheaval	of	the	Quiet	Revolution114	the	October	Crisis	,115	and	two	failed	referenda	on	Québec	separatism,	have	shaped	Anglo-French	relations	in	Canada	to	this	day.			 Two	themes	emerged	in	the	course	of	the	interviews	I	conducted.	First,	most	of	those	who	mentioned	Québec	were	in	fact	Anglo	Québecers,	some	of	whom	had	negative	feelings	towards	Québécois	politics	and	public	policy.	Aside	from	positive	comments	about	UMontréal	and	Laval	and	their	ranking	among	Canadian	economics	departments	–	one	professor	said	that	“English-speaking	Canadians	probably	forget	about”	them,	and	they	are	“more	tied	in	with	Europe”	–	the	most	positive	comment	about	Québec	came	from	an	Anglophone	professor	in	Vancouver,	who	made	the	earlier	comment	about	“modern	trends”	taking	hold	in	Québec	sooner	than	elsewhere	and	who	described	attending	a	1995	Québec	referendum	event	at	Harvard	at	which	there	were	separate	rooms	with	separate	feeds	in	the	two	languages	“and	everybody	cared.”	He	went	on	to	point	out	that,	in	the	past	25	years,	there	has	been	a	steady	increase	in	wellbeing	in	Québec	relative	to	the	rest	of	Canada,	“equivalent	to	a	
																																																								114	A	period	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	in	which	Québec	went	from	the	most	religious	and	conservative	province	to	the	least,	remarkably	quickly.	115	A	1970	incident	that	involved	the	kidnapping	of	a	government	minister	and	a	British	diplomat	in	support	of	the	Québécois	sovereignty	movement.	
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trebling	of	income	[.	.	.]	It’s	a	big	success	story,”	even	on	a	global	scale,	for	a	subpopulation	to	have	such	gains.		 Remarkably,	of	the	four	heterodox	professors	in	my	sample	–	by	all	accounts	the	four	best-known	heterodox	academic	economists	in	Canada	–	three	of	them	are	Francophone	Québécois	(the	fourth,	oddly	enough,	is	British	by	origin).	Two	of	them	scarcely	mentioned	Québec,	although	one	of	them	was	clearly	influenced	by	his	education	in	France,	which	was	only	possible	because	of	the	linguistic	link;	there	the	professors	in	his	group	were	evenly	split	between	mainstream	and	heterodox,	which	would	have	been	highly	unusual	in	Canada.	The	third	Francophone	heterodox	economist	seemed	to	share	others’	criticisms	of	Québec,	noting	that	private	schools	there	are	subsidised	(they	are	not	in	Ontario),	which	intensifies	the	societal	gap	because	good	students	and	teachers	go	to	private	schools.	He	also	described	meeting	Milton	Friedman	in	the	1970s	at	UMontréal,	where	most	people	were	excited	about	Friedman’s	visit;	he	said	UMontréal	was	a	“satellite”	of	Chicago	at	the	time,	and	that	he	had	started	a	Master’s	degree	there	but	“was	disgusted”	and	quit.		 The	only	mainstream	Francophone	Québécois	professor	I	spoke	with	seemed	to	believe	that	“Québec	is	a	separate	model”	compared	to	the	rest	of	the	country.	He	said	that	the	tax	system	is	not	particularly	progressive	“in	that	you	get	to	the	top	level	very	quickly”	and	that	45%	of	people	do	not	pay	taxes	in	Québec,	“so	the	tax	base	is	very	narrow	[and	.	.	.]	extremely	steep	[and	.	.	.]	the	incentive	to	work	is	not	very	high.”	He	later	spoke	of	the	differences	between	Anglophone	and	Francophone	universities,	saying	that	“It	gives	us	a	lot	of	constraints	[.	.	.]	You	have	to	hire	from	a	smaller	pool	of	candidates”	and	that	there	were	only	two	Québécois	academics	in	the	UMontréal	economics	department.	The	university	provides	private	tutors	to	get	an	individual’s	French	up	to	the	appropriate	level,	however	–	there	are	many	people	who	speak	Italian,	Spanish,	or	Portuguese	–	and	they	all	publish	in	English:	“There	are	very	few	people	who	publish	in	French.	It	almost	never	happens.”	He	believed	that	because	of	the	language	preference,	UMontréal	probably	has	a	higher	average	level	of	ability	in	their	programs,	with	many	students	from	Northern	Africa	and	elsewhere.		 Of	the	two	Francophones	working	for	think	tanks,	the	Conference	Board	economist	seemed	to	hold	his	home	province	in	higher	esteem.	He	said	that	Québec	economists	seem	to	reflect	the	more	“social”	focus	of	the	province.116	He	later	said																																																									116	Some	of	them	will	even	defend	supply	management	in	the	dairy	industry,	he	added,	which	most	economists	will	not.	
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that	Québec	has	perhaps	been	more	creative	in	managing	its	ageing	population,	reckoning	with	the	decline	of	manufacturing	in	the	province,	and	so	on.		 His	fellow	Francophone	at	the	C.D.	Howe	Institute,	on	the	other	hand,	barely	mentioned	Québec,	merely	saying	that	it	was	fairly	“parochial”	during	his	undergraduate	years	and	therefore	most	people	stayed	in-province	for	university.	The	main	difference,	he	said,	was	that	UMontréal	was	very	focused	on	theory	and	econometric	models	relative	to	equivalent	programs	in	the	rest	of	Canada	–	it	was	a	B.Sc.	as	opposed	to	a	B.A.		 One	Montréal-raised	Anglophone	professor	described	the	mass	exodus	of	Anglophones	from	Québec	(“at	least	half	a	million”)	during	the	1970s	and	ascribed	Montréal’s	ensuing	stagnation	(and	Toronto’s	resultant	boom)	to	that.	He	“never	felt	an	attachment	to	Québec”	although	he	was	“attached	to	Montréal”	and	was	“proud	to	be	Canadian,”	and	thought	that	this	view	was	typical	among	Anglophone	Québecers,	for	whom	there	was	more	of	a	North	American	orientation	(he	would	have	been	happy	to	move	to	the	U.S.)	than	there	was	for	other	Canadians.		 Another	Anglophone	professor	who	had	grown	up	in	Québec	was	less	charitable	towards	it;	he	claimed	that	Québec	“tends	to	be	the	most	–	quote	–	progressive	province”	and	criticised	a	number	of	policies	there.	During	the	1980	Québec	referendum	he	looked	at	public	expenditures	around	the	world,	and	Canada’s	was	the	second	most	devolved	federation	in	the	OECD	after	Switzerland.	He	later	mentioned	the	Montréal	Economics	Institute,	“which	was	inspired,	at	least,	by	[the]	Fraser	[Institute]	and	tries	to	bring	a	more	market-oriented	approach	to	the	Québec	wilderness.”	Indeed,	one	Fraser	Institute	conversant	included	Québec	in	a	list	of	regions	of	Canada	he	thought	were	“the	problem”:	“Right	across	the	country	we	have	people	who	have	convinced	themselves	that	the	solution	to	the	economic	problem	of	scarcity	is	more	government.”		 One	Anglophone	mentioned	that	the	C.D.	Howe’s	move	from	Montréal	to	Toronto	had	been	due	to	the	difficulty	of	getting	people	to	move	to	Montréal	after	the	Anglophone	exodus,	and	an	Anglophone	Western	Canadian	professor	now	teaching	at	a	Francophone	university	noted	that	the	Fraser	Institute’s	Index	of	Economic	Freedom	had	put	Québec	in	last	place	among	Canadian,	American,	and	Mexican	subnational	jurisdictions.	Taxes	are	relatively	high	in	Québec,	he	also	noted.		 Finally,	a	small	number	of	conversants	mentioned	Québec	more	or	less	neutrally;	a	Conference	Board	conversant	mentioned	Québec’s	subsidy	of	private	
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schools,	and	a	professor	in	Ontario	noted	that	French-speaking	universities	were	rising	through	the	ranks	–	UMontréal	was	a	“strong	department”	that	“has	risen	a	lot”	and	Laval	has	risen	too	–	perhaps	in	part	because	they	receive	research	money	federally	in	addition	to	generous	funding	from	the	province	of	Québec.		
	
Economics	Education			 It	seemed	that	most	conversants	had	received	a	relatively	standard	economics	education,	given	the	overwhelming	view	that	curricula	were	“homogeneous”	across	the	country117	–	but	few	explicitly	said	this.	All	but	one	of	those	who	spoke	of	a	standard	education	expressed	dissatisfaction	with	the	experience.	One	mainstream	professor	said	her	education	was	“very	standard;”	the	process	was	that	“you	learn	stuff,	you	regurgitate	it,	and	you’re	done.	I	don’t	think	it	was	a	very	inspiring	undergraduate	education.”	She	was	the	sort	of	person	who	liked	monetary	economics	“because	I	didn’t	understand	it,	and	nothing	I	learned	helped	me	understand	it,”	however,	so	perhaps	it	would	have	been	difficult	to	throw	her	off	course.	A	CCPA	economist	said,	“at	U	of	T	in	1982,	it	was	all	micro	all	the	time	–	and	game	theory	and	stuff	like	that,	which	didn’t	interest	me.	[.	.	.]	I	couldn’t	bear	the	way	economics	was	being	taught	when	I	graduated,	which	was	the	spring	of	‘83.”	One	heterodox	professor	felt	that	it	was	only	in	his	first	economic	history	class	that	“I	could	identify	with	[economics];”	of	his	macroeconomics	and	microeconomics	courses,	especially	the	latter,	he	“didn’t	think	much	of	it,”	found	it	“arid,”	and	“didn’t	connect	with	it	at	all.”	A	heterodox	colleague	characterised	his	education	as	“nothing	to	speak	about	in	the	first	three	years,	nothing	special,”	until	a	course	he	termed	“very	eclectic,	but	very	conservative	at	the	same	time”	that	exposed	him	to	new	perspectives.	Conversants	such	as	these	appeared	to	have	continued	with	economics	despite,	not	because	of,	the	way	it	was	taught.		 A	much	larger	group	of	conversants,	conversely,	believed	their	education	to	be	atypical	in	some	way	–	twelve	in	all.	One	professor	said,	“I	had	a	very	good	economics	education”	at	UToronto	and	at	Harvard	“had	a	very	broad	education.	[.	.	.]	My	own	view	is	my	education	is	as	broad	as	you’d	want.”	He	went	on	to	say,	however,	that	he	felt	that	the	historical,	institutional	aspects	of	economics	were	important,	“and	it’s																																																									117		By	“standard”	I	mean	a	mainstream	economics	education	with	little	to	no	heterodox	or	pluralist	teachings.	
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that	historical	institutional	material	that	you	don’t	pick	up	at	the	graduate	level	in	course	work.	You	pick	it	up	as	an	undergraduate	or	you	pick	it	up	as	a	practitioner,	but	it’s	not	something	that’s	taught	as	part	of	a	PhD	training.”	He	gained	that,	however,	because	Harvard	“still	had	strong	Keynesian	roots	when	I	was	there”	and	he	“was	exposed	to	all	kinds	of	things.”	Another	professor	said	that	her	education	at	SFU	was	“atypical”	–	“	SFU	was	very	much	Gary	Becker	Chicago	School	–	so,	relatively	math-light.	I	mean	I	did	math	because	I	liked	math.”	Her	education	at	the	LSE	was	unconventional	too;	Queen’s	was	the	only	one	that	could	be	considered	typical	and	she	only	stayed	there	for	a	year.	She	felt	her	undergraduate	economics	education	was	unlike	that	of	many	of	her	colleagues;	for	example,	her	fourth-year	macroeconomics	course	featured	Hayek	and	Coase,	whereas	typically	“people	who	teach	economics	don’t	know	much	history	of	economic	thought.”			 A	Conference	Board	economist	said,	“I	benefited	from	having	really	eclectic	training”	that	was	“very	atypical”	then,	and	also	relative	to	his	own	staff’s	now.	“We	took	neoclassical	micro,	which	I	thought	was	horrible,”	he	said,	but	there	was	substantial	variety	in	his	other	classes	at	the	University	of	Manitoba;	“it	was	a	strange	department,	in	that	you	had	communists,	I	mean	true	communists,	as	well	as	rigorously	trained	neoclassicals	in	the	same	space,”	with	classes	in	everything	from	Soviet-style	planning	to	modern	capitalism.	He	later	attended	McGill,	which	“was	one	of	the	few	post-Keynesian	places	in	North	America.”	An	academic	also	attended	Manitoba	as	an	undergraduate,	and	he	judged	that	about	a	fifth	of	his	professors	were	heterodox	–	“but	that’s	very	unusual	in	economics.”		 Eclectic	economics	programs	appeared	to	have	been	less	unusual	back	when	many	of	my	conversants	had	studied	the	subject,	however.	One	bank	chief	economist	lamented	that	since	he	had	studied	there	in	the	early	1980s,	“I	think	they’ve	wrecked	the	economics	department	at	the	University	of	Victoria	–	it	was	an	elite	teaching	facility”	with	professors	who	“really	knew	their	stuff	but	could	make	it	understandable”	and	courses	that	were	“grounded	in	policy	issues,”	which	is	rare	now,	but	the	department	subsequently	expanded	to	offer	Master’s	and	PhD	programs	and	lost	these	elements.		 A	PEF-affiliated	economist	told	of	a	bygone	era	at	the	University	of	Calgary	as	well:		 	Well,	it’s	certainly	not	typical	of	what	a	typical	program	would	be	like	today.	Now,	the	University	of	Calgary	was	not	a	heterodox	place;	it	was	very	
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mainstream,	it	was	probably	quite	conservative.	Stephen	Harper118	was	studying	economics	in	the	program	when	I	was	there.	So	there	was	a	strong	acceptance	of	the	neoclassical	precepts.	But	I	started	in	1979;	I	started	just	as	neoliberalism	was	about	to	hit.	You	had	a	situation	where,	even	in	a	mainstream	department,	you	had	a	bit	of	a	diversity	of	views.	You	had	a	few	lefties,	a	couple	of	lefties.	You	had	a	willingness	to	debate.	And	one	of	my	great	fears	is	that	that	isn’t	there	today.	Someone	like	me	who	came	along	might	not	find	any	kind	of	nurturing	voice	to	say	there’s	an	alternative.			He	described	a	department	that	offered	Marxian	economics119	and	Soviet	planning	in	addition	to	the	traditional	macro	and	micro	fare.	Of	another	professor	who	he	thought	was	particularly	good,	he	said:	“He	wasn’t	left-wing,	per	se,	but	he	was	a	free-thinker,	and	he	taught	the	course	from	a	totally	different	perspective”	and	had	students	connect	headlines	to	economic	theory	–	“and	always	in	a	critical-minded	way,	rather	than	the	certainty	and	determinism	that	you	usually	get	from	neoclassical	economists.	So	I	was	very	lucky.	I	suspect	if	I’d	gone	into	the	regular	macro/micro	intro	course	with	300	students	and	charts	and	graphs	I	probably	never	would	have	become	an	economist.”		 Another	conversant,	a	bank	chief	economist,	began	her	economics	education	at	a	women’s	college	in	the	U.S.	after	initially	enrolling	as	a	math	major.	Both	of	these	are	remarkably	male-dominated	fields,	but	that	fact	would	have	been	uncommonly	lacking	in	salience	in	an	all-women	environment.	A	professor	–	also	a	woman	–	said	she	was	“very	fortunate”	to	have	an	unusually	supportive	teaching	assistant	to	help	her	through	the	beginning	of	her	economics	education.	A	second	bank	chief	economist	noted	that	the	economic	history	focus	in	his	undergraduate	program	at	UToronto	was	unusual;	normally	they	“push	the	math	very	early”	even	though,	for	the	average	student,	“real-life”	applications	are	important.			 One	economist,	after	discovering	heterodoxy	in	his	third	year,120	managed	to	pursue	a	largely	heterodox	education	thereafter	by	undertaking	a	Master’s	at	McGill	and	a	PhD	at	the	“very	heterodox”	New	School.	Two	other	economists	–	one	with	the	CCPA	and	a	heterodox	academic	–	studied	in	France.	The	former	spent	her	final																																																									118	Then-Prime	Minister	of	Canada,	a	very	conservative	politician	by	Canadian	standards.	119	The	professor	“was	a	Turkish	Marxist	teaching	at	the	University	of	Calgary	for	some	reason.”	120	After	taking	that	class,	he	said,	“I	came	into	my	own.	It	kind	of	crystallised	what	I	wanted	to	do,	what	I	wanted	to	think,	how	I	wanted	to	think.	[.	.	.]	I	was	always	critical	about	economics,	I	didn’t	believe	what	I	was	learning,	supply	and	demand	and	all	that;	it	just	didn’t	mesh	with	what	I	was	observing	in	the	real	world.	[.	.	.]	But	I	didn’t	know	why.	I	didn’t	have	the	tools	to	explain	it.”			
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undergraduate	year	in	Bordeaux	where	the	program	was	“far	more	mathematically	rigorous,	and	introduced	me	to	all	sorts	of	more	complex	theories	on	everything	–	from	Marxist	economics	to	theories	of	dynamism.	[.	.	.]	Bordeaux	was	probably	the	most	conservative	faculty	in	France”	when	she	was	there	in	1981,	“and	here	was	Bordeaux,	seriously	conservative	in	its	approach,	and	teaching	Ricardian	theories	of	value,	and	connecting	it	to	Marx,	and	showing	Harrod’s	–	just	very,	very	advanced,	actually,	for	an	undergraduate	level.”			 At	Paris	1,	where	the	heterodox	professor	studied,	the	unit’s	leader	was	New	Keynesian121	but	the	others	were	heterodox.	In	France	at	the	time,	he	said,	it	was	half-and-half	heterodox	and	mainstream,	but	now	“things	have	unfortunately	changed”	–	professors	are	largely	neoclassical,	the	heterodox	people	are	older,	and	very	few	young	heterodox	people	are	able	to	find	jobs.	When	asked	why	this	happened,	he	cited	two	reasons:	infighting	among	Marxists,	Keynesians,	regulationists,122	and	other	heterodox	economists	who	did	not	realise	that	neoclassicals	were	taking	over	(“The	neoclassicals	got,	if	you	want,	better	organised.”).	Besides	which,	he	continued,	there	was	a	shift	towards	neoliberalism	more	generally.		 In	all,	this	was	a	remarkable	number	of	economists	from	my	sample	to	have	undergone	a	non-standard	form	of	economics	education.	This	is	in	addition	to	seven	COMER	members,	none	of	whom	studied	economics	formally;	two	journalists,	neither	of	whom	held	an	economics	degree;	ten	conversants	with	at	least	one	degree	in	another	area	of	study;	and	three	people	with	a	joint	major	in	economics	and	political	science.	Almost	all	of	the	latter	two	groups	were	professional	or	academic	economists,	as	were	the	twelve	who	attested	to	having	had	atypical	experiences	with	economic	education.		 My	conversants	made	it	clear	that	this	array	of	educational	experiences	in	economics	would	be	much	more	uncommon	today,	particularly	in	microeconomics.	One	mainstream	professor	said,	“I	think	graduate	micro	has	a	habit	of	being	–	tendency,	better	word	–	of	being	pretty	similar	across	programs.	Graduate	macro	I	think	tends	to	be	much	more	variable.	I	think	that’s	always	been	the	case.”	When	asked	to	describe	the	evolution	of	macroeconomics	education,	he	replied,	“there	has	been	a	convergence	in	the	discipline”	in	the	last	25	years	–	Dynamic	Stochastic																																																									121	Keynesian	disequilibrium	theory,	a	sort	of	mix	of	Keynesian	economics	(in	which	humans	are	not	necessarily	rational,	for	example,	and	there	is	a	role	for	government	stimulus)	and	mainstream	or	neoclassical	economics.	122	A	French	school	of	economic	thought,	and	even	this	was	split	in	two.	
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General	Equilibrium	(DSGE)123	started	to	replace	Real	Business	Cycle	(RBC)124	modelling,	the	first	of	which	became	used	by	Neo-	or	New	Keynesians	–	Keynesians	will	put	in	“real	and	nominal	rigidities”	and	neoclassical	economists	will	use	other	things,	he	said,	but	they	are	the	“same	type”	of	models.	There	is	now	a	move	away	from	that,	however,	as	RBC	and	DSGE	used	a	single	interest	rate	to	represent	the	financial	system	–	earlier	versions	“had	no	money.”	Now	a	graduate	macroeconomics	class	will	start	with	DSGE;	he	felt	lucky	that	he	was	taught	RBC	early	on:	“I	ended	up	getting	more	into	it	in	my	teaching	here	–	I	actually	thought	they	gave	it	short	shrift	at	MIT,”	but	in	his	opinion	you	need	to	do	both.			 Several	economists	mentioned	having	mainly	or	even	exclusively	learned	the	RBC	model,	however;	one	IRPP	economist	was	taught	the	RBC	but	became	critical	of	it	after	the	fact;	Keynesians	were	right	in	a	sense,	he	said	–	people	thought	the	post-crisis	stimulus	would	cause	major	inflation	and	it	did	not.	“People	that	had	been	working	in	the	area	for	ten	or	twenty	years	never	really	thought	about	what	happens	when	banks	fail,	which	was	a	“huge	blind	spot	for	the	profession,”	he	added.	A	microeconomics	professor	said	that	during	her	PhD	at	the	LSE	in	the	late	1980s,	macroeconomics	was	dominated	by	RBC,	which	really	turned	her	off.	Macroeconomics	is	now	much	more	concerned	with	growth,	history,	and	institutions,	she	continued,	and	is	more	empirically	driven	with	“much	less	dominance	of	theory.”		 Other	conversants	did	not	appear	to	support	this	view.	One	Bank	of	Canada	economist	remarked	upon	the	gradual	decline	in	emphasis	on	history,	while	a	mainstream	professor	contended	that	the	content	of	courses	had	not	changed	much	but	“is	taught	in	a	more	accessible	way.”	Another	mainstream	professor	felt	that	economics	education	was	“much	more	mathematical”	now,	and	noted	the	rise	of	econometrics.	This	professor	said	that	the	1960s	was	a	Keynesian	period	in	macroeconomics,	regardless	of	economists’	political	persuasions,	and	in	the	1980s	everything	shifted	towards	the	neoclassical,	general	equilibrium	paradigm.	“Usually	it’s	a	loss	of	faith	in	a	paradigm	that	makes	the	profession	shift,”	he	commented,	
																																																								123	New	Keynesian	DSGE	models	work	with	the	assumption	that	fluctuations	in	aggregate	demand	(as	in,	consumer	or	government	spending)	can	cause	business	cycles,	which	is	not	true	for	RBC	models.	124	RBC	models	are	a	subset	of	DSGE	models.	RBC	models	are	built	on	the	assumption	that	money	is	neutral	–	that	changes	in	money	supply	and	nominal	(interest-adjusted)	interest	rates	cannot	affect	employment,	wages,	and	so	on;	Keynesians	would	disagree	with	this	assumption.	
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noting	that	this	happened	in	the	1930s	with	the	rise	of	Keynesianism,	in	the	late	1970s	with	the	crisis	of	stagnation,	and	now	following	the	crisis	of	2007-2009.		 From	the	private	sector	perspective,	said	one	bank	chief	economist,	the	“profession	has	changed	dramatically”	in	the	past	few	decades	as	markets	became	more	important,	households	became	more	exposed,	and	finance	became	a	part	of	the	24-hour	news	cycle	–	particularly	during	the	1990s,	when	we	shed	regulations	that	held	down	interest	rates	and	economic	analysis	“became	more	focused	on	financial	markets,	more	focused	on	modelling,	more	focused	on	high-frequency.”125			 Finally,	a	heterodox	academic	began	with	the	history	of	institutional	economics	in	the	early	1900s	at	Chicago,	which	influenced	major	Canadian	figures	such	as	Harold	Innis,126	who	studied	there	after	World	War	I.	Until	World	War	II	many	departments	in	the	U.S.	“were	dominated	by	institutionalists”	and	“connected	with	economic	history,”	and	Innis’	staples	thesis	was	greatly	influenced	by	this,	although	it	was	also	“uniquely	Canadian	in	many	ways.”	The	historical,	institutionalist	tradition	combined	with	a	significant	British	influence,	as	several	influential	Canadian	economists	studied	in	the	UK	–	many	at	Cambridge.	This	heterodox	professor	cited	Kari	Polanyi	Levitt	as	an	example,	a	McGill	professor	who	attended	Cambridge,	studied	under	Keynes,	and	served	as	an	assistant	to	Joan	Robinson	in	the	1920s.	Alfred	Marshall	had	just	passed	away,	but	“at	the	time,	the	Marshallian	tradition	was	fairly	open”	–	Marshall’s	work	included	plenty	of	math,	but	he	was	interested	in	realism;	now	it	is	all	about	technique.	The	Walrasian	approach	(general	equilibrium)	would	later	dominate,	and	with	the	rise	of	economists	John	Hicks	and	then	Paul	Samuelson,	math	became	more	important	in	the	1930s	and	1940s.	The	Canadian	Journal	of	Economics	and	Political	Science127	and	political	economy	departments	all	split	in	two128	in	the	late	1960s,	and	at	the	time	there	“was	a	more	interdisciplinary	focus”	and	economists	“were	all	much	more	open,”	he	said;	“There	was	no	Chicago	School	to	speak	of.	[.	.	.]	Friedman	was	viewed	as	a	wacko,”129	and	there	was	substantial	interest	in	Canadian	economic	history	at	McGill	in	those	days.	The	real																																																									125	He	also	noted	that	as	a	bank	economist,	he	had	to	become	focused	on	more	superficial,	immediate	work	instead	of	deep	historical	and	contextual	work.	126	An	iconic	Canadian	political	economist.	127	Now	the	Canadian	Journal	of	Economics	and	the	Canadian	Journal	of	Political	Science,	respectively.	128	Dividing	political	science	from	economics	in	both	cases.	129	He	had	met	Friedman	in	the	1970s	at	UMontréal,	where	some	people	were	excited	about	him;	Friedman	was	a	“good	carpet	salesman,	but	there	wasn’t	much	substance.”	
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transformation	occurred	during	the	1970s	and	1980s,	when	the	profession	“started	to	get	polarised,”	and	by	the	late	1980s	they	were	mainly	hiring	people	in	the	Chicago	tradition	–	it	was	“very	tribal,”	he	recalled.	Until	that	point	Montréal,	McGill,	and	UQAM	were	“all	departments	that	were	[.	.	.]	mixed,	which	is	what	it	should	be.	[.	.	.]	We’re	not	a	church	here.”	As	soon	as	neoclassical	economists	formed	a	majority,	however,	“they	wouldn’t	give	an	inch.	[.	.	.]	And	that’s	what	happened	pretty	much	everywhere.”	However,	now,	“I	would	say	[the	Chicago	School]	is	passé,	but	the	remnants	of	it	.	.	.	there	aren’t	many	left,	even	in	Chicago.”	It	is	more	complicated	now.	Of	heterodox	economists	in	Canada	he	commented,	“we’re	not	a	big	group”	and	very	much	in	the	minority	relative	to	the	“so-called	mainstream;”	the	“mainstream	has	narrowed	itself,”	he	said,	and	the	focus	on	technique	has	pushed	out	people	“who	might	be	more	open	to	other	disciplines.”	Other	departments	have	grown	at	the	expense	of	economics	departments,	which	“have	been	shedding	all	of	this	stuff	that	used	to	be	taught	within	[economics].	[.	.	.]	Harold	Innis	would	not	be	in	an	economics	department	nowadays.	This	is	despite	the	fact	that	Harold	Innis	had	been	the	President	of	the	American	Economic	Association	in	the	1940s.”	This	professor	said	of	his	own	department	that	it	used	to	be	“all	over	the	map”	and	“open,”	with	Marxist,	Keynesian,	neo-Ricardian,	Institutionalist,	and	neoclassical	economists	all	working	there;	hiring	was	on	merit.	However	“if	[he	and	his	heterodox	colleague]	were	on	the	market	now,	there’s	no	way	we	would	ever	get	into	the	economics	department.	They	would	never	hire	us.”		
	
Why	Did	You	Become	An	Economist?			 Of	the	reasons	economists	cited	for	entering	the	discipline,	the	four	most	common	were	political	motivations,	the	explanatory	power	of	the	discipline	and/or	its	ability	to	answer	big	questions,	interest	and/or	enjoyment,	and	talent	for	the	subject.	Within	these	answers,	however,	some	interesting	nuances	and	trends	emerged.		 The	most	common	reason	for	studying	economics	was	political	(or	social	justice)	motivations	or	an	interest	in	policy,	with	22	conversants	citing	this	factor.	Only	nine	of	these	were	academics,	however,	and	of	those	just	four	could	be	considered	mainstream	economists;	the	uneven	distribution	of	answers	among	the	various	constituencies	in	my	sample	was	striking.	All	but	one	of	the	COMER	members	
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noted	this	as	a	primary	motivation;	one	explained:	“Social	justice	–	when	two	thirds	of	humanity	is	shut	out,	you	need	to	go	looking	for	the	reason.”	She	had	sought	information	on	the	topic	while	organising	a	workshop	as	the	social	justice	coordinator	for	the	missionary	oblates.130	Another	COMER	member	wondered,	as	a	teacher,	why	the	government	could	not	seem	to	afford	adequate	funding	for	public	education	–	there	were	no	answers,	she	said,	and	nowhere	to	go	to	find	out.	“If	anyone	had	ever	told	me	that	I	would	ever	read	anything	about	economics	I	would	have	guffawed	for	a	week.	I	was	not	at	all	interested,	and	totally	apolitical	as	well.”	Another	four	individuals	joined	COMER	via	other	activist	work.	A	Fraser	Institute	economist	said,	“I	was	interested	in	economics	as	a	very	early	age”	after	reading	Milton	Friedman’s	Free	to	Choose	and	thinking,	“that’s	my	set	of	values.	[.	.	.]	The	individual	is	best-off	making	decisions	for	herself	or	himself.”	A	C.D.	Howe	economist	mentioned	the	debates	in	the	late	1970s	and	early	1980s	regarding	“what	the	appropriate	role	of	government	was”	as	a	motivation	for	studying	economics;	he	went	on	to	say:		 Partly,	economics	is	supposed	to	be	the	science	of	human	behaviour,	so	it’s	intrinsically	interesting	from	that	point	of	view;	you	could	think	of	it	as	a	branch	of	anthropology.	But	also,	I	think	from	a	very	early	age	[.	.	.	]	I	was	struck	by	the	extraordinary	differences,	when	you	look	from	country	to	another,	in	how	well	societies	function	and	how	prosperous	people	are	and	how	free	they	are	to	explore	their	own	interests	and	their	own	proclivities.			 A	professor	said,	similarly,	“I	went	into	economics	probably	to	understand	why	some	people	are	rich	and	some	people	are	poor,”	although	her	research	did	not	end	up	centering	on	this	question.	Another	professor	wanted	to	look	at	inequality	and	poverty	from	an	economics	perspective.	Yet	another	–	heterodox	–	professor	referred	to	his	identity	as	“a	young	activist”	in	university	as	a	partial	motivation	for	studying	economics.	A	mainstream	professor	said,	“At	the	time	[in	high	school]	I	had	an	interest	in	social	issues,	so	I	wanted	some	social	science.”	A	PEF-affiliated	economist	said,	“I	was	engaged	in	a	range	of	different	what	you’d	call	social	activist	undertakings,	and	I	went	to	university	with	a	social	conscience,	thinking	I’d	like	to	study	something	that	was	compatible	with	that	commitment.”	A	heterodox	economist	said	of	many	people	in	his	generation,	“we	weren’t	going	into	economics	because	we	wanted	to	be	in	business	[.	.	.]	it	was	because	this	was	something	very	important	[.	.	.]	
																																																								130	A	religious	order.	
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and	I	wanted	to	make	a	difference.”	He	also	mentioned	growing	up	in	poverty	and	“want[ing]	to	make	sense	of	that.”		 One	central	banker	became	interested	in	monetary	policy	growing	up	in	the	1970s	because	“that	was	the	big	puzzle”	then;	“monetary	policy	in	the	1970s	was	a	mess,”	he	said,	and	“nothing	seemed	to	be	working.”	A	conservative	professor	recalled,	“My	interest	in	economics	was	always	a	policy-type	interest”	rather	than	the	methods,	approach,	or	way	of	thinking,	as	he	felt	was	the	case	for	others.	Finally,	a	bank	chief	economist,	a	heterodox	academic,	and	a	mainstream	professor	all	cited	an	interest	in	politics	and/or	political	science	as	a	motivation	for	studying	the	“closely	related	field”	of	economics.		 Enjoyment	of,	or	interest	in,	economics	garnered	18	mentions	in	all,	eight	of	which	were	from	professors.	One	CCPA	economist	said:			 I	had	a	classic	liberal	arts	education	in	my	first	year,	and	my	economics	professor	blew	me	away.	I	just	thought	he	was	hilarious,	and	I	was	amazed	at	what	economics	was	about.	I	don’t	even	know	why	I	picked	economics.	Maybe	it	was	just	to	fill	in	the	spot	that	I	needed.	And	then	I	continued	to	find	economics	the	most	fascinating	course	of	any	of	my	classes.131				 An	academic	economist	gave	the	explanation,	“Because	I’m	fascinated	about	money.	[.	.	.]	Because	it	dominates	everyone’s	thinking”	and	because	her	first	economics	T.A.	had	broadened	the	field	for	her;	“but	it	was	just	a	curiosity.”	When	asked	whether	she	thought	that	was	common,	she	said,	“Not	now.	Most	of	the	students	who	do	economics	are	much	more	job-focused.”132	A	bank	chief	economist	said,	“I	love	[economics]	because	it’s	analytical,	mathematical,	and	rigorous,	but	it’s	also	psychological	and	sociological	and	human	behaviour	and	that	to	me	is	a	nice	mix.”	A	heterodox	professor	said	of	his	first	economics	professor,	“she	was	wonderful,	and	she	was	demanding	[.	.	.]	she	just	made	me	love	economics.”	A	mainstream	professor	said	of	his	economics	education,	“I	loved	it	and	I	did	well.”		 Interestingly,	talent	for	the	subject	was	most	frequently	cited	first	(if	mentioned	in	a	longer	list	of	reasons)	and/or	cited	more	than	once	among	those	who	mentioned	it	(13	in	all),	and	it	was	the	most	frequently	cited	factor	among	mainstream	academic	
																																																								131	She	also	said	she	appreciated	“the	beauty	of	the	way	micro	and	macro	both	intersected	and	existed	in	separate	spheres.”	132	Students	enrolling	in	the	years	following	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	may	well	be	more	job-focused	–	and	less	likely	to	choose	to	study	a	subject	for	a	love	of	it	–	because	of	constrained	employment	opportunities.	
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economists.133	This	answer	also	highlighted	one	of	the	advantages	of	qualitative	methods;	in	the	survey	I	circulated	among	a	larger	group	of	economists,	interest	in	the	subject	by	far	eclipsed	talent	as	a	reason	for	studying	economics	–	83	out	of	100	respondents	listed	it	as	a	motivation	for	becoming	an	economist.134	When	asked	an	open-ended	interview	question,	however,	talent	came	up	more	often	–	it	was	clearly	more	front-of-mind	for	economists	when	they	were	not	presented	with	a	pre-selected	list	of	options	–	and	I	was	able	to	note	how	many	times	a	reason	was	repeated	within	the	same	answer.			 This	method	also	helped	tease	out	the	reasoning	behind	some	of	my	conversants’	answers.	One	IRPP	economist	noted	that	he	had	received	the	highest	grade	in	Grade	13	economics,	and	acknowledged	the	role	that	played	in	his	decision-making:	“when	people	tell	you	you’re	good	at	something	.	.	.”	One	mainstream	academic	economist	said,	“I	was	good	in	math,	so	just	for	that	reason	economics	was	a	natural	thing	to	[do].”	A	CCPA	economist	said,	“I’m	good	at	the	numbers	side	of	economics	–	I	can	take	datasets	apart	and	put	them	back	together	and	that	stuff	comes	very	easily	to	me.	I	was	looking	at	work	in	progressive	policy	circles	and	that	toolkit	[was]	my	selling	proposition.”	A	professor	described	a	process	of	deduction	that	turned	on	talent;	she	said	it	“was	down	to	math,	philosophy,	and	economics	because	I	enjoyed	them	all,”	but	she	was	better	at	philosophy	and	economics	than	math	“and	economics	was	going	to	pay	better.”	A	Bank	of	Canada	economist	said	he	“did	quite	well	relative	to	my	peers	when	I	was	in	high	school”	so	pursued	commerce	and	economics	in	university.	He,	like	some	others	in	my	sample,	specifically	referenced	the	grades	they	received;	of	his	first	economics	class,	he	said,	“I	think	I	got	101	in	the	course,	because	he	gave	out	bonus	points.”	A	bank	chief	economist	gave	his	reason	without	hesitation:	“Yeah,	because	it	was	easy	to	get	high	marks;”	he	was	also	able	to	recite	almost	all	of	his	undergraduate	grades.	He	continued,	“In	fairness	I	did	like	economics.	At	least	in	first-year	economics	there	tends	to	be	a	right	and	a	wrong	answer,	so	it’s	not	that	difficult	to	get	high	marks.	That	drew	me	into	it.”	Another	mainstream	academic	described	a	variety	of	courses	in	his	first	year,	including	history,	“which	I	loved	–	I	wanted	to	do	history.	[.	.	.]	I	loved	history	best	of	all	and	I	got	a	C.”	He	also	expressed	“a	real	interest	in	psychology,	how	people	make																																																									133	Seven	mainstream	academics	in	total;	no	heterodox	professors	included	talent	as	a	factor.	134	They	were	able	to	choose	as	many	as	they	wanted	among	9	options	–	plus	“Other”	–	for	why	they	had	become	an	economist.	
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decisions,”	but	noted,	“I	did	nothing	in	economics	and	I	got	an	A.	[.	.	.]	Poli	Sci	was	the	other	course	I	did	well	in.	So	I	decided	to	do	a	joint	degree	in	economics	and	political	science.”	This	professor	was	among	the	most	interdisciplinary	and	policy-focused	of	those	to	whom	I	spoke,	and	was	clearly	intellectually	curious,	yet	never	mentioned	a	genuine	interest	in	economics	itself	–	only	his	performance	or	aptitude.			 Another	mainstream	economist	said:		 	Basically,	I	didn’t	want	to	commit	to	anything,	and	I	figured	math	would	be	the	thing	that	would	give	me	the	most	flexibility	and	it	was	easy;	I	was	good	at	it.	But	then	at	the	end	I	decided	that	math	wasn’t	going	to	be	–	I	wanted	to	be	an	academic.	I	was	in	my	third	year	in	math	and	we	were	learning	theorems	that	had	been	proven	in	the	1850s,	and	so	–	[it’s	an]	awfully	long	way	to	go	to	reach	the	frontier	in	a	field	like	that.		When	asked	what	appealed	about	economics,	he	said,	“It	was	easy	for	me.	That’s	part	of	it.	The	reason	I	took	math,	quite	bluntly,	was	because	there	were	no	labs	and	no	essays	–	you	just	had	to	do	assignments.	And	I	was	good	at	it.	So,	you	know,	it	was	easy.”	He	went	on	to	explain,	“It	was	really	just	an	interest	in	human	behaviour	and	in	mathematical	modelling.	So	it	sort	of	put	them	together	in	an	interesting	way.	And	incentives.	[.	.	.]	But	I	can’t	really	say	it	was	a	drive.		It	was	basically	something	I	figured	I	would	do	okay	at.”		 A	bank	chief	economist	said	something	similar:	“I	was	doing	really	well”	and	“I	was	good	at	it”	but	also	“I	was	doing	it	for	the	sake	of	doing	it.”	He	thought	he	would	“be	a	so-so	academic”	in	economics.	Unlike	many	economists	he	was	good	at	writing	and	presenting,	and	saw	a	chance	to	excel	as	a	bank	chief	economist.135			 A	Conference	Board	economist	said,	along	those	lines,	“Basically	it’s	how	my	brain	works,	what	I’m	good	at.	I’m	good	at	lots	of	things,	but	not	brilliant	at	anything.	Although	I	can	write	pretty	well	for	an	economist.	I	can	write	in	a	way	that	people	can	read	it.”	Several	people	noted	that	economists	tend	not	to	write	well,	so	this	was	a	clear	competitive	advantage	for	him.136			 Fourteen	conversants	cited	the	broad	explanatory	power	(including	of	human	behaviour),	and	its	implication	in	big	questions,	as	part	of	the	appeal	of	economics.	“You	can	explain	the	world,”	said	one	professor;	it	“explains	people’s	behaviour.”	A																																																									135	Besides	which,	he	added,	“Did	anyone	tell	you	how	cushy	a	job	this	is?	It’s	a	dream	job.	But	don’t	tell	anybody.”	136	Like	the	chief	bank	economist	above,	the	Conference	Board	economist	clearly	enjoyed	his	work,	saying,	“I	love	my	job	because	[whispering]	–	I	can	do	almost	anything	I	want.”	
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Conference	Board	economist	said	it	was	“the	skill	set	you	need	to	take	on	big	big	problems”	and	a	mainstream	professor	concurred;	after	listing	other	factors,	he	said,	“The	other	thing	I	liked	is	that	it	really	asked	big	questions.”	A	Fraser	Institute	economist	said	that	“the	technical	definition	[of	economics]	is	the	study	of	the	scarcity	of	resources,	but	what	it’s	really	about	is	understanding	human	behaviour.”	A	PEF-affiliated	economist	cited	learning	about	the	history	of	thought	and	major	economic	debates,	“and	that	really	grabbed	me.”			 For	ten	conversants,	economics	suited	the	way	they	thought,	or	they	appreciated	the	mode	of	analysis	economics	employed.	One	professor	took	an	introductory	economics	course	during	her	Master’s	at	Harvard	“and	I	never	looked	back.”	When	asked	what	appealed	about	it,	she	said,	“I	guess	the	way	my	mind	works.”	Another	professor	said	his	first	economics	course	“was	like	a	revelation	–	I	just	found	that	the	subject	was	approaching	things	and	analysing	things	in	a	way	that	seemed	very	natural	to	me,	so	I	was	immediately	taken	with	it.”	Another	professor	liked	the	“rigorous	way	of	thinking;	there’s	a	model;”	a	bank	chief	economist	said	he	was	“captured	by	the	way	that	the	economics	profession	looks	at	the	world.”	By	one	C.D.	Howe	conversant’s	third	economics	class,	he	thought:			 	Oh	my	god,	this	is	it	for	me.	I	wasn’t	doing	really	well	at	math	because	I	didn’t	understand,	you	know,	calculus,	and	in	economics	it	became	immediately	clear	what	calculus	was	all	about.	It	was	just	expressed	differently,	in	these	very	concrete	terms.	[.	.	.]	Because	I	understood	economics	I	understood	math,	and	not	the	other	way	around.			 Two	others	perceived	an	appealing	neutrality	in	economics’	methods;	one	Bank	of	Canada	economist	commented	that	economics	“seemed	to	have	a	stronger	analytical	basis,	and	it	didn’t	seem	to	matter	as	much	what	the	views	of	the	professor	were;	[.	.	.]	analysis	was	fairly	judgement-free.”	A	mainstream	professor	said,	“I	liked	the	reasoning	that’s	involved.	[.	.	.]	Economics,	to	my	mind,	is	the	application	of	physics	–	of	pure	cold	logic	–	to	just	make	sense	of	the	world	out	there.	I’m	just	fascinated	by	it,	always	have	been.”		 A	substantial	number	of	conversants	–	eight	altogether	–	ended	up	in	economics	by	default	or	happenstance.	One	professor,	when	asked	how	he	had	come	to	economics,	said,	“Probably	accidentally.	I	was	a	commerce	undergraduate	and	knew	I	didn’t	like	it.”	Another	professor,	originally	from	Kenya,	said	that	“in	my	case	it	was	especially	random”	–	it	was	partly	a	process	of	elimination	as	his	school	had	few	options;	he	could	not	draw,	so	architecture	was	out;	his	family	thought	he	could	only	
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teach	if	he	studied	English	or	math;	engineering	was	basically	mechanics;	and	economics	was	the	only	other	option	–	“a	fall-back.”	A	third	professor	followed	a	similar	process:	he	did	not	want	to	join	the	army,	did	not	want	to	be	a	schoolteacher,	and	had	not	studied	enough	science	to	enter	that	domain,	“so	I	think	the	only	thing	available	was	social	science.	The	only	social	science	I’d	heard	of	was	economics,	so	I	applied	to	the	LSE	and	a	number	of	other	places	and	got	in.”	Another	British-born	professor	originally	applied	to	study	American	Studies	before	entering	the	workforce.	When	he	finally	went	to	university	at	the	age	of	21,	he	told	the	director	that	he	was	interested	in	political	science.	When	asked	if	he	was	good	at	math	he	said	yes	(“I	wasn’t.”),	so	the	director	recommended	economics;	“nonetheless	I	think	it	was	a	good	choice,	for	me,”	he	said.		 For	another	three	conversants	economics	truly	was	the	default.	One	heterodox	professor	said	simply,	“Well,	my	father	was	an	economist.”	He	wanted	to	go	into	medicine	at	first,	but	Laval	did	not	admit	him	because	they	could	not	compare	his	grades	from	France	(they	advised	that	he	go	to	Cégep,	to	essentially	repeat	two	years	of	high	school),	“so	I	thought,	okay,	give	this	up	and	go	into	economics.”	A	bank	chief	economist’s	father	was	a	banker,	so	he	was	familiar	with	the	field,	and	used	to	read	the	business	section	of	the	newspaper.	He	did	not	know	much	about	economics,	but	wanted	to	do	something	other	than	business	–	so	it	was	“by	default,	happenstance.”	Another	bank	chief	economist’s	brother	is	an	academic	economist	and	his	mother	was	a	consumer	debt	counsellor,	so	economics	was	a	natural	choice.		 Five	conversants	mentioned	practical	considerations	or	job	prospects	as	factors	in	the	decision	to	become	an	economist.	Upon	finishing	his	Master’s	in	history,	one	professor	was	“faced	with	the	likelihood	of	unemployment	or	hanging	my	diploma	in	the	back	of	a	taxi.”	He	was	torn	between	being	“completely	practical”	and	doing	an	MBA,	or	trying	to	maintain	“academic	interests	but	still	be	marketable	[.	.	.]	so	I	just	kind	of	drifted	into	economics.”	Another	professor	chose	economics	“somewhat	randomly,	maybe	because	I	was	good	at	math.	Jobs	were	also	better	for	economists,	so	that	maybe	played	a	little	bit	of	a	role.	But	I	hesitated.”	A	CCPA	economist	said,	“I	just	stumbled	into	it,	really,”	after	working	and	traveling	for	ten	years	and	realising	that	she	would	need	a	career	of	sorts:	“I	just	wanted	to	get	a	piece	of	paper	so	I	could	make	more	money;	that	was	my	only	rationale.”		 Five	conversants	noted	the	versatility	of	the	discipline;	one	bank	chief	economist	said,	“you	can	do	anything	and	everything”	and	“can	apply	that	framework	
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to	virtually	any	issue	in	life.	It’s	endless.”137	Three	economists	liked	the	subject	because	it	was	“challenging”	(incidentally	the	same	number	who	liked	it	because	it	was	easy)	–	one	IRPP	economist	had	thought	he	would	go	into	business,	but	found	the	classes	“intellectually	vacuous;”	economics	was	harder	and	he	learned	more.	A	professor	said,	“Something	like	history	–	I’m	being	totally	cruel	here	–	something	like	history	.	.	.	I	know	to	be	a	great	historian	–	it’s	not	easy.	But	to	be	a	half-assed	historian	is	too	simple.	I	wanted	something	where	you	really	have	to	practically	sweat	to	understand	the	logic.”		 Finally,	three	conversants	mentioned	the	appeal	of	a	“real-world”	or	“applied”	subject,	three	conversants	liked	science	but	hated	labs,	two	conversants	mentioned	not	being	“smart	enough”	to	do	math	or	physics,	and	four	conversants	appreciated	the	“historical	context”	of	economic	history	and	history	of	economic	thought	courses.			 “A	lot	of	economists	I	know	didn’t	plan	on	studying	economics,”	said	one	professor,	and	indeed,	only	one	conversant	(a	bank	chief	economist)	had	an	early	inkling	that	he	would	become	an	economist.	The	remaining	conversants	came	to	economics	in	Grade	13	or	later,	ten	of	whom	attained	at	least	one	degree	in	another	subject	first.138	This	pattern	seems	likely	to	change;	in	the	International	Baccalaureate	(IB)	programme	alone,	operational	in	175	schools	across	Canada,	the	number	of	students	learning	economics	has	nearly	doubled	in	9	years	–	from	624	students	in	24	schools	in	2008	to	1,149	students	in	46	schools	in	2017	(International	Baccalaureate,	2017).	In	my	survey	of	economics	professors,	25%	took	a	high	school	economics	course;	my	interview	sample	skewed	older	than	average,	while	the	survey	included	a	swath	of	much	younger	academics,	and	this	does	seem	to	indicate	that	more	members	of	the	younger	generation	studied	economics	in	high	school.		 Among	the	survey	respondents,	there	was	a	distinct	pattern	according	to	age	group;	65.4%	of	academics	aged	28-40	listed	“Because	I	was	good	at	it”	as	one	of	the	reasons	for	studying	economics.	In	contrast,	of	all	academic	economists	over	67,	only	20.8%	listed	talent	as	a	reason	to	enter	the	field.	This	was	as	stark	as	any	of	my	findings,	and	thus	this	will	be	addressed	further	in	the	discussion.																																																									137	One	professor	described	the	aforementioned	questionnaire	his	student	had	circulated	among	3rd-year	students	in	economics,	business,	biology,	math,	and	English,	all	at	Queen’s,	which	suggested	that	this	was	true	for	the	students	in	her	sample	as	well	–	economics	and	biology	majors	cited	as	the	single	biggest	reason	for	studying	their	subject	uncertainty	about	what	they	wanted	to	do	and	the	desire	to	keep	doors	open.	138	Interestingly,	three	conversants	specifically	completed	a	joint	major	in	political	science	and	economics.	
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Critiques	of	Economics	Education			 Unsurprisingly,	all	of	the	COMER	members	I	spoke	with	were	supportive	of	the	pro-pluralism139	student	movements	that	had	arisen	in	the	wake	of	the	financial	crisis.	One	COMER	member	said,	“Oh,	it’s	marvellous.	They’re	way	ahead	of	us	here.”	Another	COMER	member	referred	to	the	prevailing	approach	to	economics	education	as	“abysmal,”	while	another	felt	that	mainstream	economists	were	“peddling	voodoo.”	Although	their	language	and	arguments	differed,	the	academic	heterodox	economists	were	largely	in	agreement;	when	asked	whether	he	was	sympathetic	to	the	student	movements’	critiques	of	economics,	one	professor	said,	“Of	course.	Absolutely.”	He	went	on	to	say	that	the	way	to	change	the	current	situation,	as	INET	well	understands,	is	through	the	power	base	of	funding	sources,	which	neoclassical	economists	tend	to	control.	He	had	never	received	funding	from	mainstream	economics	sources,	and	was	only	ever	able	to	secure	public	funding	through	political	science	and	political	economy	channels.	Another	heterodox	professor	simply	said	of	the	profession,	“The	whole	thing	is	a	complete	mess,	which	is	why	there	are	these	initiatives	to	change	the	curriculum.”	A	heterodox	colleague	concurred,	saying,	“I’m	very	sympathetic	to	it.”	He	believed	there	were	two	problems.	The	first	is	the	way	economics	is	taught,	especially	in	France,	where	it	remains	very	theoretical	and	abstract;	this	might	be	why	there	are	more	complaints	there	than	elsewhere.	At	least	in	Canada	and	the	U.S.	we	have	good	first-year	textbooks,	he	said;	“on	the	one	hand	they	come	up	with	simple	stories,	which	are	usually	favourable	to	the	market	economy,	but	on	the	other	hand	they	are	very	well-made”	with	plenty	of	examples	and	pictures	and	not	too	much	math.	He	pointed	out,	however,	that	from	the	1980s	onwards	students	were	not	expected	to	read	books	in	PhD	programs	–	only	articles.	The	other	issue	is	that	“what	is	being	taught	is	only	mainstream	economics	[.	.	.]	people	have	zero	exposure	to	other	views.	So	the	students	are	getting	annoyed	at	that,”	and	also	at	models	that	“are	unrealistic”	and	“have	absurd	hypotheses	[.	.	.]	the	foundations,	from	our	point	of	view,	are	dumb,	so	even	if	you	add	a	few	realistic	things	on	top	of	it,	it	doesn’t	make	it	any	better.”		 Another	heterodox	academic	economist	concurred;	“In	economics,	the	crisis	of	2007	has	shown	that	certain	things	do	not	work.	And	those	theories	are	still	around																																																									139	Pluralism	means	the	inclusion	of	a	variety	of	alternative	theories,	models,	and	approaches	to	economics	that	would	not	be	included	in	the	standard	mainstream	curriculum.	
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today,”	as	opposed	to	the	approach	in	physics,	where	theories	that	do	not	work	are	discarded.	“Mainstream	theory	doesn’t	even	think	that	crises	can	exist.	Because	[markets	are]	so	efficient.	They’re	self-regulating,	they’re	efficient.	We	know	that	austerity	policies	don’t	work.	We	know	that	markets	aren’t	stabilising;	in	fact,	they’re	prone	to	instability,	chaos.”	The	crisis	“ripped	the	veil	off.”	In	terms	of	what	is	taught,	“The	real	issue	is	–	should	universities	offer	a	range	of	courses	that	reflect	different	ideas?	And	the	answer	has	always	been,	yes.”	The	absence	of	debate,	he	says,	“is	what	students	are	complaining	about,”	and	the	same	absence	is	evident	in	hiring,	journals,	and	economics	curricula.		 The	crisis	came	up	frequently	in	discussions	with	left-wing	economists.	One	PEF-affiliated	academic	opined	that	without	a	crisis,	“you’re	not	going	to	change	economic	thinking,”	and	that	Minsky	warned	us	about	our	short	memories.	Of	the	students’	movement	she	said,	“I	think	it’s	fabulous.”	She	felt	that	the	field	“has	narrowed	considerably,”	noting	that	her	undergraduate	experience	at	UToronto	included	a	robust	array	of	economic	history	and	history	of	economic	thought	courses;	the	latter	“have	been	excised	from	most	programs”	and	there	is	much	more	emphasis	on	statistics	and	streaming	students	towards	technical	jobs.	Introductory	courses	are	now	taught	by	contract	lecturers	and	“a	robot	could	do	it,”	with	textbooks	and	standardised	PowerPoint	presentations	and	the	like;	furthermore,	“the	difference	between	textbooks	now	is	the	difference	between	toothpastes”	–	textbooks	are	basically	all	the	same	and	the	only	variation	is	in	the	macro	section,	which	can	be	a	bit	more	Keynesian	or	a	bit	more	neoclassical.	One	CCPA	economist	noted	that	“you	have	to	start	with	the	neoclassical	school,	which	for	a	lot	of	students	is	a	real	turn-off.”	Many	policymakers	took	introductory	economics,	which	means	they	are	only	familiar	with	the	neoclassical	model;	minimum	wage	is	bad	for	employment,	according	to	that	view,	even	though	the	data	are	not	able	to	show	this.	The	Marxist	model,	however,	asserts	that	people	are	paid	according	to	their	bargaining	power,	not	their	marginal	productivity;	“the	CEO	gets	paid	more	because	he’s	got	more	pull	with	the	board.	Because	he	sits	on	it.”	He	went	on	to	point	out	that	“time	is	not	on	the	axis”	in	neoclassical	economics,	and	that	one	of	the	results	of	the	crisis	is	that	it	highlighted	the	fact	that	debt	accumulation	is	not	included	in	the	neoclassical	model,	where	debt	is	just	a	trade-off	among	different	people’s	time	preferences	and	“in	and	of	itself,	shouldn’t	be	able	to	affect	economic	cycles	in	the	way	that	it	did	in	2008	and	that	it	does	on	a	regular	basis.	But	that’s	unique	to	[the	neoclassical	model].	There	are	other	
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models	that	think	that	debt	is	very	important.	The	Post-Keynesians	believe	that	debt	is	very	important.”		 A	CCPA	economist	colleague	elaborated:		 So	the	thing	that	we	don’t	realise	in	economics	–	I	didn’t	realise	it	until	we	got	to	2008	–	is:	we	don’t	have	a	theory	of	money	other	than	Keynes’	theory	of	money.	We	don’t	really	have	theories	of	how	the	financial	world	intersects	with	the	real	economy,	and	that	the	world	is	massively	financialised.	That	the	world	of	shadow	banking	–	we	don’t	even	know	how	big	it	is.	BIS140	doesn’t	know	whether	we’re	double-counting.			 A	PEF-affiliated	economist	saw	this	as	an	opportunity:	“In	the	area	of	popular	economic	literacy	I	think	engaging	with	the	banking	system	and	exposing	how	it	works,	challenging	the	assumptions	of	private	banking,	is	a	very	fruitful	avenue	to	get	average	people	out	there	and	questioning	conventional	economics.”141	He	was	“completely”	supportive	of	the	student	movement	and	wondered	why	it	had	not	taken	off	in	Canada.		 These	views	were	perhaps	unsurprising,	but	some	support	for	the	students’	movement	came	from	unlikely	sources.	One	otherwise	mainstream	academic	economist	had	clearly	questioned	dominant	assumptions	in	the	wake	of	the	crisis,	saying	of	the	traditional	approach,	“Well,	it	provides	a	useful	framework,	but	it’s	way	too	abstract.	One	of	the	outcomes	of	the	financial	crisis	is	a	certain	questioning	and	crisis	in	economics	and	the	abstraction	–	where	does	it	lead?	Does	it	lead	to	anything	that’s	socially	useful?”	She	went	on	to	say	that	‘the	tail	was	wagging	the	dog’	prior	to	the	crisis,	the	‘dog’	being	the	real	economy,	in	part	due	to	“mathematisation,	so	securitisation,	of	a	whole	bunch	of	assets	in	a	way	that	abstracted	from	the	fact	that	they	were	junk.”	When	asked	whether	she	sympathised	with	the	students’	movement,	she	said,	“I	do”	–	she	had	a	“conviction”	of	this	since	cramming	for	micro	and	macro	exams	in	her	first	year,	although	she	learned	some	useful	principles,	such	as	marginal	change142	and	certain	behavioural	concepts.	Today	“some	of	the	most	interesting	
																																																								140	Bank	for	International	Settlements.	141	Indeed,	one	COMER	member	noted	that	Canadians	knew	a	lot	about	banks	and	bankers	in	the	1930s	due	to	the	upheaval	of	the	Great	Depression;	she	felt	that	this	had	helped	push	politicians	to	enact	legislation	to	reform	the	banking	sector	during	that	era.	142	The	difference	between	average	and	marginal,	essentially	–	average	cost	being	the	average	of	the	cost	of	all	units,	and	marginal	cost	being	the	cost	of	each	additional	unit	(once	a	machine	has	already	been	bought,	for	example,	the	cost	of	each	additional	widget	it	makes	will	not	be	the	same	as	the	average	cost	of	the	widgets).	
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work	is	probably	in	what’s	becoming	known	as	behavioural	economics	–	but	again,	the	danger	is	that	it	becomes	so	abstract	that	it’s	irrelevant	to	the	real	world.”			 An	IRPP	economist	echoed	this	sentiment:	“I’m	sympathetic	to	that	–	there’s	a	lot	of	truth	to	that	–	when	I	came	out	into	the	real	world	again	after	doing	my	work	I	did	feel	that	it	was	a	sheltered	academy	that	didn’t	really	care	what	was	going	on	and	was	happy	to	year	on	year	teach	the	same	courses,	publish	the	same	papers.”	This	kind	of	critique	was	particularly	prevalent	among	non-academic	economists	or	practitioners	from	other	disciplines;	one	bank	chief	economist	felt	academic	economics	was	“too	mathematical,	not	grounded	in	anything;”	a	Conference	Board	economist	said	modern	economics	is	math-heavy	–	“a	little	too	much”	–	with	“very	little	applied”	content,	which	means	that	graduates	of	these	programs	do	not	read	the	newspaper	or	see	how	their	discipline	applies	to	the	“real	world.”	A	C.D.	Howe	Institute	economist	declared,	“Institutions	matter	a	lot,	the	legal	structures	matter,	history	matters.	It’s	very	difficult	to	translate	some	of	these	skills	from	one	country	to	another,	even	though	a	lot	of	the	economic	forces	might	seem	the	same.”	One	law	and	economics	professor	lamented	that	in	the	early	days	of	the	law	and	economics	program	at	Toronto	there	was	much	collaboration,	but	economists	are	now	more	concerned	with	“formal	mathematical	modelling”	and	applied	public	policy	is	“going	out	of	style.”143	Indeed,	as	one	bank	chief	economist	said:	“Academics	are	not	very	involved	in	policy	issues,	and	the	reward	system	is	totally	stacked	against	them	doing	so.	If	you	want	the	kiss	of	death	of	getting	yourself	off	tenure	track,	involve	yourself	in	public	policy.	That’s	not	a	wise	career	move.”	Instead	you	must	publish	mathematical	or	theoretical	work,	he	said.		 Two	conversants	complained	that	the	mathematics	involved	in	economics	was	not	even	high-level;	one	heterodox	economist	said	that	his	colleagues	have	simply	memorised	formulas	and	do	not	know	how	to	do	the	more	complex	work.	A	CCPA	economist	who	had	begun	his	education	in	engineering	said,	“There’s	much	much	harder	math	that’s	taught	in	first-year	engineering	than	is	taught	in	fourth-year	economics;”	demand-supply	equations	are	the	same	as	those	once	used	by	meteorologists	to	describe	the	weather,	with	the	return	to	equilibrium	and	the	like.	“Most	economics	happens	in	spreadsheets,”	he	said;	“it’s	kind	of	concerning	sometimes.”																																																															143	He	also	mentioned	that	the	Competition	Bureau	now	has	trouble	finding	industrial	organisation	economists	who	can	do	“applied	problem-solving”	as	this	is	no	longer	taught	in	economics.	
	 142	
	 Somewhat	to	my	surprise,144	and	unprompted	en	route	to	the	elevator	after	our	interview	had	concluded,	a	Bank	of	Canada	economist	lamented	that	economics	is	“getting	more	mathematical	over	time,	much	more	so	than	when	I	was	going	through	it.	Which	I	think	is	unfortunate.	It’s	useful,	but	I	think	it	tends	to	take	the	discipline	not	always	in	the	right	direction.	Because	I	think	there’s	a	lot	of	economic	intuition	you	can	develop	without	getting	into	very	advanced	mathematics.”	At	MIT,	he	continued,	the	faculty	believed	that	the	best	training	for	an	economics	PhD	was	an	undergraduate	degree	in	physics,	and	that	the	difference	between	an	undergraduate	and	a	PhD	in	economics	is	that	“it	just	becomes	much	more	mathematical.”	He	observed	that	his	daughter	had	completed	her	undergraduate	degree	in	economics	but	did	not	want	to	continue	because	of	the	increasing	mathematisation.145		 His	was	not	the	only	seemingly	unlikely	critique.	Interestingly,	the	bank	chief	economists	were	rather	starkly	split.	One	made	some	of	the	harshest	comments	I	heard	on	the	subject:			 	The	economics	profession	should	be	severely	humiliated	and	embarrassed.	I	think	they’re	out	to	lunch.	Even	if	you	look	at	the	Bank	of	Canada,	the	financial	sector	was	represented	by	the	interest	rate	and	the	exchange	rate,	and	that	was	it.	Neither	one	of	those	variables	had	anything	to	do	with	the	crisis.			He	did	go	on	to	say	that	new	models	are	emerging	now,	but	critiqued	the	austerity	policies	in	Greece,	along	with	the	IMF’s	recommendations,	and	seemed	to	think	that	there	was	far	more	work	to	be	done.146		 His	counterpart	at	another	bank	was	less	harsh,	but	began	by	conceding,	“I	think	it’s	true	that	beyond	undergraduate	a	lot	of	academic	economics	become	math	for	math’s	sake”	and	that	economics	is	“valued	for	its	mathematical	vigour	as	opposed	to	its	practical	relevance.	[.	.	.]	Everything	is	modelled	as	if	you	have	a	perfectly	rational	single	agent	who	has	perfect	foresight	and	wonderful	information”	and	“a	lot	of	time																																																									144	I	was	similarly	surprised,	and	amused,	to	hear	(unprompted)	from	another	high-profile	Bank	of	Canada	conversant,	regarding	economists:	“By	and	large	we’re	not	great	educators.”		145	It	is	difficult	to	know	whether	his	daughter’s	reasons	were	typical,	but	there	does	appear	to	be	a	steep	drop-off	in	the	percentage	of	women	in	economics	after	the	Master’s	level;	according	to	the	2009/2010	CAUT	Almanac,	women	made	up	37.5%	of	undergraduate	economics	students	that	year,	nearly	reached	parity	among	Master’s	economics	students	at	46.6%,	and	then	dropped	sharply	to	32.7%	among	economics	PhD	students,	a	rare	pattern	among	the	dozens	of	disciplines	listed	in	the	Almanac	(Canadian	Association	of	University	Teachers,	2010,	p.	31).	146	He	also	complained	that	in	finance	programs	they	“don’t	even	do	systemic	risk,”	although	this	is	beginning	to	change	in	some	cases.		
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is	spent	on	stuff	that,	frankly,	we	never	use.	[.	.	.]	Maybe	you	enjoy	that,	it’s	consumption,	but	it’s	not	training,	and	it’s	not	that	relevant.”	He	went	on	to	say	that	perhaps	it	was	his	bias	against	freshwater147	macroeconomics,	but	that	much	of	it	was	“useless”	and	that	among	central	bankers,	even	in	the	U.S.,	it	“is	almost	completely	ignored”	because	a	lot	of	models	do	not	line	up	with	the	data.	He	also	pointed	to	economics	graduates	“who	don’t	read”	and	“can’t	write”	and	regretted	that	economics	courses	lacked	“content	on	the	actual	world”	such	as	accounting	and	finance.	“I	don’t	think	it	needs	a	wholesale	revolution,	because	part	of	what	you	learn	when	you	study	is	just	the	rigour	of	getting	through	stuff,	and	research	methods,	and	how	to	think	logically.”	However,	he	continued,	“Too	much	of	the	economic	stuff,	if	you’ve	just	done	pure	economics,	is	so	divorced	from	the	institutional	detail	that	you’re	overwhelmed	when	you	start	off		–	you	don’t	really	know	all	these	terms	that	are	floating	around.	[.	.	.	]	You	may	know	nothing	about	financial	markets,	and	you	have	your	Master’s	in	economics.”			 A	colleague	from	another	bank	thought	there	should	be	a	course	on	current	affairs,	“what’s	going	on	in	the	real	world.”	“I	think	we’re	still	learning	from	the	financial	crisis,”	he	said,	including	the	“limitations	of	models,	and	econometrics	more	broadly”	–	banks	were	using	really	short-term	models	so	we	“just	didn’t	have	enough	history	to	know.”	Yet	another	bank	chief	economist	said	of	such	criticisms	that	“some	of	it’s	probably	legitimate.”			 One	professor	seemed	impatient	with	the	students’	critiques:	“Do	I	think	the	standard	assumptions	in	the	standard	textbooks	are	false	and	misleading?	Yes	I	do,	but	so	what?”	All	social	sciences	need	to	be	re-thought,	he	said,	as	does	higher	education	more	generally;	universities	have	become	degree	mills.	“So	focusing	on	narrow,	rich	countries’	textbooks	to	me	is	wasting	your	time”	and	he	thought	this	was	a	reflection	of	the	consumer	model	of	education;	students	expect	to	learn	everything	because	they	paid	for	it,	but	they	could	just	as	easily	look	up	critiques	on	the	internet.	He	went	on	to	level	some	of	the	most	stinging	critiques	of	economists,	however:	“Economics	and	physics	bear	the	same	sin,	of	imperialism,	so	economists	tends	to	regard	themselves,	and	tend	to	be	regarded	by	other	social	sciences,	as	the	princes	–																																																									147	There	are	many	differences	between	“freshwater”	and	“saltwater”	economics,	but	loosely	speaking	freshwater	economics	is	associated	with	the	Chicago	School	and	other	institutions	with	a	small-government,	laissez-faire	bent;	saltwater	economics	includes	a	role	for	government	and	is	associated	with	Harvard,	MIT,	and	other	coastal	universities	in	the	U.S.	
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in	a	power	sense	–	among	social	scientists.	That’s	bad	for	everybody”	and	“it’s	probably	led	to	quite	a	bit	of	bad	science.”	Physicists	do	not	consider	economists	“very	scientific,”	and	he	reported	that	a	former-physicist	colleague	kept	notes	on	cases	in	which	economists	were	“busy	assuming	everything	that	should	have	been	investigated.”	He	continued:		 You	assume	self-interest	without	testing	it;	you	assume	high	levels	of	information	without	testing	it;	you	assume	something	called	rational	expectations;	you	assume	something	called	rational	choice;	as	though	it	was	a)	a	standard	of	good	behaviour	and	b)	a	feature	of	actual	behaviour	–	and,	of	course,	that’s	wrong	in	all	dimensions.	That’s	gradually	changing,	but	it	was	true	for	much	too	long.			 The	scientific	aspirations	of	economics	arose	in	discussion	with	another	professor	as	well;	she	said,	“So	many	economists	think	they’re	objective	and	scientific.	[.	.	.]	In	order	for	it	to	be	economics	it	has	to	have	statistics	or	math	in	it.	When	did	we	define	a	discipline	on	the	basis	of	which	method	we	use	to	explore	a	problem?”		 	Remarkably,	the	idea	that	the	discipline	was	objective	and	free	of	politicisation	–	although	supported	by	three	academic	conversants,	as	we	shall	see	below	–	was	challenged	by	an	older	conservative	conversant,	one	of	Canada’s	best-known	economists.	He	said,	“Macroeconomics	is	and	was	always	very	very	contentious.”	Microeconomics	is	about	individual	behaviour	–	“there’s	an	almost	unexamined	assumption	that	markets	work,”	which	is	not	to	say	that	people	have	not	looked	at	the	conditions	under	which	they	do	–	but	they	proceed	with	the	assumption	that	they	do,	and	“it	must	be	partly	true,	right?	Because	the	stuff	works.”	However,	he	said	of	the	monetary	system:			 It’s	the	set	of	social	institutions	through	which	individual	behaviour	gets	coordinated.	And	that’s	how	we	organise	our	lives.	And	that’s	very	political.	It	has	to	be	political.	And	macroeconomists	can	go	around	shouting	as	loud	as	they	want	about	being	scientists,	and	I	assure	you	we	are	–	we	indulge	in	deductive	analysis	and	we	try	to	test	our	theories	against	data,	and	sometimes	we	change	our	mind	if	someone	shows	us	we’re	wrong,	not	always,	but	sometimes	–	I	don’t	think	we’re	any	worse	than	physicists	or	anything	like	that	at	these	things	–	so	we’re	scientists,	but	there’s	also	this	other	stuff.	Because	our	science	is	immediately	about	political	issues.		When	asked	what	his	response	was	to	the	students’	movement,	he	said:			 Sort	of	a	bit	of	warm	sympathy.	[.	.	.]	My	big	grumble,	which	if	listened	to	would	take	a	lot	of	the	steam	out	of	this,	is	that	economic	departments	no	longer	pay	enough	attention	to	economic	history	and	they	no	longer	pay	any	attention	to	
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the	history	of	economics.	If	they	did,	the	students	would	meet	some	of	these	traditions	at	least	in	a	historical	context	and	at	least	they	would	learn	why	they’re	not	in	the	middle	of	the	theory	curriculum.	They	might	then	want	to	go	disagree	with	it,	but	at	least	they	would	understand	what	the	issues	are.	Now	I	think	they	just	have	a	feeling	things	are	being	kept	from	them,	and	it’s	all	part	of	a	conspiracy,	and	that’s	not	so	good.			 Economic	historians	do	not	often	secure	appointments	in	major	graduate	schools,	however,	he	said,	and	“economics	gets	into	trouble	when	one	particular	group	gets	a	lock	on	the	journals	and	the	conferences	and	appointments	in	certain	key	departments.”	He	continued,	“So	I’m	not	one	for	destroying	the	core	curriculum	of	economics,	but	I	do	think	there’s	room	for	some	of	the	other	stuff.”	Another	mainstream	professor	took	issue	with	the	scientisation	of	the	profession	more	generally,	saying,	unprompted	in	response	to	a	different	question:		 	My	frustration	with	economics	is	that	the	scientists	tend	to	sneer	at	the	engineers,	say	‘you’re	not	doing	real	economics;	you’re	helping	people	build	a	homeless	shelter.	That’s	not	real	economics.’	And	I	just	get	to	say,	that’s	fine.	Go	and	do	what	you	want,	but	I’m	actually	saving	somebody’s	life.	What’re	you	doing?	So	there’s	a	frustration	I	have	that	my	work	is	pooh-poohed	by	scientists.	[.	.	.]	There’s	a	conflict	in	academia.	I	sometimes	think	of	academics	as	one	of	two	types	–	I’m	stealing	this	from	Greg	Mankiw,	who	said	you	can	either	be	a	scientist	or	an	engineer.	And	the	scientist	is	that	kind	of	economist	who’s	so	–	theoretical	models,	based	on	extreme	–	interesting	–	assumptions	about	how	people	behave	and	how	the	world	works.	Very	simplifying	assumptions,	very	abstract	descriptions.	But	very	technical,	mathematical	approach	to	understanding	economics.	The	engineer,	which	is	how	I	would	classify	myself,	says,	that’s	helpful,	but	a	lot	of	the	abstractions	you’ve	done	in	order	to	allow	you	to	do	the	science	prevent	you	from	answering	questions	that	are	relevant	for	understanding	the	real	work	and	in	particular	the	policies	that	governments	want	to	introduce.			 If	you	are	wondering	why	there	are	so	many	homeless	people,	he	said,	“the	scientist	really	can’t	answer	that”	because	you	need	to	take	into	account	addictions	and	other	human	factors.	Earlier	in	his	career	he	had	to	do	this	“science	stuff,”	but	“it	really	didn’t	turn	my	crank.”	He	realised	that	his	work	would	only	be	read	by	a	handful	of	other	scientists	“and	it	wasn’t	like	I	was	actually	helping	anybody,”	which	is	partly	why	he	became	involved	in	policy.	As	a	“young	Turk”	your	“route	to	promotion”	is	the	science,	modelling	route,	“but	then	over	time	you	realise	you	have	to	self-teach.	I	self-taught.	If	I	wanted	to	do	more	interesting	things,	I	needed	to	[make	
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connections].”	This	he	had	clearly	done,	working	with	social	workers	and	sociologists	on	homelessness.148			 Of	economics	education,	he	said,	“I	think	mainly	we’re	educated	badly”	in	part	due	to	working	within	the	science	paradigm.	“There	should	be	at	least	one	course	that	says,	this	is	how	politics	works.	[.	.	.]	Most	of	the	students	want	to	be	engineers.	The	ones	who	want	to	be	scientists	become	faculty	members.”	Of	the	students’	movement,	he	warned	not	to	“throw	out	the	baby	with	the	bathwater,	but	it’s	certainly	true	that	we	need	to	emphasise	things	that	we	had	stopped	emphasising”	such	as	institutions,	as	the	crisis	showed	–	“we	hardly	even	mention	[institutions]	anymore.	[.	.	.]	That	was	a	fair	criticism,	that	economics	teaching	was	not	emphasising	enough	the	role	of	effective	institutions	and	not	emphasising	enough	the	role	of	government.”	Of	my	dissertation	topic,	he	said,	“I	think	it’s	a	super	interesting	question.	And	it	really	speaks	to	what	we	should	be	doing	to	graduate	schools,	and	how	they	should	be	reformed	–	and	how	they’re	failing.	They’re	failing	students,	they’re	failing	society	by	not	turning	out	people	who	[could	really	help].”			 For	him,	and	for	a	number	of	other	professors,	the	question	clearly	tapped	into	a	well	of	frustration.	When	asked	whether	economics	education	had	changed	since	he	went	through	the	system	nearly	50	years	ago,	one	professor	said:		 	No,	and	to	me	that’s	a	little	bit	of	frustration.	There’s	a	tremendous	emphasis	on	competitive	markets	–	in	macro	certainly,	but	even	in	micro	–	and	efficient	outcomes.	It’s	a	useful	paradigm	up	to	a	point,	and	of	course	in	grad	school	you’re	basically	just	learning	what	you’re	taught.	[.	.	.]	And	yet,	there	are	alternatives.	They’re	not	always	better	alternatives,	but	there	are	alternative	ways	of	thinking	about	it.	And	it	would	be	nice	if	we	did	a	bit	more	of	it.	And	I	think	that	what	typically	happens	is	people	start	off	right	down	the	middle	of	the	paradigm,	and	as	they	get	older	and	as	they	get	tenure	they	start	getting	wiser	and	thinking	about	other	things,	exposing	themselves	to	different	ideas,	and	then	it	can	be	frustrating.	For	me	it	was	frustrating,	because	it	was	harder	to	publish.	It’s	easier	to	publish	if	you	don’t	offend	anybody.	The	economic	way	of	thinking	about	that	is,	when	you	publish	a	paper	that	is	complementary	with	existing	work,	in	other	words	it	adds	to	it,	then	you	make	the	existing	work	more	valuable.	[.	.	.]	It’s	partly	why	you	end	up	with	schools	of	thought.		You	have	a	whole	bunch	of	people	who	will	cite	each	other.																																																												148	He	said	that	at	the	beginning	of	that	project	he	had	said	to	his	collaborators	in	other	disciplines,	“I	am	an	economist	so	you’re	going	to	think	I’m	a	son-of-a-bitch	sometimes	because	of	some	of	the	things	I’m	going	to	say,”	like	that	if	your	homeless	shelter	is	too	nice,	a	drug	user	may	trade	rent	for	drugs	and	live	in	the	shelter	–	“That’s	thinking	like	an	economist.	[.	.	.]	Social	workers	wouldn’t	have	thought	in	those	terms.	They’re	nicer	people	than	economists	are,”	he	laughed.	
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In	his	long	career,	the	papers	he	thought	were	his	best	took	ten	or	twelve	years	to	publish.149	When	asked	whether	he	believed	Canada	had	a	dominant	school	of	thought,	he	answered,	“Yeah,	the	dominant	school	of	thought	is	the	standard	efficient	markets	kind	of	hypothesis.	That’s	largely	what	macroeconomics	teaches.”	Behavioural	economics	is	“more	realistic”	but	there	are	still	limitations;	it	“has	no	way	of	doing	welfare	economics”	so	you	have	no	idea	if	people	are	better	off	after	a	policy	is	implemented.	If	you	are	looking	at	things	like	cigarette	taxes,	“the	standard	model	is	perfect	for	that.	But	if	you	start	talking	about	more	complex	things,	and	things	where	you’re	actually	trying	to	make	a	point	prediction	about	what	people	will	do,	the	standard	model	does	terribly.	And	it	does	it	in	the	laboratory	–	it’s	exposed	again	and	again	in	the	laboratory	as	being	wrong.”	He	clarified	that	there	was	no	one	model	that	works.	When	asked	whether	he	thought	he	was	alone	in	thinking	that,	he	said,	“No,	no,	of	course	not.	[.	.	.]	But	there’s	still	a	strong	central	core,	particularly	in	macroeconomics,	that	looks	at	efficient	markets	and	competitive	markets.”	Of	the	students’	movement,	he	said:			 I’d	love	to	see	more	of	that,	and	I	don’t	know	what	has	come	of	it.	[.	.	.]	I	haven’t	seen	any	real	response	in	macroeconomics.	[.	.	.]	One	of	the	issues	is,	politically,	just	getting	stuff	done	when	big	money	has	huge	influence	on	regulation.	Economists	understand	that;	we	study	that.	But	there	aren’t	a	lot	of	practical	solutions	that	come	of	studying	the	problem	when,	basically,	rich	people	own	the	government.	What	do	you	do?			 Another	professor	seemed	to	think	that	the	critiques	“will	tell	you	a	lot	more	about	monetary	economics	and	macroeconomics,”	which	is	“maybe	20%	of	economists.”	A	further	professor	agreed:			 	The	call	for	reform	is	always	in	macroeconomics,	I	think,	more	than	any	other	area.	In	macroeconomics	there’s	both	the	analytical	material	and	there’s	sort	of	historical	institutional	material.	And	it’s	that	historical	institutional	material	that	you	don’t	pick	up	at	the	graduate	level	in	course	work.	You	pick	it	up	as	an	undergraduate	or	you	pick	it	up	as	a	practitioner,	but	it’s	not	something	that’s	taught	as	part	of	a	PhD	training.				He	felt	that	the	criticisms	targeted	PhD	training;	“The	PhD	focuses	on	tools.”	However,	he	said,	“I’m	not	as	convinced	that	we	need	to	re-think	the	way	we	do	things.	Macroeconomics	changes	every	25	years	the	way	it	teaches	everything	anyway.	[.	.	.]	I																																																									149	“A	lot	of	economists	seem	to	be	creationists	or	something.	I	don’t	completely	understand	what	it	is.	But	there’s	a	tremendous	opposition	to	evolutionary	psychology	in	economics,”	for	example.	
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was	part	of	a	generation	–	we	ate	our	elders,	and	now	they’re	eating	us.”	Another	mainstream	economist	concurred	that	changes	in	macroeconomics	are	underway;	he	thought	there	would	be	a	“resurgence	of	Keynesian	economics”	and	said,	“I’d	say	that	macroeconomics	is	being	rebuilt”	to	integrate	the	financial	system,	noting	that	the	non-monetary	financial	system	was	also	missing	from	Keynesian	models.	He	continued,	“What	is	the	objective	of	economics?	It	is	to	explain	the	world	that	is	there.	If	the	world	has	shifted	considerably,	then	shifting	along	with	it	is	a	good	thing.	[.	.	.]	The	questioning	that	arose	after	the	crisis,	the	student	movement	and	so	on	that	objected,	is	a	good	thing.	[.	.	.]	Usually	it’s	a	loss	of	faith	in	a	paradigm	that	makes	the	profession	shift,”	but	you	need	something	“viable”	to	replace	the	old	paradigm.		 The	overwhelming	majority	of	the	remaining	comments	were	more	mixed,	acknowledging	criticisms	while	defending	aspects	of	contemporary	economics	education	in	Canada.	“Some	are	overblown	and	some	are	warranted,”	as	one	professor	put	it,	and	the	“analysis	of	financial	markets	had	been	kind	of	simplistic.”	Of	the	criticisms,	he	said,	“I	think	a	lot	of	it	is	useful”	but	the	idea	that	we	should	start	over	is	“unhelpful,”	“dangerous,	and	needs	to	be	resisted”	–	but	to	question,	do	good	research,	and	add	more	data,	as	Piketty	has	done,	is	all	good.	“Trying	to	figure	out	what	went	wrong	in	2008	is	kind	of	the	profession’s	job.	I	think	they’re	doing	it,”	he	said.	Another	professor	said	if	he	“was	taught	speculative	ideas	[.	.	.]	I	would	be	missing	out”	and	that	students	need	to	learn	mainstream	economics	in	addition	to	alternatives,	but	that	people	started	to	pay	more	attention	to	Minsky	again	after	the	crisis	and	“if	he	would	have	been	totally	forgotten	about	that	would	have	been	a	bad	thing.”		 Another	professor	said,	“I	think	a	lot	of	those	complaints	have	a	fair	amount	of	validity.”	He	pointed	to	the	advent	of	behavioural	economics,	but	its	inclusion	in	the	curriculum	varies	a	lot	–	it	depends	on	whether	the	professors	follow	the	most	recent	research.	“I	think	it’s	a	very	positive	development	for	the	discipline,	but	not	everyone	agrees	with	me,”	he	said.	He	mentioned	the	critique	that	there	was	too	much	math	in	economics,	and	when	asked	whether	he	sympathised	with	that	view,	he	said:		 	No	I	don’t,	but	here’s	what	I’d	say	is	that	it	can	be	a	barrier	to	people	who	want	to	understand	the	arguments	but	aren’t	themselves	trained	in	economics	or	trained	formally	in	mathematics	–	that	can	really	be	a	barrier.	And	a	lot	of	economists	aren’t	really	good	at	communicating	to	those	people.	So	I	think	that’s	a	problem.	And	also	I	think	there’s	a	tendency	for	economists	to	value	technique	over	content.	Papers	that	are	technically	very	difficult	but	have	very	
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little	behavioural	content	or	substance	have	a	better	chance	of	getting	published	[than	vice	versa.	.	.	.]	I	don’t	want	to	overstate	that,	but	it’s	there.150		He	thought	that	some	work	was	happening	on	this	front,	however,	and	that	in	five	or	ten	years	it	probably	would	be	taught	in	basic	macroeconomics	courses.	Another	mainstream	professor	said	that	the	critique,	even	within	economics,	has	centered	on	the	question:			 	To	what	extent	has	the	math	gone	too	far?	[.	.	.]	That	can	shut	out	a	lot	of	people	who	may	have	good	economic	intuitions,	may	have	something	to	say,	but	it’s	not	publishable	until	you	codify	it	mathematically.	So	I	think	part	of	the	new	way	of	thinking	is	to	back	off	from	that	–	as	I	say,	that’s	a	critique	that’s	been	around	for	a	long	time	–	but	perhaps	with	the	financial	crisis	it’s	created	an	impetus	for	reviewing	things.			As	an	example	he	pointed	to	Keynes’	liquidity	trap,	which	was	challenged	for	its	lack	of	mathematical	sophistication	but	would	have	been	useful	in	the	crisis.	However,	“it’s	easy,	of	course,	to	critique	the	excessive	use	of	mathematics,	but	it	has	its	virtues	too”	as	it	forces	you	“to	be	precise.	[.	.	.]	There	are	virtues	and	downsides	to	the	mathematisation	of	economics.”	He	went	on	to	say	that	there	was	“absolutely”	groupthink	in	economics	and	that	economics	is	“very	top-down,	so	there’ll	be	some	leaders	in	the	field	who	will	kind	of	dictate	what	is	mainstream	theory,	and	they	tend	to	control	the	journals.”	More	so	than	other	fields,	he	said,	economics	was	“very	hierarchical”	–	its	journals	are	ranked	frequently,	the	rankings	are	taken	seriously,	and	they	determine	salary	increases	and	grants	and	the	like.	Robert	Mundell’s	Nobel	Prize-winning	work	was	all	published	in	the	Canadian	Journal	of	Economics	(CJE),	he	pointed	out,	but	it	is	not	ranked	among	the	top	economics	journals.			 Another	professor	supported	this	view,	arguing	that	the	biggest	problem	is	when	one	group	of	people	has	too	much	power	and	there	is	not	enough	competition	among	ideas;	“sometimes	I	think	people	are	like	bees,	and	they	swarm	from	one	thing	to	another	without	questioning.	So	that’s	why	I	think	critical	thinking	is	so	important,	and	if	anything	should	be	a	criticism	of	economics	it’s	not	so	much	the	methodology	[.	.	.]	it’s	critical	thinking.”		
																																																								150	He	also	echoed	comments	from	other	conversants	in	saying:	“It’s	true	that	economics,	and	in	particular	macroeconomics,	didn’t	incorporate	the	financial	system	very	well.	And	we	learned	from	the	latest	crisis	that	that	has	to	change.	You	might	say,	well,	why	didn’t	you	that?	This	is	not	the	first	time	we’ve	had	a	major	downturn	in	the	economy	that	had	its	roots	in	the	financial	sector.”	
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	 Another	professor,	among	my	most	conservative	conversants,	said	of	the	student	critiques,	“I	would	say	[they	are]	legitimate	to	a	certain	extent.	It’s	certainly	the	case	that	I’ve	revamped	[my]”	undergraduate	macroeconomics	course,	and	that	models	were	“quite	deficient”	in	terms	of	“money	and	financial	intermediation.	[.	.	.]	So	yes,	I	think	there’s	a	case	that	can	be	made	for	adapting	the	way	we	teach,	what	we	teach,	and	the	models	we	try	to	transmit	to	take	into	account	this	particular	imperfection	that	was	kind	of	neglected	up	until	the	financial	crisis.”	He	confessed	that	it	was	difficult	to	adapt	his	teaching	because	the	new	models	are	more	complicated,	or	“maybe	I’m	just	not	a	good	enough	teacher.”	He	went	on	to	say	that	maybe	one	of	the	weaknesses	of	economists	is	“that	we	try	to	formalise	everything.	[.	.	.]	I	can	tell	a	pretty	good	story	[about	the	crisis]	but	I’m	a	little	bit	frustrated	because	I	can’t	build	that	into	a	model.	And	if	I	can’t	built	that	into	a	model	then	I’m	not	happy	as	an	economist.”		 Another	professor	wrote	a	newspaper	article	defending	Economics	101	because,	although	it	is	can	be	improved,	it	nevertheless	“is	very	valuable.”	He	went	on:			 	But	I	think	there’s	also	some	things	where	we	go	wrong.	I	think	we	don’t	talk	enough	about	policy	–	we	don’t	talk	enough	about	the	real	world.	[.	.	.]	We	teach	them	the	theory,	which	is	good;	we	teach	them	the	math,	which	is	good;	I’m	a	big	fan	of	theory	and	math.	I	don’t	think	we	should	obsess	on	the	math,	and	if	we	ever	feel	that	we	cannot	teach	economics	without	math,	then	we’re	doing	a	major	disservice.			He	felt	that	“policy	courses	[are]	the	obvious	way”	to	connect	economics	to	the	real	world,	saying	that	they	teach	theory	and	math	“partly	because	that’s	what	we	like,	and	what	we’re	good	at”	as	professors,	expecting	students	to	connect	the	material	to	the	real	world	themselves:		 	They	quite	often	come	out,	and	they	say,	well,	great,	I	can	derive	this	model,	and	I	can	show	this	diagram,	and	I	can	shift	this	curve,	but	now	my	mother	has	just	asked	me	what	inflation	targeting	is	all	about	and	how	it	works	and	is	the	Bank	doing	a	good	job,	and	my	answer	is,	‘Oh,	I’ve	taken	this	course	on	monetary	policy	and	I	don’t	know.’	And	you	think,	whoa,	there’s	something	wrong	with	that.			He	felt	courses	should	cover	questions	such	as	the	size	of	Canada’s	GDP,	what	the	economy	looks	like,	what	the	policy	debates	are,	and	the	like.	They	do	some	of	this,	he	said,	but	it	is	not	enough.	In	all,	a	large	number	of	conversants	gave	mixed	responses	of	just	this	kind,	combining	critiques	of	the	field	with	defences	of	it.		
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	 Nevertheless,	a	handful	of	economists	felt	the	criticisms	were	overblown.	One	otherwise	left-leaning	economist	seemed	offended	by	the	question,	saying,	“I	think	a	lot	of	it	is	very	ill-informed.	[.	.	.]	Things	have	changed	radically	since	the	1980s	–	there’s	been	an	empirical	revolution	in	economics.”	She	mentioned	behavioural	economics	as	well;	when	asked	whether	this	had	been	integrated	into	the	curriculum,	she	said	(somewhat	defensively),	“to	varying	degrees,”	before	softening	her	tone:	“If	you	do	behavioural	economics,	[students]	say	why	are	we	doing	anything	else?	They	just	absolutely	love	behavioural	economics.”	When	asked	about	macroeconomics,	she	said,	“This	is	what	kind	of	frustrates	me	with	what	I	see	coming	out	of	the	University	of	Cambridge	–	from	various	people	at	the	University	of	Cambridge151	–	about	economics	education	is	that	it’s	very	out-dated	in	terms	of	what’s	being	discussed”	regarding	RBC	and	rational	expectations,	for	example.	“In	macro	it’s	more	ideological,	and	I’d	say	in	the	States	it’s	more	ideological,	but	when	I	read	in	the	Guardian	about	economics	education	I	wonder	who	they’re	talking	about	because	it’s	certainly	not	the	experience	of	the	world	I	live	in.”	Interestingly,	this	conversant	had	earlier	lamented	that	“people	who	teach	economics	don’t	know	much	history	of	economic	thought,”	but	did	not	raise	this	in	the	discussion	of	students’	critiques.		 Both	UMontréal	economists	seemed	to	dismiss	the	students’	movement	as	well;	one	said,	“I	think	they	are	for	the	most	part	misinformed.”	He	claimed	that	in	economics	the	“principles	are	fairly	neutral.	[.	.	.]	It’s	not	about	ideology	–	these	are	just	tools	in	order	to	understand	these	phenomena.	You	have	to	approach	this	as	a	scientist.	[.	.	.]	You	cannot	rebel	against	the	tools	just	because	you	don’t	like	the	outcome	of	a	certain	argument,”	he	stated,	referring	to	the	students	as	“ideologically-driven.”	His	colleague	agreed:			 I	think	they’re	exaggerating	problems.	[.	.	.]	It’s	a	profession	that	is	homogeneous	to	a	large	extent,	but	I	don’t	think	it’s	homogeneous,	as	I	said,	in	terms	of	ideology	–	we	just	agree	on	the	kind	of	tools	that	should	be	done,	that	should	be	used.	[.	.	.]	I’m	certainly	not	very	sympathetic	to	their	alternative	views.	I’m	very	mainstream.			 An	SFU	professor	agreed	that	the	concerns	were	exaggerated,	saying	that	the	profession	had	already	evolved;	“Economics	came	from	political	economy	and	they	dropped	the	political.	I	think	they’re	moving	back	into	political	economy.	I	think																																																									151	I	am	not	sure	that	there	are	“various”	vocal	critics	of	economics	education	at	Cambridge;	this	may	have	been	a	way	of	expressing	her	frustration	with	me	and/or	my	question,	however.	
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they’re	more	like	the	French	students	in	1968	than	.	.	.	I	can	see	changes	in	the	economics	curriculum.”	To	make	second-year	courses	interesting	he	had	always	discussed	Hungarian	hyperinflation,	the	Depression,	U.S.	bank	failures,	and	the	like,	“so	I	felt	somewhat	immune	from	the	criticisms	–	because	it	was	always	part	of	my	course,”	he	said.152				
Learning,	Curiosity,	and	Multidisciplinarity			 Although	some	conversants	were	highly	intellectually	curious	within	the	context	of	a	single	subdiscipline	or	range	of	topics	within	economics,153	in	general	most	intellectually	curious	economists	were	interested	in	a	wide	variety	of	topics.	They	also	tended	to	value	curiosity	itself.	One	Conference	Board	economist	–	who	had	already	inquired	about	the	other	conversants’	answers	to	a	number	of	my	interview	questions,	asked	to	see	my	MSc	thesis,	and	wondered	what	my	PhD	research	had	uncovered	thus	far	–	said,	in	the	course	of	an	otherwise	unrelated	discussion,	“the	best	student	in	a	bad	program	is	still	the	best	student	–	they’ll	be	curious,	have	really	done	well.”	A	professor	told	me	that	her	trajectory	was	thanks	to	a	couple	of	mentors,	but	mainly	“curiosity,	networking,	and	serendipity.”	Later,	when	she	asked	what	I	had	studied	prior	to	the	PhD	and	wondered	how	I	had	ended	up	studying	such	disparate	subjects,	I	answered,	truthfully,	“Curiosity.”	She	looked	satisfied	and	said,	firmly,	“Good.	That’s	my	actuation	as	well.”	One	bank	chief	economist	who	had	mentioned	that	he	was	“very	interested”	in	competency-based	outcomes	in	education,	immigration,	indigenous	issues,	and	a	surprising	array	of	other	topics,	valued	the	“eclectic	interests”	of	a	fellow	economist.		 One	of	my	most	delightful	interviews	was	with	an	Oxford-educated	professor	who	pointed	to	multidisciplinarity	as	a	benefit	both	of	the	UK	system	and	of	a	chair	he	held	at	Harvard.	He	learned	most	from	political	scientists	rather	than	economists,																																																									152	This	professor	also	said	he	was	“appalled	by	the	lack	of	written	work	students	have,”	lamenting	that	most	Canadian	universities	had	eliminated	the	honours	thesis	for	economics	degrees;	he	felt	that	writing	was	essential	to	policy	analysis	–	so	he	would	“harvest	all	sorts	of	complaints”	for	assigning	and	correcting	essays,	a	rare	example	of	a	professor	insisting	on	doing	so.	153	One	of	these	was	a	professor	who	asked,	at	the	beginning	of	our	interview,	“You’re	doing	a	PhD	in	economics?”	When	I	responded,	“No,	in	Education,”	he	replied,	“Ah,	cool!	Cool	cool	cool.	This	is	good.”	Another	example	was	of	a	CCPA	economist	who	bought	all	of	the	Economic	Club	of	Canada	speeches	from	1948-1981	from	a	yard	sale;	she	is	reading	her	way	through	them	all!	
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engaging	with	ideas	about	social	capital	and	wellbeing	“rather	late	in	the	game,”	which	“was	a	big	advantage”	because	you	have	an	open	mind	and	can	talk	to	everyone;	“flexibility	and	openness	are	absolutely	critical,”	he	said.	However,	he	lamented:			 People	are	more	and	more	compartmentalised,	even	within	subdisciplines	[.	.	.]	and	that’s	a	real	problem.	And	a	combined	problem,	a	linked	problem	to	that,	is	fashions.	You	find	the	same	schools	are	generating	the	staff	for	a	whole	broad	set	of	universities,	and	they	come	along	with	a	groupthink	that	can	be	poisonously	uniform.	So	then	it	can	be	hard	to	keep	appropriately	broad	and	open	in	what	is	taught	to	students.			The	UK	system	necessitated	more	classes	in	economics	during	his	undergraduate	years	than	were	typical	in	Canada,	“but	I	always	had	interests	much	broader	than	what	I	was	studying,	whatever	it	was.”	Indeed,	in	our	interview	he	discussed	prison	reform,	evolutionary	biology,	child	psychology,	and	much	more.	Another	professor	said	that	during	his	undergraduate	education	he	“dabbled	in	history	and	sociology	and	a	few	other	things	that	broadened	my	education,	and	I	was	glad	I	did	that.”	Two	of	three	Calgary	conversants	–	one	of	whom	was	in	the	School	of	Public	Policy	and	the	other	of	whom	was	in	economics	–	had	among	the	most	wide-ranging	interests	of	my	conversants.	One	said	he	had	enrolled	in	the	Chartered	Financial	Analyst	program	and	declared	he	“did	it	partly	for	fun	–	it	sounds	kind	of	crazy,	but	if	you	intend	to	be	an	academic	you’ll	appreciate	that.”	He	added,	“As	a	kind	of	consumption	aspect154	of	your	own	education,	I	find	I	have	a	pretext	for	reading	philosophy	books	and	science	books	and	I	think	that	continues	to	interest	me.”	His	colleague’s	interests	included	homelessness,	domestic	violence,	and	a	variety	of	other	topics,	including	history,	which	he	reads	in	his	free	time.	He	suspected	his	colleagues	were	“bored”	and	“unhappy”	because	they	fail	to	collaborate	and	are	not	particularly	congenial.	He	was	the	only	one	in	his	department	to	answer	a	homelessness	research	call,	which	was	clearly	transformative	for	him;	he	was	“pretty	sure	my	colleagues	thought	‘This	isn’t	a	science	issue’”	and	therefore	were	uninterested.		 A	couple	of	conversants	warned	of	the	dangers	of	a	lack	of	diversity	or	openness	to	other	disciplines.	One	conservative	academic	said	that	a	big	department	required	“an	awful	lot	of	diversity	if	it	was	going	to	be	doing	right	by	its	students.”	He	also	noted	that	UToronto	had	divided	up	the	social	sciences	quite	late,	in	the	1980s,	and																																																									154	Using	the	term	“consumption	aspect”	to	connote	enjoyment	of	an	activity	is	an	amusing	example	of	economist-speak.	
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that	this	had	marked	the	beginning	of	the	decline	of	economic	history	there,	which	had	been	one	of	their	specialties.	An	IRPP	economist	observed	that	people	tend	to	hire	people	who	look	and	think	like	them,	and	that	this	can	contribute	to	groupthink,	but	he	also	noted	that	the	advent	of	behavioural	economics	has	helped	some	members	of	the	profession	to	start	to	learn	about	psychology,	sociology,	and	other	disciplines.		 As	a	rule,	COMER	members	in	my	sample	were	the	greatest	advocates	of	multidisciplinarity,	and	among	the	most	intellectually	curious	and	diverse	in	their	interests.	As	mentioned	previously,	one	held	three	degrees	(including	a	PhD	in	Education)	in	three	different	areas;	another	had	four	degrees,	in	arts,	law,	and	education;	a	third	had	degrees	in	music	(from	the	Royal	Conservatory),	education,	and	filmmaking.	Two	COMER	members	dropped	out	of	university	but	continued	to	read	widely	across	subjects;	one	of	these,	101	years	old	when	I	met	him,	still	played	music	almost	daily	and	was	a	plaintiff	in	a	court	case	against	the	Canadian	government.	As	a	Toronto	Star	reporter	wrote:			 	He	delivered	hats	off	Wall	Street	during	the	Crash	of	‘29,	sipped	coffee	with	George	Orwell	on	Las	Ramblas	during	the	Spanish	Civil	War	and	stood	guard	over	Trotsky’s	corpse	in	Mexico.	He	built	homes	in	Toronto,	edited	his	most	recent	book	on	economics	a	few	months	ago,	and	now	spends	his	days	practising	his	violin	and	readying	for	one	final	accomplishment[:	the	COMER	court	case].	(Popplewell,	2008)			 My	grandfather,	in	the	same	spirit,	lived	in	agricultural	communes	in	Russia,	Cuba,	and	China	and	read	thousands	of	books	in	his	30	years	of	retirement	–	on	subjects	as	varied	as	Middle	Eastern	history	and	climate	change	(at	the	age	of	91	he	developed	a	sudden	penchant	for	murder	mysteries).155	One	COMER	member,	a	teacher156	who	reads	ten	books	in	parallel,	told	me	that	“the	only	real	way	to	make	change	is	through	education”	and	that	in	all	eras,	“The	arts	were	thinking	about	it	first																																																									155	One	of	his	fellow	COMER	members	in	Saskatoon	told	me	about	the	educational	background	of	the	people	in	their	group;	one	person	taught	economics	at	the	university,	another	had	a	PhD	in	education,	and	the	rest	were	professionals	but	self-taught	in	economics	itself.	When	I	noted	that	my	grandfather	would	have	been	the	only	one	who	was	not	highly	educated	among	them	and	asked	how	he	fit	in,	she	answered,	“Your	grandfather	was	very	much	the	spirit	of	COMER	[.	.	.]	after	his	departure,	we	shrank.”	Educational	qualifications	did	not	seem	to	be	a	basis	for	legitimacy	within	the	group,	then.	156	She	taught	English,	Latin,	and	history	(to	Inuit	children	in	the	North	as	well	as	the	children	of	the	very	wealthy),	and	served	as	a	guidance	counsellor	at	times	in	both	public	and	private	schools.	
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–	they	were	thinking,	writing,	imagining	a	better	world.”	She	and	her	colleague	created	an	“innovative	Grade	13	course	that	was	multidisciplinary,”	an	achievement	that	was	clearly	a	highlight	of	her	career.	She	later	noted	that	“people	from	all	different	disciplines	are	recognising	the	relationship	between	economics	and	everything	else.	David	Graeber	is	an	anthropologist	who	wrote	a	book	this	thick	[about	debt].”157	“Unfortunately	the	academic	world	has	been	dropped	into	separate	silos,”	another	COMER	member	told	me,	adding	that	history	was	the	most	relevant	discipline	for	understanding	economics.	I	interviewed	him	and	another	COMER	member	on	the	same	day,	and	he	brought	me	materials	that	his	colleague	later	expressed	interest	in:	“I’d	like	to	have	a	glance	at	the	end,	just	in	case	I	haven’t	seen	it.	Good	for	him.”	The	second	conversant	later	told	me:			 I	have	a	lot	of	interests.	Monetary	reform	is	probably	the	major	one	and	has	been	for	a	long	time.	But	I	have	a	lot	of	continuing	interest	in	education	in	the	Commonwealth.	Also	the	undergraduate	majors	of	political	science	and	international	studies.	[.	.	.]	In	retirement	I	go	to	a	lot	of	conferences	on	subjects	that	I’ve	mentioned,	including	in	Japan	and	Thailand.				 A	large	number	of	those	to	whom	I	spoke	displayed	considerable	curiosity	during	the	interview	itself.	Seventeen	conversants,	disproportionately	those	who	worked	for	think	tanks,	asked	questions	about	my	thesis	and/or	expressed	interest	in	reading	it	when	I	was	finished.158	Twenty-five	conversants	recommended	books	to	me	(although	three	of	these	recommended	only	their	own	work),	and	six	conversants	gave	me	books	or	other	materials	to	read	(four	of	these	were	COMER	members,	one	was	a	PEF-affiliated	economist,	and	the	last	was	a	Conference	Board	economist).	Ten	conversants	sent	me	links	or	materials	via	email	(among	this	group,	a	disproportionate	number	were	heterodox	or	PEF-affiliated	economists).	Finally,	a	large	number	of	conversants	had	studied	a	subject	other	than	economics	for	at	least	a	year	or	two;	most	of	these	had	studied	math,	physics,	chemistry,	engineering,	or	medicine,	but	a	large	number	had	studied	history,	political	science,	and/or	philosophy	and	a	couple	of	people	had	studied	international	relations	(one	even	studied	English	for	two	years;	another	had	a	degree	in	sociology;	and	a	third	had																																																									157	As	she	described	her	introduction	to	economics,	“In	the	first	year	we	might	as	well	been	at	a	conference	on	Mars,”	but	a	mentor	with	knowledge	of	the	subject	helped	her	through.	158	One	professor,	in	the	fashion	of	an	economist,	asked,	“So,	what	is	the	time	horizon	for	your	dissertation?”	Another	professor	said,	“I	am	fascinated	in	your	project	–	because	this	is	something	that	needs	doing.”	
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degrees	in	nursing	and	public	administration).	A	small	number	had	studied	economics-adjacent	fields	such	as	finance,	commerce,	and	accounting.		 Interestingly,	two	professors	at	McGill	showed	a	remarkable	degree	of	unfamiliarity	with	qualitative	research;	one	of	them	said,	“I	don’t	know	how	you	convert	an	interview,	with	long-winded	answers	like	mine,	into	–	like,	how	do	you	systematically	analyse	interviews,	I	don’t	know.	You’ll	figure	it	out.”	His	colleague,	similarly,	seemed	concerned	about	how	I	might	go	about	translating	qualitative	data	into	quantitative	form,	wondering	aloud	whether	and	how	I	might	code	responses	and	the	like.	This	was	striking	as	it	seemed	as	though	neither	of	them	had	spoken	to	colleagues	in	the	other	social	sciences	–	for	whom	interviewing	is	a	common	practice	–	about	their	research	methods.		 Also	noteworthy	were	instances	in	which	conversants	mentioned	having	modified	their	views	on	a	subject,	or	having	changed	their	positions	entirely.	One	conversant	had	been	working	as	an	economist	on	“labour	adjustment”	following	the	1980s	recession.	After	the	election	of	1988,	during	which	Prime	Minister	Brian	Mulroney	promised	to	keep	social	programs,	the	government	began	to	roll	back	Employment	Insurance			 .	.	.	and	that’s	when	I	got	radicalised.	Everything	else	up	until	then	meant	nothing	to	me	particularly,	politically.	But	when	I	was	dealing	with	the	fallout	and	watching	how	these	changes	to	a	public	policy	would	affect	the	people	who	were	scrambling	to	get	back	into	a	labour	market	that	had	no	room	for	them,	I	became	radicalised.	And	that’s	when	I	became	much	more	interested	in	doing	public	policy	work	than	strictly:	what’s	the	market	doing.	Just	seeing	the	intersect	between	public	policy	and	private	venture	became	an	abiding	interest	of	mine.				 One	COMER	member	(the	aforementioned	teacher)	described	a	similar	moment	of	political	awakening.	She	spent	two	years	in	the	High	Arctic	as	a	teaching	principal,	during	which	time	the	government	recalled	the	area	administrator	and	in	consequence	she	became	increasingly	responsible	for	the	function	of	basic	services	in	the	community.159	When	funding	for	temporary	labour	was	halted,	she	took	a	dog	team	to	call	her	superior	from	a	nursing	station,	threatening	to	leave	if	they	failed	to	restore	funding.	The	weather	turned	on	her	return	trip	and	she	got	lost	with	the	sled	dogs	for	four	or	five	days	on	the	land,	“and	that	was	a	terrific	experience,”	she	said.	Due	to	that	ordeal	and	others,	she	“began	to	be	politicised	there.”																																																									159	“Theoretically	I	was	even	the	coroner,”	she	said.	
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	 Three	of	four	heterodox	academics	described	particular	economics	courses	that	fundamentally	changed	their	view	of	the	discipline	and	inaugurated	their	reorientation	towards	heterodoxy.	Another	professor	described	his	shift	away	from	the	scientific	approach	to	economics	and	towards	a	policy-oriented,	engineering	view:	“So	that’s	how	my	life	has	evolved	as	an	economist.	I’ve	moved	away	from	the	science	towards	the	engineering.	And	of	course	that’s	why	I’m	now	in	the	School	of	Public	Policy.”	A	bank	chief	economist	who	had	been	educated	in	the	monetarist	tradition	said	“that	didn’t	really	rub	off	on	me	–	I	think	probably	it	didn’t	take	that	long	for	me	to	get	out	into	the	working	world	and	drifting	towards	being	a	mainstream,	conventional	economist.”	A	Conference	Board	economist	said	that	he	used	to	be	more	of	a	“Chicago-style”	thinker	and	is	now	“more	balanced.”	Two	professors,	conversely,	described	a	late-life	shift	to	the	right;	one	said	he	was	not	a	Real	Business	Cycle	type,	but	“as	I	get	older	I’m	much	more	moving	toward	the	free	market	side	of	things,”	even	though	his	PhD	model	had	price	rigidities	and	imperfections	built	into	it,	which	meant	there	was	a	role	for	government.			
	
Hierarchy			 In	line	with	research	highlighting	the	strongly	hierarchical	character	of	–	and	unusual	penchant	for	rankings	within	–	the	discipline	of	economics	(Fourcade,	2009;	Fourcade	et	al.,	2015),	this	seems	to	be	largely	true	for	the	Canadian	case.	It	is	noteworthy,	although	perhaps	unsurprising,	that	conversants	almost	universally	referred	to	the	top	U.S.	universities	as	the	“academic	lodestar,”160	with	Harvard,	MIT,	Princeton,	Berkeley,	Stanford,	Chicago,	and	Yale	all	viewed	as	superior	to	any	Canadian	economics	department.	Indeed,	the	top	U.S.	departments	“kind	of	dominate	the	field.	[.	.	.]	All	things	being	equal,	it’s	considered	to	be	more	prestigious	to	get	a	degree	outside	Canada,”	as	one	professor	put	it.	Another	said	they	tell	their	top	students	“if	you	can	get	into	a	Top	Ten	school,	go.”	One	bank	chief	economist	said	unequivocally,	“There’s	no	MIT	or	Harvard	in	Canada,”	in	part	because	the	difference	in	funding	among	Canadian	universities	is	insignificant;	Canada’s	top	universities,	he	said,	were	more	in	line	with	the	U.S.’	second	tier.	As	one	IRPP	economist	put	it,	“If	you’re	a	good	actor,	you	go	to	Hollywood,”	and	any	economist’s	aspiration	is	the	
																																																								160	This	comment	was	from	a	heterodox	professor,	notably.	
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“nirvana”	of	the	States.	No	conversant	disputed	the	superiority	of	the	top	U.S.	universities,	and	several	brought	up	this	point	unprompted.		 There	was	also	substantial	agreement	as	to	the	ranking	of	the	top	economics	departments	in	Canada.	Eleven	conversants	listed	UBC	and	UToronto	as	the	best	two	departments	(a	professor	said,	“fairly	clearly”),	with	four	listing	UBC	as	the	top	(“At	the	moment	I	would	say	the	best	is	UBC	quite	clearly,	now,”	said	one	professor;	another	said,	“I	think	UBC	really	stands	out”).	Another	believed	that	UToronto	is	probably	closest	to	the	top-tier	U.S.	universities	and	UBC	is	“trying	very	hard,”	with	yet	another	judging	that,	for	his	field	(international	finance),	UToronto	was	the	best.			 There	was	yet	more	agreement	on	the	top	four	departments,	which	“have	been	the	top	departments	forever;”	fully	13	professors	and	three	non-academics	concurred.	One	professor	said,	“after	the	top	two	it’s	hard	to	rank;”	it	was	Queen’s	and	Western	historically,	but	Queen’s	had	fallen	back	in	the	past	15	years	and	some	good	people	are	nearing	retirement,	so	“it’ll	be	a	struggle	to	stay	in	the	top	5.”	Another	professor	said,	“Queen’s	–	unionisation	has	killed	that	department.	They	can’t	compete	for	academic	economists	the	way	that	they	used	to.”	There	was	the	greatest	disagreement	about	Queen’s,	in	fact;	for	one	bank	chief	economist,	it	was	the	top	department,	as	it	was	for	a	McGill	professor	who	had	taught	there	(“I	guess	Queen’s	and	UBC	are	to	my	mind,	with	a	policy	bias,	the	places	where	I	see	the	most	interesting	stuff	coming	from”),	although	he	also	said,	“I’m	probably	somewhat	biased.”	As	a	rule,	however,	as	one	professor	claimed:		 	Well,	the	best	departments	–	I	don’t	think	there’s	any	doubt.	Toronto,	UBC,	Queen’s,	Western,	and	in	Montréal	it’s	hard	to	tell	now.	It	used	to	be	the	University	of	Montréal	for	sure.	But	McGill	has	really	hired	some	excellent	people,	so	their	ranking	has	gone	up.	But	I	still	think	that	neither	one	of	them	is	in	the	same	camp	as	the	first	four	I	mentioned.			 The	story	seemed	to	be	the	relative	ascendancy	of	UBC	and	the	relative	decline	of	Queen’s	and	Western	among	the	top	four.	As	one	professor	said,	“Western	Ontario	was	a	powerhouse.	It’s	no	longer	a	powerhouse.	[.	.	.]	They	were	by	far	the	best	department	in	Canada	in	the	early	80s,	and	they’ve	blown	up	and	rebuilt	themselves	twice	since	then,	but	it’s	never	getting	back	to	the	same	level.”	Another	professor	said	of	Western,	“Thirty,	forty	years	ago	they	were	always	in	the	top	four.	You	might	not	say	that	now.”	A	Western	professor	himself	agreed;	“Economists	like	to	rank	departments,	right?	That’s	usually	done	on	publications,	and	when	I	first	came	here	Western	was	distinctly	above	the	other	three	places,	and	that	changed	over	time.”	A	
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bank	chief	economist,	a	Western	alum,	said,	“Maybe	this	is	a	bias,	but	I	still	think	Western	is	up	there,	but	I	don’t	think	it’s	as	clearly	pulled	away	from	the	pack	as	in	the	past.”	Another	bank	economist	pointed	to	the	number	of	central	bankers	who	had	gone	to	Western,	however,	so	its	influence	likely	is	still	felt,	if	less	so;	a	Bank	of	Canada	economist	confirmed	that	Western	had	been	dominant	in	macroeconomics	in	the	1970s,	1980s,	and	1990s,	but	not	so	much	now.		 UBC,	on	the	other	hand,	was	most	commonly	referred	to	as	the	top	department,	but	often	expressed	as	“is	now	the	top	department”	or	“has	become	the	top	department.”	Two	conversants	pointed	to	factors	that	would	bolster	UBC	and	Toronto	in	the	coming	years;	one	said,	“UBC	has	been	extremely	successful.	The	weather	and	the	academic	climate	both	help	UBC	do	their	recruiting.”	Toronto’s	ranking	was	often	viewed	as	partly	“by	sheer	force	of	numbers”	as	the	country’s	largest	economics	department,	but	one	professor	attributed	this	success	in	part	to	the	advantage	of	being	located	in	Canada’s	largest	city.			 Many	conversants,	especially	professors,	noted	the	relative	rise	of	two	French-language	universities	–	UMontréal	and	Laval	–	particularly	in	econometrics.	McGill	was	“viewed	as	a	weaker	spot	historically”	but	several	mentioned	that	its	relative	standing	had	improved;	one	professor	said,	“McGill’s	reputation	has	improved	quite	a	lot	in	the	last	10	years.	In	fact	in	some	fields	like	econometrics	they’re	arguably	among	the	best	departments	on	the	continent	right	now.”161			 UMontréal	came	up	more	frequently	as	a	front-runner,	however.	One	UBC	professor	praised	their	econometrics	group	as	“world-class”	in	“that	important	niche.”	Another	professor	felt	that	“English-speaking	Canadians	probably	forget	about”	the	French-speaking	universities,	which	are	“more	tied	in	with	Europe,”	but	they	are	among	the	best.	Yet	another	professor	judged	that	Montréal	is	a	“strong	department”	that	“has	risen	a	lot,”	as	has	Laval,	pointing	to	the	generous	funding	these	institutions	receive	at	the	provincial	level	in	addition	to	their	federal	allocation.	One	of	the	financial	journalists	ranked	UMontréal	and	Laval	alongside	UToronto	and	Queen’s,	and	a	Conference	Board	economist	declared	that	he	predominantly	hires	from	Queen’s	and	Laval.			 Aside	from	UMontréal	and	McGill,	McMaster,	UCalgary,	and	Alberta	were	most	commonly	listed	among	top	departments,	with	5	or	6	mentions	each.	One	professor																																																									161	One	UMontréal	professor	laughed,	saying	that	he	thought	they	would	continue	to	move	up	the	rankings	“partly	by	stealing	some	of	our	people.”	
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said	McMaster	had	improved,	another	believed	it	had	slipped,	and	a	further	three	professors	specifically	put	it	in	fifth	place,	just	behind	the	top	four.	Laval	received	four	mentions,	while	the	common	view	seemed	to	be	that	“Alberta’s	star	has	also	risen.	In	terms	of	rigour,	certainly	in	terms	of	funding,”	as	one	professor	put	it;	some	said	that	this	was	true	in	terms	of	specific	specialties	–	one	specifically	mentioned	that	“Calgary	is	getting	better	in	behavioural	economics.”	A	Conference	Board	economist	joked	that	UCalgary	“smells	like	money.”			 SFU	received	three	positive	mentions	–	a	fourth	commented	that	“SFU	is	big”	but	that	the	“lastingness”	of	its	research	“is	not	commensurate	with	the	size	of	the	place.”	Three	universities	received	two	mentions	each:	Dalhousie,162	Ottawa,	and	Guelph.	Carleton,	Waterloo,	and	the	Victoria	all	received	a	single	mention;	each	of	these	three	was	deemed	to	have	improved	of	late.			 Among	private	sector	economists,	the	perspective	was	somewhat	different.	For	one	thing,	these	economists	were	all	based	in	the	East,	where	the	major	banks,	the	Bank	of	Canada,	and	federal	government	departments	are	located,	so	they	tended	to	overlook	the	Western	universities	–	even	UBC,	arguably	the	top	department.	An	exception	to	this	rule	was	the	Bank	of	Canada;	a	quarter	to	a	third	of	their	fellowships	go	to	UBC,	said	one	Bank	conversant,	who	went	on	to	suggest	that	“the	school	[a	potential	employee	attended]	has	a	limited	impact”	but	that	it	was	exceptional	for	someone	to	come	from	anywhere	other	than	the	top	five	or	six	universities.	One	bank	chief	economist	said	that	almost	all	of	those	they	hire	come	from	one	of	the	top	departments,	but	that	there	is	a	bias	in	favour	of	hiring	people	from	your	own	institution;	they	will	“give	the	same	answer	you	had.”	A	Conference	Board	economist	made	a	similar	point,	saying,	“you	tend	to	use	your	networks”	for	hiring,	and	that	the	concentrations	of	graduates	from	the	same	schools	is	partly	due	to	this.			 A	second	Conference	Board	economist	replied	that	he	prefers	to	hire	Master’s	graduates	because	they	are	“more	malleable”	and	team	players.	He	went	on	to	point	out	that	“it’s	kind	of	hard	to	find	a	bad	undergrad	in	Canada.	I	think	the	standard	for	undergrad	training	in	the	country	is	actually	remarkably	uniform	and	high,”	and	that	he	would	hire	from	pretty	much	any	undergraduate	program.163	A	bank	chief																																																									162	Dalhousie	was	given	particular	kudos	in	both	cases;	one	of	my	most	conservative	academic	conversants	said,	“I	tend	not	to	be	as	progressive	as	the	people	at	Dalhousie,	but	I	think	they	do	good	work.	It’s	always	worth	reading.”	163	He	added	that	he	would	expect	Master’s	degree-holders	to	have	attended	a	top-tier	graduate	programme,	however.	
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economist	concurred,	pointing	out	that	in	OECD	education	rankings,	Canada	comes	in	the	“top	of	the	pack”	and	has	excellent	universities.	Another	bank	chief	economist	said	that	there	was	not	much	of	a	gap	among	the	top	departments,	and	that	if	you	do	a	PhD	at	one	of	these,	you	still	need	to	find	a	way	to	stand	out	because	there	is	none	of	the	automatic	prestige	that	comes	from	holding	a	degree	from	Harvard,	for	example.			 A	few	professors	declined	to	rank	their	own	institutions,	while	some	from	the	top	institutions	politely	listed	their	own	department	last	within	its	class.164	One	aspirational	UMontréal	professor	listed	his	university	right	after	the	top	four	(“People	talk	about	the	top	five”),	while	his	colleague	said,	“I’m	hoping	here”	(UMontréal)	would	be	listed	among	the	departments	in	the	“second	tier,	below	UBC	and	Toronto.”		 These	conversants	were	not	alone	in	this	tendency.	One	McGill	professor	focused	on	the	undergraduate	level,	where	McGill	ranks	higher,	saying,	“at	the	undergraduate	level	there	are	several	departments	which	are	equally	good	[.	.	.]	I	would	rank	McGill	at	the	top.”	A	bank	chief	economist,	a	Queen’s	alum,	said	that	they	had	been	in	the	top	place,	although	not	since	the	mid-1990s.	A	current	Queen’s	professor	said,	“We	would	like	to	say	UBC	and	Queen’s	are	the	best”	for	graduate	school	and	especially	placement	of	graduates,	and	a	Calgary	professor	commented,	“I	know	the	Calgary	School	of	Public	Policy	is	very	influential.”	As	above,	one	Toronto	professor	said,	“I	know	in	the	fields	I’m	involved	in,	all	the	good	people	are	around	here.”			 That	same	professor	had	earlier	said,	however:	“I’ve	never	really	thought	of	ranking	[the	departments],”	and	several	other	professors,	similarly,	had	not	thought	much	about	ranking	or	were	actively	opposed	to	the	practice.	One	professor	simply	stated,	“I	would	say	I	don’t	know,”	and	that	she	does	not	follow	rankings	closely,	although	she	was	at	a	top-ranked	department;	“My	flair	is	for	policy;	it’s	not	for	mathematical	economics,”	she	said,	perhaps	implying	that	rankings	are	more	likely	to	take	the	latter	into	account	more	than	the	former.	One	Conference	Board	economist	simply	refused	to	answer,	saying,	“I’ll	pass	on	that	one	[.	.	.]	I’m	not	going	to	name	names.”		 Others	simply	thought	ranking	irrelevant;	one	C.D.	Howe	conversant	said	that	in	hiring	“we’re	not	looking	for	any	particular	institutional	background.”	This	contrasted	with	the	economists	involved	in	hiring	above	who	did	tend	to	hire	from	the	top																																																									164	For	example,	one	UBC	professor	listed	UBC	after	Toronto,	while	a	Western	professor	listed	Western	last	among	the	top	four.	
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departments.	Another	bank	chief	economist	said	that	it	is	“what	they	build	on	top	of	[their	education]”	and	most	people	need	to	be	“retooled”	once	they	arrive	at	the	bank	anyway.	A	PEF	economist	said,	“Well,	there’s	certainly	a	‘respected’	totem	pole.	[.	.	.]	I	don’t	pay	much	attention	to	that.	I	do	pay	attention	to	places	where	you	have	diversity	of	thought.”		 A	few	conversants	took	issue	with	the	very	idea	of	ranking.	One	professor	argued	that	big	departments	“have	an	innate	advantage”	and	that	rankings	discriminate	against	young	departments	because	they	tally	articles,	citations,	and	downloads.	Rankings	“do	more	or	less	confirm	your	prejudices,”	he	said.	A	bank	chief	economist	said,	“We’re	blessed	with	a	number	of	very	good	universities,	so	I	don’t	tend	to	took	at	where	people	come	from.	Part	of	that	is	just	conscious	–	I	try	not	to	–	we	all	have	biases	[.	.	.]	and	you	want	to	be	as	open-minded	as	you	can.	[.	.	.]	I	don’t	think	I’d	get	into	that	ranking	game.”165			 Finally,	one	McGill	professor	expressed	particularly	vehement	opposition.	Earlier	in	the	interview,	he	had	said,	somewhat	insistently,	“McGill	will	be	higher-ranked	than	McGill’s	economics	department.	It’ll	be	number	one;	the	economics	department	will	be	seven,	right,	or	some	number	like	that.”	When	I	asked	later	which	departments	he	thought	were	the	best,	he	seemed	rather	offended,	saying,	“I	wouldn’t	even	try	[to	rank	them].166	I	think	it’s	a	stupid	exercise.	[.	.	.]	For	people	who	are	simple	in	that	regard,	they	can	rank.”	He	went	on	to	say	that	he	liked	Maclean’s	rankings167	because,	he	declared,	they	are	for	students,	and	there	is	evidence	that	they	influence	applications:			 So	I	understand	that	exercise.	What	I	don’t	understand	–	or	what	I	don’t	care	about	–	is,	let’s	rank	McGill’s	economics	department,	and	rank	it	against	Toronto	and	UBC	and	Queen’s,	and	then	I	say,	what	are	we	doing?	Is	it	just	this	kind	of	macho	–	is	that	what	we’re	trying	to	do?	[.	.	.]	So	I’m	pretty	convinced	that	we,	as	a	society,	spend	too	much	money,	too	many	resources,	too	much	time,	on	ranking	exercises,	and	not	enough	on	simply	saying:	let’s	just	get	better.		
																																																								165	He	also	told	the	story	of	a	Toronto	instructor	who	told	his	class	of	graduate	students	that	those	who	had	not	attended	a	top	undergraduate	institution	did	not	matter;	this	had	clearly	upset	him,	as	he	had	not	attended	a	top-ranked	school.	166	Even	though	he	had	just	pinpointed	McGill’s	exact	ranking,	overall	and	among	economics	departments	specifically!	167	Maclean’s	rankings	are	for	universities	as	a	whole,	which	would	benefit	his	economics	department;	McGill	would	rank	lower	among	other	economics	departments	than	it	would	relative	to	other	Canadian	universities	overall.	
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	 Outside	of	the	academy	the	hierarchy	was,	if	anything,	yet	clearer.	There	was	universal	agreement	among	conversants	that	the	C.D.	Howe	Institute	was	the	most	influential	think	tank	in	the	country,	prompting	comments	such	as,	“Within	Canada	I’d	say	the	C.D.	Howe	certainly	is	the	gold	standard,”	and	its	influence	was	obvious	to	supporters	and	critics	alike.	Several	conversants	pointed	to	the	profound	links	between	the	Institute	and	the	Bank	of	Canada,	whose	former	Governors	are	almost	all	C.D.	Howe	affiliates	in	some	form.			 In	the	private	sector,	it	was	evident	that	the	big	banks’	chief	economists	have	a	significant	amount	of	influence,	although	one	conversant	said,	“I	don’t	know	how	much	sway	any	of	the	bank	economists	would	have	because	they	really	don’t	get	into	a	lot	of	policy	prescription.”	Others	seemed	to	believe	that	their	voices	were	heard	at	the	national	level,	however,	and	one	financial	journalist	admitted	that	she	had	almost	exclusively	quoted	Bay	Street	bank	economists	before	later	attempting	to	diversify	to	academics	and	others.	A	CCPA	conversant	pointed	out	that	there	used	to	be	economics	departments	in	businesses,	and	now	that	is	only	true	mainly	of	the	big	banks,	which	are	paid	for	media	appearances	and	appeared	to	be	listened	to	more	than	the	think	tanks.	Another	financial	journalist	said	that	the	bank	economists’	views	tend	to	align	“remarkably”	with	“whatever	the	bank’s	best	interests	are,”	although	many	conversants	in	the	sector	maintained	that	they	were	given	free	rein	and	that	“what’s	good	for	Canada	is	good	for	the	bank,”	thus	reducing	conflicts	of	interest.	Bias	aside,	one	heterodox	academic	professor	said,	“I	think	all	these	economists	working	for	banks	do	have	influence.”			
Departments’	Political	Orientations			 Some	interesting	trends	emerged	in	contrasting	economists’	strict	hierarchical	rankings	of	Canadian	economics	departments	with	their	views	of	the	political	leanings	of	those	same	departments.	First,	it	was	clear	that	Western,	historically,	had	been	the	most	conservative,	monetarist,	and/or	freshwater	economics	department	in	the	country,	and	for	some	this	reputation	persisted;	one	bank	chief	economist	said,	“There	was	this	idea	that	Western	was	the	Chicago	of	Canada.”	A	colleague	concurred,	“Oh,	for	sure.	Western	had	a	very	strong	reputation	as	being	a	[.	.	.	]	generally	hard-line	monetarist	school.”	A	mainstream	professor	agreed;	“Western	is	certainly	right-
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of-centre.”	A	total	of	sixteen	conversants	identified	Western	as	Canada’s	closest	cousin	to	the	Chicago	School	historically,	while	eight	of	these	thought	it	still	was.			 In	comparison,	only	two	people	specifically	listed	Calgary	as	a	right-wing	pole	within	Canadian	economics;	one	IRPP	economist	said	that	the	Calgary	School	of	Public	Policy	would	be	Canada’s	Chicago	if	he	had	to	choose,	and	that	it	lines	up	with	C.D.	Howe.	“In	terms	of	ideological	leanings	they’re	right,	they’re	right	of	centre	and	[.	.	.]	I	don’t	think	anyone	would	disagree	with	that,	I	mean	the	one	guy	[Jack	Mintz]	was	the	president	[of	the	C.D.	Howe	Institute],	went	to	the	other	place	[Calgary].”	Two	professors	and	a	Fraser	Institute	economist	pointed	to	SFU	as	having	been	more	right-wing	historically;	one	of	these	professors,	now	at	SFU	himself,	felt	that	it	used	to	be	right-wing	but	“most	of	them	weren’t	that	good	anyway.”168	Upon	reflection,	however,	this	conversant	judged	that	the	department	was	“pretty	middle	of	the	road”	but	with	“perhaps	a	little	more	heterogeneity	than	is	typical,	higher	variance	within	the	department.”	A	colleague	at	Queen’s	concurred,	saying,	“they	have	the	most	right-wing	person	in	the	discipline	there,”	but	also	people	who	are	more	left-wing	than	at	Queen’s.	His	colleague	mentioned	that	there	had	been	a	few	Marxists	there	some	years	ago,	lending	credence	to	the	impression	of	heterogeneity	within	the	department.	One	professor	noted	that	most	York	economists	are	to	the	right	of	the	profession,169	but	that	York	as	a	whole	is	more	to	the	left.	Finally,	a	heterodox	professor	referred	to	UMontréal	in	the	1970s	as	a	“satellite”	of	Chicago.		 Aside	from	these	comments,	Western	was	clearly	viewed	as	Canada’s	Chicago	School,	or	at	least	its	former	Chicago	School.	It	is	worth	examining	the	historical	development	of	Western	as	a	“hotbed	of	monetary	policy	analysis,	both	theoretical	and	practical”	with	major	advisory	functions	for	the	Bank	of	Canada	and	C.D.	Howe,	as	an	economist	from	the	latter	put	it.	One	mainstream	professor	noted	that	there	has	“traditionally	been	strong	ties	between	Chicago	and	Western,”	as	was	confirmed	by	two	Western	conversants,	the	first	of	whom	was	one	of	the	stars	around	whom	Western	had	built	the	department	in	the	mid-1970s.	This	conversant,	prior	to	coming	to	Western,	“was	at	Chicago	at	a	very	special	time.	[.	.	.]	This	was	when	Milton	Friedman	was	just	emerging	from	being	regarded	as	a	raving	lunatic.”	The	free-market,	monetarist	ethos	there	had	taken	hold	at	a	few	other	U.S.	universities	as	well,																																																									168	He	mentioned	one	individual	he	believed	had	been	good	in	the	1970s,	“although	he	went	insane	later.”	169	Excepting	heterodox	professor	John	Smithin	and	a	couple	of	others,	these	were	generally	professors	with	cross-postings	in	other	departments.	
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and	it	was	from	these	schools	that	Western	recruited.	Unlike	UToronto,	Western’s	economics	department	split	off	from	the	other	social	sciences	50	years	ago,	and	by	the	early	1980s	it	comprised	50	faculty	members,	a	large	cadre	of	economists	by	Canadian	standards.	My	conversant,	a	monetarist	himself,	felt	that	a	big	department	in	a	small	country	needed	“an	awful	lot	of	diversity	if	it	was	going	to	be	doing	right	by	its	students”	–	not	like	the	U.S.,	where	there	are	many	departments	with	diversity	mainly	in	interdepartmental	(as	opposed	to	intradepartmental)	form	–	but	that	Western	never	succeeded	in	becoming	particularly	diverse;	“Western	is	very	very	freshwater,	very	market-oriented	in	its	outlook.”	When	I	asked	whether	that	was	true	now,	he	said,	“Oh,	yeah.	If	you	see	where	the	PhDs	come	from,	they	come	from	Chicago	and	Minnesota,	Rochester	and	so	on.”			 His	colleague	at	Western	concurred;	“We’re	very	much	in	the	freshwater	zone.”	However,	he	continued:			 	The	department	has	become	less	conservative	over	time.	I’ve	been	here	37	years,	and	when	I	first	came	it	was	really	distinctly	a	small-c	conservative	place	and	then	just	over	time	because	no	one	was	particularly	paying	attention	–	certainly	no	one	was	hiring	on	the	basis	of	people’s	political	outlook	–	and	what	happened	over	time	is	just	people	arrived	who	were,	in	U.S.	terms,	they	were	Democrats	rather	than	Republicans,	so	the	centre	of	gravity	has	shifted.			 One	heterodox	conversant	remarked	upon	a	shift	among	central	bankers	who	are	Western	graduates,170	noting	that	the	views	of	current	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Stephen	Poloz	now	diverge	quite	markedly	from	the	standard	monetarist	view,	probably	due	to	experience.	Similarly,	Deputy	Governors	have	begun	expressing	opinions	that	would	have	been	unusual	before	the	financial	crisis,	he	said,	such	as	the	view	that	low	interest	rates	are	not	a	panacea	–	instead,	you	may	end	up	encouraging	speculation,	which	breeds	instability.	Pre-crisis,	low	interest	rates	were	viewed	as	stable	and	raising	interest	rates	was	not	thought	to	have	a	long-term	effect	on	the	economy,	but	this	has	changed	–	they	now	say	that	long-run	potential	output	is	affected	and	that	supply	factors	influence	the	rate	of	labour	productivity	growth.	This	view,	that	short-term	policies	and	events	affect	the	long-term,	is	something	Post-Keynesians	have	believed	for	a	long	time,	this	conversant	said,	but	only	recently	have	central	bankers	–	disproportionately	products	of	Western	–	begun	to	agree.	
																																																								170	Western	graduates	account	for	a	significant	proportion	of	Canadian	central	bankers;	half	of	the	current	Governing	Council	attended	Western	(Parkinson,	2014).	
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	 Interestingly,	a	Bank	of	Canada	conversant	appeared	to	think	that	the	freshwater	orientation	persisted	across	the	country,	saying,	“I	think	in	Canada,	the	current	generation	are	pretty	much	all	freshwater.”	He	offered	the	example	of	the	Carleton	macroeconomics	study	group,	which	he	judged	to	be	basically	all	Real	Business	Cycle	–	“Being	from	MIT,	I	was	kind	of	the	exception.”	His	view	of	how	it	came	to	be	that	way	highlighted	Western’s	role:	“Partly	it	was	Western,	Ontario,	University	of	Western	Ontario,	and	that	for	many	years	was	the	strongest	department	in	the	field	of	macroeconomics.”	Many	Western	graduates	spread	out	across	the	country,	which	created	a	“critical	mass”	in	the	profession.	A	mainstream	economist	agreed,	“Yeah,	the	dominant	school	of	thought	is	the	standard	efficient	markets	kind	of	hypothesis.	That’s	largely	what	macroeconomics	teaches.”	A	Conference	Board	economist	noted	that	“McGill	was	one	of	the	few	post-Keynesian	places	in	North	America”	when	he	was	there,	a	rarity	in	the	profession.		 Another	Conference	Board	conversant	suggested	that	this	trend	was,	if	anything,	intensifying;	“I	kid	the	youths	that	come	in	here	–	the	new	economists	–	about	their	being	very	capitalistic,	some	of	them.	[.	.	.]	Most	of	the	schools	are	quite	laissez-faire,	let’s	say,	Chicago	School-style	thinking.”	A	heterodox	academic	economist	made	a	related	comment:	“I	think	the	people	who	are	most	friendly	to	heterodox	ideas	now	are	the	older	people.	Like	Richard	Lipsey.	[.	.	.]	If	I	listen	to	him,	there	is	a	lot	I	would	agree	with.”	Older	mainstream	economists,	he	said,	were	“not	hardliners”	and	“not	dogmatic”	compared	to	many	of	their	younger	colleagues.			 This	is	not	how	a	Fraser	Institute	economist	saw	it,	however;	he	said,	“in	the	profession	Keynes	is	still	dominant.”	A	left-leaning	UBC	professor	agreed,	“Well,	broadly	speaking,	I	think	the	rest	of	the	world	regards	saltwater	as	mainstream.	[.	.	.]	Among	my	European	colleagues	they	often	regarded	the	U.S.	as	a	strange	place,	and	still	do.”		 Several	other	conversants	contrasted	Canada	with	the	U.S.,	mainly	in	terms	of	polarisation	or	variation.	One	professor	said,	“The	U.S.	is,	I	would	say,	more	polarised	and	more	politicised.”	Three	professors	used	the	same	phrase,	referring	to	Canada’s	economics	departments	as	“more	homogeneous”	than	in	the	U.S.	Another	professor	said,	“We	have	a	kind	of	consensus	here,	which	basically	means	that	we	don’t	get	the	extremes	that	the	U.S.	has.	We	don’t	have	a	conservative	extreme	especially.	[.	.	.]	The	Conservative	Party	here	is	not	like	the	Republican	Party.	It’s	much	more	centrist.”	When	asked	whether	there	were	departments	that	deviated	from	the	norm,	one	
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professor	said,	“The	boring	norm?	Not	so	much;”	there	was	no	“strong	ideological	stamp”	on	departments.	“I	don’t	think	there’s	anything	like	what	there	is	in	the	U.S.,”	said	one	professor;	“the	departments	as	a	whole	are	fairly	balanced.”	“I	think	it’s	easy	to	have	that	kind	of	polarity	in	the	U.S.,”	said	another	professor,	because	they	have	so	many	schools;	“maybe	Canadians	are	less	ideological	in	that	sense,”	although	he	thought	that	even	in	the	U.S.	the	polarisation	had	lessened	due	to	the	shift	to	empirical	work	across	the	profession:	“My	guess	is	the	Friedman	years	are	behind	us.”		 Many	of	these	professors	seemed	to	approve	of	the	fact	that	Canadian	economics	departments	were	less	polarised,	or	at	least	they	did	not	view	it	negatively.	One	bank	chief	economist	said,	neutrally,	that	there	was	not	much	difference	among	departments	in	Canada,	at	least	through	the	Master’s	level;	they	are	“fairly	uniform”	and	the	curricula	“tend	to	be	fairly	similar.”	A	professor	said	in	partial	explanation,	“Well,	they’re	all	state-financed”	in	Canada;	“none	of	them	is	particularly	rich.”		However,	one	PEF-affiliated	economist	viewed	Canada’s	homogeneity	as	problematic,	saying:		 It’s	not	a	coincidence	I	did	both	my	graduate	degrees	outside	of	Canada	–	there	isn’t	a	lot	of	diversity	in	Canada.	If	anything,	even	though	our	political	discourse	in	Canada	is	more	open,	I	think,	than	certainly	it	is	in	America	and	maybe	than	it	is	in	Britain,	the	way	our	universities	are	structured	is	such	that	almost	all	the	departments	are	homogenous	mainstream	departments.			 For	some	mainstream	or	right-of-centre	economists,	their	lack	of	concern	over	this	homogeneity	may	have	been	in	part	due	to	the	perception	that	Canada	was	“less	ideological”	–	as	one	C.D.	Howe	conversant	said,	“I	wouldn’t	say	there’s	very	obvious	colourations	to	the	economics	departments	when	it	comes	to	ideological	points	of	view.”	He	said	that	Canada	had	several	“large,	diverse	economics	departments”	and	seemed	to	suggest	that	the	variation	was	simply	intra-	rather	than	inter-departmental.	Another	right-of-professor	appeared	to	agree	with	the	latter	point;	when	asked	whether	departments	had	an	ideological	slant	in	Canada,	he	said:		 I	don’t	think	so.	But	it	raises	a	good	question;	I	hope	your	thesis	will	tell	us	why.	I	don’t	think	there	are	big	differences	of	doctrine	across	departments.	I	think	within	departments	there’s	a	wide	range	of	opinion.	But	is	there	a	department	in	Canada	that	is	our	equivalent	of	the	Chicago	School?	I	don’t	think	so.		
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	 In	all,	a	large	number	of	conversants	–	20	altogether	–	concurred	with	the	view	that	there	were	no	significant	political	or	ideological	differences	among	departments,	and	many	of	these	did	not	see	a	split	within	departments	either.		 Two	professors	objected	to	the	very	concept	of	ideological	departments.	One	thought	the	saltwater/freshwater	divide	“is	a	macro	thing”	and	that	people	with	a	background	in	engineering,	math,	and	physics	“take	economics	courses	that	are	mainly	math	–	they	don’t	necessarily	have	any	ideological	commitments	to	various	points	of	view.”	Due	to	changes	in	data	collection	and	methodology,	she	continued,	“I’d	say	economics	in	general	is	less	ideological	than	it	used	to	be.”	Another	professor	concurred;	“Nobody	sees	their	research	as	being	ideologically	driven.	It’s	just	a	set	of	logical	reasonings	that	should	be	confronted	with	the	data.”			 Two	conversants	observed	more	of	a	difference	in	the	business	community;	one	bank	chief	economist	said	that	economists	“tend	to	differentiate	more	in	the	business	schools.”	Oddly,	a	heterodox	economist	registered	less	mainstream	thinking	outside	of	academia:			 [In	the	private	sector]	probably	the	majority	are	not	mainstream.	Certainly	a	lot	that	I’ve	met.	Where	do	they	dominate?	Well,	academia,	which	is	subsidised	by	the	state	primarily,	in	our	case,	and	guess	where	else?	Government,	Bank	of	Canada,	all	these	places.	They	dominate	there.	Not	everyone	who	works	for	the	Department	of	Finance	is	mainstream.	But	the	vast	majority	of	the	people	they	hire	there	tend	to	be.	[.	.	.]	It’s	ironic;	they	celebrate	the	virtues	of	the	market,	but	the	only	reason	why	these	guys	are	able	to	dominate	in	the	profession	is	
because	of	government.				 In	general	the	heterodox	economists	felt	keenly	the	loss	of	heterodoxy	in	economics	departments	in	the	past	30	years.	One	professor	described	the	gradual	homogenisation	of	the	profession	thus:			 I	would	never	be	hired	at	the	University	of	Ottawa	today.	[.	.	.]	[two	of	my	other	heterodox	conversants]	would	never	be	hired	today.	[.	.	.]	At	Harvard	40	years	ago	they	hired	a	Marxist,	but	they	wouldn’t	do	that	today.	[.	.	.]	There	was	a	time	when	departments	were	more	open,	more	interested	in	debate.	The	whole	concept	of	debate	has	vanished	in	economics.			 Another	heterodox	professor	told	me	as	preamble,	“you	have	to	understand,	in	economics	orthodox	programs	are	more	or	less	everything.”	As	exceptions	he	pointed	to	the	PEF	and	“there’s	a	group	of	quite	interesting	Post-Keynesians	in	Canada”	along	with	a	few	heterodox	professors	at	the	University	of	Manitoba	and	in	Political	Science	at	York,	but	little	else.	
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	 A	heterodox	colleague	said,	“Well,	it	depends	what	you	call	a	range.	Within	neoclassical	economics	you	have	new	classical	economics	and	New	Keynesian	economics,	so	the	people	who	are	in	macroeconomics	in	the	mainstream	would	say	yeah,	there	is	a	variety	of	views.	[.	.	.]	From	our	standpoint,	they	start	from	the	same	assumptions;	they	just	make	a	few	modifications.”171	He	pointed	to	heterodox	economists	at	Manitoba,	Laurentian,	and	York,	and	“a	few	[individual	economists]	here	and	there”	including	in	large	departments	like	Toronto;	there,	he	said,	they	will	often	be	found	in	history	of	economic	thought	or	fields	unrelated	to	micro	or	macro	theory.	Another	heterodox	economist	said,	“In	Canada	I’d	say	it’s	more	homogeneous.	There	are	a	few	places	that	are	known	as	more	heterodox”	–	Laurentian,	Ottawa	(with	only	two	heterodox	economists,	but	“they	really	pack	a	punch”),	and	Manitoba	(“but	they’re	getting	completely	silenced	now,”	for	which	the	CAUT	sanctioned	the	university).	A	PEF-affiliated	economist	noted	the	conflict	at	Manitoba	(“that’s	a	significant	blow	to	the	constellation	of	heterodox	thinkers”),	which	“has	a	heterodox	tradition,	and	the	department	until	recently	embraced	the	idea	of	a	diversity	of	thought	that	was	being	presented	there.”172	He	also	mentioned	two	non-economics	departments	with	heterodox	teachings	(York	and	Carleton)	and	two	economics	departments	with	a	few	heterodox	members	(Ottawa	and	Laurentian).		 Some	mainstream	economists	named	a	number	of	departments	with	heterodox	economists.	Two	mentioned	Ottawa	–	one	said	it	and	Laurentian	have	“more	Marxist-type	economists”	and	that	they	are	“outside	the	general	orthodoxy.	I	think	they’d	say	yes,	they’re	heterodox.”	One	mildly	left-leaning	economist	spoke	of	heterodoxy	as	a	sort	of	Marxism,	saying	that	Saskatchewan	has	some	Marxists,	SFU	used	to	have	a	few,	and	Dalhousie	may	as	well.	Finally,	a	left-leaning	professor	said,	“University	of	Manitoba	prides	itself	on	being	more	heterodox.	[.	.	.]	I	think	what	they	really	mean	is	low-productivity.”		 It	was	noteworthy	that	none	of	the	heterodox	academic	economists	mentioned	Dalhousie,	although	one	PEF-affiliated	economist	noted	their	department	“has	some	open-minded	people.”	Four	mainstream	economists	identified	Dalhousie	as	being	on																																																									171	Interestingly,	he	said	that	in	terms	of	policy	prescriptions	in	the	short-term,	Post-Keynesians	and	New	Keynesians	would	agree	(e.g.	what	to	do	in	a	recession),	and	that	“in	the	long	run	the	New	Keynesians	are	similar	to	the	neoclassicals.”	172	Now	that	they	are	considering	splitting	off	the	heterodox	part	of	the	department,	he	feared	that	it	“as	you	could	imagine	is	likely	to	become	a	poor	cousin	and	perhaps	eventually	abolished.	That	exact	same	thing	happened	to	another	heterodox	department	in	the	States,	at	Notre	Dame.”	
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the	left;	one	said,	“The	best-known	department	that	fits	that	stance	is	probably	Dalhousie”	and	another	said	that	a	couple	of	Dalhousie	economists	who	“think	of	themselves	as	mainstream”	he	would	see	as	being	on	the	left.		 Much	more	common	among	the	mainstream	economists	was	to	view	some	of	the	larger,	higher-ranked	departments	as	having	mild	ideological	slants.	“Queen’s	is	viewed	maybe	as	a	little	bit	left-of-centre,	on	average,”	said	one	Queen’s	professor;	a	UBC	colleague	commented	that	“Queen’s	would	be	much	more	like	Harvard,	MIT,”	a	bank	chief	economist	thought	it	was	on	the	Keynesian	end	of	the	spectrum,	and	a	Western	professor	said	“Oh,	and	Queen’s	was	rather	Harvard-ish	as	well.”173	Mainly,	however,	conversants	noted	Queen’s’	connections	to	Ottawa,	specifically,	and	its	focus	on	policy	issues	more	generally	–	one	C.D.	Howe	conversant	said	it	was	“practical,”	policy-oriented,	and	“very	applied,”	preparing	him	for	the	“real	world.”174		 Aside	from	one	heterodox	professor	who	viewed	Toronto	as	somewhat	right-wing,	as	Canada’s	largest	economics	department	there	was	much	more	the	sense	that	it	was	either	“very	mainstream”	or	centrist	(the	view	of	three	conversants)	or	that	it	“is	big,	so	it	always	had	a	variety	of	people,”	as	one	professor	put	it;	two	other	conversants	shared	this	view.	Three	conversants	felt	Toronto	was	mildly	Keynesian	or	saltwater	–	“Toronto	was	a	very	Harvard-looking	place	for	a	long	time;	that	was	my	impression,”	commented	one	professor,	although	he	was	right-leaning	himself.	He	went	on	to	say	that	Toronto	divided	up	the	social	sciences	late,	in	the	1980s,	and	that	economic	history	–	a	Toronto	specialty	–	went	into	decline	then.	Indeed,	one	bank	chief	economist	chose	to	study	there	in	the	1980s	because	of	its	political	economy	focus	relative	to	other	departments.		 McGill’s	formerly	split	department	came	up	thrice;	one	professor	there	said,	“we	had	a	local	schism,	but	I	don’t	think	that	was	typical,”	and	another	two	economists	referred	to	it	as	Post-Keynesian	or	a	bit	less	Chicago-style.	As	McGill	has	risen	up	the	ranks,	however,	it	may	have	lost	the	variation	it	formerly	had;	one	heterodox	economist	viewed	its	current	orientation	as	right-wing.		 This	conversant	also	viewed	UBC	as	right-wing,	but	of	the	highly-ranked	departments	it	was	most	often	viewed	as	somewhat	progressive	or	left-of-centre;	four	mainstream	economists	concurred	on	this	point,	with	assessments	such	as,	“UBC	is,	I	would	say,	like	Queen’s	–	maybe	even	a	little	bit	slightly	to	the	left	of	Queen’s”	and																																																									173	These	conversants	viewed	Queen’s	as	saltwater	or	somewhat	left-leaning,	in	other	words.	174	One	bank	chief	economist	said	it	was	“mathematical,”	however.	
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“There	have	been	times	where	UBC	has	been	the	Berkeley	–	maybe	not	as	extreme.”	In	observing	that	Calgary	leaned	conservative	and	UBC	leaned	progressive,	one	professor	wondered	whether	“location	might	be	correlated	–	I	didn’t	think	about	that.”	One	professor	felt	UBC	was	mainstream;	another	said	that	“UBC	isn’t	focused	on	Ottawa,”	partly	due	to	geography	and	the	“idiosyncratic	history	of	the	place;”	one	Fraser	Institute	conversant	believed	they	were	heterogeneous	due	to	their	size;	and	a	right-wing	professor	said	that	“UBC	has	been	very	eclectic	and	very	successful.”		
	
	
Economics	Education	in	Canada,	the	U.S.,	and	the	UK			 A	large	contingent	of	conversants	felt	that	economics	education	everywhere	was	similar	in	character	–	in	North	America,	certainly,	but	even	globally.	“There’s	really	no	significant	difference	at	the	undergraduate	level,”	said	one	professor,	and	the	textbooks	are	the	same;	another	professor	said,	“My	sense	is	the	programs	in	North	America	have	converged.	[.	.	.]	My	sense	is	that	a	PhD	is	a	pretty	similar	beast.”	Yet	another	professor	agreed,	“it’s	identical”	except	from	the	fact	that	students	can	take	a	separate	Master’s	degree	in	Canada.175	“The	Western	world	is	similar,”	said	another	professor,	and	a	colleague	elaborated:			 	There’s	no	difference.	[.	.	.]	That’s	kind	of	a	feature	of	economics,	of	this	field,	is	that,	again,	everyone	accepts	these	tools	and	everyone	is	fairly	uniform.	Again,	it’s	the	closest	to	a	hard	science,	like	physics.	There	won’t	be	a	big	difference	between	Canada,	U.S.,	Europe	–	economics	is	about	the	same.		Yet	another	professor	said:		 Economics	as	opposed	to	many	other	disciplines	is	very	global.	It’s	also	very	homogeneous,	in	a	sense.	So	there’s	one	big	model	–	supply	and	demand,	essentially.	There	used	to	be	a	big	difference	between,	say,	market	economics	and	more	socialist	economics	or	whatever.	But	this	has	really	disappeared.	So	it’s	a	very	homogeneous	subject.	So	where	you	go	in	the	world	doesn’t	make	that	much	difference	in	terms	of	analytical	tools	and	methods.																																																											175	In	the	U.S.,	said	one	professor,	you	receive	a	Master’s	degree	“only	as	a	consolation	prize.”	A	Bank	of	Canada	conversant	said,	more	bluntly,	that	in	the	U.S.	“F	equals	MA.”	He	went	on	to	say	that	in	Canada	there	is	a	“market-driven	demand	for	Master’s	students”	including	at	the	Bank	of	Canada,	but	the	Federal	Reserve	in	the	U.S.	hires	very	few	(95%	have	PhDs).	He	thought	it	might	be	because	there	is	more	competition	there,	or	perhaps	because	the	relative	lack	of	required	economics	classes	in	U.S.	undergraduate	degrees	makes	people	feel	a	PhD	is	necessary.	
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He	cited	one	exception,	however;	“So	macro	is	a	big	area	where	there	are	these	factions	that	don’t	talk	too	much	to	each	other.”	One	CCPA	economist	noted	the	Anglo	world’s	dominance	in	the	profession	and	the	absence	of	heterodoxy	in	that	sphere:	“The	heterodox	school	is	very	fringe	in	the	English-speaking	world.”			 Another	professor	said	of	methods	in	economics,	“Oh,	I	imagine	they’re	the	same,”	and	that	there	has	been	a	diffusion	of	the	U.S.	approach	to	Canada.	“I’d	say	the	emphasis	on	mathematical	economics	is	the	same	here	–	maybe	a	little	more	gung-ho	here	–	so	it’s	hard	to	get	young	economists	interested	in	policy”	because	of	difficulties	with	advancement	in	the	field	and	the	de	facto	requirement	that	publications	focus	on	math,	she	said.	This	was	notable	in	the	context	of	several	remarks	about	many	Québécois	universities’	focus	on	mathematics	and	“world-class”	work	in	econometrics,	and	also	in	relation	to	one	heterodox	professor’s	comment	that	“in	France	it’s	more	abstract,”	and	that	that	might	be	why	there	are	more	complaints	from	students.	If	the	Francophone	approach	has	had	an	effect	on	the	Canadian	economics	community	in	particular	ways,	the	focus	on	mathematics	and	econometrics	(even	relative	to	a	generally	mathematised	field)	may	be	one.		 One	professor	who	studied	in	the	U.S.	said	that	the	good	Canadian	and	American	schools	all	teach	mainstream	neoclassical	economics,	and	that	“I	think	by	and	large	the	departments	in	Canada	that	were	aspiring	to	do	well	were	aspiring	to	imitate	the	top	five	or	top	ten	U.S.	departments.”176	There	had	been	much	interchange	from	the	1950s	and	1960s	onwards	as	he	and	many	other	economists	went	to	the	U.S.	for	graduate	school	and	subsequently	returned	to	Canada.	The	U.S.	has	traditionally	had	much	more	influence	on	Canada	than	the	UK,	he	said,	but	McGill,177	Toronto,	and	Dalhousie	had	strong	UK	connections	because	of	the	well-known	Canadian	economist	Harry	Johnson	and	other	links.	After	World	War	II,	UK	trade	declined	and	the	U.S.	was	booming,	so	Canada	turned	to	the	latter	more	generally;	economics	was	no	exception.178	
																																																								176	As	another	professor	put	it,	“we’re	very	tied	into	the	U.S.	hierarchy.”	As	above,	another	professor	said,	“All	things	being	equal,	it’s	considered	to	be	more	prestigious	to	get	a	degree	outside	Canada.”	177	Some	people	at	McGill	had	ties	to	the	UK	Cambridge	and	took	their	side	in	the	Cambridge	Controversies,	he	added.	178	One	effect	that	persisted	from	the	earlier	UK	influence	was,	according	to	one	bank	chief	economist,	that	former	British	colonies	as	a	group	tend	to	be	good	at	maintaining	data.	
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	 Several	conversants	made	the	point	that,	on	average,	Canadian	economists	tend	to	be	more	interested	in	international	trade	than	their	American	(and	often	British)	counterparts;	one	professor	said	that	the	U.S.	did	not	trade	much	until	the	1970s	whereas	“Canada	always	traded.”	“The	fact	that	Canada	is	a	small	open	economy	has	forced	us	to	think	about	the	linkages	between	macro	and	micro,	industrial	structure,	trade,	foreign	investment,”	said	a	Conference	Board	economist;	a	professor	agreed:	“In	Canada	it’s	kind	of	hard	not	to	think	about	open	economy	issues,	whereas	in	the	U.S.	you	can;	at	least	when	I	was	a	graduate	student	there,	you	could	ignore	the	rest	of	the	world.”	Yet	another	professor	concurred,	“Canada	is	a	small	open	economy”	as	opposed	to	the	U.S.	and	“Little	England”	and	“we	are	very	vulnerable	to	the	cold	winds	of	economic	forces	from	outside,	so	many	many	Canadians	end	up	taking	international	perspectives	on	things.”	For	example,	Nobel	Prize-winner	Bob	Mundell’s	work	concerned	“monetary	economics	in	an	open	economy	–	exchange	rates	matter,”	and	this	he	“owes	to	his	roots	in	Canada.”		 Another	professor	who	completed	a	PhD	in	the	U.S.	noted	that	there	it	was	“much	more	competitive,	particularly	at	the	top	schools.	And	that	means	there’s	less	cooperation	among	your	colleagues.	And	that’s	something	I	never	really	felt	in	Canada;”	there	is	“very	little	jealousy,	I’ve	found,	in	Canada.”	One	British-born	professor	remarked	upon	the	social	aspects	of	economics	departments	in	the	U.S.	as	well,	saying,	“I	found	Berkeley	very	unfriendly.”179			 He	also	noticed	a	narrowing	of	the	field	in	North	America.	He	had	studied	quite	a	bit	of	economic	thought	as	a	student	in	the	UK,	and	a	colleague	at	Berkeley	laughed	at	him	for	writing	a	paper	in	that	subfield.	He	also	claimed	that	“North	America	is	truncated,	because	Joe	McCarthy	and	his	buddies	did	a	really	good	number	on	the	left-wing	tradition	in	the	social	sciences	in	North	America.”180	He	mentioned	the	example	of	the	University	of	Illinois,	which	had	housed	one	of	the	best	economics	departments	in	the	1940s	and	whose	older	professors	had	been	able	to	dispatch	their	younger	colleagues	because	of	the	latters’	leftist	political	leanings.	The	department	never	really	recovered,	he	maintained.	As	a	further	example	he	added	that	Canadian	economist	Lorie	Tarshis’	Keynesian	textbook	was	banned	in	many	universities	and																																																									179	He	went	on	to	say,	“It’s	no	wonder	the	students	tried	to	burn	the	place	down.	Absolutely	right.”	180	Keep	in	mind	that	this	was	a	conservative	monetarist	professor	saying	this,	which	bolsters	another	professor’s	contention	that	some	of	the	older	generation	of	economists	had	a	greater	tolerance	for	alternative	viewpoints	in	the	profession.	
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did	not	go	into	a	second	printing.	This	sort	of	thing	did	not	happen	in	the	UK	in	the	same	way.181	When	I	asked	whether	the	economics	profession	in	Canada	was	diverse,	however,	he	said,	“Oh,	I	think	the	diversity	is	here	in	Canada.”	But	he	went	on	to	say	that	“American	literature	dominates	economics	literature	–	that’s	because	there’s	so	many	of	them,	apart	from	anything	else”	and	that	it	is	probably	the	same	with	physics,	but	when	discussing	policy	American	debates	may	not	be	applicable	elsewhere.	Academics	get	more	credit	in	the	rankings	for	articles	in	leading	American	journals,	which	is	another	issue	for	Canada-specific	policy.	Another	professor	agreed,	saying	that	researching	Canada	“is	not	something	I	would	recommend	for	anyone	earlier	on	in	their	career”	as	is	not	rewarded.182		 Of	those	who	felt	there	was	a	difference	between	the	U.S.	and	Canada,	many	referred	again	to	the	relative	lack	of	polarisation	among	Canadian	economics	departments,	saying	that	Canada’s	economics	community	–	and	political	environment	more	generally	–	was	“more	homogeneous”	and	“less	polarised”	than	in	the	U.S.	As	one	professor	said,	“I	don’t	think	the	divisions	are	anywhere	near	as	distinct	in	Canada,	which	in	a	way	it	sort	of	mirrors	the	political	culture	in	Canada	–	fortunately	we	don’t	have	the	extremes	and	the	level	of	confrontation	that	you	see	in	the	U.S.	at	the	moment.”	This	was	often	viewed	as	a	function	of	the	relative	truncation	of	the	political	spectrum	and	leftward-leaning	political	culture	in	Canada	relative	to	the	U.S.;	one	professor	said,	“I	think	our	Conservative	tail	is	less	extreme	than	in	the	U.S.	–	I	mean,	their	whole	political	distribution	is	to	the	right,”	and	another	said	Canada	was	a	“slightly	more	socialist	country.”	Another	professor	thought	Canadian	economists	were	less	doctrinaire	than	their	U.S.	brethren;	even	those	who	emigrate	to	the	U.S.	are	still	viewed	as	at	least	centre	or	left-of-centre	there,	he	said,	and	he	could	not	think	of	any	right-wing	Canadian	émigré	economists.	“Canadians	are	a	bit	more	middle-of-the-																																																								181	Three	other	conversants	also	had	the	sense	that	the	UK’s	economists	are,	as	one	professor	put	it,	“more	willing	to	have	arguments	with	one	another,	agree	to	disagree”	than	their	North	American	counterparts.	When	it	comes	to	economic	thought,	said	one	COMER,	the	UK	is	a	“more	pluralistic	society	than	here.”	Another	professor	thought	UK	economists,	on	average,	may	be	a	bit	“less	technical”	and	“a	bit	more	open	to	competing	perspectives.”	The	economic	discourse	in	Canada	and	the	UK	was	generally	viewed	as	more	civil	than	in	the	U.S.,	but	perhaps	in	the	context	of	more	variety	in	the	UK	and	more	homogeneity	in	Canada.	182	Economics	departments	in	Canada	could	agree	to	collectively	boost	the	ranking	of	the	Canadian	Journal	of	Economics	in	terms	of	their	internal	hiring	decisions.	If	they	did	this	all	at	once,	the	expectation	of	the	quality	of	the	journal	would	improve,	which	could	in	turn	affect	the	actual	quality	of	the	journal	–	these	rankings	are,	in	many	ways,	as	self-fulfilling	as	many	other	aspects	of	finance/economics.	
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road	between	Keynesian	and	neoclassical”	relative	to	the	U.S.,	agreed	another	professor;	“As	right-wing	as	Harper	is,	he’s	still	left-wing	relative	to	the	U.S.”			 One	bank	chief	economist	agreed.	“I	actually	think	Canadians	have	a	very	different	political	attitude	than	Americans	do.”	He	spoke	of	the	healthcare	debate	in	the	U.S.	and	how	“although	they	wouldn’t	say	it,”	the	crux	of	it	was	that	people	did	not	want	to	pay	for	other	people’s	coverage.	“In	Canada	it’s	unquestioned	that,	no,	you	pay	for	that	other	person’s	healthcare,	and	you	will	do	so	without	complaint.”	He	watched	someone	on	American	television	complain	about	Obamacare	and	the	challenge	of	making	ends	meet	on	an	annual	income	of	$500,000,	“and	I	happen	to	work	in	an	industry	where	there	are	a	lot	of	these	people.	And	they	may	gripe	among	themselves	or	this	and	that,	but	no	one	would	go	on	TV	saying	‘you’re	killing	the	job-creators.’”	In	Canada	“there’s	a	level	of	understanding	that	governments	are	going	to	make	some	policies	that	are	going	to	help	people	who	are	poorer	than	you	and	you	may	not	like	it,	but	you’re	going	to	lump	it	quietly.	You’re	going	to	recognise	that	that’s	the	way	it	goes.”	Is	that	decorum,	I	asked,	or	a	different	attitude	towards	taxes?	“I	think	it’s	a	different	attitude	towards	the	role	that	government	has	to	play	to	support	the	people	who	are	the	least	well-off,”	he	responded.183	He	went	on	to	say:		 If	a	Canadian	politician	spoke	like	any	of	those	people	[running	for	the	Republican	primary],	their	political	career	would	be	over.	[.	.	.]	And	they’ve	got	a	whole	party	saying	those	things.	So	there	is	definitely	a	different	political	spectrum	here.	[.	.	.]	Even	among	the	economists,	who	would	tend	to	be,	I	would	say,	on	average,	more	right-wing	than	left-wing,	among	bank	economists	–	just	the	nature	of	the	beast	–	although	I	consider	myself	a	centrist,	and	some	of	them	are	too,	but	even	then	they	wouldn’t	be	as	right-wing	as	some	of	the	clients	they	would	have	to	go	meet	in	Texas.				 There	seemed	to	be	general	agreement	among	conversants	about	the	difference	in	political	spectra	in	Canada	and	the	U.S.,	and	several	others	echoed	this	bank	economist’s	point	about	the	role	of	government.	One	professor	said,	“I	think	there	is	a	general	view	among	Canadians	that	there’s	more	collectivism,	in	our	thinking	about	
																																																								183	He	added	that	he	thought	part	of	the	issue	in	the	U.S.	is	race-based,	that	people	do	not	want	to	pay	for	a	black	person’s	healthcare;	“they’re	not	feeling	an	affinity,	that	we’re	all	in	this	together.”	He	thinks	Canadians	do	not	picture	a	particular	race	or	identity	when	they	think	of	paying	for	someone	else’s	healthcare	–	they	think	of	a	poorer	region	of	Canada.	
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policy	and	what’s	appropriate	for	government,	than	there	is	in	the	States.”184	Another	professor	elaborated:		 	American	ones	are	funny.	It’s	such	a	different	system	in	the	U.S.	[.	.	.]	Maybe	it’s	the	recognition	in	Canada,	just	in	broad	terms,	there’s	more	of	an	acceptance	among	economists	that	there	is	an	important	role	for	government	to	play.	And	the	science	of	economics	says	yeah,	there’s	an	important	role	for	government	to	play;	no	one	should	ever	deny	that.	Government	has	very	important	roles	to	play.	The	question	is	to	maximise	what	it	does	well	and	minimise	what	it	does	badly.	I	think	there’s	a	lot	of	economists	in	the	States	that	tend	to	forget	that	basic,	really	fundamental	theorem	of	economics	–	that	there	is	in	fact	a	role	for	government.	[.	.	.]	To	pretend	that	you	could	have	some	sort	of	well-functioning	society	without	some	redistribution	of	income	is	just	beyond	me.185			 A	bank	chief	economist	agreed	that	in	the	U.S.	“some	things	are	more	extreme	from	a	tax	policy	perspective;”	they	pay	more	for	healthcare,	for	example,	but	“do[n’t]	have	full	coverage.”	He	said	he	meets	with	clients	in	the	U.S.	“and	you	say,	there	are	some	solutions	here,	and	they	call	you	a	socialist	from	Canada	who	likes	high	taxes.”	One	professor	pointed	out	that	the	UK	and	Europe	are	“more	sympathetic	to	egalitarian”	beliefs	than	the	U.S.	as	well,	and	that	“the	U.S.	has	always	been	the	odd	man	out	on	many	things.”		 Aside	from	the	commentary	on	political	differences	between	Canada	and	the	U.S.	and	the	implication,	either	stated	or	implied,	that	these	differences	extended	to	economists,	most	conversants	pointed	to	relatively	minor	variations	in	economics	education	between	the	two	countries.	One	difference	was	that	a	U.S.	liberal	arts	education	requires	fewer	economics	courses	in	an	economics	undergraduate	degree	relative	to	Canada;	one	bank	chief	economist	said	that	when	he	arrived	at	Harvard	for	his	PhD,	even	with	a	3-year	undergraduate	degree	he	was	around	the	middle	of	the	class	in	terms	of	preparation.	A	professor	who	attended	MIT	for	his	PhD	was	told	he	could	skip	several	microeconomics	courses	as	he	had	already	covered	the	material	during	his	undergraduate	program;	this	was	true	for	another	professor	who	attended	Harvard.	A	professor	with	a	PhD	from	Stanford	said	that	a	Canadian	economics	B.A.	was	“much	better	preparation”	than	its	U.S.	equivalent.	Yet	another	professor,	this	one	with	a	PhD	from	Harvard,	said,	“The	way	economics	is	taught	in	Canada,	and																																																									184	He	went	on	to	say,	“And	I’m	not	sure	how	to	quantify	that	difference	–	I’m	sure	it	has	been	quantified,	in	surveys.”	These	sorts	of	comments	–	attempts	to	quantify	or	measure	statements	when	asked	to	share	their	own	personal	opinions	–	were	common	among	the	economists	I	spoke	with.	185	It	is	worth	noting	that	he	was	among	the	small	group	of	professors	affiliated	with	the	Fraser	Institute,	arguably	Canada’s	most	right-wing	think	tank.	
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probably	in	Britain,	is	very	different	than	the	way	it’s	taught	in	the	United	States,”	because	the	U.S.	liberal	arts	training	included	six	economics	courses,	perhaps,	relative	to	more	like	twelve	at	UToronto	–	and	economic	history	and	history	of	economic	thought	were	both	required	courses	in	the	latter.		 Indeed,	a	further	two	professors	claimed	that	Canada	fell	between	the	U.S.	and	the	UK	in	terms	of	economics	preparation	at	the	undergraduate	level.	In	the	UK	students	“had	an	MA	by	American	standards”	by	the	end	of	their	undergraduate	course,	said	one	academic;	Canada	was	behind	the	UK	and	Australia	in	terms	of	preparation,	but	ahead	of	the	U.S.	Another	professor	concurred	with	that	view,	adding	that	at	the	London	School	of	Economics	(LSE)	“all	they	take	is	economics”	and	it	was	quite	advanced,	using	textbooks	you	would	see	in	graduate	school	in	North	America.		 A	surprising	number	of	my	conversants	had	in	fact	attended	LSE	at	some	point	–	eight	in	all	(two	at	the	undergraduate	level,	six	as	Master’s	students,	and	two	–	one	of	whom	continued	on	from	her	Master’s	–	at	the	doctoral	level).	One	professor	who	enrolled	at	the	LSE	in	1973	said	“There	were	significant	connections	with	the	UK	at	that	time”	in	Canada	and	described	LSE	professors	as	right-wing	but	the	students	as	the	opposite;	“you	could	be	whatever	flavour	of	left-wing	you	wanted	to	be,	but	if	you	weren’t	left-wing	you	just	kept	quiet	about	that.”186		 A	Bank	of	Canada	economist	who	studied	at	the	LSE	and	Toronto	said	they	both	taught	a	“very	mainstream	kind	of	economics.”	However:			 In	North	America,	the	training	is	largely	focused	on	efficiency.	We	never	talk	about	equity,	or	very	rarely	do	we	talk	about	equity,	unless	you	take	a	welfare	economics	course.	Whereas	when	I	went	to	the	LSE,	more	people	talked	about	the	equity-efficiency	trade-off.	And	that	was	eye-opening	for	me,	because	I	never	got	that	as	an	undergrad	at	U	of	T,187	and	even	when	I	was	at	MIT,	the	equity-efficiency	trade-off	[wasn’t	very]	prominent.			That	was	the	major	substantive	difference	between	the	UK	and	North	America,	he	felt.	As	a	central	banker,	he	noted	that	in	the	UK	“macro	is	not	a	significant	field”	and	most	respected	economists	are	micro	theorists.	In	terms	of	structure,	at	the	time	a	UK	Master’s	included	all	of	the	graduate-level	coursework,	then	very	little	during	the	PhD,	but	it	had	“evolved	more	towards	the	U.S.	model.	[.	.	.]	Canadian	schools	had	the	UK	model	for	a	while,”	but	are	moving	more	towards	the	U.S.	This	view	was	echoed																																																									186	One	bank	chief	economist	received	the	advice	that	“the	LSE	was	this	left-wing	school,	which	maybe	it	was	in	the	60s”	and	that	“if	people	see	that,	they	won’t	hire	you.”	He	said	that	they	have	since	hired	people	from	LSE	at	his	bank,	so	that	was	“bad	information.”	187	University	of	Toronto.	
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by	another	professor	who	studied	at	the	LSE,	who	said,	“as	time	goes	by	I	think	they’re	becoming	more	and	more	patterned	after	the	North	American	model.	[.	.	.]	Pretty	much	most	departments	in	the	U.S.,	Canada,	and	England	offer	a	pretty	standard	PhD	program.	One	big	difference	the	UK	used	to	have	with	respect	to	North	America	was	the	course	work	content	of	the	PhD,”	which	is	much	heavier	in	North	America,	especially	relative	to	Oxbridge.	Indeed,	a	professor	with	a	PhD	from	LSE	said	it	was	very	unstructured	and	there	were	“hardly	any	courses;	you	find	a	supervisor	and	sit	there	and	write.”	Yet	another	professor	described	his	2-year	LSE	program	(a	B.Sc.)	as	eight	exams	at	the	very	end,	and	basically	no	other	assessment	or	output;188	the	final	year	was	dedicated	to	economics.		 A	professor	who	studied	at	Oxford	said	that	it	offered	a	very	unstructured	DPhil	program,	and	“the	failure	rate	was	huge.	[.	.	.]	Basically,	the	program	wasn’t	very	good.”	He	noted	that	the	MPhil	is	a	standalone	degree,	as	in	Canada,	as	opposed	to	a	stepping-stone	as	it	is	in	the	U.S.,	but	that	interdisciplinary	was	built	into	the	college	system	at	Oxford	in	a	way	that	it	was	not	at	Canadian	universities.	He	went	on	to	say	that	Canada	was	traditionally	“a	mid-Atlantic	operation”	but	in	the	post-Thatcher	era189	“Canada	has	moved	closer	to	Europe,	and	Britain	has	crossed	over.	So	Britain	is	more	like	the	U.S.	–	in	subjective	wellbeing,	in	social	trust,	in	a	whole	range	of	issues.”	Canada	is	now	between	the	U.S.	and	Scandinavia,	he	said,	and	closer	to	the	latter	–	the	top	ten	happiest	countries	in	the	world	invariably	include	Scandinavia	and	Canada	but	not	the	U.S.	or	the	UK.	
	
	
	
	
	
		
																																																								188	He	later	contrasted	this	with	his	experience	in	graduate	school	in	the	U.S.;	“I	really	did	find	it	awfully	stressful,”	he	said,	and	“much	more	regimented.”	189	One	mainstream	professor	said	that	prior	to	Thatcher’s	reign,	“the	intellectual	elite”	may	even	have	been	a	bit	to	the	left	of	Canada	but	that	Thatcher	“basically	remade”	parts	of	society	and	they	did	not	regain	their	shape	afterwards.	A	conservative	British	professor,	on	the	other	hand,	pointed	out	that	“Cambridge	had	a	lock	on	economics”	prior	to	the	Thatcher	era,	partly	as	a	result	of	the	legacy	of	Keynes	and	his	acolytes,	“and	it	was	terrible.”		
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Economists’	Views	on	Inequality190			 The	subject	of	income	inequality	generated	significantly	longer	answers	–	in	transcript	form,	thousands	of	words	more	–	than	any	other.191	Although	few	of	my	conversants	were	completely	unconcerned	about	inequality	–	and	those	who	fell	into	this	category	invariably	expressed	concern	over	poverty	and/or	social	mobility	instead	–	a	significant	percentage	felt	that,	although	inequality	in	general	was	an	issue,	Canada	had	not	fallen	into	problematic	territory	in	this	respect.	A	significant	proportion	of	conversants	referred	to	the	U.S.	as	a	reference	point	–	specifically,	as	an	example	of	a	country	that	had	taken	inequality	too	far;	Canada	was	often	deemed	to	be	acceptable	in	comparison.	Yet	their	answers	demonstrated	a	level	of	preoccupation	with	the	issue	that	simply	was	not	in	evidence	as	regards	other	policy	questions.		 There	was,	however,	a	minority	who	seemed	unconcerned	about	inequality	altogether.	From	the	Fraser	Institute	there	was	a	flat-out	dismissal	of	Thomas	Piketty’s	work,	Capitalism	in	the	21st	Century192:	“I	think	his	book	has	been	rightly	ridiculed	in	the	profession	for	having	a	whole	lot	of	mistakes	both	conceptually	and	empirically.”	A	second	Fraser	Institute	conversant	elaborated:		 Piketty’s	book	makes	me	gnash	my	teeth,	it’s	such	an	ignorant	piece.	It’s	a	book	on	inequality.	It’s	a	complete	distortion,	and	completely	–	I	mean,	once	again,	you’re	entitled	to	your	own	opinions,	but	you’re	not	entitled	to	your	own	facts.			This	conversant	went	on	to	describe	the	Fraser	Institute’s	work	on	social	mobility	in	Canada,	which	showed	that	there	is	“all	kinds	of	mobility,	and	there	always	has	been,”	whereas	Piketty	is	guilty	of	“egregious	calculation	errors	and	methodological	issues”	and	seems	to	suggest	that	only	income	distribution	matters.	Besides	which,	“The	most	important	things	in	life	are	not	about	money.	And	therefore	when	we’re	talking	about	how	a	society	is	organised,	the	more	important	question	is	that	issue	about	choices”	and	having	the	“freedom	to	go	where	you	want”	and	no	“nanny	state”	telling	you	what	to	do.193																																																									190	See	the	Appendices	for	my	conversants’	views	on	usury,	capital	gains	taxation,	and	carbon	taxes.	191	This	is	true	even	controlling	for	the	fact	that	I	asked	this	question	of	an	unusually	high	proportion	of	conversants	–	almost	all,	in	effect.	192	Piketty’s	tome	concerns	wealth	inequality	across	many	geographies	and	over	several	centuries	in	some	cases;	it	was	a	surprise	hit	when	it	was	published.	193	There	was	evident	frustration	in	his	voice	over	Piketty’s	book.	He	went	on	to	say:	
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	 Despite	expressing	fondness	for	UBC	economist	John	Helliwell	as	a	person,	this	conversant	expressed	frustration	over	Helliwell’s	work	on	happiness:	“So	what’s	the	argument	now?	That	we	need	to	make	people	happy!	And	as	it	happens,	happiness	is	very	difficult	to	measure.	[.	.	.]	These	so-called	sharing,	caring	socialist	troglodytes	think	cab	drivers	are	low-income,	and	they	are	thinking,	‘I’m	free!’”	He	went	on	to	critique	the	idea	of	income	inequality	as	a	measure,	referring	to	the	two	times	in	one’s	life	cycle	when	one	“should	be	poor”	–	when	young,	and	when	“run[ning]	your	assets	down”	in	old	age.194	He	asked:			 	Given	that	that’s	the	normal	state	of	affairs	in	someone’s	life,	what	does	equality	mean?	Equality	of	income?	What	about	talent?	[.	.	.]	What	you	want	to	have	is	equal	opportunity.	So	you	do	want	to	make	sure	that	everybody’s	got	an	access	to	education	if	they	want	–	not	everybody	wants	it.195																																																																																																																																																																																The	money	outcomes	are	important	–	in	my	view,	they	are	most	important	because	of	the	non-monetary	things	they	produce:	the	higher	life	expectancy,	the	lower	level	of	maternal	mortality	in	childbirth,	the	high	level	of	infant	survival,	the	non-existence	of	self-induced	disease	like	through	water	which	is	badly	.	.	.	and	all	that	kind	of	stuff.	[.	.	.]	But	measured	in	a	tangible	way,	ways	that	you	can	actually	see,	not	happiness.	[.	.	.]	See,	this	is	another	way	of	trying	to	reframe.	They	lost	the	argument.	Everybody	now	knows	that	the	socialists	lost	the	argument.	Nobody	now	argues	that	it	would	be	a	good	idea	to	have	a	communist	state,	totalitarian	kind	of	government	–	nobody	argues	that	anymore.	Maybe	except	in	North	Korea.	But	–	who	cares.		194	Having	been	raised	in	modest	circumstances	himself,	he	went	on:	It’s	not	much	fun	if	you	start	high.	And	by	the	way,	I’ve	had	in	my	life	the	privilege	–	I	say	privilege	because	it’s	been	a	big	benefit	in	how	I	organise	my	own	life	–	of	knowing	a	lot	of	very	wealthy	people	and	seeing	children	who	are	born	into	very	high	levels	of	affluence	–	and	what	a	baggage	that	is	on	you.	What	a	terrible	.	.	.	and	I’ve	been	asked	to	advise	some	of	the	wealthiest	families	in	Canada	–	on	economic	and	other	activities.	And	I	always	tell	the	kids	–	you	are	born	with	a	huge	disadvantage.	You	have	got	a	problem	–	because	the	incentives	have	been	taken	away	from	you	to	improve	your	life	and	normal	yardsticks	that	people	use	to	measure	their	progress	have	been	taken	away	from	you,	because	it’s	going	to	be	very	difficult	for	you	to	end	up	more	wealthy	than	you	are	now.	So	what	you’d	better	do	is	you’d	better	give	this	all	up	and	go	out	on	your	own.		195	He	felt	that	education	should	be	free	up	to	the	end	of	secondary	school,	but	not	after:			That	person	has	more	of	an	incentive	to	organise	their	own	way	through	university	–	because	they’re	going	to	get	the	benefit.	They’re	going	to	be	the	primary	beneficiary.	In	the	case	of	these	people	who	have	their	Grade	12,	the	society	gets	a	benefit	out	of	having	a	well-educated	population	and	so	on	and	so	on	and	economists	have	shown	that	the	benefit	to	the	society	is	at	least	equal	to	the	amount	of	subsidy	that’s	going	in.	It’s	not	true	for	post-secondary	education.	
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	 Piketty’s	book	was	a	clear	irritant	for	another	conversant	as	well,	a	conservative	academic	who	had	written	a	book	about	the	topic;	he	brought	up	Piketty’s	work	unprompted,	arguing	that	“we	should	be	focused	on	poverty	–	don’t	really	worry	about	inequality;	they’re	two	different	things	and	the	important	thing	is	poverty.”	He	described	his	analysis	of	papers	in	the	NBER	database196	since	around	1970.	There	were	few	papers	on	inequality	in	the	first	ten	or	fifteen	years,	but	there	has	been	a	stable	number	since	then	with	a	small	increase	in	2008.	When	I	pointed	out	that	that	mirrors	the	increase	in	inequality	in	the	Western	world	from	the	1980s	onwards,	he	said	“the	onset	does	come	when	the	onset	of	inequality	comes,	so	the	profession	is	paying	attention”	but	that	inequality	in	the	U.S.	mainly	increased	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	and	not	greatly	since.	I	asked	him	whether	there	was	an	ideal	level	of	inequality,	to	which	he	responded:	“Well,	I	think	it’s	irrelevant.	But	I	don’t	think	I’m	typical;	I	think	most	people	worry	about	inequality.”	Including	economists,	I	asked?	“Yeah,	increasingly	I	think	they	do,”	he	said,	although	they	have	traditionally	thought	more	about	growth.		 Another	older	conservative	economist	cited	a	critique	of	Piketty’s	book	by	The	Economist	and	a	review	by	George	Fallis	arguing	that	the	Canadian	data	do	not	fit	Piketty’s	pattern.	But	this	conversant	volunteered:	“I	don’t	like	inequality.	I	mean	I	really	don’t.	I	would	be	a	guaranteed	minimum	income	person,”	although	“I’m	more	worried	at	the	bottom	end	than	I	am	about	the	top	end.”	He	said	he	did	not	have	a	problem	with	opera	stars	and	athletes	“being	paid	a	fortune”	and	that	we	do	not	normally	think	about	how	long	very	high	incomes	last,	that	there	is	regression	to	the	mean	over	the	course	of	a	person’s	life.	When	I	asked	for	his	view	on	the	level	of	inequality	in	Canada,	he	said:			 	When	I	walk	around	downtown	London,	or	around	downtown	Toronto,	and	I	see	all	the	homeless,	most	of	whom	look	like	mental	cases	to	me,	I	get	very	upset.	So	I	think	no,	we’ve	got	a	real	social	problem.	And	I	don’t	see	why	the	food	bank	should	be	a	permanent	social	institution	either.197			 One	former	policymaker	discussed	his	own	preoccupation	with	income	distribution	when	he	worked	in	the	Department	of	Finance,	citing	evidence	that	“as																																																									196	The	National	Bureau	of	Economic	Research	(NBER)	database	is	a	repository	for	working	papers	on	economics.	197	In	terms	of	which	policies	he	thought	would	alleviate	such	poverty,	he	said,	“Oh,	I	think	refundable	tax	credits	is	the	way	to	go.	[.	.	.]	I	would	also	put	healthcare	into	that	system”	and	tax	people	on	the	healthcare	they	receive,	a	fee-for-service	model	for	people	above	a	certain	income	level,	maybe	capped	past	a	certain	total	cost.	
	 182	
you	expand	the	size	of	the	market,	then	the	premium	to	the	winner	gets	bigger	and	bigger”	but	noting	that	that	is	on	the	earnings	side,	which	is	not	what	Piketty	was	writing	about.198	Returns	to	capital	have	been	low	recently	so	it	is	hard	to	assume	returns	will	be	high	in	future,	he	said,	especially	as	technologies	inevitably	change	the	distribution	of	income.199	When	I	asked	directly	whether	we	should	reduce	inequality	or	poverty,	he	said	that	we	cannot	solve	inequality	on	the	supply	side	only,	and	that	it	will	be	a	“very	interesting	question	going	forward.”	He	viewed	poverty	as	a	different	question:			 [It	is	about]	how	much	you’re	willing	to	take	out	of	the	system	to	subsidise	the	bottom	end,	because	you’re	always	going	to	have	the	bottom	end.	[.	.	.]	This	is	I	think	a	very	interesting	issue	that	in	some	sense	traditional	economists	like	me	are	not	really	capable	of	dealing	with.	If	you	think	about	it,	it’s	very	interesting	that	in	times	that	are	tough	on	the	then-existing	middle	class,	the	middle	class	then	tends	to	turn	very	conservative.	And	that’s	been	true	through	history.		He	saw	this	in	“right-wing,	anti-redistribution	groups”	like	the	Tea	Party	gaining	support	from	people	who	should	be	supporting	redistribution;	the	middle-income	group	has	seen	no	income	gains	in	25	years	and	have	been	driven	down	relative	to	top-earners	but	also	relative	to	low-earners	who	receive	government	support,	which	exacerbates	social	tensions.	He	pointed	to	the	paradox	of	low-income	Conservatives	and	Republicans	asking	for	self-punishing	policies,	and	the	diminishing	bargaining	power	of	labour	in	bad	times:	“It	always	struck	me	–	I	started	as	a	labour	economist	–	that	it’s	absolutely	always	the	case,	and	it	was	always	very	strange	that	the	union	movement	suffered	its	worst	setbacks	just	at	the	very	time	that	you	would	think	it	was	most	needed.”		 A	C.D.	Howe	conversant	was	similarly	reluctant	to	answer	directly;	he	also	took	an	academic	approach	to	the	question,	saying,	“I	was	very	surprised	by	the	thesis	in	that	book.”200	He	took	a	rare	historical	view,	talking	about	medieval	times,	when																																																									198	Piketty’s	work	concerned	the	functional	distribution	of	income	between	labour	and	capital	and	the	aberration	of	the	mid-20th	century,	according	to	this	conversant.	199	He	also	made	the	point,	“I	think	students	of	economics	today	are	very	lucky.	Because	we’ve	just	come	through	a	few	years	where	we’ve	had	lots	of	variation	in	the	data,	lots	of	variation	across	countries,	you’ve	got	all	sorts	of	potential	hypotheses,”	whereas	students	in	the	early	1990s	and	afterwards	“basically	had	run	for	a	period	from	the	early	80s	until	2007	with	relatively	little	variation	in	the	data.”	200	This	was	partly	because	Piketty’s	work	provided	a	clue	for	those	trying	to	decide	between	pay-as-you-go	and	funded	pensions,	he	said.	Right	now	savers	are	not	getting	any	return;	“if	you	think	Piketty	is	right,	then	there’s	no	pension	crisis.	Because	the	large	funds	increasingly	own	all	of	the	investable	assets,	right?”	But	in	“the	world	I	live	in,	
	 183	
lenders	charged	high	interest	rates	for	loans	to	an	emperor	or	prince	and	frequent	defaults	meant	that	accumulation	did	not	happen	as	per	Piketty’s	thesis;	the	1950s,	1960s,	and	1970s	are	not	standard	“if	you	know	anything	about	history,”	and	for	every	good	period	for	lenders	there	is	always	a	bad	one.	When	asked	directly	whether	he	thought	inequality	was	a	problem,	he	sidestepped	the	question:	“It’s	partly	a	question	of	where	you	think	technology	is	going”	and	whether	it	is	“winner-takes-all”	technology.	If	that	happens,	“then	we	have	a	problem;	[.	.	.]	that	can	be	a	force	for	income	polarisation,	and	I	just	don’t	know	what	the	answer	is.”	Perhaps	detecting	a	pause	on	my	part,	he	continued:		 	That’s	probably	not	the	answer	you	were	wondering	about.	[.	.	.]	To	the	extent	that	it	is	happening,	we	may	need	to	use	the	redistributive	tools	we	have	a	bit	more	aggressively,	and	like	a	lot	of	people	I	look	at	education	as	one	way	we	have	of	mitigating	[inequality	.	.	.].	It	depends	whether	people	are	concerned	about	the	fairness	of	it	or	not.	I’m	often	struck	that	the	high	salaries	for	athletes	don’t	seem	to	bother	people.	I	suppose	it’s	because	they	feel	their	performance	is	measurable.	[.	.	.]	Process	seems	to	matter	to	people.		When	I	tried	again	to	ask	about	inequality	in	Canada,	he	described	the	1970s	“compression	of	wages”	followed	by	the	increase	in	inequality	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	that	now	seems	to	have	levelled	off,	saying	that	Canada	is	different	from	the	U.S.,	perhaps	because	of	better	education,	commodities,	housing,	or	opportunities	for	people	who	had	“strong	backs	but	not	necessarily	strong	–	well,	you’re	recording	this	interview,	so	I’d	better	be	careful	what	I	say.”	When	asked	whether	he	preferred	the	level	of	inequality	in	Canada	or	the	U.S.,	he	again	avoided	the	question,	saying,	“People	will	trade	these	things	off	differently;”	in	the	U.S.	“you	can	get	ahead”	so	people	seem	not	to	think	inequality	is	“as	obnoxious.”			 Responses	such	as	these	cumulatively	helped	me	to	notice	a	feature	of	the	academic	economists	–	and,	on	the	whole,	the	bank	chief	economists	–	to	whom	I	spoke:	they	tended	to	answer	questions	directly	and	linearly.	It	was	almost	always	in	conversation	with	a	think	tank	economist	or	policymaker	that	I	struggled	to	get	a	straight	answer	to	a	question,	or	encountered	‘straw	man’	arguments.	Academic	economists	were	much	more	direct;	for	example,	one	conservative	professor																																																																																																																																																																														people	are	scared.”	He	later	argued	that	the	pensions	divide	was	less	extreme	for	couples	than	individuals	because	of	“risk	pooling	within	the	family”	and	that	with	assortive	mating,	wealthier	couples	can	“invest	in	the	human	capital	of	their	kids,”	but	“you	can’t	have	the	government	arranging	marriages”	and	that,	similarly,	although	the	transition	from	a	feudal	to	meritocratic	society	will	show	anomalies	in	income,	this	does	not	mean	that	we	should	go	back	to	the	feudal	system.	
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responded,	when	asked	whether	inequality	bothered	him,	“Very	little.	[.	.	.]	As	long	as	there’s	a	way	up	out	of	the	bottom.	[.	.	.]	It’s	not	a	zero-sum	game;	[.	.	.]	this	is	not	trickle-down	economics,”	although	wage	stagnation	is	“a	little	bit	worrying.”201	Of	Piketty’s	work,	which	he	had	read,202	he	said	that	the	book’s	major	equation	is	in	the	standard	growth	model	in	basic	neoclassical	macro	courses	“so	to	me,	it’s	not	new	at	all	[.	.	.]	R	is	greater	than	G	in	the	long	run;	nevertheless	capital	has	a	constant	share	of	national	income	in	the	long	run.”203	He	emphasised	that	Piketty	was	not	looking	at	mobility,	although	“one	of	the	admirable	things	that	he	did	do”	was	compile	timespan	data	and	comparisons	across	countries.	In	general	this	professor’s	view	was	that	if	people	amass	fortunes	by	saving	rather	than	consuming,	that	is	channelled	towards	investment	“and	what’s	wrong	with	that?”	He	maintained	that	he	would	be	content	if	Scrooge	were	a	saver,	a	consumer,	or	a	philanthropist;	all	of	these	options	would	benefit	the	economy.			 Several	other	professors	were	equally	unbothered;	one	said,	“I’m	less	concerned	with	income	inequality	than	living	standards.	[.	.	.]	I	am	concerned	about	how	difficult	it	seems	to	be	for	people	from	disadvantaged	backgrounds	to	make	their	way	up	in	Canada,”	and	he	did	not	worry	about	his	own	status	relative	to	others.	Regarding	Piketty’s	book,	he	said,	“people	are	interested	in	inequality	and	income	distribution,	and	this	is	a	long-standing	question	in	economics”	alongside	intergenerational	mobility	and	concentration	of	wealth,	although	he	thought	economists	were	more	interested	in	the	data	sources	than	the	policy	question	itself.		 Another	mainstream	professor	agreed	that	there	was	widespread	interest	within	the	profession:	“There’s	clearly	an	appetite	for	this	kind	of	discussion,	but	where	does	that	go?	How	does	that	align	with”	the	fact	that,	particularly	in	the	U.S.,	people	“don’t	vote	in	their	economic	interests?”	She	said,	“I’m	very	happy	that	that	work	is	out	there”	and	although	“I’m	sort	of	generically	suspicious	of	people	who																																																									201	He	then	volunteered,	“I	guess	I’m	becoming	really	right-wing	in	my	old	age,	but	I’m	pretty	much	against	minimum	wage	laws	as	well,”	using	the	example	of	MacDonald’s	firing	people	in	Alberta	on	their	18th	birthday	because	the	minimum	wage	laws	started	to	apply.	The	birthday	firings	seemed	to	be	a	result	of	the	differential	between	the	minimum	wages	for	people	under	and	over	the	age	of	18,	not	the	minimum	wage	itself,	but	we	did	not	have	time	to	explore	this	issue.	202	He	was	among	the	small	minority	of	conversants	to	have	read	the	entire	book,	a	tome	of	hundreds	of	pages;	most	others	admitted	to	having	skimmed	or	read	reviews	of	it	instead.	203	Either	I	misunderstand	or	he	does.	If	R	is	greater	than	G,	R	can	have	a	constant	share	of	the	national	income,	but	if	the	rate	of	growth	of	R	is	greater	than	the	rate	of	growth	of	G,	then	surely	R	cannot	then	have	a	constant	share	of	the	national	income.	
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collect	large	datasets”	they	seem	to	have	done	it	carefully	in	this	case,	although	she	thought	the	Canadian	data	was	suspect.	She	said	it	might	depend	a	bit	nationally	and	internationally,	but	within	Canada	“I	would	work	much	more,	first,	on	the	poverty	piece,”	and	that	opportunity,	distribution	according	to	age,	and	mobility	are	all	worth	looking	at.			 The	international	comparison	centred	on	the	U.S.	A	right-wing	academic	colleague	referred	to	Piketty’s	book	as	“good	quality	work”	and	“useful”	but,	similarly,	pointed	to	“limitations”	in	the	data.	He,	too,	did	not	care	about	the	people	at	the	top,	but	rather	more	the	people	on	the	bottom	“and	that	people	feel	they’re	advancing,”	pointing	out	that	the	Canadian	and	U.S.	numbers	were	very	different;	in	the	former,	there	had	been	a	big	jump	in	inequality	in	the	1990s,	but	it	was	flat	in	the	2000s.	People	were	angry	after	the	financial	crisis	and	inequality	became	a	bigger	deal,	however,	“so	I	can	understand	the	hostility.”		 Another	mainstream	professor	mentioned	Piketty	unprompted,	saying	his	data	“hasn’t	been	seriously	challenged”	but	that	his	“policy	prescriptions	[were]	total	fantasy.”	Fortunately,	“Canada	doesn’t	look	nearly	as	bad	in	this	respect”	because	of	its	public	education	and	healthcare	systems,	and	he	believed	that	the	income/wealth	of	the	top	1%	had	declined	in	Canada.	In	Canada	the	state	is	“more	generous”	and	its	“politics	not	as	dysfunctional.”204			 Another	professor	pointed	out	that	“In	Canada	there	hasn’t	been	a	debate	about	distribution	of	wealth,”	and	noted	that	there	is	no	estate	tax	in	Canada	–	and	very	little	discussion	of	that	fact,	either.	In	contrast,	in	Europe	historically	there	has	been	much	more	of	a	debate	around	“breaking	up	inherited	wealth,”	and	there	were	“punitive”	estate	taxes	in	the	UK.	Piketty’s	book,	he	claimed,	explains	that	money	makes	money,	basically,	which	is	why	wealth	can	continue	through	the	generations	–	because	you	can	live	on	the	interest.	Inequality	“has	become	an	issue,”	particularly	in	the	U.S.,	but	“it’s	not	as	big	an	issue	here.	[.	.	.]	There’s	concern	for	the	poor”	and	“what	to	do	with	the	homeless”	but	we	do	not	often	hear	about	CEOs’	pay.			 One	mainstream	economist	said:			 I’m	not	worried	about	the	1%	too	much,	if	a	few	bankers	get	rich.	My	Dean	here	[redacted],	former	Dean,	he	gets	on	his	high	horse	about	that.	But	that’s	not	the																																																									204	He	made	the	interesting	point	that	all	of	the	“lightning-rod”	issues	in	U.S.	politics	–	education,	healthcare,	immigration,	gay	marriage,	and	abortion,	are	all	“non-issues”	here;	Liberals	may	advocate	for	a	slightly	more	expansive	social	policy,	for	example,	but	all	of	the	main	political	parties	essentially	agree	on	these	topics.	
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big	social	problem.	It’s	that	there	are	no	good	institutions	to	weigh	against	increasing	income	inequality.			This	conversant	went	on	to	say,	however,	that	“I	honestly	think	that	income	inequality	is	corrosive”	and	that	Piketty’s	theory205	is	“legitimate,	defensible	–	it	makes	a	lot	of	sense.”		 One	mainstream	professor	seemed	discomfited	when	asked	whether	inequality	concerned	him,	responding,	“Yeah,	it	does.	[long	pause]	I’m	not	sure	why,	but	partly	.	.	.	I	guess	the	source	of	my	discomfort	is	we’re	all	in	this	together,	as	Red	Green206	says,”	and	that	people	become	disengaged	if	they	see	that	kind	of	wealth;	they	“won’t	see	that	the	free	market	system	works	for	them”	and	will	start	voting	for	a	party	that	promises	to	“dismantle	capitalism.”	I	asked	whether	he	would	still	have	a	problem	with	inequality	were	that	not	a	risk;	he	said	that	he	did	not	mind	high	earned	income,	but	“I	believe	we	should	have	a	progressive	taxation	that	takes	more	from	the	rich	than	it	takes	from	the	poor.	And	we	have	that.	We	have	a	large	redistribution.	The	richest	people	in	Canada	pay	80%	of	taxes.”207	When	asked	whether	he	would	change	Alberta’s	flat	tax,	and	he	said,	“Yeah,	probably.	But	it’s	not	a	big	deal”	because	of	the	exemption	of	$15,000,	“but	I	would	make	it	more	progressive	than	it	is.”	When	I	asked	whether	he	thought	he	was	alone	among	Albertan	economists	in	thinking	that,	he	laughed,	“No.	Jack	[Mintz]	wouldn’t	like	it,”	although	the	tax	has	attracted	a	lot	of	rich	people,	so	there	is	a	danger	there.	However,	he	said,	gesturing	upwards,	“The	1%	has	gone	like	this,	and	even	scarier	is	the	0.1%.”		 Responses	from	the	bank	chief	economists	were	particularly	interesting	because	they	are	frequently	exposed	to	the	1%	as	high-level	employees	of	institutions	that	serve	this	group	and	have	its	constituents	as	top	executives.	One	chief	economist	had	clearly	given	the	issue	some	thought	and	had	developed	great	concern	for,	and	knowledge	of,	segments	of	the	population	that	live	in	poverty;	yet	he	shied	away	from	discussions	of	inequality	itself:		 So-called	inequality	–	I	like	to	look	at	it	in	its	pieces.	I	say	if	you’re	a	single	mother	with	a	gross	income	of	$24,000,	your	biggest	problem	is	not	your	next-door	neighbour	who	makes	a	million	dollars	–	perceptions	of	welfare	are																																																									205	Notably,	he	thought	Piketty’s	thesis	had	gained	authority	in	part	due	to	his	collaboration	with	Tony	Atkinson	in	the	UK.	206	A	comedic	Canadian	television	personality.	207	He	thought	it	was	a	problem	that	many	people	pay	no	taxes	at	all,	because	“you	don’t	have	a	dog	in	the	fight,”	and	even	a	small	minimum	tax	would	communicate	that	“you’re	not	just	a	poor	person,	you’re	still	contributing	to	society.”	
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relative	to	a	degree,	I	get	that;	thanks	to	the	economics	of	happiness	we	have	series	that	show	that	–	but	your	biggest	problem	is	you’ve	got	$24,000	and	you’ve	got	3	hungry	kids.	So	I	think	we	gloss	over	the	real	problems	by	totally	looking	at	it	in	the	relative	context	we	do.	And	I	don’t	like	looking	at	it	as	a	zero-sum	game,	that	we	have	to	take	something	away	from	the	millionaire	to	give	to	somebody	else.			In	Canada,	he	continued,	“who’s	poor?	There’s	three	main	camps”:	single	mothers,208	recent	immigrants,209	and	the	indigenous	population,	and	we	are	not	going	to	solve	these	issues	by	thinking	of	them	as	relative,	as	opposed	to	absolute,	problems.	When	I	enquired	as	to	what	he	thought	of	the	current	level	of	inequality	in	Canada,	he	said:		 I	don’t	even	like	to	think	of	it	that	way.	I	don’t	know	what	the	right	level	is.	I	think	a	lot	of	executive	compensation	is	excessive,	but	only	excessive	when	it’s	not	tied	to	performance,	so	that	would	tend	to	lower	it	[.	.	.]	and	we	have	way	too	many	poor	people,	that	would	reduce	inequality,	but	I	tend	to	look	at	it	as	the	pieces.			 A	fellow	bank	chief	economist	called	Piketty’s	book	an	“amazing	piece	of	work”	but	noted	the	criticisms,	one	being	that	within	countries	inequality	is	up,	but	globally	it	is	down	–	which	“kind	of	goes	against	his	theory.”	Yet	“it’s	very	obvious	that	there	are	winners	and	losers	in	free	trade”	and	“even	Ricardo	says	you	have	to	compensate	the	losers.”	He	was	in	favour	of	consumption	taxes,	luxury	taxes,210	and	land	transfer	houses	on	high-end	homes,211	but	felt	income	inequality	was	“a	little	bit	overblown.”	The	Gini	coefficient	in	Canada	is	not	so	bad,	he	said.	It	is	worse	in	the	U.S.,	in	part	because	of	the	financial	crisis;	quantitative	easing	benefited	investors	–	“a	pretty	small	price	to	pay,”	but	it	did	cause	some	wealth	inequality.	When	asked	whether	inequality	was	too	high	in	the	U.S.,	he	said:	“People	take	chances	and	they’re	rewarded	hugely.	But	unfortunately,	of	course,	on	the	downside	you	do	have	a	much	bigger	underclass	in	the	U.S.	than	you	do	in	almost	any	other	industrialised	economy.”	Although	he	said	he	was	biased,	“I	think	it’s	about	right	in	Canada.”	He	went	on	to	say,	however:	“I	have	a	problem	with	cranking	personal	income	taxes”	above	50%;	“it’s	a	mistake”	as	it	disincentivises	risk-taking	and	incentivises	tax	avoidance.	He	said	it	was	better	not	to	“cut	down	the	high	poppies”	but	to	support	the	lower	end.		 His	counterpart	at	another	bank	said:																																																									208	Fully	80%	of	child	support	payments	are	in	arrears,	he	pointed	out,	and	people	are	better	off	on	welfare	than	working	for	minimum	wage.	209	Selection	and	integration	are	both	issues	for	this	group,	he	noted.	210	This	was	a	novel	suggestion	among	my	conversants.	211	“That’s	not	a	terribly	productive	activity,	so	why	not	crank	the	taxes	on	it?”	he	asked.	
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	 I	think	the	data	are	really	interesting,	and	are	telling	a	story	that’s	true.	I	think	the	evidence	is	that	in	Canada,	if	you	look	at	it	on	an	after-tax	basis	in	particular,	because	we	have	a	more	redistributive	tax	system	–	which	had	swung	around	a	little	bit,	but	which	is	now	becoming	more	redistributive	again	–	[.	.	.]	on	an	after-tax	basis	I’m	not	sure	we’ve	had	the	same	drift	toward	inequality.		He	went	on	to	question	whether	this	would	hold	true	in	the	future,	however;	“Pay	scales	at	the	top	have	exploded	relative	to	pay	scales	at	the	bottom,”	although	he	noted	that	Canada	lacked	the	proportion	of	hedge	fund	managers,	movie	stars,	and	other	groups	that	skew	the	numbers	in	the	U.S.	“I	don’t	think	you	can	perpetually	have	[increasing	inequality],”	however,	citing	critiques	of	Piketty’s	work	by	some	who	are	generally	supportive	of	his	argument.	When	asked	what	he	thought	of	inequality	in	Canada,	he	said:			 I	think	that’s	a	matter	of	taste.	I	don’t	think	an	economist	is	in	any	better	a	position	to	say	that	than	anyone	else	[.	.	.]	and	yes,	there	are	costs	of	having	higher	marginal	rates,	but	.	.	.	there’s	a	range	of	possibilities,	let’s	put	it	that	way,	that	are	not	ruinous	to	the	economy.	[.	.	.]	How	much	do	you	want	to	reward	personal	initiative,	but	also	accidents	of	birth?			When	asked	what	he	would	prefer,	he	said:			 	That’s	irrelevant.	[pause]	I	think	Canada’s	not	bad	in	that	regard,	actually.	I	think	that	we	strike	a	reasonable	balance.	Whether	it’s	perfect,	I	don’t	know.	[.	.	.]	There	are	arguments	to	be	made	that	maybe	the	tax	system	should	become	a	little	more	redistributed	if	the	income	distribution	has	become	a	little	less	equal	on	a	pre-tax	basis.	I’m	sympathetic	to	some	of	that,	but	I	think	you	have	to	be	careful	not	to	go	so	far	that	you	cause	an	exodus	of	wealthy	people	who	simply	move	to	a	jurisdiction	with	less	taxes,	for	example.				 Yet	another	bank	chief	economist	argued,	“We’re	starting	at	a	better	point”	than	the	U.S.	and	Europe,	but	“when	you	get	into	a	slower-growth	period,	distributional	issues	become	more	important”	–	along	with	environmental	issues,	which	he	saw	as	a	looming	problem	in	the	coming	years.	“Everybody	would	like	inequality	to	be	reduced	as	long	as	it	didn’t	hurt	them	–	it’s	like	green	energy.	[.	.	.]	The	real	issue	is	in	helping	people	who	are	vulnerable,	who	are	at-risk,”	whether	they	are	high-	or	low-income.	He	went	on	to	say,	“My	view	is	that	governments	get	bigger	and	not	smaller	in	the	coming	years	[.	.	.]	the	question	is,	are	they	in	your	life	efficiently	or	inefficiently?”	He	thought	public	opinion	was	fairly	clear;	if	you	asked	people	whether	they	would	prefer	widening	or	decreasing	inequality,	he	would	be	very	surprised	if	10%	of	respondents	fell	into	the	former	camp	–	probably	fewer.	When	asked	whether	
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he	would	put	himself	in	that	majority	category,	he	said,	“Absolutely.	But	the	question	is	how	you	get	there.”			 A	fourth	bank	chief	economist	said,	“I	think	it’s	an	issue	globally,”	but	that	Canada	fares	“relatively	well”	–	in	part	because	our	public	school	system	is	a	“luxury”	that	a	lot	of	other	countries	do	not	have.	He	would	like	to	raise	levels	of	wealth	for	all	and	reduce	inequality	at	the	same	time,	but	claimed	that	that	is	the	job	of	fiscal,	not	monetary,	policy	at	this	point	–	growth	is	the	solution	to	inequality.212		 The	sole	American-raised	bank	chief	economist	somewhat	dissented	from	her	peers.	She	thought	inequality	was	an	“important”	issue	and	“I’m	glad	it’s	getting	so	much	attention.	And	it	should,	because	it	biases	all	the	averages,	the	rich	are	for	sure	getting	richer,”	although	less	so	in	Canada	because	our	tax	system	is	“more	progressive.”213	She	maintained	that	education	narrows	the	gap	and	that	both	poverty	and	inequality	were	concerns,	and	worried	that	“you	become	more	unequal	in	a	knowledge	economy”	due	to	assortive	mating	and	similar	trends.	Remarkably,	she	was	the	only	bank	chief	economist	not	to	invoke	the	U.S.	as	a	comparison,	and	her	concern	over	inequality	seemed	to	outweigh	her	concerns	about	the	negative	consequences	of	redistribution.		 Still	others	pointed	to	the	U.S.	as	problematically	unequal,	while	endorsing	or	at	least	tolerating	Canada’s	status	quo.	One	Conference	Board	conversant	commented:		 It	should	always	be	something	monitored	and	of	concern.	Inequality	in	Canada	isn’t	anywhere	near	as	pronounced	as	it	is	in	the	States.	And	that’s	due	to	our	tax	system	and	a	variety	of	other	mechanisms.	[.	.	.]	Income	inequality,	if	it’s	too	extreme,	obviously,	can	have	a	real	impact,	not	only	personal,	but	societal	impact.	[.	.	.]	And	frankly,	it	limits	consumption	in	some	ways,	right?	[.	.	.]	We	should	always	be	concerned,	particularly	if	it	gets	out	of	hand,	but	we’ve	also	seen	that	if	you	work	to	get	income	inequality	down	at	the	expense	of	incentives,	that	also	has	a	very	negative	impact.		
																																																								212	Comments	such	as	these	came	up	with	some	frequency,	even	among	private	sector	economists	as	in	this	case;	as	a	group,	my	conversants	were	broadly	pro-stimulus	(loosely	Keynesian,	if	you	wish),	and	many	felt	it	was	time	for	fiscal	policy	to	step	in	where	monetary	policy	had	been	more	dominant.	213	She	did	lament	our	lack	of	billionaires,	however.	
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When	asked	about	Canada’s	current	level	of	inequality,	he	responded,	“I’m	sure	that	we	need	to	make	sure	that	we’re	taking	care	of	vulnerable	populations	and	the	like”	but	there	is	not	a	specific	right	answer.214			 A	couple	of	academics	answered	similarly.	One	said	of	Piketty’s	book	that	of	the	two	sections,	“one	is	the	more	factual	things	[.	.	.]	published	in	scientific	journals,	so	it	must	be	more	or	less	uncontroversial,”	while	the	other	part	is	“more	political,”	“more	dubious,”	and	has	been	criticised	(“it’s	not	fair,	but	.	.	.”).	He	claimed	that	Piketty	“made	a	great	contribution”	by	adding	new	data	for	the	top	income	bracket,	and	that	the	distinction	between	wealth	and	income	inequality	was	helpful	for	policy.	When	asked	whether	inequality	mattered,	he	said,	“It	does	to	the	extent	that	–	I	mean,	inequality	is	a	difficult	issue	because	it	has	really	–	some	of	it	is	good	from	an	economic	point	of	view,	because	it	gives	incentives	for	people	to	work	and	invest.	[.	.	.]	But	on	the	other	hand,	too	much	inequality”	and	especially	mobility	–	which	is	particularly	affected	by	inheritance	–	is	a	problem.	He	believed	that	with	enough	mobility	inequality	would	sort	itself	out,	although	too	much	“is	definitely	dangerous	and	bad.”	When	asked	what	he	thought	of	Canada,	he	felt	the	“current	situation	is	okay,”	but	with	a	great	deal	of	hesitation	and	some	critical	commentary	on	Québec.				 One	of	this	professor’s	colleagues	replied,	when	asked	whether	he	worried	about	inequality,	“Sure.	It’s	part	of	my	research	too.”	A	dollar	for	a	poor	person	“generates	more	utility”	and	there	is	the	“social	insurance”	argument,	which	says	that	redistribution	helps	to	balance	out	good	and	bad	fortune.	Yet,	“some	reasons	why	there’s	inequality	are	good,	and	that’s	just	the	way	things	work,”	he	said,	pointing	to	incentives	to	innovate	and	take	risks;	we	must	find	the	“optimal	level	of	tax	progressivity.”	When	asked	whether	inequality	was	too	high	in	Canada,	he	again	invoked	the	U.S.	example,	saying	inequality	had	risen	in	Canada	but	not	as	much	as	it	had	there	–	and	some	of	this	increase	is	beneficial,	as	we	may	be	more	efficient	due	to	the	use	of	computers	and	the	like;	“I	don’t	know	if	it’s	too	much.”215																																																										214	He	proceeded	to	direct	me	to	the	records	of	a	parliamentary	committee	on	the	topic,	as	there	is	a	statement	from	the	Conference	Board	in	there,	but	would	not	provide	a	direct	answer.	215	Regarding	Piketty’s	work,	this	conversant	remarked	that	although	the	first	part	of	his	book	is	“important,	and	widely	recognised	as	being	important,”	the	second	part	is	more	“interpreting”	and	“forecasting;”	most	academic	economists	would	not	put	much	weight	on	his	predictions,	such	as	that	inequality	will	continue	to	“explode.”	He	maintained	that	most	of	the	more	“damning”	critiques	of	Piketty’s	works	were	from	people	who	agree	with	him,	not	“conservative	zealots,”	although	his	overall	assessment	of	Piketty’s	work	was	positive.	
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	 Another	mainstream	academic	opined,	“Economists	have	never	had	much	to	say	about	inequality,	and	what	to	do	about	it.	And	there’s	a	reason	for	that	–	their	tools	are	not	political,	or	values-based.	[.	.	.]	Economics	has	always	said:	we’re	not	about	values.	We	take	them	as	given.”216	When	asked	whether	inequality	concerned	her,	she	said,	“Of	course.	Inequality	of	opportunity	is	a	bigger	concern.”	When	asked	whether	Canada’s	current	level	of	inequality	was	too	high,	she	said	drily,	“Given	the	taxes	I	pay,	I	doubt	it.	[.	.	.]	Canada	–	I	think	it’s	done	a	pretty	good	job	on	opportunity.	And	then	you	have	to	redistribute.	And	it’s	done	quite	a	job	compared	to	the	United	States	on	redistribution.	But	it	hasn’t	solved	the	problem.”	When	asked	how	we	might	solve	the	problem,	she	said,	“It’ll	always	be	with	us;”	the	only	place	she	had	seen	equality	was	in	pre-reform	China,	where	there	was	“equality	in	poverty.”		 A	fellow	mainstream	economist	had	studied	top	income	taxation	and	social	insurance.	His	research	on	self-employment	examined	whether	the	fact	that	good	and	bad	years	will	be	taxed	differently	affects	whether	people	choose	to	become	self-employed,	and	he	found	“little	effect.”	Similarly,	he	said,	evidence	shows	that	“people	are	not	very	sensitive	to	income	tax	rates,”	which	does	not	mean	you	can	do	anything	in	that	regard,	but	small	changes	will	not	make	much	difference.	His	comment	on	this	was	remarkable:		 	A	lot	of	economists	seem	to	think	there’s	a	big	impact,	even	though	there	are	no	studies	to	support	it.	So	that	seems	to	be	very	ideological,	and	that	seems	to	be	quite	American,	actually;	a	lot	of	American	economists	tend	to	put	that	slant	on	it.	And	it	seems	to	be	just	a	belief	they	have	–	people	must	be	responding	to	this,	even	if	they	can’t	find	it	in	the	data.			This	conversant’s	work	showed	that	the	top	tax	rate	has	fallen	almost	everywhere	since	the	1960s,	yet	“I	don’t	think	that	raising	the	top	tax	rate	would	have	much	of	an	impact	on	anything,	other	than	collecting	more	tax	revenues.	[.	.	.]	It’s	not	the	high	tax	rates	that	are	encouraging	people	to	work	less;	it’s	the	generous	retirement	packages.”	He	went	on	to	critique	the	work	of	economists	who	say	otherwise;	“they	seem	to	want	to	think	that	high	taxes	are	bad,	and	they	spin	the	arguments	to	make	it	
																																																								216	She	said	of	Piketty,	“It’s	good	that	he	can	write	well,	and	it’s	phenomenal,	his	timing.”	However,	“it’s	not	totally	thought-through.	He	recognised	that	himself,	and	he’s	done	a	public	service	by	making	all	his	data	publicly	available.”		
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work.”	Just	to	clarify,	I	asked	whether	he	was	in	favour	of	increasing	the	top	tax	rate.	He	said,	“Yes,	I	would,”217	contending:			 I	think	there	is	a	lot	of	danger	in	the	really	extreme	high-end	–	the	fact	that	top	incomes	and	top	wealth	distributions	are	so	concentrated	now.	That	could	have	implications	for	social	cohesion;	it	could	have	implications	for	the	distance	–	not	so	much	in	Canada,	but	Washington	–	has	from	ordinary	people.		He	went	on	to	cite	a	paper	arguing	that	inequality	was	a	“threat	to	social	solidarity”218	and	brought	up	the	sociological	concept	of	anomie,	the	gap	between	expectations	and	reality,	and	its	links	to	the	rise	of	populism.	Yet	he	finished	by	saying,	“So	yeah,	[inequality	is]	something	to	be	concerned	about,	but	it’s	not	something	I	worry	about	on	a	daily	basis.”		 A	second	Conference	Board	conversant	seemed	deeply	concerned	about	inequality.	He	began,	“I’m	not	at	all	surprised	to	see	that	there	is	a	shift	towards	owners	of	capital	and	people	with	a	big	stock	of	capital	making	gains	over	time,	but	even	if	it’s	true,	it’s	hard	to	fix,”	and	asserted	that	Canada’s	inequality	had	levelled	off	since	the	mid-1990s.	But	when	I	asked	him	whether	income	inequality	concerned	him,	he	said:			 	Oh,	always,	always.	One	of	the	ways	to	make	a	stronger	society	is	to	raise	the	poorest,	raise	the	productivity	of	the	poorest,	find	ways	to	make	them	feel	that	they	can	flow	into	the	workforce.	And	it’s	a	destabiliser.	If	you	don’t	do	that,	you	end	up	hiring	police	and	putting	up	walls,	which	has	been	the	American	solution.		When	I	asked	whether	his	concern	was	more	about	poverty	or	inequality	itself,	he	said,	“Certainly	for	me,	raising	the	floor	is	the	starting	point,”	and	volunteered	that	we	need	a	guaranteed	annual	income.	When	asked	whether	the	level	of	inequality	in	Canada	was	acceptable	currently,	he	said,	“It’s	probably	a	little	bit	higher	than	ideal.	But	I	would	really	focus	more	on	inter-generational	mobility.	[.	.	.]	And	that’s	why	our	research	always	focuses	on	as	strong	a	public	education	system	as	possible,	where	
																																																								217	It	is	worth	noting	that	this	conversant	had	conducted	research	for	the	right-wing	Fraser	Institute	in	the	past,	yet	he	was	one	of	few	conversants	to	state	an	explicit	preference	for	raising	taxes	on	the	top	income	bracket.	218	He	also	mentioned	an	article	that	describes	the	advent	of	advertisements	for	products	no	one	can	afford,	but	whose	purpose	is	to	boost	the	status	of	the	few	who	can	buy	them.	
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Canada	actually	gets	pretty	high	grades.	K	to	12,219	we’re	among	the	best	in	the	world,”	while	in	post-secondary	we	are	“much	more	fragmented.”	He	brought	up	Québec’s	subsidisation	of	private	schools,	on	which	I	inquired	as	to	his	view,	and	he	said,	“Well,	I	have	no	philosophical	opposition	to	this.	I	think	choice	is	good,	fundamentally.	But	at	the	end	of	the	day,	the	state	funding	public	education	is	the	anchor	in	our	system.	[.	.	.]	I	say	over	and	over	again	–	any	government	that	actually	cuts	its	per-capita	funding	for	public	education	is	insane.	That’s	our	future	as	a	country.”			 The	theme	of	education	as	a	protective	element	against	inequality	was	a	common	one,	particularly	among	a	small	number	of	left-wing	conversants,	but	even	more	so	among	centre	or	centre-right	conversants	who	may	have	preferred	education	to	outright	redistribution.	That	said,	many	conversants	acknowledged	the	need	for	both,	and	healthcare	and	education	both	emerged	as	points	of	pride	in	Canada’s	status	quo,	especially	relative	to	the	stratified	nature	of	those	two	institutions	in	the	U.S.		 A	preponderant	number	of	conversants	contrasted	Canada	with	the	U.S.	in	other	ways	as	well.	One	IRPP	informant	said	we	have	reached	“peak	Piketty”	and	that	inequality	was	a	salient	issue	because	of	public	sentiment	in	the	U.S.,	where	it	was	more	concerning	than	in	Canada.	Yet,	“I	think	the	public	is	right	to	be	worried.	[.	.	.]	The	fact	that	we	have	those	gaps	in	societies	is	problematic,”	although	he	believed	it	was	unwise	to	go	to	the	other	extreme.	That	said,	“We’ve	reached	a	status	quo	system	where	the	distribution	of	income	in	Canada	I	think	is	–	is	and	should	be	–	viewed	as	an	unjust,	offensive	outcome,	and	there	should	be	some	serious	consideration	of	what	kind	of	policies	could	mitigate	that.”		 Both	journalists	concurred.	One	said,	“In	a	lot	of	ways	the	debate	in	Canada	is	seeded	by	the	U.S.,”	where	this	is	more	of	an	issue,	but	that	former	Prime	Minister	Harper’s	policies	could	worsen	the	situation	in	Canada.	“One	of	the	things	that	goes	into	the	Canadian	identity	is	that	it’s	a	more	egalitarian	society,	and	the	less	egalitarian	we	are	.	.	.”	she	trailed	off.	“It’s	nearing	a	danger	point	for	Canada	too.”		 This	was	the	view	of	a	majority	of	mainstream	academic	economists	and	all	heterodox	and	PEF-affiliated	economists	I	spoke	with.	One	mainstream	economist,	when	asked	whether	Canada	was	too	unequal,	said,	“I	would	say	so,	yeah.	We’re	back																																																									219	Kindergarten	to	Grade	12,	or	the	beginning	of	primary	school	to	the	end	of	secondary	school.	
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to	where	we	were	in	the	early	1900s.”	He	described	differential	impacts,	highlighting	the	decline	in	poverty	among	the	elderly,	which	“was	probably	the	poorest	group	in	society,”	and	the	significant	levels	of	poverty	that	persist	among	Aboriginal	communities	and	immigrants	–	the	latter	group,	though	better-educated,	encountering	more	barriers	in	the	job	market.	Furthermore,	he	pointed	out,	almost	all	growth	since	the	1980s	has	gone	to	the	top	10%;	“I	think	that’s	a	really	serious	problem”	revealing	inequality	itself	as	unfair.	“Most	economists	look	for	ways	society	can	make	itself	better-off,	use	its	resources	more	efficiently.	[.	.	.]	But	if	all	the	benefit	goes	to	people	at	the	top,	is	it	really	worth	doing?”	He	said	that	the	increase	in	wealth	at	the	top	is	“not	because	the	people	who	are	getting	the	higher	incomes	in	some	sense	deserve	it	because	of	the	special	skills	they	have,	they’re	just	in	a	position	to	reap	the	rewards	of	gains	in	income.”	He	viewed	this	as	a	“question	of	basic	equity	or	fairness”	and	that	inequality	also	“raises	concerns”	about	political	influence.		 A	left-leaning	mainstream	economist,	who	did	not	seem	to	have	a	problem	with	private	schooling	(despite	supporting	public	education)	and	who	advocated	for	working	conditions	on	welfare	grants,	nevertheless	had	strong	views	on	inequality.	He	said	Piketty’s	“basic	conclusions	are	unassailable,”	and	that	his	point	was	that	“what’s	normal	is	capitalists	run	the	world,	and	we	got	our	intuition	about	normality	from	the	40	years	following	the	enormous	dual	catastrophes	of	the	Depression	and	World	War	II.”	However,	“his	policy	prescriptions	are	a	bit	stupid.	[.	.	.]	Because	he	doesn’t	know	any	macro.	[.	.	.]	You	look	through	his	book	for	a	macro	model,	and	you	kind	of	wish	there	was	one	–	but	there	isn’t.	That’s	kind	of	a	problem,	since	this	is	a	macroeconomic	problem.”220	His	solutions	included	education,	skills	training	for	low-skilled	labour,221	strengthened	unions,	and	changes	in	corporate	law	to	empower	shareholders.	He	continued:		 Lots	of	economists	don’t	mind	maximising	total	income.	Although	less	so	now,	because	it’s	so	obvious	that	it’s	stupid.	If	you	maximise	total	income,	you	just	make	Adelson	richer.	Who	cares	if	Adelson	is	richer?	What	did	that	accomplish?	[.	.	.]	Once	you	get	rich,	the	money	is	in	large	measure	a	scorecard.			He	went	on	to	make	a	cultural	point;	“It’s	easier	to	get	worked	up	about	poverty,”	but	the	question	is,	“What	kind	of	society	would	you	have	more	fun	living	in?[.	.	.]	Our	sense	of	community	and	cohesion	is	connected	with	inequality.”																																																										220	Interestingly,	this	conversant	did	not	want	to	be	quoted	critiquing	Piketty.	221	He	cited	Germany	as	a	country	that	does	this	well.	
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	 A	fellow	mainstream	economist	elaborated:	“I	think	where	you	have	a	lot	of	inequality	you	start	having	social	class	divisions	and	inequality	of	opportunity,	and	that’s	kind	of	toxic,”	referring	to	academic	literature	suggesting	that	“we’re	social	animals”	who	“like	to	get	along	with	other	people,	and	trust	other	people,	and	hang	out	with	other	people,	and	where	you	have	a	lot	of	inequality	it	seems	difficult	to	have	that.”	As	for	whether	income	inequality	was	too	high	in	Canada,	the	response	was	instantaneous:	“I	would	say	it	is.”		 Another	mainstream	economist	returned	to	the	point	about	culture.	When	asked	whether	inequality	bothered	him,	he	responded,	“Yes,	because	it’s	part	of	something	bigger.	[.	.	.]	When	I	study	institutional	structures	[.	.	.]	the	ones	that	work	all	have	less	income	inequality.”	This	needs	to	be	part	of	a	cultural	shift,	however;	you	cannot	just	take	away	people’s	wealth	–	there	has	to	be	“a	sense	of	sharing;”	part	of	inequality	is	driven	by	land	prices	and	earned	income,	but	bad	policy	and	the	culture	of	the	finance	industry	share	some	blame	as	well.	“A	good	social	context	is	one	where	there’s	inherent	equality,”	he	said;	“it’s	a	consequence,	not	a	cause,”	and	therefore	the	debate	in	this	area	is	too	narrow.			 Other	mainstream	economists	had	a	more	straightforward	response.	One	replied,	when	asked	if	inequality	is	a	problem:			 Yeah,	oh,	absolutely,	it’s	enormous.	And	you	can’t	get	away	from	the	fact	of	the	unbelievable	excess	of	money	that	the	people	at	the	top	have.	They	have	way	more	money	than	anybody	could	possibly	need.	And	way	more	money	than	they	need	for	any	realistic	incentive.	The	story	is	that	they’re	earning	it	because	they’re	productive,	and	they	need	to	be	given	incentives	to	keep	on	being	productive.	But	this	is	nonsense.	It’s	absolute	nonsense.			He	went	on	to	say,	“Certainly	perfect	equality	is	no	good,	because	then	everyone	is	equally	poor,”	and	that	the	former	USSR	declined	because	of	corruption	and	inequality	–	but	relative	status	does	matter.	What	does	not	matter	is	what	the	“top	guy”	makes	and	“it	makes	no	difference	to	his	welfare,	absolutely	none.	And	if	it	does,	it’s	not	something	I	give	any	moral	weight	to.”	We	should	not	confiscate	it	all,	because	that	“leads	to	bad	behaviour	on	the	part	of	those	individuals,”	but	there	should	be	some	redistribution.	The	poverty	floor	is	probably	more	important,	but	inequality	matters	too,	“and	it	matters	to	people”	–	although	not	so	much	to	him,	he	says!	In	the	U.S.,	the	Chicago	School	economists	and	others	are	“stunningly	smart	[.	.	.]	but	they	have	a	core	belief	in	economic	efficiency	and	a	core	belief	that	distribution	doesn’t	
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matter,”222	despite	evidence	of	obvious	–	and	worsening	–	societal	problems	flowing	from	inequality.	Thus	although	there	have	been	criticisms	of	Piketty’s	book,	it	was	“very	very	well-received.”		 Another	mainstream	economist,	asked	whether	he	was	concerned	about	inequality,	responded	firmly:	“Yes.	Always	have	been.”	When	asked	whether	he	felt	this	way	even	aside	from	the	issue	of	poverty,	he	said,	“Yes,	I	just	have	a	general	concern	about	income	inequality	that’s	not	just	related	to	poverty.”	He	explained:			 Economists	all	believe	in	efficiency,	so	most	of	the	economists	who	are	concerned	about	income	distribution	would	say	it’s	just	an	inefficient	use	of	resources.	A	dollar	is	worth	much	less	to	Bill	Gates	than	to	a	homeless	person.	If	you	think	in	utilitarian	terms,	how	are	you	going	to	create	more	human	welfare?	Well,	one	way	you	could	do	it	is	to	have	a	more	equal	distribution	of	income.	[.	.	.]	In	strict	economic	theory,	we	don’t	believe	in	utilitarianism,	but	here	we’re	talking	about	your	attitude	as	a	citizen,	really,	rather	than	some	kind	of	a	scientist.	So	I	feel	free	to	bring	those	judgements	into	play.				I	asked	whether	he	thought	Canada	had	a	problem	with	inequality	at	present.	Nodding,	he	said,	“Yeah.	Yeah.	And	it’s	partly	a	general	issue	but	it’s	also	related	to	specific	sub-groups	of	the	population.	So	the	problem	of	Aboriginal	poverty	is	incredible.”223	When	asked	what	solutions	he	would	recommend,	he	said	that	nothing	was	really	possible	with	the	current	government,224	so	he	did	not	tend	to	think	about	policy	prescriptions.225	This	professor	was	most	concerned	about	Aboriginal	poverty,	a	difficult	problem	to	solve,	but	to	start	with	“we	need	to	provide	more.	[.	.	.]	Ramp	it	up	a	bit.”	When	I	asked	where	the	revenue	should	come	from,	he	surprised	me	by	saying,	“Well,	I	think	we	could	afford	to	increase	corporate	tax	–	we	could	afford	to	
																																																								222	He	also	claimed	that	they	tend	not	to	believe	in	a	minimum	wage.	“I	think	the	argument	that	it	causes	unemployment	is	overblown,”	he	said;	“minimum	wage	definitely	hurts	people	like	Sam	Walton.”	223	He	also	echoed	another	conversant’s	earlier	point,	which	was	that	people	would	have	thought	of	the	elderly	if	you	mentioned	poverty	50	years	ago,	“but	we’ve	dealt	with	that	problem”	and	Canada	has	been	one	of	the	best	at	doing	so;	we	have	also	done	a	fairly	good	job	with	young	families	with	children,	he	said.	224	Stephen	Harper’s	Conservatives	at	the	time.	225	He	went	on	to	remark,	“although,	the	Liberals	were	not	that	incredibly	generous	themselves.	We	shouldn’t	forget	that	Paul	Martin	was	the	person	who	wrestled	the	deficit	to	the	ground	in	Canada,	and	he	did	it	by	a	lot	of	cuts.”	
	 197	
increase	lots	of	different	taxes.	Taxes	have	been	cut	over	and	over	again	in	Canada	over	the	last	25	years.”226			 Another	professor	shared	the	sentiment	about	inequality,	but	rejected	the	notion	of	taxing	high-earners:		 [Inequality]	is	something	that	worries	me,	kind	of	at	an	intuitive	level	more	than	at	a	deeply	analytical	level.	I	dislike	the	idea	that	the	upper	1%	is	in	a	different	world	than	the	rest	of	the	99,	or	55	of	the	99,	that	their	kids	are	in	different	schools,	and	they	take	different	airplanes,	and	they	go	to	different	clubs	and	they	shop	in	different	stores,	and	they’re	just	–	they’re	not	part	of	the	project,	the	overall	community	project.	I	could	probably	be	told	that	there’s	no	evidence	for	what	I	just	said.	But	intuitively	I	kind	of	feel	that.	[.	.	.	But]	if	you’ve	got	market-driven	inequality,	if	something	is	going	on	in	the	market	that’s	just	skewing	stuff	to	the	upper	1%,	or	half	of	one	percent,	or	tenth	of	one	percent,	you	can	feel	better	by	putting	a	tax	on	the	upper	one	percent,	but	it’s	not	fundamentally	going	to	change	the	story.			When	asked	about	poverty	relative	to	inequality,	he	said,	“I’m	more	concerned	about	the	floor	than	inequality,	for	sure,”	and	the	stagnation	of	the	bottom	50%	in	the	last	30	years	“absolutely	concerns	me.	[.	.	.]	But	inequality	does	concern	me	as	well,	just	because	I	have	this	romantic	notion,	I	suppose,	of	community.	[.	.	.]	It’s	a	very	fuzzy,	imprecise	thing,	and	I	fully	admit	that,”	he	said,	seemingly	chagrined.			 Interestingly,	this	professor	made	one	of	several	links	between	Piketty’s	work	and	the	Occupy	Movement:			 	To	me	it’s	actually	fascinating.	So	we’ve	got	lots	of	stories	in	the	last	ten	years	about	income	inequality,	right?	It	really	became	prominent	with	the	Occupy	Movement,	and	I	think	quite	rightly	so.	[.	.	.]	It’s	the	first	time	I’ve	heard	a	coherent	–	I	mean	logically	coherent	–	discussion	of	income	inequality	that	really	comes	down	to	macro	forces.	[.	.	.]	I	just	thought	that	[R	is	greater	than	G]	was	a	very	powerful	insight.	[.	.	.]	It’s	a	very	basic	story	in	a	lot	of	ways,	yet	it’s	one	I	hadn’t	heard	before.				 Another	mainstream	professor	made	the	Occupy	Wall	Street	connection	as	well:	“If	he	hadn’t	written	that	book,	the	Occupy	Wall	Street	movement	probably	would	have	just	collapsed	and	people	would	have	forgotten	it.”	He	echoed	the	near-unanimous	view	among	my	conversants	–	that	the	first	part	of	the	book	is	data-focused,	and	despite	some	criticisms	“on	the	whole,	I	think	the	consensus	is	that’s	a	magnificent	piece	of	work	and	really	advances	our	knowledge	a	great	deal	in	that																																																									226	Along	with	eight	other	conversants,	he	specifically	lamented	the	Harper	government’s	cut	to	the	Goods	and	Services	Tax	(GST),	which	was	“a	pretty	painless	way”	of	raising	revenue.	
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whole	area,”	while	the	second	part	is	“more	contentious”	and	“can	be	downright	misleading”	because	of	“the	assumptions	he’s	quietly	built	in.”	The	idea	of	the	first	and	second	“theory	of	capitalism”	is	“value-loaded”	and	the	term	itself	is	“Marxian.”	Furthermore,	he	pointed	out,	the	last	period	of	great	inequality	was	followed	by	massive	redistribution	as	the	rules	changed,	resulting	in	a	great	socioeconomic	shift,	so	“if	you	take	a	political	economy	perspective	on	these	things	it’s	unreasonably	simplistic	[.	.	.]	to	think	there	won’t	be	a	political	economy	response”	to	growing	inequality.227	The	third	part	of	the	book,	comprising	chapters	on	policy,	“was	not	well-received,”	he	said,	and	“shows	his	socialist	inclinations”	as	well	as	the	impracticality	of	many	of	his	policy	prescriptions.	But	overall	he	clearly	valued	the	book,	and	when	asked	whether	he	was	concerned	about	inequality,	he	said,	“Oh,	sure.	[.	.	.]	Both	from	a	normative	–	sense	of	fairness”	perspective	but	also	in	terms	of	the	distribution	of	health	and	opportunity:	“I	think	it’s	quite	unacceptable	that	a	poor	person	–	for	no	other	reason	than	the	family	they	were	born	into	–	faces	a	much-stunted	set	of	opportunities	than	a	rich	person.	That	strikes	me	as	quite	unfair,”	and	society	could	miss	out	on	future	Mozarts	this	way.	He	went	on	to	discuss	the	ways	in	which	inequality	allows	elites	“to	entrench	themselves	and	their	heirs,”	and	“in	the	long	run	that	will	hobble,	or	reduce	the	success	of,	a	society.”228	He	invoked	the	contemporary	example	of	Matty	Moroun,	who	owns	the	bridge	between	Windsor	and	Detroit	and	hired	“hot-shit	lawyers”	to	delay	construction	of	a	second	bridge	for	about	20	years:			 I	didn’t	know	a	human	being	could	own	a	whole	flaming	bridge.	[.	.	.]	Here	he	is	putting	his	own	personal	interests,	of	trying	to	protect	his	private	little	monopoly	worth	millions	and	millions	of	dollars	to	him,	and	he’s	quite	prepared	to	hurt	the	livelihood,	or	economic	wellbeing,	of	millions	of	other	people.	Well,	that	comes	out	of	inequality,	not	because	of	poverty.																																																											227	This	political	economy	view	of	income	inequality	was	surprisingly	rare,	even	though	several	conversants	referred	to	the	sharp	decrease	in	inequality	that	followed	the	turbulence	of	the	Great	Depression	and	World	War	II.	Similarly,	no	one	mentioned	the	potential	for	a	political	economy	response	to	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	and	the	concomitant	possibility	of	reversing	the	current	trend	of	rising	income	inequality	through	political	action.	228	He	was	one	of	few	conversants	to	use	a	historical	example	–	that	of	Venice,	where	initially	“the	politics	were	much	more	egalitarian	than	the	norms	of	the	time”	and	they	invented	the	joint-stock	company	because	that	helped	investors	share	risk	in	the	shipping	industry,	but	eventually	the	wealthiest	families	kicked	away	the	ladder	and	the	city	stagnated;	inequality	causes	this	sort	of	thing,	he	said.	
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When	asked	whether	he	thought	his	views	were	common	among	economists,	this	professor	said,	“I	think	in	Canada	there	is	a	consensus	on	the	points	I’ve	been	making.	This	is	far	less	so	in	the	States,”	where	“there	are	a	lot	of	people	who	believe	in	a	wide-open	market	and	.	.	.	let	it	behave	as	it	does.	And	however	it	behaves,	it	must	be	efficient.”			 This	had	been	the	sort	of	response	I	had	been	expecting	from	heterodox	and	PEF-affiliated	economists,	but	there	was	widespread	concern,	even	indignation,	about	inequality	among	the	majority	of	my	conversants.	No	progressive	economists	took	the	contrary	view,	however;	as	one	heterodox	professor	said,	“I’m	not	on	the	poor	street.	I’m	okay.	But	I	have	a	problem	with	[inequality]	from	a	policy	perspective,	from	an	economics	perspective.	I	think	it	can	represent	a	very	dangerous	–	it’s	a	powder	keg.	That’s	what	inequality	is	–	it’s	a	powder	keg,”	going	on	to	say	that	inequality	was	too	high	in	Canada.	He,	too,	invoked	Occupy	Wall	Street:		 If	you	talked	about	inequality	ten	years	ago,	you	were	crazy,	you	were	a	Marxist.	Now	inequality	has	come	into	the	mainstream.	I	think	two	things	happened:	the	social	movement	of	Occupy,	that	sort	of	put	a	human	face	on	it,	and	a	bunch	of	people	were	always	doing	work	on	inequality.	But	then	the	book	by	Thomas	Piketty229	[.	.	.]	Now	people	are	very	aware	of	CEOs,	and	bonuses,	and	it’s	being	covered	in	newspapers	.	.	.	I	think	that’s	a	good	thing.230	[.	.	.]	I’ve	always	said	that	the	greatest	triumph	of	the	right	is	[the	idea]	that	deficits	are	bad.	And	I	think	the	greatest	triumph	of	the	left,	still	in	the	making,	is	this	idea	of	inequality.			 A	CCPA	economist	also	emphasised	the	Occupy	connection,	saying,	“This	is	all	about	Occupy;”	there	had	been	plenty	of	papers	about	inequality	for	30	years,	but	without	Occupy	Wall	Street	Piketty’s	book	would	not	have	been	noticed.	He	agreed	that	inequality	in	Canada	was	too	high,	and	as	policy	prescriptions	he	recommended	higher	taxes,	capital	gains	taxes,231	and	a	renewal	of	the	union	movement.232	He	also	made	the	point	that	there	is	less	pre-tax	inequality	within	a	high-tax	regime	because																																																									229	He	had	several	critiques	of	Piketty’s	work	–	“Oh,	I	have	lots	of	criticism”	–	but	agreed	with	the	bulk	of	his	academic	colleagues	that	it	was	a	“wonderful	dataset”	and	“it’s	given	people	a	glimpse	of	the	extent	of	inequality.”	230	He	gave	the	example	of	the	Tim	Horton’s	CEO	opposing	a	$15	minimum	wage	and	the	ensuing	criticisms	of	his	level	of	compensation.	231	He	pointed	out	that	long-	and	short-term	capital	are	taxed	differently	in	some	countries	(inflation	is	taken	into	account,	in	other	words),	so	there	is	no	need	to	tax	capital	gains	at	50%	as	is	the	case	in	Canada.	232	“That’s	why	the	middle	class	exists,”	he	said,	but	unions	are	now	mostly	public	sector	organisations	in	Canada;	new	companies	are	not	unionising	and	thus	the	overall	rate	of	unionisation	is	decreasing.	
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the	CEO	will	ask	for	a	golf	membership	instead	of	the	higher	wages	s/he	knows	will	be	taxed	away	anyway.		 The	other	conversant	to	invoke	Occupy	Wall	Street	was	a	COMER	member	who	had	invited	Occupy	protesters	to	camp	in	her	yard	for	several	weeks	after	they	were	evicted	from	a	Toronto	park.	She	said,	“To	me,	poverty	is	a	problem.	To	me,	social	injustice	is	a	problem.”	A	fellow	COMER	member	concurred;	inequality	is	“proof	that	the	system	has	failed,”	and	she	opposed	“such	gross	inequality,	because	it	speaks	of	injustice	and	somebody	exploiting	somebody	else.”	Yet	another	COMER	member	connected	inequality	with	the	aims	of	COMER:	“Income	inequality	is	adversely	affected	by	austerity,	and	vice	versa.	And	the	austerity	is	because	mainstream	people	won’t	recognise	–	or	refuse	to	recognise	–	or	just	cannot	believe	that	money	can	be	created	out	of	nowhere	and	spent	into	the	economy,”	going	on	to	warn	that	the	issue	is	“getting	worse	incrementally.”		 A	PEF-affiliated	economist	agreed:		 	There’s	always	a	problem	of	inequality	under	capitalism,	but	it’s	certainly	gotten	worse	under	neoliberalism.	Piketty’s	work	has	been	taken	seriously;	he’s	gotten	a	huge	amount	of	attention,	and	rightly	so	–	he’s	been	very	careful	in	his	empirical	research	and	his	historical	work.	And	I	think	he’s	opened	up	lots	of	opportunities	for	us.	I	don’t	accept	his	ultimate	conclusions	in	terms	of	which	sorts	of	policies	are	required,	or	feasible	–	this	idea	of	a	global	wealth	tax	and	just	doing	straight	redistribution	I	don’t	think	is	feasible	for	all	kinds	of	reasons,	some	of	which	are	economic.			 Aside	from	his	use	of	the	word	“neoliberalism,”	these	views	echoed	many	of	the	earlier	comments	from	mainstream	economists.233	Two	heterodox	academic	presented	a	similar	mix	of	critiques	and	support	when	it	came	to	Piketty;	one	said	cryptically,	towards	the	end	of	our	interview	and	without	time	for	elaboration,	that	Piketty	had	made	the	same	mistake	as	Marx.	Another	heterodox	academic	economist	expounded,	“It’s	extraordinary	empirical	work,”	but	“on	the	theory	side,	he’s	much	weaker.	He’s	not	really	neoclassical,	but	he’s	relying	on	neoclassical	theory,	so	the	little	he	has	on	theory	has	been	heavily	criticised	by	my	colleagues.”	However:		 [Inequality	has]	been	an	important	issue	for	heterodox	economists	plus	a	few	mainstream	economists	from	way	in	the	past.	[.	.	.]	We	have	always	argued	that	it’s	part	of	the	explanation	of	the	crisis,	that	the	wage	share	has	been	
																																																								233	Remarkably,	almost	everyone	in	my	sample,	across	the	political	spectrum	no	less,	agreed	that	a	global	wealth	tax	would	not	be	practicable.	
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diminishing	[.	.	.]	so	the	only	way	to	keep	up	with	the	Joneses	is	to	borrow	heavily.			When	asked	whether	inequality	in	Canada	was	too	high	at	present,	he	said,	“Well,	it’s	probably	too	high.	It’s	not	as	bad	as	in	many	other	countries,”	and	we	have	welfare	programs	and	the	like,	“but	it	is	certainly	shocking	to	see	medical	doctors	earning	as	much	as	they	do;	they	are	putting	our	public	health	system	in	jeopardy.	And	of	course	it’s	shocking	to	see	how	much	money	people	in	finance	make.”234			 A	PEF-affiliated	academic	economist,	when	asked	whether	inequality	was	an	issue,	responded	simply,	“Yes,”	especially	for	rural	Aboriginal	communities,	the	inner	city,	low-income	earners,	mental	health	sufferers,	and	other	marginalised	groups;	inequality	would	be	worth	addressing	regardless,	but	these	pockets	deserve	particular	attention:	“It’s	abhorrent	that	in	an	economy	as	healthy	as	Canada’s	we	have	people	who	do	not	have	access	to	safe	water,	do	not	have	access	to	basic	food,	do	not	have	access	to	affordable	housing	–	and	let’s	throw	in	there	–	do	not	have	access	to	affordable	childcare.	[.	.	.]	Definitely	it’s	untenable.”			 This	was	the	view	of	a	CCPA	economist	who	characterised	Piketty’s	work	as	a	reprise	of	Kuznets’	ideas.235	“What	he’s	tapped	into	is	this	idea	that	the	game	is	rigged,”	with	600	pages	of	data	and	stories	to	back	it	up.236	This	economist	went	on	to	prescribe	policies	to	address	the	issue	–	affordable	housing,	childcare,	post-secondary	education,	transit,	and	clean	water:		 	De-marketise	them.	De-marketise	some	element	of	them.	[.	.	.]	It’s	a	great	leveller	to	have	these	fundamentals.	[.	.	.]	If	you	provided	those	things	at	prices	that	did	not	have	profits	built	into	them,	just	covering	the	costs	of	them,	it	would	be	great.	It	would	not	necessarily	reduce	income	inequality,	but	it	would	reduce	the	impact	of	income	inequality.			When	asked	if	it	would	be	sufficient	to	“vanquish	the	sting”	of	inequality,	as	she	phrased	it,	she	said	that	the	only	way	to	pay	for	her	policy	prescriptions	was	to	“go	where	the	money	is”	by	taxing	the	rich,	capital	gains,	inheritance,237	and	carbon.	“I																																																									234	For	example,	UOttawa	spends	$10	million	in	management	costs	for	their	pension	fund	annually	and	he	felt	he	could	do	almost	as	good	a	job	for	way	less	–	“so	that’s	part	of	the	inequality.”	235	Kuznets’	work	suggested	that	the	rising	tide	does	indeed	raise	all	boats	in	the	early	stages	of	industrialisation,	but	Piketty	and	Saez	showed	that	there	may	be	a	reversal	of	this	trend	in	its	later	stages.	236	She	did	note	that	some	of	the	best	critiques	are	from	Canada,	however,	where	wealth	is	mainly	in	real	estate	and	does	not	follow	Piketty’s	pattern.	237	$1	trillion	will	be	passed	down	in	the	next	20	years	in	Canada,	she	pointed	out.	
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actually	would	argue	we’re	going	to	have	to	raise	revenues	to	move	into	the	21st	century,”	she	said;	healthcare	and	infrastructure	will	cost	a	fortune	in	the	coming	decades.	“You’ve	got	a	major	infrastructure	deficit	and	we’re	balancing	the	books?	Who	cares?”	she	asked.		 As	it	happens,	the	overwhelming	condemnation	of	inequality	among	my	conversants	may	have	been,	in	part,	a	function	of	the	selection	of	full	professors	as	a	priority	within	my	interview	sample.	In	my	survey	of	99	academic	economists	across	the	country,	there	turned	out	to	be	a	stark	generational	divide.	Among	younger	economists	–	everyone	younger	than	the	Baby	Boomers	generation,	52	years	of	age	and	younger	–	support	for	reducing	the	level	of	income	inequality	in	Canada	decreased	sharply,	with	fully	35%	opposed	to	the	idea	of	reducing	the	level	of	inequality	in	Canada.	Among	those	aged	53	and	older,	the	vast	majority	was	in	favour	of	reducing	inequality;	only	11%	were	opposed.			 Among	survey	respondents	as	a	whole,	77%	agreed	or	agreed	with	provisos	that	“the	distribution	of	income	in	Canada	should	be	more	equal.”	Yet	the	age	differential	was	extreme	–	fully	34.6%	of	academic	economists	aged	28-40	disagreed	with	this	statement,	as	compared	to	16.7%	of	academic	economists	over	the	age	of	71.	Similarly,	29.2%	of	academic	economists	aged	41-52	disagreed,	as	did	only	13.2%	of	Baby	Boomers	(aged	53-71).	There	was	more	or	less	a	consistent	increase	in	support	for	income	equality	with	economists’	increase	in	age,	with	the	older	two	categories	so	supportive	that	they	are	off	the	charts	of	surveys	of	American	economists,	including	particularly	progressive	subsets	like	female	economists	(May	et	al.,	2014).	This	is	especially	remarkable	given	the	fact	that	income	inequality	in	Canada	is	already	significantly	lower	than	it	is	in	the	U.S.		 As	an	additional	data	point,	it	is	worth	noting	that	on	specific	measures	of	inequality	Canadian	economists	appear	to	be	even	more	the	outliers;	Canadian	academic	economists	were	significantly	more	likely	to	think	that	top	executives	were	overpaid	(81%	felt	this	way)	than	members	of	the	American	public	(66.8%),	who	were	in	turn	significantly	more	likely	to	think	so	than	American	economists	(39.39%)	(Sapienza	&	Zingales,	2013,	p.	13).	As	direct	measures	of	egalitarian	sentiment	among	Canadian	economics	professors,	these	numbers	are	truly	remarkable.				
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Tax	Evasion			 In	the	course	of	58	interviews,	I	raised	the	issue	of	tax	evasion	in	20	of	them	and	three	of	my	conversants	–	including	one	bank	chief	economist	–	brought	up	the	issue	unprompted.	I	did	not	have	time	to	ask	the	Fraser	Institute	conversants,	nor	the	C.D.	Howe	Institute	conversants,	which	may	have	affected	the	distribution	of	the	responses.	Of	those	who	answered	the	question,	however,	only	three	conversants	had	a	forgiving	attitude	towards	tax	evasion	and	all	three	were	older,	right-wing,	and,	notably,	full	professors.			 One	of	these	professors	said,	directly,	“You	can’t	blame	anyone	for	wanting	to	pay	as	little	tax	as	possible.	And	I	grew	up	in	Britain	when	the	marginal	tax	rate	was	96%.”	He	described	‘one-hit	wonders’	who	ended	up	in	bankruptcy	court,	and	others	who	moved	out	of	the	country	to	avoid	the	high	marginal	rate:	“The	problem	is	the	high	tax	rate.	[.	.	.]	There’s	a	long	literature	on	why	taxing	consumption	is	a	more	economically	efficient	and	equitable	thing	to	do.”		 The	second	professor	to	take	this	view	picked	up	on	my	language,	questioning	my	use	of	the	word	“evasion”	as	opposed	to	“avoidance,”	going	on	to	say,	“I	don’t	think	you	can	blame	them”	for	using	legal	loopholes;	“the	job	of	the	accounting	adviser	in	a	firm	would	be	to	minimise	the	tax	liabilities	of	his	or	her	company.	Why	not?”	When	I	asked	whether	legality	and	morality	line	aligned	for	him	in	this	area,	he	answered	indirectly,	saying	that	the	tax	system	is	far	too	complicated	and	that	he	would	get	rid	of	most	tax	loopholes,	especially	because	small	firms	cannot	afford	accountants	like	the	big	firms	can.	When	I	circled	back	to	the	question	of	illegal	tax	evasion,	he	said	reluctantly,	“Yeah,	I’m	not	in	favour	of	doing	things	that	are	illegal.	But	the	temptation	is	certainly	there.”	He	cited	the	high	taxation	rate	in	Québec,	saying,	“So	I	don’t	condone	it	completely,	but	I	can	kind	of	understand	why	people	look	for	opportunities	that	are	there	to	hide	things,	even	if	it’s	illegal.”		 The	third	professor	who	held	this	view	said,	baldly,	“What	creates,	of	course,	a	strong	incentive	to	use	all	that	stuff	is	a	high	marginal	rate;”	a	person	will	“have	a	much	stronger	incentive”	to	evade	high	marginal	taxes,	which	creates	a	vicious	cycle	as	evasion	decreases	tax	revenue	and	fuels	the	need	for	yet	greater	tax	increases.		 He	went	on	to	explain	that	it	is	hard	to	measure	tax	evasion.	“Revenue	Canada	comes	up	with	estimates	[.	.	.]	and	I	don’t	think	the	numbers	have	gone	up	all	that	much.	And	theory	says	that	with	reductions	in	top-end	marginal	rates	they	should	be	
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coming	down	a	bit.238	[.	.	.]	Big	increases	in	top	marginal	tax	rates?	I	think	that’s	going	to	screw	up	the	world	fairly	substantially”	and	the	money	will	go	under	ground	and	into	retirement.	In	what	I	thought	was	a	noteworthy	balance	between	acknowledging	the	role	of	society	in	individual	success	and	alluding	to	his	own	line	in	the	sand	in	terms	of	fairness,	he	went	on	to	say:			 I	think	we	should	try	to	teach	people	to	be	good	people.	If	you	become	phenomenally	wealthy	you	shouldn’t	just	get	fat;	you	should	spread	the	wealth	around	and	try	to	do	good	–	that’s	a	social	obligation	that	you	have.	And	I’m	not	opposed	to	a	progressive	income	tax,	but	a	rule	of	one	for	you,	one	for	me,	seems	to	be	a	kind	of	time-honoured	rule,	and	one	for	you,	two	for	me	just	doesn’t	–	I	understand	that	the	person	didn’t	earn	their	income	all	on	their	own,	that	there’s	a	social	structure	and	so	on,	and	it	takes	a	village,	and	Steve	Jobs	didn’t	really	do	it	all	by	himself,	but	once	you	get	two	for	me,	one	for	you,	two	for	me,	one	for	you,	I’m	very	uncomfortable	with	that.			 These	sentiments	seemed	to	be	very	much	a	minority	view,	however,	even	among	those	who	could	understand	the	temptation	to	avoid	a	very	high	tax	rate.	One	academic	and	former	Finance	Department	official,	when	asked	about	tax	havens,	said	without	hesitation,	“They	should	be	closed.	They	create	enormous	distortions.	Again,	they’re	not	about	to	go	away	–	because	we	live	in	a	Westphalian	world.”	When	I	ask	what	should	be	done,	she	asked,	“But	are	they	a	huge	problem?”	This	seemed	to	be	a	genuine	question,	so	I	cited	a	study	that	suggested	7	trillion	USD	as	a	conservative																																																									238	We	had	an	interesting	exchange	along	those	lines:		 Professor:	“I	guess	I’m	not	viscerally	as	anxious	about	people	escaping	taxes	in	one	way	or	another	as	I	am	about	government	being	overly	intrusive	in	people’s	lives.	But	if	we	had	a	tax	system	that	was	simpler,	and	fairer,	had	fewer	loopholes,	and	lower	rates,	then	I	think	there’d	be	a	much	smaller	incentive	to	take	advantage	of	those	loopholes	and	you	could	be	much	more	outraged	by	people	who	would,	even	so,	try	to	avoid	taxation.	These	days	anybody	who	pays	a	50%	marginal	rate	–	or	higher	because	of	claw-backs	of	various	social	programs	–	tends	to	sympathise	with	people	who	try	to	evade	their	taxes.	And	if	you	had	a	much	lower	rate,	I	think	there	would	be	much	less	public	sympathy	for	people	trying	to	escape	a	reasonable	rate	of	taxation.	Fifteen	years	ago	it	was	even	worse,	with	rates	of	55,	and	close	to	60%.	So	there’s	been	some	reduction	of	marginal	rates,	and	I	think	that	helps,	but	I	think	we	can	go	further.”			 Me:	“So	there’s	been	a	decrease	in	the	amount	of	tax	evasion	since	then?”		 Professor:	“Um,	the	incentive	to	evade	taxes	has	come	down	with	the	reduction	in	tax	rates.”	
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estimate	of	global	wealth	held	in	tax	havens	(Zucman,	2013).	“Well,	that’s	not	small	change.	So	if	they’re	that	significant	then	they	are	a	distorting	factor.	So	I	could	imagine	some	cooperation	around	the	objective	of	getting	rid	of,	or	moderating	the	size	of,	a	large	distortion.”	But	when	I	asked	whether	she	would	agree	with	those	who	say	that	tax	evasion	is	understandable	if	there	is	a	high	tax	burden,	the	response	is,	“Sure.”		 The	supposition	that	tax	evasion	was	a	minor	problem	in	Canada	was	common	one.	One	Conference	Board	conversant	said,	“Obviously	you	want	people	to	pay	their	taxes.	[.	.	.]	It’s	a	responsibility	of	citizenship,”	but	asked,	“Is	it	going	to	have	a	significant	–	I	mean	a	truly	significant	–	effect	on	national	accounts?	Not	sure,	right?”	I	thought	the	phrasing	of	the	following	was	interesting:	“There’s	no	shame	in	optimising	taxes,	right?	[.	.	.]	But	evasion	is	very	different.”	When	I	asked	whether	he	thought	tax	evasion	was	an	issue,	he	said	he	had	not	studied	the	topic	but	“I	don’t	know	that	we	do	have	a	massive	problem.	[.	.	.]	We	have	very	sophisticated	tax	authorities,	and	to	put	it	bluntly,	we’re	not	Greece.	[.	.	.]	It’s	probably	better	contained	here	than	in	some	other	countries.	[.	.	.]	It	will	have	an	impact,	obviously,	but	the	question	is	how	big	and	how	sustained.”		 With	this	conversant,	clearly	the	dividing	line	was	between	legal	avoidance	and	illegal	invasion,	which	an	IRPP	conversant	put	baldly:			 	There’s	always	the	issue	of	doing	something	that’s	legal	and	doing	something	that’s	right.	[.	.	.]	If	I	had	a	lot	of	money,	I’d	probably	think	about	how	I	could	lower	my	tax	burden	–	I	wouldn’t	want	to	be	stupid	if	I	had	millions	of	dollars	sitting	around,	but	at	the	end	of	the	day	there’s	the	question	of	whether	people	are	doing	things	that	are	sensible	or	not.		He	mentioned	a	fellow	researcher	who	found	that	20%	of	Canadian	investment	flows	go	to	the	Caribbean,	which	makes	sense	for	those	countries	but	for	the	Canadians	involved	it	is	“problematic”	and	“government	should	probably	be	doing	something	to	address	those	issues.”	At	budget	lock-ups	at	first	he	was	surprised	to	see	a	room	full	of	accountants	looking	for	ways	to	save	clients	money	on	taxes,	but	then	said	that	it	was	government’s	job	to	make	rules	that	make	sense	and	it	was	the	accountants’	job	to	help	their	clients.	He	felt	it	was	“sad”	if	that	is	your	job,	however,	and	it	is	“not	very	productive	[.	.	.]	tax	evasion,	tax	avoidance	or	whatever	you	want	to	call	it,	it’s	not	for	productive	purposes.”		 A	mainstream	professor	turned	first	to	the	cause	of	the	issue,	saying,	“You	know	what?	I’ll	bet	most	tax	evasion	comes	from	the	people	losing	respect	for	the	system,”	
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and	that	he	is	worried	that	people’s	awareness	of	tax	evasion	among	the	0.1%	makes	them	less	inclined	to	pay	taxes	themselves.	In	Greece	people	see	waste	and	lose	the	will	to	pay	taxes.	When	I	asked	whether	tax	evasion	was	a	concern,	he	said,	“I	don’t	think	it’s	a	big	issue	in	Canada,	so	it	doesn’t	concern	me	a	lot,”	but	he	preferred	taxes	like	the	GST,	which	makes	each	store	owner	a	tax	collector	who	is	going	to	make	you	pay.		 Some	of	the	most	interesting	responses	came	from	the	large	banks’	chief	economists,	most	of	whom	had	clearly	given	the	issue	some	thought.	One	had	compiled	an	estimate	of	the	underground	economy	for	the	Fraser	Institute,	concluding	that	it	was	2-4%	of	GDP,	although	the	Institute	initially	did	not	include	his	paper	in	their	series	because	the	other	estimates	were	in	the	20-30%	range.	He	mentioned	that	the	HST239	had	increased	this	number;	it	is	“a	pretty	powerful	incentive	for	smaller	operations”	as	it	does	not	apply	under	$30,000.	He	said	there	was	some	“off-shore	stuff,”	but	that	he	thought	it	was	less	than	in	other	countries:	“I	don’t	think	we	have	a	culture	of	that	in	Canada,	and	I	think	there’s	no	complicity	from	the	Canadian	financial	institutions.”	I	asked	whether	he	thought	our	elites	feel	that	taxation	is	legitimate,	then,	and	he	said,	“I	think	so”	and	that	the	top	taxation	rate	in	Ontario	is	52%,	so	we	are	not	at	the	95%	rate	that	drove	Mick	Jagger	away:	“In	fact,	the	highest	marginal	tax	rates	are	for	people	making	$20,000-40,000	with	children”	because	of	tax-back	rates	on	social	spending	and	the	like.		 One	of	his	fellow	bank	chief	economists	concurred	that	the	underground	economy	was	relatively	stable,	but	that	the	introduction	of	the	GST	and	HST	“force[d]	more	activity	underground.”	He	said	that	tradespeople	sometimes	offer	to	do	work	on	his	home	for	cash	“and	I	really	resent	that.	[.	.	.]	Once	people	start	getting	into	that	mindset,	you	get	into	a	bad	downward	spiral,	if	it	becomes	accepted	behaviour.”	He	felt	that	social	norms	are	the	problem	in	Greece;	their	spending	is	fine,	but	their	tax	collection	is	poor.	On	the	other	hand,	he	thought	tax	evasion	was	“probably	not	a	huge	problem	in	Canada,	but	I	think	the	federal	government	should	do	everything	they	can	to	clamp	down.”	He	pointed	out	that	it	is	really	only	executives	who	can	do	it,	as	it	usually	concerns	investment	income.	In	Canada,	he	said,	“I	think	legal	tax	reduction	is	certainly	more	than	accepted.	I	think	tax	evasion	is	still	frowned	upon.	[.	.	.]	I	don’t	think	anyone’s	going	to	brag	to	their	neighbour	that	they’re	illegally	avoiding	taxes.”	
																																																								239	Harmonised	Sales	Tax,	a	combined	federal/provincial	value-added	consumption	tax.	
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	 A	third	bank	chief	economist	brought	the	matter	up	unprompted,	saying,	“Wealthy	individuals	shouldn’t	be	able	to	manage	to	avoid	taxes	just	because	they	have	the	luxury	of	wealth	and	can	hire	people	to	do	it	for	them.”	He	felt	that	this	is	on	a	“downward	trend”	and	that	it	“used	to	be	viewed	as	a	smart	thing	to	do.	[.	.	.]	I	suppose	it	was	always	frowned	upon”	but	it	is	more	so	now.		 This	consensus	among	the	bank	chief	economists	was	striking,	as	it	much	more	closely	mirrored	the	views	of	my	left-wing	conversants	than	I	would	have	expected.	One	CCPA	conversant	echoed	the	bank	chief	economist’s	point	regarding	the	group	of	taxpayers	most	able	to	avoid	taxes,	saying:			 	The	tax	loopholes	are	a	huge	issue.	They’re	largely	constructed	for	wealthy	Canadians,	those	are	the	people	who	use	them	–	you	look	at	things	like	the	stock	option	deduction	–	who	gets	paid	in	stock	options?	That’s	what	it’s	built	for.	That’s	how	the	top	1%	gets	paid.	When’s	the	last	time	you	got	paid	in	stock	options?	And	that’s	just	one	of	the	more	egregious	ones.	There	is	a	whole	variety	of	those	tax	loopholes	that	are	constructed	only	for	people	who	get	paid	in	particular	ways	that	most	people	don’t	get	paid	in.		This	conversant	went	on	to	describe	the	corporate	side	of	the	taxation	question,	which	is	a	“total	free-for-all,”	especially	if	you	have	international	operations	–	“you	choose	what	you	pay.”	Tax	avoidance	is	comparatively	difficult	on	the	personal	side,	on	the	other	hand;	putting	money	in	the	Barbados	is	illegal	for	people,	not	corporations.	But	“the	tax	breaks	that	are	implemented	on	the	personal	side	go	almost	exclusively	to	the	wealthy,	unless	they’re	explicitly	designed	not	to.”	Furthermore,	a	lot	of	wealth	is	tied	up	in	small	businesses,	which	can	allow	owners	to	write	off	expenses,	engage	in	income	splitting,	and	the	like.		 A	CCPA	colleague	pointed	out	that	the	Canada	Revenue	Agency	(CRA)	just	took	a	major	cut,	some	of	which	was	due	to	automation	but	some	of	which	was	a	“mind-blowing”	move	to	cut	the	big	business	and	international	teams,	which	is	where	the	profits	are.	“What	happens	is,	when	you	talk	more	about	tax	evasion	but	you	don’t	do	anything	about	it,	people	feel	like	the	game	is	rigged,	people	get	disaffected,	and	then	they’re	less	likely	to	want	to	participate,”	the	conversant	said.	She	echoed	the	point	made	earlier	by	one	of	the	bank	economists,	emphasising	that	the	laid-off	CRA	employees	had	more	than	paid	for	themselves.	She	worried	that	the	Harper	government’s	refusal	to	work	with	the	G20	on	tax	evasion	could	gradually	allow	social	norms	to	move	towards	those	of	Greece:	“If	you’re	paying	taxes,	you’re	a	putz.”	One	of	the	COMER	members	repeated	the	concern	about	the	government’s	
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management	of	the	CRA,	wondering,	“Why	doesn’t	the	government	pay	more	money	to	get	smarter	people”	to	keep	up	with	tax	evaders?	Another	COMER	member	pointed	to	the	cadre	of	wealthier	people	profiting	from	real	estate	but	avoiding	taxes	on	the	proceeds.		 A	PEF-affiliated	academic	economist	returned	to	the	theme	of	“the	people	who	can	afford	to	evade	taxes,”	pointing	out	that	we	should	want	to	pay	taxes	to	live	in	Canada.	But	“I	don’t	think	most	economists	think	about	[tax	evasion]”	and	the	right-wing	is	envious	of,	and	apologists	for,	high	income-earners.	“I	don’t	think	they	understand	the	scope	of	it,”	she	said,	and	cited	IMF	statistical	discrepancies	that	jumped	in	the	late	1980s	from	1-2%	to	over	10%,	when	it	become	technologically	easier	to	transfer	funds	overseas	without	detection.		 The	above	views	amounted	to	a	near-unanimous	condemnation	of	tax	evasion	among	heterodox	and	mainstream	economists	alike.	All	but	three	professors	expressed	something	ranging	between	distaste	and	outrage	when	asked	about	tax	evasion.	Notably,	only	one	professor	I	spoke	with	thought	that	a	global	wealth	tax	was	practicable,	yet	almost	everyone	advocated	for	global	coordination	on	tax	evasion	–	surely	just	as	much	of	a	collective	action	problem.	One	professor	said,	unprompted,	that	there	should	be	international	coordination	around	tax	data	and	the	like:	“Am	I	in	favour	of	that?	100%.”	Another	professor	said,	directly	contrasting	the	scepticism	around	a	global	wealth	tax	with	calls	for	international	coordination	around	tax	evasion,	“I	think	that	has	more	traction.	[.	.	.]	That,	of	course,	calls	for	some	kind	of	coordinated,	cooperative	approach	among	countries.”	But	of	developments	in	tax	treaties	to	prevent	tax	evasion,	“I	think	this	is	very	promising.”	A	colleague	concurred,	saying,	“It’s	a	significant	issue	and	there’s	lots	of	money	involved”	for	individuals	and	companies	alike,	and	that	global	coordination	would	be	good,	although	the	rich	fund	politicians	and	it	is	therefore	difficult	to	tax	both	corporations	and	those	who	are	enriched	by	them.		 Another	professor	said,	“I	haven’t	thought	about	it.	I’m	not	a	fan	of	tax	evasion.	Not	a	fan	of	that.	I	think	the	Canadian	banks	are	engaged	in	pretty	big	ways	too.”	He	had	read	about	huge	capital	flows	to	the	Caribbean;	“it’s	kind	of	insane,”	although	there	is	“not	much	we	can	do	in	Canada”	as	the	lead	has	to	come	from	the	U.S.	and	others	in	the	international	community.	Yet	another	professor,	when	asked	about	tax	evasion,	said,	“Sure,	sure.	That	should	not	happen,”	although	it	is	hard	to	do	anything	about	it.	When	I	asked	what	should	be	done,	the	response	was:	“It’s	a	bit	beyond	
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economics.	You	should	just	obey	the	law,”	and	we	should	increase	the	resources	allocated	to	monitoring	the	issue,	as	per	the	U.S.	deal	with	Switzerland.	Furthermore	“it’s	probably	a	smart	idea	to	have	amnesty,	partial	amnesty	[.	.	.	and]	use	the	carrot	instead	of	the	stick.	[.	.	.]	But	it’s	a	problem,	sure.”		 Another	professor	agreed	with	the	need	to	exchange	information	internationally,	and	explicitly	referred	to	the	power	imbalance	at	play,	arguing	that	it	is	“not	clear	what	benefit	to	society”	tax	evasion	serves,	and	“it	looks	easy	on	paper	–	just	shut	down	the	Cayman	Islands,”	but	that	the	people	who	have	money	there	are	probably	“pretty	powerful.”	Besides	which,	“capital	is	very	mobile;	that’s	why	it’s	hard	to	tax”	while,	on	the	other	hand,	“wages	are	pretty	good	for	that”	as	they	are	transparent	and	immobile.	But	“it’s	important,	and	it’s	a	concern.	[.	.	.]	The	best	tax	is	one	that	has	a	very	wide	base	and	a	very	low	rate”	and	tax	evasion	makes	for	a	narrower	base,	which	creates	a	vicious	circle.	This	occurred	with	cigarette	taxes;	contraband	became	more	common	as	taxes	increased.	This	professor	advocated	for	a	combination	of	lowering	rates,	simplifying	the	tax	code,	and	increasing	enforcement,	as	“tax	evasion	is	a	problem	for	everyone.	We’re	all	paying	more.”		 One	mainstream	professor	surprised	me	by	analysing	tax	evasion	in	the	sociological	context	of	power	relations,	noting	the	public’s	lack	of	recognition	of	the	severity	of	the	problem	until	WikiLeaks	and	others	“documented	just	how	egregious	the	evasion	is,	so	that	can	be	a	serious	problem.”	He	went	on	to	say	that	“sociologists	point	out,	quite	interestingly,	that	a	social	problem	is	a	construct”	and	that,	when	asked	to	cite	examples	of	social	problems,	his	students	usually	fail	to	mention	tax	evasion,	perhaps	because	“it’s	a	white-collar	crime”	and	is	not	frequently	brought	to	the	public’s	attention	–	although	they	will	agree	that	it	is	a	problem	once	the	issue	is	raised.	Furthermore,	he	continued,	sociologists	talk	about	“how	power	structures	control	the	message”	and	cited	the	work	of	William	Domhoff,		 	.	.	.	who’s	a	very	left-wing	radical,	but	publishes	a	lot	of	books,	a	lot	of	them	very	interesting.	And	he	has	books	about	what	he	calls	the	‘power	elite’	in	the	United	States.	[.	.	.]	So	there’s	a	lot	of	work	coming	out	now	showing	just	how	influential	the	super-rich	are	–	in	politics,	for	example,	we	know	now	that,	there’s	a	recent	study	that	came	out	of	Princeton	about	how	the	policy	desires	of	the	top	.1%	or	.01%	and	everybody	else	and	then	you	look	at	what	was	actually	voted	on	in	Congress	–	it’s	almost	completely	lined	up	with	the	top	interests.		This	comment	was	surprising	because	it	was	one	of	few	examples	in	which	one	of	my	mainstream	conversants	a)	cited,	and	discussed	at	length,	publications	from	another	
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discipline	and	b)	took	seriously	the	work	of	a	“left-wing	radical”	even	though	he	clearly	identified	with	a	different	set	of	political	beliefs.	This	professor,	despite	displaying	a	greater	degree	of	awareness	of	the	issue	and	the	causes	of	it,	went	on	to	say	that	“I	think	it’s	very	pronounced	in	the	States,	much	more	so	than	Canada.”		 Finally,	perhaps	the	most	strident	statement	came	from	another	mainstream	professor:	“I	am	with	the	general	public.	I	think	it’s	morally	wrong.”	He	said	specifically	that	all	of	the	money	should	be	confiscated	if	tax	evasion	is	detected,	not	just	back	taxes,	fines,	and	penalties,	and	that	Canada	should	sign	tax	treaties	and	ban	travel	to	countries	that	refuse	to	sign:	“I’m	in	favour	of	very	strong	measures	to	prevent	tax	havens.”	Again,	this	statement	–	and	these	proposed	measures	–	was	in	fact	harsher	than	the	positions	many	of	my	left-wing	conversants	felt	comfortable	taking.		 Among	survey	respondents,	25%	did	not	think	tax	evasion	was	a	problem,	and	again	a	large	proportion	of	these	responses	was	concentrated	among	the	young	(more	than	half	of	whom	who	answered	the	question	felt	tax	evasion	was	not	a	problem).	As	for	whether	penalties	for	tax	evasion	should	increase,	26.5%	said	no,	but	this	reluctance	to	penalise	was	concentrated	among	the	middle	age	groups	(ages	41-71;	only	54.2%	of	the	41-52	cohort	supported	such	punishments),	whereas	the	young	(88%)	and	the	old	(81.8%)	both	were	overwhelmingly	in	favour	of	increased	penalties.	Interestingly,	only	9	survey	respondents	correctly	identified	tax	evasion	as	a	more	significant	problem	in	Canada	than	it	is	in	the	U.S.			
Altruism/Self-Interest			 There	was	no	other	question	that	so	nearly	randomised	my	conversants’	answers.	In	response	to	the	question	of	whether	the	humans	species	was	cooperative	or	self-interested,	one	COMER	member	referred	to	“human	greed”	and	the	tendency	to	be	corrupted	by	power,	while	another	said	of	human	nature,	“There’s	good;	you	need	any	evidence	for	that?”	Bank	chief	economists	agreed	with	heterodox	economists;	Fraser	Institute	economists	argued	that	we	would	need	bigger	government	if	humans	were	not	so	cooperative,	while	an	academic	and	long-time	public	servant	expressly	called	the	human	race	“self-interested”	(and	said	that	“there’s	a	characteristic	of	humans	called	greed.	And	no	one’s	figured	out	how	to	cure	them	of	greed.”).	In	short,	within	my	sample	there	was	nearly	no	correlation	between	
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conversants’	views	of	human	nature	and	their	life’s	work	or	political	views.	Yet	several	interesting	themes	emerged.		 First,	the	extreme	range	among	COMER	members	is	worth	noting	as,	in	the	course	of	other	questioning,	they	tended	to	fall	towards	the	far	left	of	the	political	spectrum.	One	member	was	clearly	motivated	to	work	on	monetary	reform	in	order	to	curtail	what	she	saw	as	a	dangerous	human	tendency	towards	greed,	while	another	was	motivated	by	a	belief	in	human	goodness.	Similarly,	to	hear	a	centrist	former	senior	official	of	the	Department	of	Finance	characterise	humans	as	‘greedy’	came	as	a	surprise.			 One	academic	economist	also	saw	a	human	tendency	towards	greed,	regardless	of	culture,	saying,	“Just	because	you’re	an	American	or	a	Canadian,	you’re	still	trying	to	maximise	your	profit.	You’re	trying	to	diddle	the	other	guy	as	best	you	can;	that’s	what	competition	is.	[.	.	.]	I	think	we’re	all	self-interested.	For	sure.	But	sometimes	you’ll	have	trouble	seeing	my	behaviour	as	me	being	self-interested.”	He	was	right;	this	professor	had	taken	his	economics	students	to	speak	with	homeless	people	directly,	and	his	work	in	the	area	could	only	be	called	exemplary.	Furthermore,	he	said,	“I	give	to	charity	because	it	feels	good,	and	it	seems	necessary,”	and	he	was	the	only	conversant	to	mention	people	with	disabilities.	Yet	he	said	of	humans,	“I	firmly	believe	we’re	all	autistic;	it’s	just	some	of	us	are	further	down	one	end	than	the	other.”		 The	above	individual	did	not	make	explicit	the	argument	that	two	conservative	professors	and	both	Fraser	Institute	conversants	went	on	to	elaborate	upon,	but	he	alluded	to	it	–	namely,	the	idea	that	what	looks	like	cooperation	is	really	self-interest.	As	one	professor	said,	“Well,	I’m	a	Smithian,	and	I	think	our	self-interest	drives	us	to	cooperate.	[.	.	.]	Maybe	not	everything,	and	maybe	not	even	the	most	important	things	worth	studying”	are	covered	by	Smith’s	conception,	but	“in	economics	I	think	a	lot	of	stuff	is	that	kind	of	stuff.”	He	went	on	to	indicate	that	several	psychological	studies	have	shown	that	that	is	not	exactly	true,	“and	I’m	willing	to	buy	that,”	but	in	a	lot	of	cases,	he	continued:		 	To	get	useful	predictions	out	of	what’s	going	to	happen,	we	probably	don’t	have	to	consider	all	of	those	behavioural	complications.	For	other	problems	maybe	we	will	behave	in	perverse,	irrational	ways,	and	if	we	observe	that	kind	of	behaviour,	well,	we’d	better	work	on	a	different	explanation.	[.	.	.	But]	when	analysing	the	price	of	potatoes	we	probably	don’t	need	that.			
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For	fiscal	and	monetary	policy,	he	said,	“I	think	we	have	all	the	tools	we	need,”	but	we	probably	need	psychology	for	poverty	and	other	such	issues,	although	you	may	find	that	people	are	behaving	rationally	and	not	“something	stranger.”	He	believed	that	that	Smith,	Ricardo,	and	Marshall	all	“had	a	deep	understanding	that	people	were	kind	of	strange.”			 A	fellow	conservative	academic	averred,	when	asked	where	on	the	spectrum	humans	fall,	“In	the	space	between	The	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiments	and	The	Wealth	of	Nations	on	my	bookshelf!”	To	him	Smith’s	invisible	hand	meant	that	“self-interest	induces	cooperative	behaviour.”	As	a	near-majority	of	my	conversants	agreed,	“Well,	we’ve	got	to	start	somewhere”	and	homo	economicus	is	a	helpful,	if	not	always	completely	accurate,	tool	for	economists:			 In	a	huge,	huge	range	of	cases,	rational	maximising	behaviour	is	just	the	same	thing	as	consistent	behaviour.	Because	after	all	you	can’t	see	utility	function.	[.	.	.]	So	it’s	a	fairly	innocuous	assumption	in	all	sorts	of	places.	[.	.	.]	The	difficulties	arise	when	you’re	dealing	with	situations	where	the	outcomes	are	risky.	[.	.	.]	So	I	would	just	as	soon	stick	with	maximisation.	My	beef	with	modern	economics	is	they	don’t	pay	enough	attention	to	those	coordination	issues	that	have	to	do	with	the	monetary	system.			 A	more	extreme	version	of	the	above	Smithian	argument,	that	self-interest	drives	humans	to	cooperate,	was	expressed	by	a	Fraser	Institute	conversant:			 	We’re	beings	that	cooperate	.	.	.	It’s	also	the	idea	of	the	collective	is	built	right	in	–	the	feeling	that	we	have	to	support	other	people	is	built	right	into	us.	Cooperation	is	the	result	of	a	selfish	instinct,	that	we	cooperate	because	it’s	in	our	self-interest	to	cooperate	–	so	everything	from	blood-sucking	bats	to	orcas	are	cooperative	producers.		His	Fraser	Institute	colleague	made	a	similar	point,	but	did	not	invoke	self-interest	at	all;	instead	he	invoked	Ayn	Rand	in	making	the	point	that	we	would	need	much	more	government	if	humans	were	not	cooperative.		 Two	conversants	made	the	argument	that	cooperation	tended	to	be	restricted	to	a	narrow	set	of	circumstances.	One	bank	chief	economist	claimed	that	we	are	more	likely	to	cooperate	with	family	members	and	the	groups	closest	to	us,	but	not	to	the	exclusion	of	strangers:		 It’s	a	little	bit	like	social	Darwinism,	right?	Maybe	you	help	people	whose	genes	are	closer	to	your	own,	right?	There’s	all	that	theory.	But	to	a	certain	extent,	we	do	cooperate.	You	know,	I’ve	been	in	situations	.	.	.	Lots	of	times,	people	will	do	
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something	for	a	total	stranger,	but	it	helps	if	they	have	some	sense	of	affinity	in	some	way.				 A	mainstream	academic	economist	made	a	similar	point,	setting	out	a	narrower	conception	of	cooperation:		 I	am	cooperative	with	my	wife	and	with	my	children	and	with	my	other	family	members.	But	as	I	keep	getting	further	and	further,	I	am	more	concerned	with	myself	and	my	family,	if	you	like,	than	with	others.	In	my	relationships	with	broader	society,	I	want	to	protect	my	interests,	and	promote	my	interests.			 This	was	a	common	view;	whether	the	conversant	fully	believed	in	homo	
economicus240	as	an	accurate	portrayal	of	human	nature,	s/he	tended	to	see	it	as	a	useful	tool.	Again,	this	view	came	from	a	surprisingly	wide	range	of	economists.	One	CCPA	economist	said,	“A	rational	self-interested	model	can	be	a	useful	model	in	some	cases,”	adding	that	his	problem	had	more	to	do	with	the	absence	of	time	and	debt	in	economic	models.			 Several	mainstream	academic	economists	concurred.	One	stated	that:			 Life	is	rarely	binary.	So	do	I	think	people	like	you	or	I	respond	to	financial	or	price	incentives,	like	those	produced	in	markets?	Yes.	For	many	things?	Yes.	For	everything	we	do	in	life?	No.	[.	.	.]	Love	and	compassion	and	generosity	and	altruism	–	all	of	those	things	are	important.	But	I	would	say,	if	you	want	to	understand	market	transactions,	[.	.	.]	which	are	a	huge	fraction	of	what’s	going	on	with	life,	I	think	modelling	things	as	homo	economicus,	or	modelling	things	as	people	respond	in	part	to	incentives	–	I	can’t	imagine	dispensing	with	that	idea.				 Another	professor	said	of	homo	economicus,	“Well,	certainly	I	don’t	believe	it.	But	it	is	a	convenient	tool.	[.	.	.]	Do	I	believe	that	individuals	and	companies	behave	slavishly,	totally	rationally	on	this	and	nothing	else?	No.”	But	although	these	assumptions	are	not	perfect,	“it’s	a	very	reasonable	way	of	going	about	doing	it.”	He	used	the	example	of	raising	the	minimum	wage:	first-year	economics	students	are	taught	that	it	increases	unemployment,	he	said,	but	“I	would	say	there	is	not	a	consensus	on	this”	and	that	the	research	is	mixed;	there	is	some	evidence	of	monopoly	power	at	the	selling	end	and	at	the	wage	end,	so	there	is	no	perfect	competition.	“Like	Walmart?”	I	asked.	“You’ve	got	it.	That’s	Exhibit	A,”	he	said;	“Well,	there’s	a	case	where	slavishly	following	a	very	simplistic	analysis	–	with	a	nice	little	assumption	of	perfect	competition,	by	the	way	–	can	lead	to	quite	questionable	and																																																									240	The	rational,	atomistic,	self-interested	human	–	“representative	agent”	–	of	many	economic	models.	
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seemingly	unrealistic	conclusions.	So	you	have	to	be	very	careful	with	the	assumptions	you	build	in.”	He	went	on	to	remark,	ruefully,	that	he	had	bought	a	house	essentially	to	warehouse	the	furniture	from	his	childhood	home	after	his	mom	died;	“The	biggest	economic	decision	I	made	in	my	life	was	based	on	emotion,”	he	said,	even	though	interest	rates	were	really	high	then	–	perhaps	not	the	most	rational	of	decisions,	but	not	a	bad	one.		 A	fellow	mainstream	economist	concurred	with	the	view	of	the	assumption	of	rationality	as	a	useful	tool,	saying:		 	The	vast	majority	of	economists	would	–	and	I	would	certainly	say	–	it’s	not	an	accurate	description	of	human	nature,	that	lots	of	other	things	like	altruism	and	so	on	play	a	role.	[.	.	.]	Whenever	you	try	to	model	behaviour,	you	have	to	simplify;	you	have	to	abstract	from	the	complexity	and	focus	on	the	core.	So	the	big	issue	is:	are	you	making	simplifications	that	are	unimportant	at	the	margin,	or	are	you	making	simplifications	that	are	really	fundamental?	And	that’s	a	tougher	problem.	For	people	who	have	been	defending	standard	neoclassical	economics	saying	that	we’re	going	to	assume	that	people	are	fully	rational,	they’re	well-informed,	they	maximise	utility	subject	to	a	budget	constraint,	they	know	that	that’s	not	accurate,	not	strictly	how	they	behave,	but	they	nonetheless	think	that	the	predictions	you	get	from	those	sorts	of	assumptions	are	useful.			 Another	mainstream	academic	seemed	slightly	irritated	by	the	question,	saying,	“I	think	the	question	is	a	bit	misplaced	in	a	way,	or	missing	in	nuance.”	He	stated	that	people	think	economists	believe	that	people	are	homo	economicus-like,	but	no	one	is	that	extreme.	If	you	assume	the	opposite,	however,	“it’s	very	sloppy”	and	“very	descriptive.”	Homo	economicus	simply	allows	economists	to	look	at	things	a	bit	differently;	economists	think	obesity	might	be	related	to	food	prices,	for	example,	and	the	homo	economicus	construct	can	help	us	think	about	crime	and	the	like,	whereas	“if	you	think	that	people	are	criminals	because	they’re	irrational,	none	of	these	policies	would	have	any	impact	and	we	shouldn’t	think	about	them	as	useful	tools.”	We	can	look	at	other	factors	if	homo	economicus	is	not	explanatory,	and	do	not	have	to	believe	in	the	concept	to	work	in	economics:	“It’s	really	just	an	elegant	working	tool	to	explore	certain	motivations,	how	important	are	incentives,	that	sort	of	thing.	So	if	you	ask	me	personally	where	I	think	people	stand,	I	think	it’s	kind	of	in	the	middle.	I	mean,	clearly	people	are	self-interested,	but	they’re	also	generous	to	their	community	and	things	like	that.”		 Another	academic	economist	shared	this	view:		 	
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We’re	somewhere	in	between	[self-interested	and	cooperative].	[.	.	.]	It’s	clear	that	it’s	very	extreme,	but	going	the	other	way	and	thinking	they’re	very	stupid	is	probably	not	very	fruitful	either.	So	there	are	obvious	reasons	why	they	might	not	be	completely	rational	[.	.	.]	but	as	a	general	rule	I	think	it’s	a	good	approximation,	and	since	it	comes	with	being	an	economist	too.	[laughs]	I	will	be	surprised	if	you	would	get	a	very	different	answer,	whoever	you	ask.			 Yet	another	mainstream	economist	said,	when	asked	whether	he	thought	homo	
economicus	worked	well	as	an	assumption:		 	We	have	some	evidence	that	when	people	do	experiments	and	they	look	at	the	predictions	for	various	games,	that	you	see	more	cooperation	than	you	would	expect.	[.	.	.]	But	I	don’t	think	it’s	something	you	can	rely	on.	Basing	our	policy	on	everyone	being	good-willed	I	think	is	a	mistake.			 The	theme	continued,	even	for	economists	who	had	an	opinion	about	human	nature	that	did	not	line	up	with	the	homo	economicus	model;	another	mainstream	academic	economist	said	that	“fundamentally,	most	parts	of	economics	is	about	individuals	being	selfish,	self-interested,	etc.,”	which	was	“a	very	useful	assumption”	even	though	he	did	not	think	people	were	like	that.	Milton	Friedman	used	the	analogy	of	playing	pool;	most	people	are	not	expert	in	geometry	but	still	make	similar	moves	in	the	game.	In	the	end,	this	economist	argued	that	humans	are	“something	in	between	[cooperative	and	self-interested].”		 This	was	also	the	view	of	a	third	COMER	member,	who	claimed	that	humans	were			 .	.	.	somewhere	in	the	middle,	but	it’s	a	pretty	wide	middle.	Some	people	I	think	would	say	that	humans	are	hard-wired	for	competition,	but	you	can	make	a	very	good	case	that	we’re	hard-wired	to	be	compassionate	and	cooperative	as	well.	The	louder	proponents	of	somewhat	unregulated	free	enterprise	talk	about	competition	as	what	does	it,	but	no	head	of	a	business	wants	competition	–	he	wants	certainty.			 Two	bank	chief	economists	agreed.	One	said	that	humans	were	“somewhere	in	the	middle”	and	that	she	thinks	about	it	a	lot;	sometimes	she	can	scarcely	believe	how	bad	people	are	from	watching	the	news	–	and	yet,	“people	are	capable	of	a	sense	of	community	and	a	sense	of	family	and	of	taking	care	of	each	other,	and	the	more	we	can	incentivise	that	the	better,”	while	at	the	same	time	“there’s	such	low	tolerance	for	people	who	are	different	in	whatever	way.”		 Her	counterpart	at	another	bank	said:			
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I	think	every	individual	is	different,	and	I	think	every	society	is	different	as	well.	It’s	probably	a	cliché,	but	countries	like	the	Scandinavian	countries	seem	very	cooperative,	whereas	countries	like	the	U.S.	seem	very	competitive	–	and	the	Chinese	too.	[.	.	.]	Canada	probably	falls	neatly	in	the	middle	there.	I	would	say	that	we’re	probably	still	a	little	bit	on	the	cooperative	side,	but	I	would	say	it	was,	over	time,	over	the	last	30	years,	it	was	more	on	the	competitive	side,	I	would	say.	For	better	or	for	worse.				 Two	conversants	who	perceived	humans	to	be	both	cooperative	and	self-interested	stood	at	nearly	opposite	ends	of	the	political	spectrum;	one	was	likely	the	most	conservative	academic	economist	I	spoke	with,	while	the	other	was	an	academic	economist	who	mentioned	donating	to	the	CCPA.	But	their	notional	oppositional	positioning	would	not	necessarily	have	been	apparent	from	their	answers.		 The	conservative	professor	said,	“I	think	they’re	both.	They’re	largely	self-interested	but	you	can	get	so	much	from	cooperation,”	and	a	person	has	more	to	gain	with	a	good	reputation.	When	I	asked	whether	he	judged	homo	economicus	to	be	an	accurate	portrayal	of	humans,	he	said	that	his	models	often	use	rational	expectations,	but	people	do	not	have	that	kind	of	“calculation	power.”	He	mentioned	agent-based	models,	which	he	thought	had	potential,	but	said	that	the	rational	expectations	assumption	is	“very	tempting”	for	economists	because	it	simplifies	things;	“one	of	the	biggest	shortcomings	of	economists	is	to	address	problems	because	they’re	simple	and	not	because	they’re	important.”		 The	other	(progressive)	professor	said:			 It’s	both.	[.	.	.]	There’s	the	Wealth	of	Nations	Adam	Smith,	and	there’s	the	Moral	Sentiments	Adam	Smith.	People	are	tremendously	motivated	by	collective	identities	in	various	forms,	and	people	go	crazy	if	they’re	unable	to	have	contact	with	other	people.	This	is	why	solitary	confinement	is	torture	–	because	we	literally	go	mad	if	we	are	not	with	other	people.	But	at	the	same	time,	betting	against	people	doing	what’s	in	their	best	interest	is	not	generally	wise.	So	we’re	both,	and	that’s	what	makes	economics	interesting.				 A	similarly	diverse	constellation	of	conversants	answered	that	humans’	tendencies	towards	cooperation	or	self-interest	were	contextual;	a	bank	chief	economist,	a	left-wing	academic	economist,	a	mainstream	economist,	a	Conference	Board	economist,	and	an	IRPP	economist	all	agreed	on	this	point.		 The	left-wing	academic	economist	viewed	the	spectrum,	in	fact,	as	spanning	the	poles	between	individualistic	and	socially	constructed	(in	terms	of	both	human	behaviour	and	identity).	She	then	said	that	she	viewed	humans	as	largely	socially	constructed,	their	behaviour	contextual,	and	she	viewed	the	economy	that	way	too.	
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She	felt	that	“economists	have	internalised	this	notion	of	the	rational	human	being”	and	that	things	happen	without	agency	on	the	part	of	people,	communities,	and	institutions.	Just	as	she	has	nothing	to	back	up	her	belief	in	bigger	government,	neither	can	others	back	up	their	belief	in	small	government	–	“but	at	least	I	admit	that	it’s	a	belief.”		 The	IRPP	economist	explicitly	considered	the	distinction	between	cooperation	or	self-interest	to	be	contextual,	and	viewed	homo	economicus	as	a	caricature.	He	spoke	of	studies	of	the	Ultimatum	Game	in	which	economists	tend	to	think	that	people	should	take	a	penny	because	it	is	“in	your	interest,”	whereas	he	himself	thought	that	“50/50	is	a	sensible	split”	and	that	“you	need	a	model	that	has	some	sense	of	fairness;	[.	.	.]	thinking	of	the	world	that	way	changes	the	way	you	interact	with	people”	and	can	make	you	“strategic,	heartless	maybe.”	When	I	asked	whether	he	viewed	humans	as	cooperative,	he	answered	that	it	depends	on	who	we	are	with.	He	went	on	to	say	that	models	built	on	rational	assumptions	still	get	you	somewhere,	but	you	then	have	to	go	further.		 A	Conference	Board	economist	laughed,	saying,	“I	think	that’s	a	–	that	would	be	an	overly	simplistic	way	of	analysing	humans.	I’m	over	60.	I	think	people	cooperate	when	they	have	collective	objectives	and	concerns	and	opportunity;	certainly	people	can	be	self-interested,”	but	it	is	not	something	you	can	put	on	a	1-to-10	scale.	“Well,	people	are	self-interested,	but	they	can	be	interested	in	their	community.	I	think	people	can	show	a	great	deal	of	concern	about	each	other	depending	on	the	situation”	and	engage	in	“lots	of	good	cooperative	behaviour	as	well.”		 A	mainstream	academic	economist	characterised	the	human	brain	as	a	Swiss	Army	knife,	with	tools	for	different	situations;	one	of	his	issues	with	behavioural	economists	was	that	they	did	not	sufficiently	acknowledge	the	role	of	context	in	human	behaviour.	As	for	homo	economicus,	“It’s	a	pretty	good	way	to	start.	[.	.	.]	In	terms	of	its	accuracy,	people	don’t	behave	that	way,	but	they	do	behave	in	ways	which	I	think	we	can	get	a	handle	on	using	evolutionary	psychology.”	He	cautioned	against	the	naturalistic	fallacy,	speaking	of	purported	differences	between	boys	and	girls;	“there’s	nothing	wrong	with	saying	we	should	change	things	to	try	and	make	things	better,”	he	claimed,	regardless	of	what	nature	and	nurture	have	currently	shaped	in	us,	pointing	to	the	flexibility	of	the	human	mind	in	the	face	of	a	changing	environment.	“Somewhere	in	the	middle,	you	get	the	possibility	that,	in	an	entirely	genetic	model,	there	would	be	a	gene	for	learning	and	being	affected	by	culture.”	He	
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went	on	to	note	that	studies	show	that	people	in	capitalist	countries	are	more	honest241	than	people	in	communist	and	former	communist	countries	–	but	officials	are	corrupt	there,	he	suggested,	and	social	norms	have	a	lot	to	do	with	how	we	behave	in	such	contexts.			 The	mainstream	academic	economist	above	was,	along	with	one	of	the	bank	chief	economists,	one	of	the	few	conversants	to	speak	in	normative	language	and	prescribe	an	approach	as	healthful	or	helpful.	This	was	striking.	The	bank	chief	economist	suggested	it	“depends	on	what	you’re	talking	about.	In	many	cases	we’re	very	cooperative;	in	many	cases	we	are	very	competitive.”	In	terms	of	business,	“I	think	we	have	to	become	more	cooperative,	and	less	competitive	in	certain	areas.”	He	went	on,	“I	think	you’ll	find	that	institutionally	we	have	to	move	to	a	more	cooperative	model.”			 In	answer	to	the	same	question,	his	counterpart	at	another	bank	said:		 I	don’t	know,	somewhere	in	the	middle,	I	guess?	I	come	back	to	the	economics	of	happiness	–	sense	of	community,	interacting	with	people,	helping	other	people,	always	rates	high	in	every	country	we	know	how	people	do	it.	But	there’s	a	fair	bit	of	self-interest	at	the	same	time,	so	it’s	a	balance	of	the	two.	And	Canada	–	almost	anything	you	can	think	of,	Canada	comes	right	in	between	Europe	and	the	United	States.	We’re	a	little	bit	of	the	European	influence	–	more	egalitarian,	more	cooperative	in	that	sense,	but	a	little	bit	like	the	United	States	as	well.			 A	C.D.	Howe	Institute	conversant	said,	“Well,	clearly	we’re	social	animals.	So	cooperation	and	altruism	are	built	way,	way	in.	[.	.	.]	Unfortunately	some	of	that	cooperation	is	against	other	groups	of	humans.”	He	continued,	“I	work	in	a	charity”	and	they	are	dependent	on	people’s	generosity,	but	people	also	respond	to	incentives	and	“will	pursue	their	own	self-interest	at	times,”	so	it	is	a	“constant	struggle	to	align	incentives,”	even	among	teachers,	doctors,	and	the	police;	he	invoked	the	concept	of	fiduciary	duty	as	well.	In	all,	his	view	was	that		 	.	.	.	.	we’re	a	mixture;	the	cooperative	end	of	it	is	extremely	strong,	and	that’s	why	we’re	having	this	conversation,	even.	But	then	the	competitive	analysis	is	also	very	useful	for	figuring	out	how	people’s	interests	might	diverge	from	what	you	might	like	them	to	do,	and	with	any	luck	you	can	find	ways	of	mitigating	that.			 Finally,	a	plurality	of	conversants	claimed	that	humans	were	on	the	cooperative	end	of	the	spectrum,	if	to	varying	degrees.	Conversants	in	this	camp	included	a	Bank																																																									241	In	studies	of	the	rate	at	which	a	(planted)	lost	wallet	is	returned.	
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of	Canada	economist,	a	COMER	member,	a	bank	chief	economist,	one	mainstream	and	two	heterodox	academic	economists,	a	Conference	Board	economist,	and	a	PEF-affiliated	economist;	if	one	includes	the	economists	who	believed	that	our	self-interest	leads	us	to	cooperate,	the	plurality	grows	considerably.	Each	economist	had	a	slightly	different	take	on	the	issue,	however,	and	there	was	a	range	of	assumed	cooperativeness	even	within	this	group.		 The	Bank	of	Canada	economist	suggested:		 I	think	people	do	want	to	cooperate	.	.	.	That’s	the	nature	of	community.	You	can’t	have	a	community	without	cooperation,	so	I’d	put	us	more	towards	the	cooperative	scale.	Because	there’s	a	lot	of	challenges	we	can’t	face	individually	–	I	think	that’s	perhaps	more	true	for	Canada,	because	we	have	inclement	weather	–	you	need	your	neighbours	to	help	push	your	car	out	of	the	snow	bank.				 One	bank	chief	economist	laughed,	saying,	“Generally	–	broad	generalisation	–	we’re	more	cooperative,	but	it	probably	varies	by	age	cohort	as	well.	Younger	people	are	probably	more	cooperative	than	older	people.	[.	.	.]	There’s	more	collaboration	going	on	than	when	I	was	young.”	This	statement	ran	counter	to	the	view	of	his	bank	counterpart	earlier,	who	held	that	cooperation	had	declined	in	recent	years.		 A	Conference	Board	economist	said,	“Oh	my	goodness.	Humans!	The	nature	of	humankind.	Well	ultimately,	I	think	it’s	about	getting	the	balance	right.	Most	people	I	think	are	naturally	cooperative.”	He	mentioned	how	his	team	loved	cooking	together	on	their	retreat,	then	employed	a	sports	analogy:	you	can	have	individual	stars,	and	cooperative	teams.	“Clearly	Soviet-style	cooperation	doesn’t	work	–	because	that’s	coercion.	Same	thing	with	the	ends	of	the	political	spectrum.	But	I	think	the	healthiest	societies	are	those	which	get	the	balance	right.”		 One	heterodox	academic	economist	said,	“I	think	that	a	lot	of	studies	have	shown	that	people	are	usually	ready	to	be	cooperative.”	He	had	been	reading	about	Ayn	Rand’s	view	on	the	topic,	and	“some	people	act	like	this,	and	I	think	in	particular	students	of	economics	tend	to	start	behaving	like	that.	[laughs]	But	I	think	naturally	people	are	on	the	other	extreme.	I	mean,	in	general.”	A	heterodox	colleague	said,	“Depends	if	you’re	a	Leviathan	or	not.	I	think	it	–	not	to	be	cliché	–	but	I	think	it	takes	a	village.	To	do	anything.”		 A	PEF-affiliated	economist	put	it	more	baldly:		 	The	defining	feature	of	humanity,	of	homo	sapiens,	is	we’re	the	only	species	that	can	cooperate	on	complex	tasks	outside	of	our	immediate	family	unit.	[.	.	.]	Any	
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social	science	other	than	economics	laughs	out	loud	at	this	idea	of	homo	
economicus,	and	realises	that	we	never	would	have	survived	when	we	descended	from	the	trees	if	that’s	actually	how	we	were.	And	slowly,	some	economists	are	recognising	a	lot	of	cooperation	and	interaction	and	trust	and	so	on	are	essential	to	everything	we	do,	even	in	a	free-market	setting.	So	the	idea	of	homo	economicus	is	one	of	the	axioms	that	is	driven	not	by	an	observation	of	reality,	but	one	of	the	axioms	that’s	put	in	place	to	support	the	theoretical	edifice	of	the	Walrasian	general	equilibrium.			He	went	on	to	conclude	that	it	was	an	“odd	and	backward	way	to	develop	a	theory.	[.	.	.]	Usually	when	you	develop	a	theory,	you	look	at	the	world	and	you	try	to	come	up	with	something	that	simplifies	and	explains	the	world.	But	the	neoclassical	model	is	very	different.”		 A	mainstream	economist	concurred,	saying:	“Well,	you	see,	all	of	life	is	variety,	but	relative	to	what	anyone	in	economics	would	tell	you,	we’re	much	more	generous	and	cooperative.	Relative	to	what	the	Dalai	Lama	would	say,	maybe	about	the	same.	I	think	I	agree	with	him	on	that.”	He	spoke	of	psychological	studies	of	children	of	just	18	months:			 	These	kids	are	just	naturally	generous.	They	are	made	happy	by	being	generous.	We	train	it	out	of	them.	[.	.	.]	People	are	happier	when	they’re	generous.	We	have	a	lot	of	experimental	evidence	–	it’s	not	just	the	correlational	stuff.	[.	.	.]	It	shouldn’t	be	a	surprise	that	cooperative	modes	and	norms	have	survival	power,	especially	in	complex	societies.		“What	you	have	to	do	is	create	social	identities	that	are	broader.	And	so	they	have	to	span	generations	and	span	borders,”	he	went	on,	describing	studies	demonstrating	the	benefits	of	shared	as	opposed	to	individual	laughter.242		 This	was	the	same	professor	who	was	understandably	irked	by	my	request	for	him	to	sign	a	consent	form,	as	he	viewed	the	interview	as	a	gift	of	his	time	(which,	frankly,	it	absolutely	was);	the	introduction	of	a	transactional,	legalistic	formality	at	the	end	was	insulting.	In	that	vein,	it	seems	important	to	note	the	cooperative	behaviour	that	my	conversants	displayed	in	the	course	of	my	fieldwork.																																																									242	He	also	made	a	series	of	captivating	observations	about	the	Milgram	experiment	(in	which	prisoners	and	guards	famously	descended	into	an	ugly	oppositional	relationship),	asserting	that	the	dark	outcome	is	not	inevitable	and	that	the	resistance	model	–	“the	Robben	Island	version”	–	can	arise	in	the	right	circumstances.	But	he	went	on	to	say,	“and	I	get	very	cross	at	both	of	them,	right?	I	say,	for	god’s	sake	why	don’t	you	think	beyond	this	us-them	stuff	that	drives	sociology,	drives	social	psychology,”	pointing	to	a	study	in	Australia	that	showed	that	a	third	model	works	well	if	you	provide	opportunities	for	guards	and	prisoners	to	cooperate,	and	both	groups	are	happier	this	way.	
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	 First,	my	response	rate	was	high.	The	great	majority	of	the	people	I	contacted	agreed	to	an	interview,	itself	a	cooperative	act.243	One	IRPP	conversant	gave	me	three	
hours	of	his	time	at	a	crucial	stage	of	my	research	(the	beginning),	orienting	me	to	the	discipline	as	a	whole.	Six	others	spent	two	hours	with	me,	and	15	conversants	spoke	with	me	for	at	least	an	hour	and	a	half.	Fully	29	of	my	conversants	offered	to	help	in	some	way,	many	of	whom	sent	me	research	details	that	I	had	requested,	answered	follow-up	questions,	and	more.	Several	bought	me	coffee.	Someone	offered	me	chocolate.	One	person	paid	for	breakfast,	and	another	(rather	right-wing)	economist	paid	for	more	than	his	share,	saying,	“I’m	not	a	PhD	student.	I	make	more	money	than	you.”	Two	people	gave	me	a	ride,	and	another	person	offered	me	one.	Five	conversants	gave	me	materials	–	books	and	articles	–	to	take	away	with	me.	Although	many	of	these	cooperative	acts	came	from	economists	who	skewed	left	relative	to	my	sample	as	a	whole	–	all	but	one	of	the	COMER	members	is	included	in	the	list	above,	for	example,	as	well	as	all	four	heterodox	academic	economists	and	all	but	one	PEF-affiliated	economists	–	a	number	of	the	most	conservative	academics,	in	addition	to	two	out	of	three	Conference	Board	economists	and	two	C.D.	Howe	Institute	economists,	can	be	included	here.	Quite	apart	from	the	rides,	food,	books,	and	coffee,	and	wherever	humans	may	fall	on	the	spectrum	between	cooperative	and	self-interested	(and,	indeed,	regardless	of	whether	economists	are	different	in	this	respect),	these	acts	of	generosity	have	been	indispensable	in	the	development	of	the	dissertation	of	this	particular	human	animal.			
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																									243	The	two	exceptions	were	the	Department	of	Finance,	which	refused	all	requests,	and	the	Bank	of	Canada,	to	which	I	wrote	emails	to	half	a	dozen	people	and	received	a	centralised	reply	proposing	a	single	conversant	to	meet.	
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Discussion		
The	Homogeneity	of	Canadian	Economists			 Research	tells	us	a	number	of	things	about	economics.	Among	the	social	sciences	the	discipline	is	unusually	hierarchical	and	preoccupied	with	rankings,	including	of	academic	journals	and	university	departments	(Fourcade,	2009;	Fourcade	et	al.,	2015).	Economics	education	globally	has	also	seen	a	marked	convergence	of	thought	over	the	past	few	decades	–	especially	methodologically,	but	in	terms	of	its	students’	and	professors’	views	on	the	economy	and	economic	policy	prescriptions	as	well.			 My	results	suggest	that	the	Canadian	case	is	no	exception	in	this	regard.	Among	Canadian	economists	as	well	as	within	economics	education	in	Canada	more	generally,	there	appears	to	be	a	clear	hierarchy	and	a	high	level	of	homogeneity;	diversity	within	economics	in	Canada	may,	to	the	extent	it	exists,	be	intra-	rather	than	inter-departmental.	Despite	this,	Canada	may	have	a	slightly	higher	concentration	of	heterodox	economists	than	other	countries;	global	lists	of	heterodox	economists	include	a	significantly	greater	heterodox-per-capita	ratio	in	Canada	than	in	the	U.S.	and	the	UK,	for	example	(Lee,	2009),	although	this	could	simply	mean	that	the	Progressive	Economics	Forum	in	Canada	is	more	organised	than	equivalent	organisations	elsewhere.			 Regardless,	it	does	appear	that	my	heterodox	conversants’	fears	of	marginalisation	are	grounded	in	fact;	it	is	rare	indeed	to	find	a	heterodox	economist	in	any	of	the	top	departments	in	the	country,	and	in	the	course	of	my	research	heterodox	concepts	almost	never	arose	in	conversation	outside	discussions	with	heterodox	economists	themselves.	Among	mainstream	conversants	I	sometimes	observed	a	curious	conflation	of	heterodoxy	with	Marxism	or	Soviet-style	economics,	the	latter	of	which	can	be	more	readily	dismissed	as	outside	the	realm	of	reasonable	debate.244	Interestingly,	a	similar	misconception	was	repeated	elsewhere	in	my	sample,	as	follows:	my	heterodox	conversants	viewed	Committee	on	Monetary	and	Economic	Reform	(COMER)	members	as	100%	Money	adherents,	whereas	most	of	the	COMER	members	I	spoke	with	wanted	to	preserve	some	(still	much	reduced)	form	of	fractional	reserve	banking.245	As	above,																																																									244	Although	many	heterodox	economists	would	consider	themselves	to	be	quite	left-wing,	few	would	ally	themselves	with	the	ideology	of	the	former	USSR	or	Marx;	this	distinction	may	be	one	of	which	some	mainstream	economists	are	unaware.	245	Fractional	reserve	banking	refers	to	a	system	in	which	banks	are	permitted	to	hold	a	fraction	of	their	deposits	and	lend	out	the	remainder	up	to	several	times	over	(thereby	creating	money	in	the	process),	whereas	100%	Money	adherents	would	advocate	for	a	system	in	which	a	bank	can	only	lend	out	the	money	it	has	on	deposit	and	no	more.	
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some	mainstream	economists	associated	heterodoxy	with	Marxism	and/or	the	former	USSR.	Some	progressive	or	heterodox	conversants	viewed	mainstream	economists	as	much	more	rigidly	laissez-faire	than	they	turned	out	to	be,	while	a	Fraser	Institute	economist	felt	that	the	mainstream	was	almost	exclusively	Keynesian.		 All	of	the	above	reveals	some	misconceptions	Canadian	economists	may	hold	about	other	groups	of	economists.	But	it	is	also	worth	noting	that	all	of	the	above	beliefs	ascribe	to	these	groups	a	political	orientation	that	is	much	more	extreme	than	the	views	they	in	fact	hold.	What	this	may	reflect	is	that	the	political	spectrum	–	in	Canada	as	a	whole,	perhaps,	but	also	among	economists	–	is	narrower	and	less	varied	than	many	conversants	assume.	Indeed,	as	my	results	suggest,	there	is	a	pronounced	degree	of	homogeneity	in	the	discipline	of	economics	in	Canada,	even	if	heterodoxy	has	slightly	more	of	a	presence	than	is	common	elsewhere.	This	was	very	much	in	line	with	research	on	groups	of	economists	in	other	countries.		 Even	so,	Canadian	economists’	homogeneity	may	have	its	own	particular	character.	In	the	U.S.,	studies	suggest	that	the	ratio	of	Democrats	to	Republicans	within	economics	departments	is	the	lowest	of	all	social	sciences,	at	3:1;	other	departments	are	much	more	uniformly	left-leaning	(Klein	&	Stern,	2005,	2006).	In	Canada,	economics	professors	appear	to	be	heavily	concentrated	in	the	middle	of	the	political	spectrum,	which	is	nevertheless	significantly	to	the	left	of	its	American	equivalent.	Within	mainstream	academic	economics	fully	50%	claim	to	vote	Liberal	(somewhat	left-leaning	on	the	Canadian	political	spectrum),	while	only	14%	vote	Conservative	(the	only	right-wing	federal	political	party	in	Canada)	and	8%	vote	for	the	New	Democrats	(social	democrats;	left-wing	among	Canadian	political	parties).	Although	results	vary	election	to	election,	there	are	substantially	more	Conservatives	(normally	over	30%	of	the	popular	vote	and	sometimes	close	to	40%)	and	New	Democrats	(normally	15-20%	of	the	popular	vote,	with	a	surge	in	2011	to	over	30%)	among	the	Canadian	population	as	a	whole	than	there	are	among	academic	economists.	Canadian	economists	on	either	end	of	the	Canadian	political	spectrum	–	which	is	narrow	to	begin	with246	–	are	mainly	concentrated	outside	of	academia,	in	other	words;	they	are	to	be	found	in	think	tanks	like	the	Canadian	Centre	for	Policy	Alternatives	(CCPA)	on	the	left	and	the	Fraser	Institute	on	the	right,	as	well	as	among	self-taught	economists	such	as	the	group	of																																																									246	None	of	the	major	political	parties	in	Canada	is	anti-abortion	or	opposed	to	gay	marriage,	and	they	are	all	in	pro-immigration	and	in	favour	of	universal	public	healthcare,	for	example;	there	is	an	uncommon	degree	of	consensus	in	Canada	on	many	of	the	U.S.’s	most	contentious	political	issues,	as	one	of	my	conversants	observed.	
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COMER	members	I	interviewed.	Thus	even	in	a	political	system	with	a	high	degree	of	consensus,	Canadian	academic	economists’	voting	patterns	were	yet	more	homogeneous	than	those	of	the	population	as	a	whole.	Homogeneity	–	politically	and	methodologically	–	does	appear	to	be	common	to	the	field	elsewhere	as	well,	however,	and	in	this	respect	Canadian	economists	are	unexceptional.	
	
	
The	Cohort	Effect			 My	results	yielded	some	surprises,	however.	A	multitude	of	misattributed	quotations	echo	the	trope	that	to	be	a	conservative	when	young	is	to	lack	a	heart,	and	to	be	a	liberal	when	old	is	to	lack	a	brain.	Among	Canadian	economists,	this	pattern	is	turned	on	its	head;	older	professors	are,	on	average,	more	critical	of	income	inequality,	and	more	supportive	of	critiques	of	the	economics	profession	that	have	emerged	in	the	wake	of	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis,	than	their	younger	colleagues.	Indeed,	I	observed	a	late-life	flowering	of	intellectual	curiosity,	societal	concern,	and	interest	in	public	policy	among	a	significant	percentage	of	older	academics	–	particularly	those	considered	by	their	peers	to	be	among	the	most	eminent	in	their	field.		 Similarly,	the	view	has	generally	been	that	nationality	does	not	much	affect	economists’	methods	or	political	views	(Önder	&	Terviö,	2014),	given	the	homogeneity	of	the	profession	at	a	global	scale.	Yet	older	Canadian	economics	professors	appear	to	be	almost	half-way	between	U.S.	economics	professors	and	–	quite	remarkably	–	U.S.	sociology	professors,	the	furthest	left	of	the	major	academic	disciplines	cited	in	a	study	by	Fourcade	et	al.	(2015,	p.	107).	On	issues	such	as	the	alleviation	of	poverty	at	the	cost	of	higher	national	debt,	90%	of	U.S.	sociology	professors,	“barely	half”	of	U.S.	economics	professors,	and	only	a	third	of	U.S.	finance	professors	supported	the	proposition	(ibid.);	nearly	70%	of	Canadian	economists	from	the	Baby	Boomer	generation	did	so.	The	results	on	inequality	are	even	more	extreme;	older	Canadian	academic	economists	are	significantly	more	supportive	of	reducing	inequality	than	American	economists	and	the	American	populace	(of	whom	66%	were	supportive)	(The	New	York	Times/CBS	News,	2015),	and	these	older	academics	(at	86.8%)	are	also	more	critical	of	inequality	than	the	Canadian	populace,	of	whom	84%	felt	income	inequality	was	a	concern	(Stratcom	Strategic	Communications,	2017).	Even	including	the	younger	cohort,	Canadian	academic	economists’	views	on	income	inequality	are	less	than	10%	away	from	those	of	
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their	layperson	brethren’s,	with	77%	in	favour	of	reducing	inequality,	and	somewhat	surprisingly	they	are	also	significantly	more	supportive	of	efforts	to	decrease	income	inequality	than	are	academic	economists	in	Sweden	(under	40%)247	(Berggren,	Jordahl,	&	Stern,	2009)	or	women	economists	in	the	U.S.	(63.1%)	(May	et	al.,	2014,	p.	129).	Strikingly,	on	this	question	the	older	cohorts	of	Canadian	economists	are	in	fact	aligned	with	Swedish	gender	studies	and	sociology	professors	(Berggren	et	al.,	2009)	–	two	of	the	most	left-wing	academic	disciplines	in	one	of	the	most	left-wing	countries	in	the	world.			 There	are	several	possible	explanations	for	these	results.	First,	however,	it	is	worth	examining	some	of	the	factors	that	appear	not	to	have	much	influenced	the	cohort	effect.	My	results	were	fairly	clear:	there	was	no	apparent	link	between	one’s	current	political	views	and	one’s	family’s	political	views	growing	up,	and	even	the	influence	of	economists’	graduate	school	training	–	which	they	may	have	chosen	in	part	to	align	with	their	views	–	was	relatively	insignificant.	Family	income	during	my	conversants’	and	survey	respondents’	formative	years,	similarly,	did	not	appear	to	affect	their	later	political	leanings,	even	though	all	cohorts	in	my	sample	benefited	from	very	high	average	incomes	relative	to	the	population	as	a	whole.	The	younger	survey	cohort	had	been	raised	in	households	that,	with	an	average	annual	income	of	$195,133,	fell	close	to	the	top	1%	of	income	distribution	in	Canada	($206,900)	(Veall,	2012,	p.	1252),	whereas	my	older	survey	cohort	estimated	their	household’s	annual	income	(during	their	high	school	years)	at	$82,340,	adjusted	for	inflation.	Although	it	is	difficult	to	make	a	direct	comparison,	partly	because	GDP	per	capita	in	Canada	(in	constant	dollars)	has	nearly	tripled	since	1960	(World	Bank,	2016)	and	partly	because	Canadian	income	distribution	has	changed	in	that	time,	$82,340	would	have	been	up	to	four	times	higher	than	the	average	income	per	capita	during	my	older	cohorts’	formative	years,	approximately	the	same	multiple	of	the	average	income	as	the	younger	cohorts’	households’	income	would	be	some	decades	later.	All	cohorts,	then,	came	from	wealthy	families	on	average,	and	wealthier	people	(elites)	are	more	likely	to	be	exposed	to	self-interest	priming	and	socialisation	that	can	inhibit	prosociality	(Kraus	et	al.,	2012;	Piff	et	al.,	2010,	2012)	–	yet	Baby	Boomer	economists	ended	up	holding	markedly	more	egalitarian	views	than	their																																																									247	Income	taxes	are	higher	in	Sweden,	which	is	likely	at	least	a	partial	explanation	for	the	fact	that	Canadian	academic	economists	are	almost	twice	as	likely	as	Swedish	academic	economists	to	support	the	idea	of	reducing	income	inequality.	That	said,	income	inequality	is	higher	in	the	U.S.	than	in	Canada,	yet	American	academic	economists	are	less	likely	than	their	Canadian	peers	to	be	in	favour	of	reducing	inequality.	
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younger	colleagues.	Thus	it	does	not	seem	that	family	income,	family	political	orientation,	or	graduate	training	has	much	to	do	with	the	cohort	effect	I	observed.		 A	few	differences	among	the	cohorts	did	appear,	however.	One	possible	reason	for	the	age-related	differences	in	political	views	–	perhaps	correlative	rather	than	strictly	explanatory	–	is	that	65.4%	of	academics	under	41	listed	“Because	I	was	good	at	it”	as	a	motivation	for	studying	economics,	whereas	only	20.8%	of	all	economists	over	the	age	of	67	listed	talent	as	a	reason	to	enter	the	field.	As	per	the	literature	on	intrinsic	and	extrinsic	motivation	detailed	above,	there	may	be	a	difference	between	those	who	enter	a	profession	out	of	curiosity	as	opposed	to	those	who	join	due	to	the	draw	of	external	validation	or	cognitive	ease.248	Furthermore,	if	academic	economists	are	now	disproportionately	people	whose	cognitive	and	learning	styles	lend	themselves	to	economics,	that	could	affect	the	overall	cognitive	diversity	of	the	field	and	contribute	to	a	tendency	towards	particular	political	leanings	among	economists	as	a	group.	Indeed,	it	is	worth	noting	that	none	of	my	COMER	or	heterodox	conversants	cited	talent	as	a	reason	to	study	economics,	and	only	one	left-wing	think	tank	economist	did	so;	as	a	group,	these	conversants’	views	on	issues	like	inequality	tended	towards	those	of	the	mainstream	Baby	Boomer	economists	in	my	sample.	It	may	therefore	be	worth	further	exploring	whether	the	younger	cohorts’	initial	motivations	for	studying	the	subject	are	somehow	related	to	their	political	views’	marked	divergence	from	those	of	their	older	colleagues.			 Such	future	research	would	do	well	to	investigate	beyond	inter-cohort	differences,	however;	it	might	otherwise	bypass	one	of	this	study’s	most	intriguing	findings,	which	is	as	follows:	even	within	cohorts	–	among	economists	of	the	same	age,	who	were	exposed	to	the	same	historical	events,	social	norms,	and	the	zeitgeists	of	their	common	era	–	those	who	were	exposed	to	economics	before	university	appear	to	have	a	markedly	more	laissez-faire	view	of	economics	and	political	issues.	Even	in	the	older	cohorts	in	my	survey	sample,	in	which	talent	for	the	subject	was	a	relatively	rare	consideration	for	joining	the	field	(20.8%),	fully	half	of	those	who	had	studied	economics	in	high	school	listed	“Because	I	was	good	at	it”	as	a	motivation	for	becoming	an	economist.	They	were	also	slightly	less	likely	(72%	as	opposed	to	77%)	to	believe	that	incomes	in	Canada	should	be	more	equal,	significantly	less	likely	to	believe	that	the	Canadian	government	should	tax	inheritances	(58.3%	versus	71%	in	the	sample	as	a	whole),	and	less	likely	to																																																									248	As	noted	above,	the	job	market	for	younger	economists	is	much	more	difficult	now	than	it	was	for	the	Baby	Boomers,	and	for	this	reason	alone	such	a	trend	is	perhaps	to	be	expected.	
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think	that	executive	pay	was	too	high	(76%	versus	81%),	even	though	this	group	skewed	younger	than	the	sample	as	a	whole	and	the	younger	cohorts	were	somewhat	more	concerned	about	high	executive	pay	(84.6%)	than	the	other	cohorts	(79.8%).	Within	my	qualitative	interview	sample,	the	contrast	was	yet	more	extreme;	none	of	my	left-wing	conversants	had	been	exposed	to	economics	in	high	school,	and	conversants	with	early	exposure	to	economics	were	–	almost	without	exception	–	markedly	more	right-wing	than	the	others	I	spoke	with.			 Most	of	the	studies	of	the	effects	of	economics	education	on	students’	thinking	and	assumptions	regarding	human	behaviour	have	been	conducted	on	undergraduates,	as	this	is	most	people’s	first	exposure	to	the	discipline.	But	it	is	worth	considering	whether	the	age249	at	which	one	first	encounters	economics	has	an	effect	on	the	extent	to	which	the	outcomes	documented	in	my	literature	review	–	for	example,	the	increased	tendency	towards	a	calculative,	self-interested	mindset	that	can	accompany	exposure	to	mainstream	economics	courses	(Carter	&	Irons,	1991;	Wang	et	al.,	2011;	Wang	&	Murnighan,	2012)	–	end	up	manifesting	themselves	in	economics	students.	This	is	over	and	above	the	selection	effect,	which	appears	to	skew	economics	students	towards	those	behaviours	and	beliefs	as	well	(B.	Frank	&	Schulze,	2000).	Most	of	my	older	conversants	did	not	take	economics	in	high	school,	whereas	this	was	much	more	common	for	the	younger	cohort.	Given	the	rapid	increase	in	the	number	of	economics	courses	offered	at	the	high	school	level,	it	is	worth	investigating	whether	economics	education	at	a	younger	age	could	have	an	effect	on	an	economist’s	outlook	later	in	life.			 As	the	literature	review	in	Chapter	2	shows,	in	experimental	conditions	fourth-year	non-economists	offer	almost	50%	of	the	allotted	cash	to	their	partners	in	the	Ultimatum	Game,250	while	fourth-year	economics	students’	offers	are	among	the	lowest	of	all	disciplines	(Carter	&	Irons,	1991;	Etzioni,	2015).	Even	simple	exposure	to	money	priming	can	have	an	effect	on	people’s	thinking,	motivations,	and	behaviours	(Vohs,																																																									249	Of	course	we	are	shaped	by	our	experiences	throughout	our	lives,	but	future	research	might	usefully	explore	whether	brain	development	may	be	one	of	the	relevant	factors	influencing	the	cohort	effect	I	observed.	Studies	suggest	that	the	prefrontal	cortex	is	not	fully	developed	until,	on	average,	the	age	of	25,	and	memories	and	identity	formation	are	both	concentrated	in	the	late	teens	and	early	twenties	due	to	patterns	in	brain	–	especially	prefrontal	cortex	–	development;	studies	suggest	that	a	disproportionate	number	of	our	lifelong	memories	are	formed	between	the	ages	of	10	and	30,	with	a	median	age	of	22.7	(Rathbone,	Moulin,	&	Conway,	2008),	and	the	brain	is	yet	more	plastic	during	the	teenaged	years	(Sanders,	2015).	250	A	common	experimental	game	in	which	one	student	is	given	$10	and	asked	to	make	an	offer	between	$0	and	$10	to	a	second	student,	who	can	only	accept	or	refuse.	If	the	offer	is	refused,	neither	student	receives	any	money.	
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2015).	Ariely’s	studies	of	cheating	showed	that	it	occurred	at	approximately	the	same	level	in	cultures	all	over	the	world;	the	only	cultural	difference	his	team	noted	was	when	they	tested	politicians	in	D.C.	and	bankers	in	NYC;	the	bankers	cheated	approximately	twice	as	much	(Ariely,	2012,	p.	243).	Indeed,	in	one	study	merely	reminding	bankers	of	their	workplace	appeared	to	induce	more	dishonest	behaviour,	whereas	bankers	who	were	not	primed	in	this	way	behaved	like	everyone	else	(Cohn,	Fehr,	&	Maréchal,	2014).		 This	may	be,	in	part,	because	of	the	self-interest	priming	inherent	in	the	teaching	of	
homo	economicus	as	the	assumed	rational	agent	of	first-year	economics;	although	my	research	found	that	few	–	if	any	–	professors	actually	felt	this	was	an	accurate	representation	of	human	nature,	the	oversimplification	of	introductory	economics	courses	could	give	students	the	opposite	impression.	This	is	important	because	studies	suggest	that	a	person	who	overestimates	others’	levels	of	self-interest	is	more	likely	to	become	more	self-interested	him-	or	herself	(Ratner,	1999),	even	though	humans	tend	to	act	surprisingly	altruistically	in	experiments251	(Carter	&	Irons,	1991).	Thus	introductory	economics	education	in	its	current	form	risks	triggering	the	feedback	loop	Ghoshal	worried	about	(2005);	teaching	the	self-interest	model	to	students	may	in	fact	
induce	self-interest	in	those	same	students.				 It	is	an	old	saw	that	what	is	natural	is	often	deemed	right.	Humans	appear	to	be	prone	to	cooperation	–	indeed,	cooperative	acts	can	induce	in	us	a	neurochemical	rush	to	which	other	humans	tend	to	respond	instinctively	and	spontaneously	in	kind;	on	the	other	hand,	it	appears	to	take	reflection	to	induce	greed	(Rand,	Greene,	&	Nowak,	2012).	Yet	our	behaviour,	cognition,	and	mental	models	are	very	much	contextual.	So	although	cooperation	may	be	our	birthright,	it	can	be	encouraged	or	suppressed	due	to	the	social	norms	we	are	exposed	to.	Furthermore,	learning	what	the	social	norm	is	can	have	an	effect	on	how	we	think	and	behave;	this	is	particularly	relevant	in	terms	of	the	self-interest	norm,	which	research	suggests	can	be	induced	in	the	process	of	teaching	it	(Dale	T.	Miller,	1999).			 Further	research	suggests	that	we	tend	to	defend	our	early	convictions	in	the	face	of	contrary	evidence	(Mercier	&	Sperber,	2017),	which	means	that	economics	students	could	have	a	tendency	towards	defending	their	first	–	oversimplified	–	views	of	economics	and	its	assumptions	about	human	nature	and	social	norms.	This	effect	may	have	waned	in	my	older	conversants	over	time	–	and	their	first	exposure	to	economics																																																									251	There	is	evidence	suggesting	that	humans	even	surprise	themselves	in	this	respect;	people	may	be	less	self-interested	than	they	themselves	think	they	are	(D	T	Miller	&	Ratner,	1998).	
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was	less	standardised,	and	less	neoclassical,	in	any	case	–	but	it	would	appear	that	a	large	percentage	of	all	undergraduate	students	only	ever	study	this	oversimplified	form	of	introductory	economics,	which	might	be	a	sort	of	inoculation	against	the	cooperative	social	norms	that	they	would	otherwise	be	exposed	to	in	the	course	of	a	degree.252	This	effect	may	be	yet	more	extreme	in	Canada	because,	as	my	results	show,	in	at	least	some	cases	Canadian	undergraduates	are	required	to	take	more	economics	courses	and	fewer	non-economics	electives	than	their	colleagues	in	the	U.S.,	front-loading	a	significant	amount	of	economics	content	during	students’	impressionable	years.		 It	is	worth	viewing	this	finding	in	the	context	of	my	qualitative	results.	None	of	the	heterodox	economists,	almost	none	of	the	women,	none	of	the	COMER	members,	and	only	one	of	the	left-leaning	economists253	in	my	sample	came	to	economics	in	high	school	or	even	in	their	first	few	years	of	university	in	many	cases;	thus	these	groups	had	none	of	the	early	exposure	to	economics	I	observed	among	the	especially	laissez-faire	economists	in	my	sample.	Further	study	could	examine	whether	the	political	views	of	these	categories	of	economists	–	women,	autodidacts,	and	heterodox	economists,	all	understudied	groups	–	are	in	any	way	related	to	the	age	at	which	they	first	came	to	economics	as	a	field.254			
Canadian	Economics	in	Time	and	Space			 There	are	many	other	possible	factors	that,	severally	and	in	combination,	may	help	to	explain	the	differences	among	the	various	cohorts	of	economists	in	my	sample.255	Historical	and	geographical	trends	may	well	be	among	the	strongest	influences	on																																																									252	This	could	also	affect	the	level	of	cooperation	within	the	discipline	of	economics	itself;	communities	with	cooperative	social	norms	are	more	able	to	overcome	the	free-rider	problem,	for	example	(Ostrom,	1990).	253	This	conversant	was	only	mildly	left-leaning,	and	he	had	not	studied	economics	per	se;	he	took	a	modicum	of	business	studies	in	high	school.	254	Bearing	in	mind	that	causation	can	easily	run	both	ways	in	this	case.	255	This	section	neglects	to	analyse	the	cohort	effect	within	two	groups:	autodidact	economists	and	heterodox	economists.	This	is	because,	in	my	sample,	none	of	the	members	of	these	groups	belonged	to	the	younger	cohorts.	It	may	come	as	no	surprise	that	the	autodidacts	and	heterodox	economists	I	spoke	with	were	extremely	pro-interdisciplinary	(the	COMER	members	held	degrees	in	a	bewildering	array	of	academic	disciplines)	and	prosocial	in	their	views;	what	was	surprising	was	that	the	other	members	of	the	oldest	two	cohorts	in	my	sample	–	among	conversants	and	survey	respondents	alike	–	largely	agreed	on	many	issues.	
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economists	of	different	ages,	and	indeed	my	results	are	best	contextualised	by	situating	economists	in	time,	in	space,	and	along	the	political	spectrum.		 First,	as	became	clear	in	the	course	of	my	fieldwork,	economics	education	appears	to	have	been	more	varied	and	eclectic	–	even	in	high-ranked	mainstream	departments	–	in	the	1970s	and	earlier,	when	my	older	conversants	were	in	university.	The	youngest	generation	in	my	sample	would	have	been	educated	well	after	economics	departments	split	off	from	the	rest	of	the	social	sciences,	which	happened	over	the	course	of	several	decades,	with	Western	among	the	first	to	do	so	in	the	late	1960s	and	with	Toronto	among	the	last	in	1982.	This	may	have	had	an	effect	on	the	multidisciplinarity	of	the	education	of	those	who	took	economics	courses	before	and	after	the	split,	an	important	factor	for	a	field	that	is	known	for	being	especially	insular	and	uni-disciplinary	(Fourcade	et	al.,	2015,	p.	93).		 Indeed,	my	older	conversants	were	much	more	open	to	knowledge	from	other	disciplines.	Only	22%	of	economists	above	the	age	of	53	(Baby	Boomers	and	older)	answered	“No”	to	the	question,	“In	general,	is	interdisciplinary	knowledge	better	than	knowledge	obtained	by	a	single	discipline?”	whereas	40%	of	the	younger	economists	(aged	52	and	under)	answered	“No.”	Rather	remarkably,	the	total	for	my	survey	of	economists	was	31.6%	“No”	responses,	which	puts	Canadian	academic	economists	in	the	same	range	as	American	academic	sociologists	(25.3%	“No”),	political	scientists	(28%	“No”),	and	historians	(31.7%	“No”),	as	opposed	to	American	economics	academics	(57.3%	“No”),	in	terms	of	their	views	on	the	value	of	interdisciplinary	knowledge	(Fourcade	et	al.,	2015,	p.	95);	in	other	words,	my	older	survey	participants	appear	to	be	more	pro-interdisciplinary	than	academics	from	any	discipline	in	the	U.S.256,	even	though	the	proportion	of	U.S.-	and	otherwise	foreign-educated	academics	–	and	therefore	American	influence	–	is	larger	in	economics	than	in	other	academic	disciplines	in	Canada	(A.	Scott,	1993)	and	has	been	for	some	time	(A.	Scott	&	Grubel,	1969).		 The	greatest	variation	in	political	views	was	to	be	found	among	the	very	oldest	economists	in	my	sample.	Of	these	were	two	of	Canada’s	best-known	academic	economists	–	themselves	on	or	near	opposite	ends	of	the	political	spectrum	–	and	a	few	others	in	their	age	cohort,	all	of	whom	received	PhDs	in	the	1960s.	These	conversants,	from	every	point	on	the	political	spectrum,	all	seemed	to	recognise	the	dangers	of	homogeneity	or	the	dominance	of	one	sect	above	the	others	–	perhaps	in	part	because																																																									256	This	is	a	key	indicator	given	that	some	research	suggests	that	“abler	economists	tend	to	publish	more	general	research”	(Kendall,	2008),	contrary	to	some	departments’	emphasis	on	specialisation.	
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they	had	witnessed	several	examples	of	this	throughout	their	lives.	“Economics	gets	into	trouble	when	one	particular	group	gets	a	lock	on	the	journals	and	the	conferences	and	appointments	in	certain	key	departments,”	said	one	conservative	conversant,	lamenting	the	fact	that	“Cambridge	had	a	lock	on	economics”	for	several	decades	in	the	middle	of	the	last	century	“and	it	was	terrible.”	But	he	was	similarly	critical	of	attempts	to	curtail	diversity	and	debate	at	the	other	end	of	the	political	spectrum,	bemoaning	the	fact	that	“North	America	is	truncated,	because	Joe	McCarthy	and	his	buddies	did	a	really	good	number	on	the	left-wing	tradition	in	the	social	sciences	in	North	America.”		 An	eminent	academic	on	the	other	end	of	the	political	spectrum	worried:	“You	find	the	same	schools	are	generating	the	staff	for	a	whole	broad	set	of	universities,	and	they	come	along	with	a	groupthink	that	can	be	poisonously	uniform.	So	then	it	can	be	hard	to	keep	appropriately	broad	and	open	in	what	is	taught	to	students.”	Indeed,	in	the	U.S.	47%	of	the	faculty	at	PhD-granting	universities	attended	the	same	(top	ten)	universities,	with	yet	greater	concentration	at	the	upper	end	(Pieper	&	Willis,	1999,	p.	86).	Several	older	economists	remarked	upon	the	pressures	of	publishing,	the	econometrics-centric	preferences	of	the	top	journals,	and	departments’	emphasis	on	a	narrow	set	of	metrics,	all	of	which	result	in	a	situation	in	which	“policy	is	a	middle-aged	person’s	game,”	for	after	one	has	tenure.		 In	short,	among	the	oldest	group	of	economists	–	those	over	the	age	of	71	–	could	be	found	the	greatest	support	for	diversity	of	thought,	a	refreshing	tolerance	of	opposing	views,	and	often	a	healthy	dose	of	criticism	of	the	increasing	homogeneity	of	the	field.	It	may	not	be	an	accident	that	these	economists	were	exposed	to	the	most	eclectic	curricula	of	all	the	conversants	in	my	sample.	Indeed,	compared	to	their	younger	colleagues,	as	a	group	they	expressed	a	wider	range	of	views	themselves;	were	more	supportive	of	diversity	of	thought,	even	if	it	went	counter	to	their	own	beliefs;	and	were	more	comfortable	with	the	criticisms	of	economics	education	that	had	emerged	following	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis.			 This	older	group	of	economists	taught	a	generation	of	Baby	Boomer	economists,	who	were	broadly	tolerant	of	opposing	viewpoints	but	were	more	homogeneously	prosocial.	The	Baby	Boomers,	many	of	whom	were	educated	in	economics	throughout	the	late	1970s	and	1980s	–	during	the	ascendancy	of	Chicago	School	ideology	–	were	themselves	exposed	to	a	more	standardised	curriculum,	despite	their	broadly	egalitarian,	pro-government	views;	some	members	of	this	generation,	in	turn,	educated	a	fairly	uniformly	laissez-faire	generation	of	economists.	This	is	despite	the	fact	that,	as	a	
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group,	Baby	Boomer	economists	did	not	tend	to	share	those	laissez-faire	views	–	but	they	had	begun	to	teach	the	standard	curriculum	that	persists,	with	very	few	changes	(Siegfried	&	Walstad,	2014),	to	this	day.			 Studies	do	suggest	that	economics	education	can	have	different	effects	on	students	depending	on	how	it	is	taught;	the	calculative	mindset	and	self-interest	orientation	that	commonly	emerges	in	economics	students	exposed	to	efficiency-	and	self-interest-focused	training	appears	to	be	much	reduced	or	even	absent	in	students	exposed	to	a	more	welfare-	and	cooperation-oriented	economics	education	(R.	H.	Frank	et	al.,	1993).	Perhaps,	then,	it	is	unsurprising	that	the	older	generation	of	academic	economists	developed	less	of	an	efficiency-	and	market-oriented	approach	to	the	discipline.			 After	all,	the	tectonic	plates	of	the	influences	on	economics	in	Canada	shifted	dramatically	from	the	1970s	to	the	1980s;	in	the	latter	decade,	Canada	drew	ever	closer	to	the	U.S.,	during	a	dramatic	rightward	turn	in	American	politics,	while	in	the	1970s,	arguably	the	UK’s	most	progressive	era,	Canada	had	been	closer	to	the	UK	than	it	is	now.	In	short,	in	a	relative	sense	Canada	was	closer	to	each	of	these	two	countries	as	they	reached	the	outer	limit	of	their	respective	political	spectra	at	the	time	–	the	UK	on	the	left,	and	the	U.S.	on	the	right.	This	may	have	been	compounded	on	the	right	by	the	economics	departments’	splitting	off	from	political	science	departments	all	across	the	country	throughout	the	60s,	70s,	and	early	80s.	Therefore	the	swing	in	economics	influences	in	Canada	may	have	been	wider	than	it	might	have	otherwise,	perhaps	even	more	so	due	to	the	fact	that	academic	economists	had	more	exposure	to	the	U.S.	than	in	other	disciplines	(A.	Scott,	1993;	A.	Scott	&	Grubel,	1969)	during	that	period.	For	economics	students	the	1960s	may	have	seemed	especially	different	from	the	1970s	and	then	1980s,	both	within	their	academic	departments	and	in	the	Canadian	political	realm	more	broadly.		 Furthermore,	Canada	had	undergone	its	own	political	shift	in	that	time.	From	1963	to	1984,	with	the	exception	of	a	few	months,	Canada	was	governed	by	successive	Liberal	administrations	that	set	the	stage	for	the	country’s	current	political	identity,	inaugurating	policies	on	multiculturalism,	modern	social	issues,	and	universal	public	healthcare.	Canada	was	late	to	the	conservatism	that	took	hold	in	the	UK	in	1979	with	the	election	of	Margaret	Thatcher	and	in	the	U.S.	with	the	1980	election	of	Ronald	Reagan;	Brian	Mulroney,	Canada’s	Progressive	Conservative	Prime	Minister,	did	not	come	to	office	until	1984.	
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	 Even	as	politics	in	Canada	reached	its	liberal	apogee	in	the	era	prior	to	1984,	however,	the	University	of	Western	Ontario	was	on	a	meteoric	rise	within	the	Canadian	economics	profession.	Distinctly	Chicago	School-esque	ideologically,	it	was	the	undisputed	top	economics	department	in	the	country,	and	it	seems	likely	that	its	free-market	orientation	had	some	effect	on	economics	education	in	other	departments,	even	with	a	relatively	greater	UK	–	and	therefore	welfare-oriented	–	influence	during	that	time.			 Indeed,	several	older	conversants	mentioned	that	Canadian	economics	education	had	a	more	markets-	and	efficiency-oriented	tenor	than	the	UK	prior	to	the	Thatcher	era,	suggesting	that	Canada	may	have	always	lacked	–	in	a	relative	sense	–	the	welfare	focus	of	pre-1980s	Britain.257	Even	so,	the	oldest	Baby	Boomers	in	my	sample	would	have	embarked	upon	their	undergraduate	economics	programs	in	1964	at	the	earliest,	still	well	within	the	period	in	which	Canadian	economists	appear	to	have	had	closer	ties	with	the	UK.	Furthermore,	the	1960s	was	a	decade	of	unprecedented	transformational	social	change	that	could	not	but	have	had	an	effect	on	the	teenagers	and	young	adults	of	the	age.	Besides	which,	a	large	majority	of	the	Baby	Boomers	had	finished	at	least	their	first	degree	by	the	time	the	Chicago	School	rose	to	prominence	in	the	late	1970s	and	1980s.	Yet	most	of	them	would	still	have	been	in	graduate	school	as	the	Chicago	School	ethos	began	to	take	hold,	and	with	Western	–	very	much	a	Chicago	School-adherent	institution	–	as	a	dominant	force	in	Canadian	economics	education	at	the	time,	it	is	surprising	that	this	did	not	have	a	greater	effect	on	the	Baby	Boomers’	views.258	Indeed,	the	role	of	government	was	seriously	questioned	in	the	1980s,	with	wide-ranging	effects	on	the	discipline	in	Canada	and	elsewhere	(Fourcade	et	al.,	2015).		
																																																								257	Heterodox	economists	were	largely	pushed	out	of	UK	academic	institutions	from	1992	onwards	(Lee,	Pham,	&	Gu,	2013).	Fourcade	has	described	the	progressive	foundations	of	economics	in	the	UK,	followed	by	the	shift	towards	market-oriented	economics	in	the	Thatcher	era	(Fourcade,	2006).	The	perception	among	some	of	my	conversants	was	that	economics	in	the	UK	had	been	–	and	perhaps	still	is	–	more	multidisciplinary	than	in	the	U.S.	258	If	future	research	does	show	that	early	exposure	to	economics	has	an	effect	on	students’	later	political	orientations,	it	would	be	worth	examining	in	tandem	whether	the	politics	of	Baby	Boomers’	teenaged	years	–	all	of	which	fell	within	the	era	of	successive	Liberal	administrations	that	set	the	stage	for	Canada’s	modern	progressive	identity,	from	1963	to	1984	–	had	a	similarly	long-lasting	effect	on	their	political	views.	Indeed,	if	Baby	Boomers	are	so	different	from	other	cohorts	of	economists	in	part	due	to	their	socialisation	in	the	progressive	era	of	the	1960s	and	1970s	in	Canada,	it	is	worth	examining	whether	political	exposure	at	a	particular	age	–	due	to	developmental	factors	or	otherwise	–	can	have	measurable	effects	on	people’s	political	views	in	the	long-term.		
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	 It	is	possible	that	the	timing	of	older	academics’	economics	education	played	a	role	in	shaping	their	views,	as	I	explore	in	the	case	of	the	younger	cohort	below.	Several	conversants	noted	that	there	had	been	significant	ties	between	Canada	and	the	UK	during	the	aforementioned	period	in	which	Cambridge	–	and	Keynesianism	–	had	a	lock	on	the	economics	profession.	The	shift	towards	the	U.S.	seemed	to	happen	before	the	Thatcher	era	in	Britain	began,	so	the	net	effect	of	the	UK’s	influence	may	have	been	broadly	progressive.259			 Furthermore,	severe	financial	crises	do	appear	to	affect	economic	thinking.	My	earlier	work	added	to	the	research	suggesting	that	the	turmoil	of	the	1980s	was	a	formative	period	for	Canadian	banking	regulation	(Quigley,	2012).	If	Canadian	economists	were	frightened	into	adopting	a	cautious	approach	to	government	regulation	in	the	1980s,	as	it	appears	they	had	been,	perhaps	that	acted	as	a	counterweight	to	claims	that	the	role	of	government	should	be	reduced	–	even	with	the	dominance	of	the	University	of	Western	Ontario	economics	department	at	the	time.	In	the	Canadian	case	it	may	be	that	the	economic	trauma	of	the	1980s	left	a	sort	of	epimemetic260	stamp	on	economics;	it	seems	to	have	been	a	period	in	which	ideas	took	hold	that	would	affect	Canadian	economists	for	decades	to	come.		 The	youngest	generation	in	my	sample	–	28-	to	40-year-olds,	or	Millennials	–	would	have	come	of	age	in	an	era	of	Liberal	governance	in	Canada.	The	Liberal	Party	was	in	power	from	1993	to	2006	without	interruption,	covering	off	almost	the	whole	of	Millennials’	high	school	graduation	dates	and	most	of	their	years	of	undergraduate	education.	It	is	worth	noting	that	this	was	very	much	a	market-oriented	administration	in	many	ways.	Socially	liberal,	the	Liberals	nevertheless	embarked	on	the	most	brutal	cost-cutting	regime	in	Canadian	history	in	the	1990s	(Baragar	&	Seccareccia,	2008;	Dalton,	2009),	as	a	few	of	my	conversants	also	noted.	They	posted	budgetary	surpluses																																																									259	Western’s	influence	appears	to	have	waned	somewhat	in	the	economics	profession	in	Canada,	while	UBC’s	star	has	risen.	UBC	is	perceived	to	be	more	eclectic	and	considerably	to	the	left	of	Western;	will	its	influence	on	the	field,	and	potentially	other	departments’	emulation	of	its	approach,	cause	UBC	to	have	an	effect	on	Canadian	economists	akin	to	that	of	pre-1980s	Britain?	260	I	have	seen	the	word	“epimemetic”	used	in	academic	scholarship	on	organisational	culture	and	on	the	margins	of	the	internet	to	describe	the	equivalent	of	epigenetics	(environmental	factors	altering	genes	or	gene	expression,	which	can	then	be	passed	down	to	future	generations)	in	computers,	but	here	I	mean	to	refer	to	the	idea	of	an	event	or	exposure	that	changes	the	lineage	of	thought	in	a	discipline,	as	the	Great	Depression	clearly	did	for	economics.	This	concept	is	as	per	Richard	Dawkins’	discussion	of	“memes”	–	cultural	concepts	or	ideas	that	spread	through	the	population	via	social	interaction.	
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in	most	of	the	fiscal	years	of	their	successive	administrations,	during	which	time	the	economy	boomed;	Canada	was	listed	as	the	#1	country	on	the	United	Nations’	Human	Development	Index;	and	national	debt	shrunk.	At	the	same	time,	consumer	debt	began	to	climb	and	the	Liberals	–	and	later	the	Conservatives	–	began	to	dispense	with	some	financial	sector	regulations.261	It	was	what	some	academics	would	call	a	“neoliberal”	administration.		 If	the	influence	from	contemporary	domestic	politics	was	generally	laissez-faire	for	the	youngest	cohort	in	my	sample,	so	was	the	influence	from	the	U.S.	and	the	UK	over	the	same	period.	It	is	worth	emphasising	again	that,	to	a	greater	extent	than	in	other	disciplines	(Fourcade,	2006),	economics	is	U.S.-centric	and	legitimacy	within	the	discipline	comes	from	a	certain	academic	pedigree	–	from	the	top	few	American	economics	departments,	in	other	words,	and	perhaps	to	a	lesser	extent	Oxford,	Cambridge,	and	the	London	School	of	Economics	in	the	UK.	Exposure	to	U.S.	social	norms	is	greater	among	economists	than	in	other	disciplines	because	proportionally	more	economists	have	studied	there	(A.	Scott,	1993;	A.	Scott	&	Grubel,	1969),	and	U.S.	politics	has	been	broadly	neoliberal	or	neoconservative	–	laissez-faire,	in	other	words	–	over	the	past	30	years	as	much	as	introductory	economics	curricula	have	been.	For	the	youngest	cohort	in	my	sample,	then,	many	influences	–	in	terms	of	social	norms,	economics	curricula,	and	North	American	politics	–	would	have	pointed	in	the	same	direction.		 Indeed,	evidence	from	a	large	number	of	conversants	from	both	the	left	and	the	right	suggest	that	there	has	been	a	convergence	in	the	views	of	professors	within	the	discipline	since	the	1980s.	The	younger	group	of	economists	in	my	sample	may,	then,	have	been	educated	in	more	of	a	monoculture	relative	to	their	older	colleagues.	Furthermore,	several	younger	conversants	reported	having	been	taught	RBC	theory	well	after	the	point	at	which	it	had	largely	been	replaced	by	other	models;	future	research	could	usefully	examine	whether	the	RBC	model	may	have	persisted	in	Canada	(or	at	least	at	Western)	longer	than	elsewhere,	or	whether	advances	in	the	discipline	were	as	slow	to	enter	the	curriculum	in	other	jurisdictions	as	well.			
																																																									261	Fortunately,	as	a	body	of	academic	work	has	shown,	much	of	this	financial	sector	deregulation	was	delayed	compared	to	the	U.S.	and	the	UK;	at	the	advent	of	the	crisis,	not	enough	of	this	had	taken	hold	to	do	significant	damage	as	it	did	elsewhere.	
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Diversity	in	Economics	
		 Because	many	people,	if	not	most,	encounter	economics	for	the	first	time	during	their	undergraduate	education,	introductory	courses	have	a	significant	role	to	play	in	diversifying	the	field	at	a	later	stage;	how	it	is	taught	will	in	part	determine	who	pursues	further	study	in	the	area	and	who	feels	welcome	to	do	so.	Defaults	matter;	instructors	of	mandatory	introductory	courses	teach	mainstream	economics,	whereas	only	students	who	are	already	interested	in,	or	are	aware	of,	an	alternative	will	take	pluralist	electives	–	which	are	usually	only	available	to	upperclassmen.	As	the	above	literature	shows,	there	is	a	self-selection	effect	in	economics;	thus	it	is	worth	examining	whether	the	field	is	attracting	a	diversity	of	students	at	the	outset.		 In	a	field	that	is	overwhelmingly	the	domain	of	older	white	men,	it	is	particularly	important	to	attend	to	those	who	do	not	self-select	into	the	field,	and	to	the	“silences”	in	interviews	–	the	absence	of	women	and	minorities	in	discussions	of	economics.	Perhaps	unsurprisingly,	women	almost	never	came	up	in	the	interviews	I	conducted,	even	though	I	was,	myself,	an	obvious	prompt.	Minority	groups	were	also	mentioned	rarely,	if	at	all.		 This	is	perhaps	in	part	because	there	are	so	few	women	and	minorities	in	the	field,	especially	in	academia.	It	is	worth	putting	the	economics	profession	in	the	context	of	one	of	the	subjects	the	field	addresses	–	economic	development.	The	story	of	productivity	growth	in	advanced	economies	is	one	of	technological	advancements,	certainly,	but	it	is	–	as	one	of	my	conversants	explained	–	also	the	story	of	integrating	marginalised	populations	into	the	labour	pool.	The	induction	of	large	numbers	of	women	into	the	workforce	was	responsible	for	significant	productivity	gains	in	Western	economies	since	World	War	II;	they,	alongside	immigrants	to	Canada,	are	a	large	part	of	the	reason	for	Canada’s	impressive	growth	and	development	over	the	past	several	decades.	One	could	say	that	the	discipline	of	economics	has	yet	to	reflect	the	forces	that	shaped	Canada	as	a	modern	economy;	for	perspective,	the	percentage	of	women	in	the	economics	profession	(12.7%)	is	less	than	half	of	women’s	labour	force	participation	in	Canada	as	a	whole	in	the	early	1950s	(approximately	25%)	(Statistics	Canada,	2017).			 Somewhat	along	the	same	lines,	fully	94%	of	my	sample	of	academic	economists	agreed	that	the	net	effect	of	immigration	on	Canada	has	been	positive;262	immigrants’																																																									262	The	remainder	reported	that	the	effect	was	neutral	or	did	not	know	–	not	one	claimed	the	effect	was	negative.	
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are	underrepresented	in	the	field	of	economics,	however.	A	significant	proportion	of	economists	favoured	helping	First	Nations,	even	at	the	risk	of	running	up	federal	debt.	There	is	not	a	single	First	Nations	economist	in	the	country,	however,	as	far	as	it	is	possible	to	tell	from	online	departmental	photos.		 The	senior	ranks	of	economics	departments	appear	to	be	almost	exclusively	the	domain	of	white	men,	despite	Canada’s	ethnic	diversity	and	the	fact	that	in	2001	fully	34.6%	of	federal	government	economists	were	women	(Dooley	et	al.,	2001,	p.	4).	The	dearth	of	female	academic	economists	is	common	in	economics	elsewhere	as	well,	however	(Dooley	et	al.,	2001;	Robb	et	al.,	2006).	Canada	ranks	third	among	OECD	countries	in	terms	of	the	proportion	of	college	and	university	educators	who	are	women	(Canadian	Association	of	University	Teachers,	2015,	p.	46),	but	that	would	not	be	obvious	from	the	websites	of	Canadian	economics	departments.	Again,	this	is	an	issue	that	is	not	unique	to	Canada;	McDowell,	Singell,	Ziliak	(1999)	show	that	women	face	difficulties	in	getting	promoted,	even	after	controlling	for	publishing	record	and	the	like	–	although	this	is	much	less	the	case	in	China	(Robb	et	al.,	2006),	suggesting	that	social	norms	and	other	cultural	factors	can	influence	the	proportion	of	female	economists	substantially.	Although	mine	was	not	a	representative	sample,	I	was	struck	by	the	number	of	high-profile	women	I	interviewed	whose	economics	background	was	non-standard	in	some	way,	who	studied	something	else	initially	or	who	took	time	off,	and	who	persevered	despite	being	actively	“turned	off”	by	the	way	economics	was	taught.263	Similarly,	of	my	survey	respondents	a	disproportionate	number	of	women	(58.3%,	and	fully	75%	among	the	youngest	cohort	and	the	Baby	Boomers	in	my	sample)	had	taken	time	off	before,	after,	or	between	degrees,	compared	with	34%	of	the	men	in	my	sample.	The	qualitative	responses	I	heard	from	women,	too,	differed	dramatically	from	those	of	male	academic	economists,	many	of	whom	had	undertaken	a	standard	economics	education	with	no	interludes	in	other	disciplines	or	occupations.	It	may	be	that	the	field	is	less	likely	to	attract	and	retain	more	than	just	the	women	who	were	willing	to	persevere	despite	significant	barriers.	If	my	sample	is	at	all	typical,	and	women	come	to	the	subject	later,	on	average,	then	the	diversity	of	the	field	in	that	respect	is	partly	a	function	of	the	ease	with	which	a	person	can	switch	to	economics	at	a	late	stage	in	her	
																																																								263	This	was	true	of	all	of	the	autodidact	economists	I	spoke	with	as	well;	to	a	one,	they	had	come	to	economics	later	in	life.	
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education264	–	and	that	is	itself	partly	a	function	of	the	flexibility	of	the	university	or	the	education	system	more	generally,	or	of	economics	programs	specifically	in	this	case.265		 A	shift	in	the	proportion	of	female	economists	could	have	indirect	effects	as	well.	Studies	have	shown	that	gender	–	likely	due	to	socialisation	effects	–	may	affect	social	norms;	women	are	more	likely	to	cooperate	under	experimental	conditions	(Etzioni,	2015),	and	other	studies	suggest	that	collaborative	researchers	tend	to	be	more	productive	(Levitt	&	Thelwall,	2016)	–	something	to	test	for	in	economics	departments	that	are	able	to	increase	the	number	of	women	in	their	ranks.	Furthermore,	an	increased	focus	on	women	in	economics	would	likely	expand	the	breadth	of	works	included	in	economics	syllabi,	potentially	bringing	the	only	woman	ever	to	have	won	the	Nobel	Prize	in	Economics	–	Elinor	Ostrom	–	into	the	curriculum;	this	could,	in	turn,	encourage	a	return	to	the	study	of	institutions	and	social	contexts	in	economics.	Her	work	shows	that	the	tragedy	of	the	commons	can	be	cooperatively	managed	out	of	existence,	for	example	–	a	timely	message	when	it	comes	to	climate	change.		
	
Economists’	Critiques	of	the	Discipline		 		 My	conversants	mentioned	several	other	curricular	changes	that	could	be	made.	They	particularly	emphasised	the	lack	of	institutions	and	history	in	Canadian	economics	education,	while	a	few	lamented	the	increasing	mathematisation	of	the	field	(although	this	did	not	bother	some).	Evidence	suggests	that	the	mathematisation	of	economics	in	Canada	may	be	somewhat	more	pronounced	than	elsewhere;	Canadian	economics	departments	are	significantly	more	likely	(45%	compared	to	23%	in	the	U.S.)	to	require	two	calculus	courses	as	an	admissions	standard	(Milkman	&	McCoy,	2008),	and	a	few	of	my	conversants	specifically	mentioned	that	Canadian	economics	was	more	“math-y”	than	elsewhere	(especially	in	Québec	departments	known	for	their	expertise	in	econometrics)	–	one	said,	“I’d	say	the	emphasis	on	mathematical	economics	is	the	same	here	–	maybe	a	little	more	gung-ho	here	–	so	it’s	hard	to	get	young	economists																																																									264	Based	on	these	results,	it	would	be	interesting	to	test	whether	the	establishment	of	economics	programs	tailored	to	late	entrants	to	the	field	would	attract	a	wider	variety	of	students	to	economics.		265	The	first	woman	in	Canada	to	become	a	tenured	economics	professor	(in	1950,	at	the	University	of	Saskatchewan),	Mabel	Timlin,	received	her	B.A.	at	37	(taking	one	class	at	a	time)	and	her	PhD	at	48;	she	was	a	teacher	and	administrator	in	the	meantime,	and	dabbled	in	literature	as	well	(Cicarelli	&	Cicarelli,	2003).	
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interested	in	policy.”	Others	were	clearly	frustrated	by	economics	students’	inability	to	write	prose,	while	some	critiqued	the	lack	of	diversity	in	the	field.		 Interestingly,	my	conversants’	critiques	of	economics	education	largely	echoed	comments	from	COMER	members	and	the	UK	Society	of	Business	Economists	(SBE)	alike;	the	members	of	both	groups	felt	economics	graduates	needed	more	economic	history,	more	history	of	economic	ideas,	and	more	of	an	ability	to	translate	economic	concepts	into	plain	language.	The	SBE’s	priority	list	of	courses	included	standard	macro	and	microeconomic	fare	alongside	data-handling	skills,	followed	by	Money,	Banking	and	Financial	Economics,	Economic	History,	and	International	Trade.	They	particularly	cited	poor	communication	skills	and	a	lack	of	“real	world”	or	“historical	awareness”	among	economists	(SBE	Steering	Group,	2013).	A	survey	of	international	economics	curricula	conducted	by	the	International	Student	Initiative	for	Pluralism	in	Economics	(ISIPE)	produced	similar	results	(ISIPE,	2016).	They	emphasised	the	necessity	of	teaching	critical	thinking	skills	and	lamented	that	math,	statistics,	and	management	accounted	for	35%	of	average	course	content	whereas	economic	history,	environmental	economics,	and	courses	covering	contemporary	issues	such	as	inequality	accounted	for	only	10.5%	of	course	content.	In	short,	there	is	broad	consensus	as	to	how	the	average	undergraduate	economics	curriculum	could	be	changed.	Introductory	economics	is	highly	standardised	internationally	and	so,	as	it	turns	out,	are	the	critiques	of	it.	A	large	proportion	of	my	data	on	curricular	reform	–	from	conversants	and	survey	respondents,	institutionally	educated	and	autodidact	economists,	and	heterodox	academics	and	right-wing	think	tank	employees	alike	–	all	point	in	the	same	direction.		 Perhaps	even	more	striking	is	that	the	consensus	reflects	a	general	openness	to	critiques	of	the	discipline.	Almost	all	of	the	conversants	in	my	qualitative	sample	shared	at	least	some	criticisms	of	economics	education,	and	only	20%	of	the	respondents	in	my	survey	sample	outright	rejected	the	complaints	about	the	discipline	that	had	emerged	following	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis.	Many	of	the	critiques	were	mixed	with	defences,	of	course,	but	there	was	a	general	willingness	to	accept	negative	appraisals	across	the	board.		
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Hierarchy	in	the	Canadian	Economics	Profession			 In	the	course	of	my	fieldwork	I	was	able	to	generate	a	significant	amount	of	data	on	relative	esteem	in	the	Canadian	economics	profession.	Departmental	rankings	and	institutional	respect	for	certain	think	tanks	–	and	hence	relative	esteem	–	are	fairly	clear	in	Canada.	Canadian	economists	gain	esteem	by	studying	outside	the	country,	preferably	at	the	top	U.S.	economics	departments,	as	mentioned	above	and	as	was	widely	reported	among	my	conversants.	This	can	be	viewed	as	an	example	of	signaling	–	of	quality	and	legitimacy	in	this	case	(Hammerstein	&	Hagen,	2005).	Indeed,	among	the	92	academics	who	answered	the	question	in	my	survey	sample,	58.7%	of	PhDs	were	awarded	by	U.S.	universities,	and	28.3%	of	these	were	from	the	top	six	U.S.	economics	departments	alone.	This	is	as	compared	to	a	total	of	21.7%	of	PhDs	from	Canada’s	top	four	economics	departments	combined.		 Within	Canada,	the	top	four	departments	are	fairly	clearly	the	University	of	British	Columbia	(UBC),	the	University	of	Toronto,	the	University	of	Western	Ontario,	and	Queen’s	University.	Among	those	four,	however,	there	appears	to	have	been	a	shift	over	the	past	couple	of	decades;	Western	has	dropped	from	the	top	spot,	while	Queen’s	has	reportedly	declined	somewhat	in	quality	as	well.	UBC,	on	the	other	hand,	has	risen	through	the	ranks.	So,	too,	have	Albertan	universities	(the	University	of	Calgary	and	the	University	of	Alberta),	largely	due	to	private	funding,	according	to	my	conversants,	as	have	several	Québécois	universities	–	l’Université	de	Montréal,	l’Université	Laval,	and	the	Anglophone	McGill	University.				 These	shifts	in	the	hierarchy	could	bring	about	at	least	two	interesting	developments	in	the	Canadian	economics	profession.	First,	UBC	is	now	the	clear	frontrunner,	a	position	formerly	held	by	Western.	Western	was	likely	Canada’s	most	Chicago-like	university	in	its	heyday	and	its	influence	on	other	Canadian	universities	was	broadly	free-market.	UBC,	on	the	other	hand,	is	viewed	by	my	conversants	as	unusually	“eclectic”	among	Canadian	economics	departments,	and	it	is	also	viewed	as	being	to	the	left	of	the	profession	as	a	whole.	If	the	top	department	has	an	influence	on	departments	elsewhere,	that	influence	in	Canada	has	shifted	from	right	to	left	in	a	generation.	Furthermore,	other	trends	appear	to	be	moving	in	the	opposite	direction;	Alberta	is	arguably	Canada’s	most	conservative	province,	and	its	universities’	faculty	members	sometimes	bear	the	same	ideological	stamp,	while	the	two	Francophone	Québécois	universities	are	methodologically	extreme	in	a	relative	sense	in	that	they	are	
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markedly	and	notably	oriented	around	econometrics.	Although	Canada	has	a	tendency	towards	homogeneity	in	the	economics	profession,	perhaps	the	coming	era	will	see	a	divergence	in	economic	thought	–	with	the	result	that	the	discipline	as	a	whole	becomes	more	varied	and	contested.	For	my	older	conversants,	many	of	whom	had	witnessed	the	dangers	of	dominant	sects	within	economics,	this	would	likely	be	a	good	thing.			
The	Effects	of	Canadian	Social	Norms	
		 Among	the	15	American-raised	economists	in	the	survey	sample,	they	were	nearly	20%	more	likely	to	say	that	they	were	a	bit	more	left-wing	than	they	were	in	high	school	than	was	true	of	my	sample	as	a	whole.	Although	my	survey	represents	a	small	sample	of	all	academic	economists	in	the	country,	this	is	an	intriguingly	suggestive	finding	that	warrants	further	investigation.	If	found	to	be	significant,	this	would	suggest	that	Canadian	social	norms	may	have	had	a	countervailing	effect	on	American	economists	such	that	they	are	in	fact	almost	as	likely	to	be	more	left-wing	than	right-wing	after	some	years	in	Canada	(this	is	as	opposed	to	the	sample	as	a	whole,	in	which	economists	were	almost	twice	as	likely	to	be	more	right-wing	than	left-wing	relative	to	their	high	school	selves).266		 Of	course,	social	norms	may	also	flow	the	other	way;	economists’	attitudes	could	have	some	effect	on	the	views	of	the	Canadian	populace.	Yet	there	is	some	evidence	that,	even	among	private	sector	economists	more	likely	to	be	exposed	to	U.S.	cultural	norms,	Canada’s	influence	is	strongly	felt.	It	is	worth	noting	that	I	interviewed	six	of	the	most	influential	private	sector	economists	in	the	country	(the	major	banks’	chief	economists,	past	and	present).	These	bank	chief	economists	displayed	a	significant	degree	of	variation	in	their	responses	to	questions	about	policy	issues,	and	their	political	orientations	appeared	to	be	at	least	somewhat	varied	as	well.	The	degree	to	which	many	of	them	held	left-leaning	views	on	particular	policy	issues	was	especially	interesting	because	they	may	be	more	often	exposed	to	U.S.	business	norms	than	other	economists	in	my	sample.		
																																																								266	One	indicator	that	the	idea	of	being	“progressive”	was	viewed	inherently	positively	–	that	this	constitutes	a	Canadian	social	norm	–	was	right-wing	economists’	hasty	assurances	that	their	proposals	could	still	be	considered	“progressive;”	this	happened	in	conversation	with	seven	such	conversants!	
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	 Furthermore,	an	examination	of	the	Boards	of	Directors	of	equivalent	Canadian	and	American	organisations	–	the	Canadian	Association	of	Business	Economists	(CABE)	and	the	National	Association	of	Business	Economists	(NABE),	respectively	–	shows	that	there	is	a	significantly	greater	range	of	the	types	of	organisations	board	members	represented	in	CABE	as	opposed	to	NABE.	On	the	CABE	board	there	was	a	representative	of	a	large	cooperative	as	well	as	a	CCPA	economist,	for	example,	whereas	the	entirety	of	the	NABE	board	was	strictly	private-sector.	Thus	it	is	possible	that	the	upper	echelon	of	the	business	sector	in	Canada	is	somewhat	more	varied	than	in	the	U.S.267	Moreover,	a	couple	of	conversants	noted	that	private-sector,	government-sector,	and	Bank	of	Canada	economists	were	less	uniformly	neoclassical	than	their	academic	colleagues	in	Canada,	which	may	not	be	the	case	in	the	U.S.	Again,	I	did	not	have	enough	data	to	come	to	a	firm	conclusion	on	this,	but	it	warrants	further	investigation.		 The	U.S.	was	clearly	many	conversants’	reference	point	for	a	number	of	policy	issues	–	particularly	in	the	case	of	income	inequality,	capital	gains	taxation,	and	healthcare	policy;	conversants	expressed	their	own	views	(and	often	expressed	support	for	the	status	quo	in	Canada),	but	the	contrast	was	often	with	the	U.S.	Interestingly,	this	may	have	its	roots	in	a	well-documented	psychological	phenomenon.	Ariely’s	research	suggests	that,	when	a	member	of	the	out-group	(in	this	case,	a	student	wearing	a	rival	university’s	sweater)	behaves	badly,	the	in-group	becomes	more	virtuous	in	reaction;	cheating	all	but	disappeared	among	the	in-group	university	students	he	worked	with	in	such	cases	(Ariely,	2012).	It	is	worth	asking,	then,	whether	Canadian	social	norms	are	partly	established	and	maintained	by	way	of	reaction	against	what	is	perceived	as	the	out-group’s	bad	behaviour	–	the	American	tendency	towards	what	Canadians	may	believe	to	be	bad	economic	and	social	policy,	in	this	case.	Indeed,	Canadians’	anti-Americanism	is	more	or	less	a	cultural	trope,	and	Canadian	identity	at	times	has	been	defined	in	contrast	to	American	culture.	It	has	been	suggested	that	Canadian	anti-Americanism	is	a	unique	kind	of	anti-Americanism	(Nossal,	2005).	If	the	U.S.	constitutes	the	ultimate	out-group,	it	is	possible	that	it	has	shaped	Canadian	policy	indirectly	yet	powerfully	–	through	Canadians’	attempts	to	mold	public	policy	that	looks	as	little	like	American	public	policy	as	possible.		 A	conversant	pointed	out	another	factor	contributing	to	the	U.S-Canada	contrasts	under	discussion	here:	that	there	may	be	less	of	a	revolving	door	between	the	finance																																																									267	Indeed,	CABE	invited	Thomas	Piketty	to	deliver	an	address	on	income	inequality;	it	is	hard	to	imagine	NABE	issuing	a	similar	invitation.	
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sector	and	government	in	Canada	than	there	is	in	the	U.S.	My	conversant	noted	that	the	U.S.	equivalent	of	the	Department	of	Finance	in	Canada	is	populated	by	former	Goldman	Sachs	employees	instead	of	elected	officials,	as	is	the	case	in	Canada.	She	felt	this	was	a	negative,	but	it	may	result	in	less	regulatory	capture,	and	it	could	also	affect	social	norms	in	the	financial	sphere.	The	big	banks’	economists	are	tremendously	influential	in	Canada,	and	their	views	may	be	moderated	relative	to	banker	peers	in	the	U.S.	because	they	have	near-daily	interactions	with	the	Bank	of	Canada,	the	Office	of	the	Superintendent	of	Financial	Institutions,	and	the	Department	of	Finance,	whose	employees	do	not	come	from	industry.		 The	same	conversant	had	also	lamented	the	dearth	of	women	in	finance	in	Canada.	However:			 The	statistics	suggest	Canada	is	one	of	the	better	countries	to	be	a	professional	woman	in	the	financial	services	industry.	Female	representation	on	the	Boards	and	ExCos268	of	its	financial	institutions	is	25%	and	23%	respectively,	making	Canada	the	3rd	highest	ranking	country	for	Executive	Committee	gender	diversity	in	our	sample,	behind	Norway	and	Sweden.	This	high	ranking	of	gender	diversity	of	the	Canadian	financial	services	industry	shows	that	it	is	pulling	above	its	weight	when	compared	to	the	overall	Canadian	society,	which	got	a	ranking	of	number	19	in	the	latest	WEF	Global	Gender	Gap	Report	(Daisley,	2014,	p.	27).		Indeed,	according	to	Statistics	Canada	data,	women	hold	31.6%	of	all	senior	managerial	roles	in	Canada	(Status	of	Women	Canada,	2012).	Given	that	women	tend	to	behave	more	prosocially	in	experiments,	this	could	have	had	an	effect	on	social	norms	in	the	Canadian	finance	sector	more	generally.	It	would	also	be	worth	exploring	whether	the	improved	gender	balance	in	the	private	and	government	sectors	relative	to	academia	–	with	approximately	three	times	as	much	female	representation	in	the	former	two	sectors	than	the	latter	–	has	influenced	these	groups’	respective	political	views	and	adherence	to	economic	orthodoxy	more	generally.	There	is	a	more	obvious	question	that	emerges	from	the	data	as	well,	however,	which	is	how	it	is	that	the	same	country	can	boast	among	the	highest	female	participation	in	private-	and	government-sector	economics	yet	post	such	dismal	numbers	in	academia.		 Regardless,	it	does	appear	that	Canadian	economists	as	a	group	are	significantly	more	egalitarian,	pro-interdisciplinarity,	and	accepting	of	the	role	of	government	than	are	their	peers	in	the	U.S.,	despite	having	had	more	exposure	to	the	U.S.	and	its	economists	than	any	other	discipline.	Within	my	survey	results,	92%	of	respondents																																																									268	Executive	Committees.	
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supported	laws	restricting	gun	ownership;	94%	of	respondents	felt	the	government	should	restrict	development	in	certain	areas	in	order	to	preserve	biodiverse	ecosystems;	and	fully	100%	of	respondents	were	in	favour	of	universal	public	healthcare.	It	would	be	hard	to	imagine	a	similar	group	of	American	economists	coming	out	so	firmly	in	favour	of	government	intervention.	In	my	sample,	however,	even	American-born	and	-raised	economists	find	themselves	less	likely	to	move	to	the	right	than	Canadian-born	and	-raised	economists	after	some	years	in	Canada;	the	Americans,	then,	hew	at	least	somewhat	towards	the	views	of	their	adopted	country	over	time.	If	my	data	are	correct,	Canadian	social	norms	could	have	a	countervailing	effect	against	a	laissez-faire	economics	education	–	such	that	the	oldest	cohorts	in	my	sample	even	line	up	with	left-wing	academic	disciplines	in	Sweden,	a	surprising	finding	indeed.			
Canadian	Economists’	Views	on	Inequality	and	Tax	Evasion	
		 Further	patterns	emerge	in	terms	of	particular	policy	issues	–	specifically,	those	such	as	capital	gains	taxation,	usury,	tax	evasion,	and	the	like:	economic	issues	with	a	moral	valence	in	which	economic	reasoning	interacts	with	an	ethical	judgement	call.	As	above,	the	older	cohort	among	my	respondents	was	even	more	critical	of	inequality	than	the	Canadian	populace	as	a	whole,	but	Canadians	in	general	appear	to	be	more	concerned	about	income	inequality	than	Americans	(84%	compared	to	66%)	(Stratcom	Strategic	Communications,	2017;	The	New	York	Times/CBS	News,	2015),269	even	though	the	level	of	inequality	is	worse	in	the	U.S.	That	said,	although	income	inequality	is	not	extreme	in	Canada,	its	level	of	wealth	inequality	is	striking;	the	top	1%	of	the	population	owns	24%	of	the	wealth,	more	than	in	the	UK	and	only	slightly	less	than	in	France	and	Germany	(Davies,	Lluberas,	&	Shorrocks,	2011).270	In	Québec,	the	Anglophone	minority’s	top	1%	still	makes	considerably	more	money	than	the	Francophone	top	1%	(Veall,	2012,	p.	1254).																																																									269	Even	though	Occupy	Wall	Street	was	most	active	in	the	U.S.,	it	in	fact	began	with	the	magazine	cover	(featuring	a	ballet	dancer	perched	on	top	of	Wall	Street’s	raging	bull	statue)	of	Adbusters,	a	Vancouver	(Canada)	publication.	270	If	Piketty	is	right,	and	capital	does	indeed	grow	at	a	faster	rate	than	economic	growth	over	time,	Canada	fares	poorly	according	to	a	crucial	metric;	such	extreme	wealth	inequality	at	this	stage	bodes	ill	for	the	future	–	especially	seeing	as,	per	my	conversant’s	comment,	$1	trillion	will	be	passed	down	in	the	form	of	inheritances	in	Canada	over	the	next	20	years.	
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	 Despite	income	inequality	almost	as	high	as	(and	wealth	inequality	higher	than)	the	UK’s,	Canada	has	better	intergenerational	mobility271	than	Sweden;	this	has	been	attributed	in	part	to	Canada’s	public	healthcare	and	educational	systems	(Veall,	2012).272	Among	my	conversants,	too,	Canada’s	education	system	itself	was	accorded	a	share	of	the	credit	for	our	impressive	levels	of	social	mobility.		 As	for	specific	measures	to	address	inequality,	70.7%	of	survey	respondents	expressed	support	for	the	taxation	of	inheritances273,	although	only	marginally	more	respondents	felt	the	top	marginal	tax	rate	should	be	increased	than	those	who	felt	it	should	be	lowered.	One	of	the	more	marked	contrasts	with	American	economists	is	in	the	case	of	executive	compensation.	Canadian	academic	economists	are	more	than	twice	as	likely	as	American	academic	economists	to	think	that	executives	are	paid	too	much;	39.39%	of	a	group	of	eminent	American	professors	were	found	to	hold	that	view	(Sapienza	&	Zingales,	2013,	p.	13),	whereas	fully	81%	of	the	academics	in	my	sample	felt	the	same.	Among	Canadian	heterodox	and	autodidact	economists	these	figures	reached	100%.	In	general	there	was	a	strong	egalitarian274	streak	among	conversants	and	survey	respondents	of	all	political	stripes,	relative	to	economists	elsewhere	and	even	relative	to	the	Canadian	populace	in	some	cases.	
																																																								271	There	may	be	a	risk	in	putting	too	much	emphasis	on	mobility	as	opposed	to	equality,	however.	One	of	my	conversants’	comment	on	inequality	rested	on	the	argument	that	society	could	miss	out	on	future	Mozarts	in	an	unequal	system,	which	arguably	simply	replaces	the	unit	of	discrimination	–	from	accident	of	birth	to	inborn	or	cultivated	talent.	Talent	is,	of	course,	borne	of	a	combination	of	nature	and	nurture,	neither	of	which	conforms	to	common	conceptions	of	equity	as	they	are	both	outside	the	individual’s	control	and	are	influenced	by	privilege	of	all	kinds.	272	Canada’s	apparent	social	mobility	may	also	be	due	in	part	to	immigration	policies	that	preferentially	select	for	highly-educated	immigrants	who	are	often	prevented	from	working	in	their	field	of	expertise	in	Canada	–	and	thus	who	appear	to	be	low-income	in	the	first	generation	–	but	whose	children	do	exceptionally	well	in	the	second	generation.		273	In	the	words	of	one	of	my	conversants:	“Why	does	the	inheritance	flow	matter?	Partly	the	answer	is	that	inheritances	are	even	more	concentrated	than	wealth	itself,	so	that	inequality	tends	to	rise	as	the	inheritance	flow	goes	up.	But,	in	addition,	inheritance	is	widely	regarded	as	one	of	the	least	meritorious	sources	of	wealth”	(Davies,	2015).	274	Egalitarianism	has	been	linked	to	societal	wellbeing	and	Canada	does	well	on	this	score	(Helliwell	et	al.,	2017).	One	potential	explanation	for	this	is	because	in	terms	of	status	competition,	most	people	overestimate	their	own	value	or	talents	at	least	somewhat;	90%	of	the	population	thinks	they	are	above-average	drivers,	for	example	(Daniel	Kahneman,	2011).	If	the	spread	of	incomes	within	a	society	is	narrow,	perhaps	the	boost	humans	tend	to	give	themselves	brings	the	below-average	performer	to	the	median	and	the	median	performer	to	an	above-average	perceived	level	of	performance.	In	other	words,	perhaps	in	a	relatively	equal	society	most	people	have	a	decent	chance	of	believing	themselves	to	be	above	average.	
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	 The	outlier	within	the	Canadian	economic	realm	is	always	the	financial	system.	In	Canada	banking	is	highly	protected	and	regulated,	perhaps	in	part	because	of	the	economic	trauma	of	the	1980s	(Quigley,	2012),	whereas	Canada	is	almost	alone	–	aside	from	Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	in	lacking	a	single	national	securities	regulator	(Gray,	2011).275	The	lack	of	financial	system	oversight	may	be	linked	to	a	general	laxness	in	the	non-bank	financial	sector.	Rather	remarkably,	the	profits	for	insider	traders	are	higher	in	Canada	than	anywhere	else	in	the	world	(Bris,	2005),	and	there	is	purportedly	twice	as	much	tax	evasion	in	Canada	(9%	of	all	private	financial	wealth	is	hidden	in	tax	havens)	than	in	the	U.S.	(4%).	Canada’s	$300	billion	in	lost	tax	revenue	is	25%	of	the	U.S.	total	of	$1.2	trillion	despite	its	population	being	a	mere	tenth	of	the	size	(Zucman,	2014,	p.	140).	Only	9	of	100	survey	respondents	correctly	deduced	that	tax	evasion	is	higher	in	Canada	than	in	the	U.S.,	however,	and	although	my	conversants	almost	all	condemned	tax	evasion,	it	was	not	viewed	as	a	significant	problem.	It	is	worrisome	that	these	issues	are	largely	unknown	to	economists	–	even	to	some	of	the	bank	chief	economists,	which	is	odd	given	that	tax	evasion	would	implicate	some	of	the	major	banks.			 Tax	evasion	brought	out	one	of	the	strongest	contrasts	between	the	youngest	cohort	and	their	older	colleagues.	As	it	turns	out,	the	youngest	group	of	economists	is	by	far	the	most	concerned	with	wealth	and	income	distribution	at	the	top	end.	In	the	youngest	cohort,	three	times	as	many	economists	preferred	to	raise	the	top	marginal	tax	rate	than	to	lower	it.	Strikingly,	88%	of	economists	under	41	expressed	support	for	the	idea	of	increasing	the	penalties	for	tax	evasion;	of	the	second-youngest	cohort,	for	comparison,	only	54.2%	expressed	such	a	wish.	Since	this	is	not	the	norm	among	the	young	economists’	academic	colleagues	in	older	age	cohorts,	it	would	be	interesting	to	investigate	whether	peer	influence	for	that	generation	leans	towards	a	particular	distaste	for	top	income-earners.		 Most	of	the	economists	in	my	sample	–	69.8%	–	felt	that	tax	evasion	in	Canada	was	a	problem,	but	only	9%	of	respondents	in	my	survey	knew	that	tax	evasion	was	worse	in	Canada	than	the	U.S.	It	may	be	problematic	to	publicise	Canada’s	level	of	tax	evasion,	however.	Social	norms	have	a	significant	effect	on	tax	compliance	(Bobek,	Roberts,	&	Sweeney,	2007;	Cummings,	Martinez-Vazquez,	McKee,	&	Torgler,	2009),	so	the	popular	conception	that	tax	evasion	is	common	could	in	fact	lead	to	more	tax	evasion.	It	may	also																																																									275	The	Asset-Backed	Commercial	Paper	(ABCP)	crisis	of	2007	may	have	been	a	warning	sign	for	securities	regulation,	however;	perhaps	the	ABCP	crisis	will	be	to	Canadian	securities	regulation	as	the	1980s	bank	failures	were	to	Canadian	banking	regulation	and	supervision.	
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result	in	public	pressure	on	authorities	to	crack	down	on	evasion,	however	–	indeed,	73.5%	of	my	survey	respondents	(and	88%	of	the	youngest	cohort)	felt	that	penalties	for	tax	evasion	should	be	increased,	and	several	conversants	emphasised	the	need	to	increase	the	pay,	status,	and	mandate	of	tax	authorities	in	order	to	address	this	issue	effectively.276		 Interestingly,	almost	all	of	my	conversants	–	including	several	heterodox,	left-leaning,	and	autodidact	economists	–	felt	a	coordinated	global	wealth	tax	was	impractical	yet	expressed	support	for	the	idea	of	coordinating	internationally	to	prevent	tax	evasion.	Such	a	large-scale	effort	on	the	part	of	hundreds	of	countries	to	address	tax	evasion	would	surely	be	just	as	difficult	as	coordination	around	a	global	wealth	tax,	however,	which	makes	one	wonder	whether	my	conversants	were	simply	more	outraged	–	and	therefore	willing	to	advocate	for	a	difficult	solution	–	when	it	came	to	the	issue	of	tax	evasion.			
The	Future	of	Economics	Education	in	Canada			 As	for	the	future	of	Canadian	economics	education,	there	are	both	troubling	and	promising	indicators.	First,	as	populist	xenophobia	roils	the	country’s	closest	allies	–	the	U.S.	and	the	UK	–	Canada	has	remained	relatively	comfortable	with	high	levels	of	immigration.	Social	mobility	remains	among	the	highest	in	the	world,	comparable	to	that	of	Scandinavia,	and	the	most	recent	World	Happiness	Report	ranked	Canada	7th	globally	–	again,	just	behind	Scandinavia,	the	Netherlands,	and	Switzerland	(Helliwell,	Layard,	&	Sachs,	2017).	Indeed,	a	few	conversants’	perception	was	that	Canada	had	ceased	to	be	a	mid-Atlantic	entity	and	had	grown	closer	to	Europe	–	especially	Scandinavia	–	than	the	U.S.	or	the	UK,	politically	and	even	culturally.		 As	for	the	economics	discipline	itself,	Canada	enjoys	a	relatively	privileged	position	–	both	in	terms	of	the	eminence	of	living	economists	and	in	terms	of	the	rise	in	Canadian	authority	on	monetary	and	banking	policy	at	a	global	level.277	The	average	Master’s																																																									276	A	couple	of	conversants	warned	against	scaring	away	top	income	earners	with	high	taxes	and	the	like,	cautions	that	could	apply	to	a	tax	evasion	crack-down	as	well,	but	the	testimony	of	several	other	conversants	–	and	a	growing	body	of	research	–	suggest	that	fears	of	capital	flight	may	be	overblown	(Young,	Varner,	Lurie,	&	Prisinzano,	2016).	277	As	illustrated	by	Mark	Carney’s	rise	to	the	Bank	of	England’s	governorship	and	former	banking	regulation	superintendent	Julie	Dickson’s	appointment	to	the	European	Central	Bank’s	oversight	panel.	
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economics	student	in	Canada	has	higher	GPAs	and	test	scores	than	in	the	U.S.	(Milkman	&	McCoy,	2008)	and	Canadian	economists	have	historically	ranked	third	in	top-10	journal	publications	globally,	although	there	is	evidence	of	a	decline	in	Canadian	economists’	publications	in	the	Canadian	Journal	of	Economics	top-ten	journals	from	1980-2000	(Davies	et	al.,	2008).			 But	there	may	be	advantages	in	the	Canadian	context	that	go	well	beyond	the	rankings	economists	tend	to	emphasise.	Relative	to	their	colleagues	in	other	countries	(Fourcade	et	al.,	2015),	my	results	suggest	that	Canadian	academic	economists	may	be	significantly	more	open	to	knowledge	from	other	disciplines.	Acceptance	of	a	role	for	government,	and	for	redistribution,	constitutes	a	deep	consensus	among	Canadian	economists.	And	conversants	were	creditably	open	to	critiques	of	the	field	that	emerged	in	the	wake	of	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis;	given	their	clear	personal	identification	with	the	profession,278	the	lack	of	defensiveness	–	or	at	least	the	willingness	to	mix	defences	with	critiques	–	is	heartening,279	as	was	most	conversants’	refreshing	willingness	to	answer	even	difficult	questions	directly.	Furthermore,	Canadians	do	not	appear	to	mind	critiques	of	Canada,	which	may	make	it	easier	to	address	our	deficiencies;	this	may	be	one	effect	of	the	country’s	supposed	post-nationalist	ethos.	
																																																								278	Many	conversants	made	mention	of	their	identity	as	an	economist	or	spoke	of	“how	an	economist	thinks.”	One	professor	said,	“Economists	aren’t	keen	on	regulation;	this	is	something	accountants	and	lawyers	like.	We’re	much	more	likely	to	worry	about	incentives	and	try	to	get	the	incentives	right,	and	then	letting	them	do	their	thing.”	Another	professors	said	he	was	“a	little	bit	frustrated	because	I	can’t	build	[my	story	about	the	financial	crisis]	into	a	model.	And	if	I	can’t	built	that	into	a	model	then	I’m	not	happy	as	an	economist.”	Another	professor	critiqued	Stephen	Harper’s	boutique	tax	credits	because	they	were	designed	to	“[confirm]	people’s	identities	as	parents”	but	were	“not	going	to	have	a	big	effect	on	people’s	behaviour,”	which	is	not	how	an	economist	would	look	at	the	issue.	Finally,	another	professor	said,	“I	am	an	economist	so	you’re	going	to	think	I’m	a	son-of-a-bitch	sometimes	because	of	some	of	the	things	I’m	going	to	say,”	like	that	if	your	homeless	shelter	is	too	nice,	a	drug	user	may	trade	rent	for	drugs	and	live	in	the	shelter.	“That’s	thinking	like	an	economist.	[.	.	.]	Social	workers	wouldn’t	have	thought	in	those	terms.	They’re	nicer	people	than	economists	are,”	he	laughed.	It	would	be	interesting	to	contrast	these	statements	of	identity	–	that	of	an	economist	–	with	the	composite	identity	of	a	national	culture	–	in	Canada’s	case,	that	of	the	identity	of	the	“nice”	Canadian.	279	All	but	two	professors	were	wholly	unsympathetic	to	the	post-crisis	critiques	of	economics;	two	others	claimed	to	defend	the	discipline,	but	both	had	made	earlier	comments	that	revealed	frustration	with	some	aspects	of	the	current	state	of	economics	education.	
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	 Yet	there	are	dangers.	As	a	country,	Canada	faces	many	of	the	same	problems	afflicting	other	jurisdictions	around	the	world	–	climate	change,280	populism,281	and	inequality.282	Catastrophic	climate	change	would	inevitably	be	devastating	for	Canada	as	it	would	be	for	the	rest	of	the	world.	But	despite	having	contributed	disproportionally	to	the	causes	of	climate	change,	Canada	will	fare	well	in	a	comparative	sense	when	it	comes	to	droughts	and	temperature	extremes	that	threaten	human	life.	However,	there	is	surely	no	other	country	so	wealthy	yet	so	dependent	on	the	world’s	mass	consumption	of	raw	resources	–	oil,	timber,	and	every	kind	of	metal.	In	other	words,	Canada’s	climate	risk	is	extreme	given	its	imbalanced	economy.		 Nor	is	Canada	somehow	immune	to	populism.	Its	cultural	inoculations	are	in	place;	Canadians	are	pro-immigration	enough	that	the	dog-whistle	politics	peddled	by	the	same	political	advisors	who	pushed	the	Tories	to	a	win	in	the	UK	and	the	Liberals	(effectively	Tories)	in	Australia	did	not	work	in	the	2015	election	that	brought	Justin	Trudeau	to	power.	But	it	has	also	not	experienced	a	significant	economic	downturn	since	the	1990s,	which	is	when	xenophobia	tends	to	come	to	the	fore.		 Some	of	Canada’s	other	economic	risks	are	in	plain	sight.	The	stereotype	of	Canada	is	not	one	of	a	country	creaking	under	the	weight	of	inheritances,	but	in	fact	Canadians	fare	nearly	as	poorly	as	Britons	according	to	the	metric	of	wealth	inequality.	Though	our	banking	system	is	sound,	our	financial	system	is	notoriously283	lax,	with	greater	insider	trading	gains	to	be	made	in	Canada	than	in	any	other	G20	nation.	Canada’s	inequality	is	in	its	wealth	much	more	than	its	incomes,	which	may	become	obvious	over	the	next	20	years	as	trillions	of	dollars	change	hands	intergenerationally.	
																																																								280	The	future	currently	is	effectively	less	discounted	than	usual	due	to	chronically	low	interest	rates,	making	long-term	low-carbon	infrastructure	potentially	an	excellent	societal	investment.		281	Research	points	to	the	development	of	a	dual-class	system	in	the	U.S.	(Temin,	2017),	a	distinct	risk	for	Canada	as	well	as	citizens	of	different	classes	live	increasingly	dissimilar	lives.	282	Part	of	the	sting	of	inequality	–	and	the	rise	of	populism	–	may	be	due	to	humans’	loss	aversion	(and	interestingly,	being	primed	to	“think	like	a	trader”	can	induce	individuals	to	be	less	loss-averse	according	to	Daniel	Kahneman,	2011,	pp.	26–7).	People	may	sense	they	are	losing	their	expectation	of	rising	or	at	least	stable	living	standards.	This	links	to	a	concept	one	of	my	conversants	mentioned	–	anomie,	or	the	gap	between	expectation	and	reality,	which	may	well	be	part	of	working-class	white	resentment	in	the	U.S.	Canada	is	unlikely	to	be	immune	to	such	sentiment,	which	can	become	all	the	more	acute	during	times	of	economic	hardship	at	the	national	or	regional	level.	283	So	few	people	globally	would	care	to	look	into	the	Canadian	financial	system	that	it	may	be	that	the	concept	of	notoriety	could	not	possibly	apply.	
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	 Compounding	this	risk,	Canada	also	has	an	unusual	amount	of	household	debt	–	the	highest	in	the	world,	in	fact	(OECD,	2017)	–	and	it	is	unevenly	distributed	among	the	generations.284	Studies	have	illustrated	that	debt	can	exact	a	psychological	toll	(Tay,	Batz,	Parrigon,	&	Kuykendall,	2016),	which	could	be	a	drain	on	Canada’s	showing	in	the	World	Happiness	Report	(Helliwell	et	al.,	2017).	There	is	almost	no	inflation	in	the	real	economy,	in	Canada	as	elsewhere,	but	asset	prices	and	housing	costs	have	risen	dramatically:		
		If	the	imbalance	above	does	point	to	a	fundamental	imbalance,	Canada’s	positive	performance	in	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	may	well	lead	to	our	Minsky	Moment;	Canada’s	apparent	resilience	could	in	fact	have	led	to	policies	and	practices	that	could	cause	yet	greater	problems	down	the	line.	An	economics	profession	that	studies	the	particularities	of	the	Canadian	economic	and	financial	systems	would	surely	help	to	address	these	growing	trends;	but	as	of	now,	even	Canadian	economists	ignore	their	home	economy.	Moreover	the	2010	cancellation	of	the	long-form	census,	and	therefore	Canadians’	ability	to	participate	in	the	microeconomics	data	revolution,	was	at	least	temporarily	compromised,	especially	in	terms	of	studying	Canada	itself.285																																																										284	This	unequal	distribution	of	equity	and	debt	could	be	viewed	as	an	extreme	version	of	Piketty’s	R>G	formula,	with	benefits	disproportionately	flowing	to	a	generation	(the	Baby	Boomers)	in	addition	to	a	socioeconomic	class	(particularly	asset	owners).	285	Nine	conversants	mentioned	the	cancellation	of	the	long-form	census	unprompted,	including	an	academic	who	said	the	decision	was	“almost	uniformly	criticised,	not	just	by	economists.”	
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	 Furthermore,	the	self-selection	mechanism	among	prospective	economics	students	in	Canada	may	be	attracting	individuals	on	the	basis	of	considerations	such	as	earning	potential,	talent	for	the	subject,	status,	and/or	a	facility	with	math;	yet	economists	end	up	pronouncing	upon	the	environment,	healthcare,	and	many	other	issues	that	these	motivations	do	not	particularly	select	for.	Students	who	are	interested	in	major	policy	issues	such	as	these	may	well	choose	to	study	another	subject,	especially	since	the	economics	profession	discourages	work	on	public	policy.	But	there	is	evidence	that	students	respond	well	to	pluralist	teaching	(Deane,	Van	Waeyenberge,	&	Maxwell,	2016),	which	could	attract	a	greater	variety	of	economics	students	to	the	field	should	there	be	an	increase	in	pluralist	offerings.286		 The	primary	challenges	of	the	21st	century	–	income	and	wealth	inequality,	climate	change,	and	economic	stagnation	most	obviously,	but	also	the	refugee	crisis,	gender	equality,	and	the	rise	of	xenophobic	right-wing	political	movements	–	almost	all	implicate	economics	in	some	way.	Income	and	wealth	inequality	necessitate	a	wide	range	of	policy	interventions,	up	to	and	including	shifts	in	taxation,	regulation,	and	global	coordination.	Economic	stagnation,	still	ever-present	in	industrialised	economies	as	we	pass	the	tenth	anniversary	of	the	financial	crisis,	is	a	puzzle	for	economists	and	policymakers	alike.	The	shift	towards	a	zero-emissions	economy,	the	gender	effects	of	recessions	that	tend	disproportionately	to	target	jobs	in	male-dominated	fields,	and	the	scapegoating	of	minority	groups	in	response	to	economic	woes	are	all	topics	within	which	non-economic	considerations	have	a	direct	impact	on	research	agendas	traditionally	left	to	economists.	These	are,	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	issues	–	gender,	race,	and	the	environment	–	that	are	rarely	found	in	economics	curricula,	and	only	as	electives	if	they	are	there	at	all.	In	fact,	only	electives	have	evolved	within	the	field	in	recent	years;	required	courses	in	economics	have	hardly	changed	in	three	decades	(Siegfried	&	Walstad,	2014).	The	few	changes	that	have	occurred	arguably	pulled	the	discipline	in	the	wrong	direction;	once	a	mainstay	of	economics	programs,	now	“[e]conomic	history	is	almost	defunct	as	a	required	course”	(ibid.,	p.	154).			 What	the	world	may	need	is	some	populism-antidote	economics,	supportive	of	diversity/pluralism	and	a	liveable	planet;	an	economics	profession	that	has	both	the	relevant	skills	and	an	openness	to	critique,	diversity,	adaptation,	and	interdisciplinarity																																																									286	I	would	recommend	a	series	of	experiments	that	randomly	assign	first-year	students	to	economics	courses	with	different	introductory	approaches;	this	could	be	a	good	way	of	testing	which	sorts	of	introductions	to	the	field	attract	the	greatest	variety	and	quality	of	students.	
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could	be	Canada’s	contribution	to	helping	to	solve	some	of	the	most	critical	questions	of	this	century.			 For	a	variety	of	reasons,	the	economics	profession	in	Canada	is	already	set	to	change.	First,	as	in	many	academic	disciplines,	the	Baby	Boomers	will	retire	in	large	numbers	in	the	coming	years	and	their	replacements	could	be	pivotal	in	broadening	the	field.	The	recent	massive	budget	cuts	to	research	and	higher	education	in	the	United	States,	combined	with	the	chill	towards	foreign	researchers	there,	could	pose	an	opportunity	for	the	Canadian	economics	profession	to	diversify	its	membership.	Even	prior	to	Trump’s	ascendance	to	the	U.S.	presidency,	there	were	already	the	beginnings	of	a	surge	in	international	students	coming	to	Canada;	between	2009	and	2010	alone,	international	student	enrolment	in	Canada	went	from	4.7%	of	the	world’s	international	students	to	7.4%	of	the	global	total	(Canadian	Association	of	University	Teachers,	2015,	pp.	46–7),	and	Canada	now	has	over	a	third	as	many	international	students	per	year	as	the	U.S.	–	a	92%	increase	from	2008	to	2015	–	despite	having	only	a	tenth	of	the	population	(Smith,	2017).			 Moreover,	in	an	unusually	pluralistic	society	like	Canada,	it	does	not	seem	far-fetched	to	suggest	that	these	values	might	become	part	of	the	ethos	of	economics	departments.	The	advantages	to	Canada	in	this	regard	include	an	openness	to	immigration	as	well	as	the	quirk	of	bilingualism.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	Canadian	university	system	as	a	whole	is	firmly	embedded	in	the	Anglo-American	milieu,	Québec	still	accounts	for	25%	of	the	country’s	population	and	two	of	its	top-10	economics	departments;	given	the	meteoric	rise	of	Thomas	Piketty	and	the	cadre	of	French	economists	specialising	in	income	inequality	–	this	being	arguably	one	of	the	factors	contributing	to	the	recent	rise	in	populism	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic	–	Canada’s	bilingual	universities	may	have	a	role	to	play	in	connecting	Anglo-American	and	Continental	approaches	to	economics,	to	say	nothing	of	its	potential	role	in	a	more	broadly	international	sense	given	the	number	of	immigrants	participating	in	Canadian	society.		 My	data	did	not	include	current	students	of	economics,	so	it	is	too	soon	to	tell	whether	the	cohort	of	economists	who	entered	the	field	in	the	wake	of	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	may	have	a	different	orientation	towards	the	field	than	their	slightly	
	 253	
older	(and	rather	markedly	laissez-faire)	compatriots.287	True,	there	was	reportedly	a	resurgence	of	interest	in	economics	after	the	crisis:		 In	fact,	the	recent	economic	and	financial	crisis	has	arguably	made	the	discipline	of	economics	as	a	whole	more,	not	less,	visible,	and	its	expertise	more	sought-after:	the	deep	recessions	of	the	early	1980s	and	the	Great	Depression	of	the	1930s	had	the	same	effect	(Fourcade	et	al.,	2015,	p.	110).			Indeed,	reportedly	the	likes	of	Hyman	Minsky	entered	economics	because	of	the	Great	Depression.	It	is	possible,	then,	that	the	economics	discipline	in	Canada	might	adopt	a	form	of	countercyclical	economic	thinking	such	that	Canadian	departments	are	able	to	hire	people	like	Minsky	before	their	ideas	become	popular.	The	goal	could	be	to	build	a	positive	collective	reputation	for	Canadian	universities	as	a	group,	seeing	as	the	differences	among	departments	appear	insignificant	when	contrasted	with	the	stark	hierarchy	in	the	U.S.	and	the	UK.	This	would	mark	a	cooperative,	as	opposed	to	competitive	and/or	ranking	approach,	to	higher	education	in	the	country.			 This	could	also	accompany	a	reversal	of	the	downward	trend	in	publications	on	Canadian-specific	issues	(Emery	et	al.,	2013).288	Canadian	economics	departments	could	collectively	use	journal	rankings	to	their	advantage	by	deciding	en	masse	to	rate	the	Canadian	Journal	of	Economics	as	the	highest-	or	among	the	highest-ranked	journals	taken	into	consideration	in	hiring	and	promotion	decisions;	the	expectation	that	its	quality	would	improve	would	itself	result	in	an	increase	in	quality	of	the	articles	the	CJE	publishes	–	a	sort	of	self-fulfilling	prophesy	or	double-heuristic	feedback	loop	of	its	own.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																									287	That	is	not	to	say	that	the	existing	younger	cohort	of	academic	economists	may	not	eventually	come	to	the	openness	to	competing	perspectives,	appreciation	of	the	role	of	government,	and	support	for	pluralism	and	interdisciplinarity	that	arguably	characterises	their	elder	peers.	288	The	policy	ecosystem	in	Canada	would	do	well	to	avoid	some	of	the	pitfalls	of	the	U.S.	by	not	leaving	public	policy	discussions	entirely	to	(largely	privately-funded)	think	tanks;	given	that	oft-repeated	messages	are	more	likely	to	be	believed	over	time,	a	well-documented	psychological	phenomenon	(Daniel	Kahneman,	2011),	a	greater	mix	of	academic	research	–	in	plain	language,	of	course	–	could	help	to	keep	the	debate	factual.	
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Final	Summary		 Research	tells	us	a	number	of	things	about	economics.	Among	the	social	sciences,	the	discipline	is	unusually	hierarchical	and	preoccupied	with	rankings,	including	of	academic	journals	and	university	departments	(Fourcade	2009;	Fourcade	et	al.	2015);	all	of	these,	in	turn,	are	dominated	by	a	few	high-ranked	American	universities.	This	small	number	of	prestigious	institutions’	economics	departments	preside	over	a	field	that	is	also	increasingly	homogeneous,	with	similar	curricula	now	to	be	found	in	undergraduate	economics	education	all	over	the	world.	Canada	is	no	exception	by	these	metrics.	Its	curricula	are	largely	homogeneous,	its	domestic	hierarchy	is	clear,	and	it	looks	to	the	aforementioned	elite	American	economics	departments	for	legitimacy.	It	is,	however,	the	country	most	influenced	by	the	United	States;	a	country	whose	economists	rank	third	internationally	in	terms	of	publications	and	eminent	emissaries,	behind	its	two	closest	allies	–	the	U.S.	and	the	UK;	and	a	country	whose	economists	appear	to	differ,	rather	unaccountably,	from	their	international	compatriots	in	several	ways.		 Canada	is	an	illustrative	case	study	as	it	is	inarguably	the	country	most	influenced	by	the	U.S.	Yet	it	maintains	levels	of	societal	trust	and	cooperation	to	an	almost	Scandinavian	degree,	so	it	is	possible	to	glean	some	insight	into	the	degree	to	which	economics	education	and	cooperative	societal	norms	interact	in	the	economics	profession.	Research	suggests	that	it	is	not	only	economics	students’	views	on	the	free	market	and	the	role	of	government	that	are	affected	by	their	educational	experiences;	so,	too,	is	their	ethical	sense	shaped	by	the	economics	courses	in	which	they	enrol	(Wang	et	al.,	2011).	If	economics	education	both	attracts	adherents	to,	and	shapes	beliefs	and	behaviours	towards,	the	self-interest	model,	and	Canada	is	an	unusually	high-trust,	cooperative	country,	one	can	more	easily	begin	to	tease	out	the	effects	of	economics	education	from	that	of	culture	in	this	case	as	they	pull	in	somewhat	different	directions.		My	research	draws	from	100	survey	responses	from	academic	economists	as	well	as	58	in-depth	interviews	with	economists	working	in	a	variety	of	roles	–	from	think	tanks	to	the	Bank	of	Canada	and	among	both	the	formally	educated	and	the	self-taught.	It	points	to	a	few	distinctive	features	of	the	Canadian	economist:	relative	to	American	economics	professors,	Canadian	academic	economists	are	more	than	twice	as	likely	to	believe	that	executives	are	overpaid,	and	they	are	overwhelmingly	in	favour	of	decreasing	the	level	of	income	inequality	in	Canada	–	more	so	than	their	American	
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colleagues,	even	though	income	inequality	in	Canada	is	substantially	lower	than	it	is	in	the	U.S.	They	are	also	more	pro-interdisciplinarity	and	more	open	to	government	intervention.	Further	research	is	necessary	in	order	to	tease	apart	the	reasons	for	these	significant	differences.	In	the	meantime	it	is	possible	to	put	forward	a	tentative	theory	for	discussion,	as	follows:	The	effects	of	economics	education	on	economists’	later	political	views	may	compound,	and	be	compounded	by,	social	norms	and	the	political	zeitgeist	during	students’	formative	years.		All	age	cohorts	within	my	sample	displayed	the	effects	of	the	social	norms	of	their	time	as	well	as	the	nature	of	the	economics	curriculum	during	their	undergraduate	years	in	particular.	The	oldest	cohort	was	the	most	diverse	in	their	views,	and	covered	off	the	widest	swath	of	the	political	spectrum;	Baby	Boomers	were	more	uniformly	egalitarian	and	pro-multidisciplinarity,	although	more	homogeneously	so;	the	cohort	in	their	40s	and	early	50s	were	markedly	more	right-wing	than	the	other	cohorts	by	almost	any	measure;	and	the	economists	aged	40	and	under	were	markedly	laissez-faire	in	some	ways,	yet	displayed	a	flash	of	indignation	on	issues	specific	to	high	earners	–	executive	pay,	tax	evasion,	and	the	like.	As	above,	the	group	with	by	far	the	greatest	range	of	political	views	was	the	oldest	cohort	of	economists,	who	had	–	perhaps	not	coincidentally	–	been	exposed	to	the	broadest	range	of	economics	curricula	during	their	university	years.	Since	that	time,	the	range	of	political	views	among	Canadian	academic	economists	appears	to	have	shrunk,	with	the	two	poles	of	the	political	spectrum	now	represented	mainly	in	think	tanks	outside	of	academia	and	in	self-taught	citizen	economists	such	as	the	COMER	members	this	research	examined.	In	the	Canadian	academic	economics	profession,	diversity	–	of	thought,	political	views,	and	demographics	alike	–	is	to	be	found	in	a	few	pockets	only:	for	example,	in	non-economics	departments,	economics	departments	in	certain	universities	(but	not	in	the	top-ranked	departments),	and	women	economists.		If	indeed	groupthink	is	one	of	the	chief	afflictions	of	the	discipline	of	economics	at	this	time,	as	the	IMF’s	own	Independent	Evaluation	Office	found	following	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	(IEO	2011),	further	research	could	examine	which	factors	may	contribute	to	an	increase	in	diversity	–	in	terms	of	both	demographics	and	political	views	–	within	the	academy.	A	diverse	cohort	of	Canadian	economists	could	contribute	to	countercyclical	economic	thinking,	which	in	turn	could	serve	as	partial	protection	
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against	future	economic	crises.	Indeed,	Canada’s	economic	trauma	of	the	1980s,	and	the	caution	it	instilled	in	its	economics	practitioners,	arguably	delayed	the	deregulatory	trend	that	took	hold	elsewhere	and	helped	to	avert	economic	catastrophe	in	Canada	during	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis.	In	short,	Canada	may	have	already	benefited	from	countercyclical	economic	thinking	in	the	past,	but	it	is	now	increasingly	at	risk	of	groupthink	should	its	economics	profession’s	current	demographic	and	political	makeup	remain	as	it	is.		Nevertheless,	such	homogeneity	is	not	necessarily	destined	to	hold.	In	a	field	that	is,	among	the	social	sciences,	by	far	the	most	resistant	to	knowledge	from	other	disciplines,	Canadian	academic	economists	are	by	all	appearances	global	outliers.	My	research	suggests	that	they	are	significantly	more	open	to	knowledge	from	other	disciplines	than	groups	of	economists	elsewhere;	relative	to	American	academic	economists,	they	are	almost	twice	as	likely	to	believe	that	interdisciplinary	knowledge	is	better	than	knowledge	generated	from	a	single	field,	and	the	older	cohorts	surpass	even	U.S.	sociologists	in	this	regard.	There	also	appears	to	be	substantial	openness	to	the	critiques	of	the	discipline	among	Canadian	economists,	and	substantial	agreement	on	the	areas	in	which	improvements	in	economics	education	need	to	be	made.	Further	research	is	necessary	to	determine	whether	this	philosophical	humility	is	unique	to	Canadian	economists	or	whether	it	is	to	be	found	in	the	discipline	more	generally,	but	certainly	Canadians	are	in	line	with	everyone	from	business	economists	in	the	UK	to	the	pluralism	students’	movement	in	having	identified	particular	deficiencies	to	be	addressed	in	economics	curricula.	These	groups’	common	recommendations	include	a	renewed	emphasis	on	history,	institutions,	and	social	norms	in	economics.		 The	importance	of	these	three	factors	is	in	evidence	in	this	very	dissertation.	My	research	suggests	that	social	norms	may	have	a	more	profound	effect	on	economists’	beliefs	than	their	formal	education	in	economics,	and	that	historical	and	institutional	factors	–	especially	during	economists’	formative	years	–	may	have	a	life-long	impact	on	Canadian	economists’	political	beliefs.	There	also	appear	to	be	educational,	geographical,	and	cohort-related	effects	on	economists’	beliefs	that,	together	with	the	effects	of	Canadian	social	norms,	combine	to	form	an	image	of	a	discipline	that	is	less	polarised,	more	pro-interdisciplinarity,	and	substantially	more	accepting	of	a	role	for	government	in	economic	policy	than	that	of	their	economist	brethren	in	the	U.S.	
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	 As	Canadian	economists	say	themselves,	their	discipline	needs	to	take	better	account	of	history,	institutions,	and	social	norms.	But	if	the	first	step	is	to	recognise	the	problem,	Canadian	economists	are	already	en	route	to	change;	in	doing	so	they	may	usefully	draw	from	Canadian	social	norms	and	cultural	values	that	typify	the	country	–	such	as	multiculturalism	and	diversity,	egalitarianism,	and	cautious	good	government.	As	the	world	grapples	with	challenges	such	as	populism	and	xenophobia,	climate	change	and	migration,	secular	stagnation	and	low	productivity,	and	the	demographic-	and	automation-related	changes	roiling	the	labour	market,	a	diverse	and	immigration-friendly	country	whose	economists	recognise	the	role	of	good	government,	institutions,	social	norms,	and	history	could	be	a	boon	to	the	field	of	economics.	Canada	could	be	that	country.	
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Appendix	I		Research	questions	(regarding	economics	education,	economic	policy,	and	financial	markets)	that	arose	in	the	case	of	my	research:		1.	When	Robert	Mundell	won	the	Nobel	Prize	for	work	that	he	had	published	in	the	Canadian	Journal	of	Economics,	did	that	affect	the	ranking	of	the	CJE?		2.	COMER	sued	the	government	to	force	the	Bank	of	Canada	to	lend	to	the	federal	and	provincial	governments	at	no	interest.	Many	of	the	economists	I	spoke	with	thought	this	would	cause	inflation.	Would	it	be	possible	for	the	Bank	of	Canada	to	lend	to	the	provinces,	charge	a	bit	of	interest	to	reduce	moral	hazard	and	the	risk	of	inflation,	and	reinvest	the	profits	in	healthcare	and	education?		3.	Is	it	possible	that	professors	overestimate	rich	people’s	mobility	because	they	were	themselves	willing	to	(and	were	expected	to)	move	anywhere	for	a	job?		4.	Is	there	an	“everything	bubble”	and/or	a	housing	bubble,	and	is	the	increasing	size	of	the	financial	sector	relative	to	the	real	economy	a	concern?	Is	it	possible	that	inflation	is	happening,	but	it	is	being	mismeasured	because	it	is	only	occurring	in	the	housing	sector	and	financial	markets,	which	are	not	included	in	the	Consumer	Price	Index	(a	common	measure	of	inflation)?	If	we	are	operating	on	the	assumption	that	inflation	is	low,	when	in	fact	it	is	merely	uneven,	how	does	that	affect	the	reasoning	around	the	setting	of	interest	rates?	Also:	what	happens	to	the	economy	(and	housing/stock	prices)	when	the	Baby	Boomer	generation	begins	to,	en	masse,	convert	housing	stock	(with	inflated	values,	arguably)	back	into	real-economy	goods	and	services	such	as	homecare?		5.	How	should	we	think	about	derivatives	and	the	rest	of	the	shadow	economy?	How	big	are	capital	markets	and	real	estate	relative	to	the	real	economy	and	to	the	shadow	economy?	Why	are	the	data	poor/sparse	on	this	question?		6.	If	productivity	gains	since	World	War	II	were	largely	due	to	bringing	women	into	the	workforce	and	to	technological	advances,	what	happens	when	there	are	no	more	groups	to	add	to	the	workforce	and	technology	is	no	longer	able	to	deliver	the	same	productivity	gains	in	perpetuity	(presumably	3D	printers	and	the	internet	will	ensure	
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that	both	communication	and	industrial	production	are	both	instantaneous	and	available	across	all	geographical	regions)?	If	productivity	gains	are	over,	what	happens	to	all	of	the	equations/models	that	use	them	as	an	assumption/input/variable?	What	does	this	do	to	growth-dependent	economic	plans;	are	they	no	longer	viable,	or	must	they	be	adjusted	somehow?		7.	Is	an	inflation-,	productivity-,	and	interest-constrained	growth-based	economy	possible?		8.	With	high	and	rising	housing	prices	in	many	major	cities	in	Canada,	and	the	resulting	necessity	for	young	people	to	seek	help	from	their	parents	in	purchasing	a	home,	could	this	dampen	Canada’s	impressive	level	of	social	mobility	in	the	medium-	or	long-term?			9.	How	would	the	wholesale	implementation	of	the	Housing	First289	strategy	across	Canada	interact	with	the	housing	bubble?		10.	If	Monnin’s	research	(2017)	is	correct,	and	stimulative	monetary	(as	opposed	to	fiscal)	policy	increases	wealth	inequality	but	decreases	income	inequality,	what	would	be	the	long-term	effects	of	the	ongoing	low-interest	rate	regime?	The	lower	socioeconomic	classes	have	a	higher	propensity	to	consume	(and	therefore	not	accumulate	wealth);	how	does	this	and	Monnin’s	findings	affect	Piketty’s	R>G	equation?		11.	The	work	of	Kumhof	and	Ranciere	suggests	that	high-income	people’s	savings	must	be	matched	by	loans	to	low-income	people	who	will	eventually	be	unable	to	repay	their	debt,	resulting	in	a	financial	crisis.	If	this	is	true,	does	the	system	tend	towards	usury/debt	burdens	for	the	lower	classes?		12.	Are	interest	rates	always	based	on	risk	analysis	in	the	case	of	payday	loans?	Would	lower-class	and	upper-class	people	with	identical	credit	scores	be	offered	identical	interest	rates	on	a	loan,	or	are	preferential	rates	offered	to	upper-class	people	in	order	to	secure	future	business?	If	the	latter	is	the	case,	what	are	the	long-term	equity	implications	once	compound	interest	is	taken	into	account?																																																									289	A	program	in	which	homeless	people	are	housed,	for	free,	as	a	basis	for	subsequent	employment	and	treatment	programs.	Housing	First	has	been	shown	to	save	money,	in	addition	to	the	obvious	humanitarian	benefits.	
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	13.	Is	there	a	tax	system	in	existence	that	perfectly	(or	close	to	perfectly)	counteracts	Accumulative	Advantage?		14.	How	did	Justin	Trudeau’s	team	come	to	the	decision	to	campaign	on	an	anti-austerity	platform	in	the	2015	election?		15.	Is	there	a	geography	effect	(e.g.	proximity	to	Ottawa)	in	terms	of	Canadian	economists’	political	orientations	and	involvement	with	public	policy	issues?	Is	there	a	geography	effect	in	terms	of	certain	economics	departments’	ties	to	the	UK?		16.	Is	it	that	heterodox	thinkers	never	join	the	field,	that	they	do	not	stay	in	the	field,	or	that	they	adopt	mainstream	views	and	become	no	longer	heterodox?		17.	Do	Canadian	economists	tend	to	share	the	views	and	outlook	of	the	wealthy,	or	the	educated?		18.	If	economics	students	were	to	be	taught	that	elites	behave	more	like	homo	
economicus,	could	that	have	the	unintended	effect	of	encouraging	and/or	inducing	the	self-interest	norm	among	the	students?	Would	the	opposite	tend	to	happen	if	economics	students	were	to	be	introduced	to	the	idea	of	Canada’s	cooperative	social	norms?		19.	Did	taking	time	off	have	an	effect	on	survey	respondents’	views	on	various	issues?		20.	If	the	Black-Scholes	equation	was	initially	inaccurate	until	it	was	well-known	and	used	by	finance	professionals,	could	the	same	thing	happen	with	Universal	Ownership	Theory?290	As	per	Ghoshal’s	point	about	the	double	heuristic	(a	self-fulfilling	theory),	if	stating	and	re-stating	a	rule	makes	it	true,	like	the	Black-Scholes	equation	or	inflation	targets,	could	Universal	Ownership	Theory	could	take	hold	and	become	reality?	If	so,	could	stock	prices	–	which	are	really	expectations	of	future	value	–	begin	to	reflect	long-termism	and	systemic	risk?	Company	policies	that	advanced	the	growth	of	the	middle																																																									290	The	theory	that	universal	owners	of	capital	–	investors	so	large	that	they	must	hold	a	more	or	less	representative	slice	of	the	whole	market	–	inherently	have	an	interest	in	the	long-term	performance	of	the	economy	as	a	whole	as	they	cannot	reasonably	stock-pick	their	way	out	of	risks	(relating	to	financial	crises,	climate	change,	etc.).	
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class,	the	reduction	of	carbon	emissions,	and	an	emphasis	on	research	and	development	would	then	presumably	be	rewarded	in	the	market,	as	all	of	these	are	tied	to	the	long-term	health	of	the	economy.		21.	If	divestment	and	ESG	(environmental,	social,	and	governance)	investing	within	public	equity	systems	cannot	in	fact	shift	capital	(only	ownership),	might	it	be	necessary	to	change	the	composition	of	the	stock	market	as	a	whole	in	order	to	mitigate	climate	change	and	the	like?	If	so,	this	would	presumably	involve	de-listing	coal	companies	and	other	high-emissions	entities	in	addition	to	increasing	the	number	of	climate-friendly	IPOs	(Initial	Public	Offerings).	How	might	this	be	done?																									
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Appendix	II		Below	are	a	series	of	recommendations	(for	economics	education	and	economic	policy)	on	the	basis	of	my	research.	I	would	emphasise	that	I	am	far	from	an	expert	on	this,	and	all	of	what	follows	warrants	further	research.		1.	One	or	more	Canadian	economics	departments	could	conduct	a	randomised	control	trial	for	students	admitted	to	two	different	first-year	economics	classes	–	one	the	standard	first-year	fare,	the	other	based	on	a	pluralist	curriculum	–	to	see	if	a	change	in	curriculum	could	affect	the	demographics	of	economics	students	and	therefore,	eventually,	of	the	profession.		2.	One	or	more	Canadian	economics	departments	could	experiment	with	offering	a	pluralist	course	for	students	looking	to	join	the	field	of	economics	later	in	life;	this	course	could,	itself,	increase	the	diversity	of	the	discipline.		3.	Economics	departments	in	Canada	could	agree	collectively	to	boost	the	ranking	of	the	Canadian	Journal	of	Economics	in	terms	of	their	internal	hiring	decisions.	If	they	did	this	all	at	once,	the	expectation	of	the	quality	of	the	journal	would	improve,	which	could	in	turn	affect	the	actual	quality	of	the	journal	–	these	rankings	are,	in	many	ways,	as	self-fulfilling	as	many	other	aspects	of	finance/economics.		4.	The	CJE,	and	indeed	all	other	economics	journals,	should	implement	a	policy	of	anonymity	in	submissions	to	journals	(and	double-blind	reviewing)	in	order	to	eliminate	bias	in	the	process.		5.	The	economics	profession	as	a	whole	should	draft	a	plain-language	list	of	priorities	for	the	resurgence	of	political	economy	and	economic	history	(and	possibly	institutionalism)	in	Canada,	including	as	regards	funding	and	academic	publishing,	as	per	many	of	my	conversants’	comments	(and	the	results	of	my	survey,	which	showed	that	60.2%	of	respondents	thought	there	should	be	more	economic	history	in	the	curriculum;	only	2%	of	respondents	thought	there	should	be	less).			6.	Economics	departments,	or	even	individual	economics	professors,	might	consider	experimenting	with	ways	of	counteracting	the	usual	effect	economics	education	has	on	
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prosociality	among	economics	students.	This	may	involve	emphasising	the	view	of	humans	as	cooperative	animals	–	reinforcing	that	as	the	social	norm	in	the	process	–	and	teaching	the	work	of	economists	such	as	Nobel	Prize-winner	Elinor	Ostrom,	which	would	also	add	another	woman	to	the	reading	list.		7.	Several	conversants	lamented	the	decline	in	Royal	Commissions,	which	have	often	shaped	Canadian	economic	policy	in	the	past.	The	government	could	consider	striking	a	Royal	Commission	on	inheritance	taxes,	the	future	of	the	Alberta	oil	sands,	and	any	number	of	other	issues	Canada	will	have	to	contend	with	in	the	coming	years.		8.	The	federal	government	could	consider	passing	legislation	eliminating	bounced	cheque	fees	or	basing	the	fees	on	a	percentage	of	the	deposit;	having	run	out	of	money	is	punishment	enough,	and	these	fees	are	essentially	a	tax	on	the	poor.		9.	The	federal	government	could	consider	publicising	a	list	of	large-scale	tax	evaders	(and/or	repeat	offenders).	As	per	Braithwaite	(Braithwaite,	1989),	elites	are	more	sensitive	to	public	shaming	because	they	have	the	most	status	to	lose;	shaming	tends	to	be	more	effective	than	punishment	in	this	case.		10.	If	implementation	time	lags	are	the	major	issue	with	counter-cyclical	fiscal	stimulus	spending,	perhaps	the	government	could	assemble	a	dossier	with	complete	plans	for	projects	that	can	be	“shovel-ready”	in	the	event	of	a	recession	–	including	pre-signed	contracts	with	the	relevant	contractors	and	the	like.		11.	The	government	should	consider	enacting	legislation	that	would	mandate	that	capital	gains	be	taxed	at	100%	of	income,	but	adjusted	for	inflation	so	as	not	to	punish	long-term	investors.			12.	Municipalities	and	the	provincial	and	federal	levels	of	government	should	work	together	to	implement	the	Housing	First	program	across	Canada.			13.	As	per	the	comments	of	a	few	of	my	conversants,	“regulators	should	be	paid	more,	they	should	have	status,	in	order	to	attract	some	really	smart	people	–	because	they’re	always	behind	the	innovation	curve.”	The	government	should	consider	improving	the	
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wages	and	working	conditions	of	financial	sector	regulators	and	the	Canadian	Revenue	Agency.																																																	
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Appendix	III		Please	see	below	for	conversants’	views	on	usury,	capital	gains	taxation,	and	carbon	taxation:		
Usury			 The	purpose	of	a	question	about	usury	–	where	interest	ends	and	usury	begins,	according	to	conversants’	personal	beliefs	–	was	two-fold.	First,	I	hoped	to	gauge	their	reaction	to	a	term	–	“usury”	–	that	is	loaded	and	rife	with	moral	undertones.291	Second,	I	wanted	to	assess	whether	conversants	were	familiar	with	the	circumstances	of	people	living	in	poverty	and	with	the	role	power	plays	in	one’s	interactions	with	the	financial	sector:	the	wealthy,	as	a	rule,	are	not	at	risk	of	being	charged	usurious	levels	of	interest.292	I	asked	the	question	towards	the	end	of	the	interview,	as	it	elicited	hesitation	and	even	irritation	in	many	of	my	otherwise	genial	conversants.	Of	all	of	the	questions	I	asked,	this	one	–	along	with	the	question	about	human	nature	–	was	most	likely	to	elicit	a	negative	response	and,	sometimes,	to	change	the	tenor	of	the	interview.293		 As	a	group,	and	with	one	(rather	unexpected,	given	his	other	answers)	exception,	the	most	extreme	responses	came	from	Montréal-based	professors	–	McGill,	UMontréal,	and	UQAM	conversants.	One	said:	“I	guess	.	.	.	Any	agreement	that’s	come	to	in	an	open	competitive	market	I’m	fundamentally	not	going	to	condemn”	and	that	if	there	is	only	one	lender,	“they	can	get	your	whole	reservation	price	–	they	can	get	the	whole	area	under	your	demand	curve.	And	even	so,	it’s	still	a	voluntary	transaction.	[.	.	.]	So	I	guess	I																																																									291	Moreover,	the	understanding	of	the	term	has	changed	dramatically	in	Western	culture	in	the	past	several	hundred	years;	in	most	cultures	until	the	advent	of	modern	capitalism,	all	interest	was	morally	condemned	as	usury	(Laulajainen,	2000).	292	Microfinance	institutions	commonly	charge	between	20%	and	60%	on	small	loans	to	people	living	in	poverty,	for	example,	even	though	some	of	the	borrowers	have	had	their	credit	scores	screened	(Hudon,	2007).	It	is	difficult	to	believe	that	a	wealthy	person	with	an	equivalent	credit	score	would	be	charged	such	a	high	rate	of	interest	for	anything	but	the	riskiest	of	enterprises.	293	As	a	follow-up	question	I	asked	conversants	to	guess	Canada’s	current	legal	interest	rate	limit.	Two	conversants	actually	knew	the	limit,	which	is	60%,	and	one	guessed	it	correctly,	but	aside	from	these,	no	one	came	close	to	the	real	total	and	nearly	everyone	was	surprised	to	hear	what	it	was;	almost	all	estimates	were	in	the	20%-30%	range,	with	one	at	10%	and	two	at	50%.	Interestingly,	upon	hearing	what	the	limit	was,	most	of	my	conversants	‘connected	the	dots’	and	realised	that	the	target	of	the	legislation	was	likely	the	payday	lending	industry;	they	had	never	seen	such	interest	rates	in	the	course	of	normal	financial	transactions	(and	it	is	likely	that	none	of	them	had	ever	done	business	with	a	payday	lender	themselves).	The	follow-up	discussion	therefore	changed	the	tone	of	the	conversation	again	in	some	cases,	as	conversants	reasoned	their	way	through	the	complications	of	this	industry.	
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don’t	like	the	term	usury.	[.	.	.]	I	think	usury	begins	wherever	monopoly	begins,	and	lack	of	choice	begins	[.	.	.	although]	people	who	are	facing	monopolists	are	in	a	vulnerable	position.”		 When	I	asked	whether	he	would	advocate	for	a	limit	in	cases	of	monopoly,	he	said,	“I’d	advocate	for	competition”	and	that	monopolies	“are	usually	created	by	some	government,”	going	on	to	opine	that	even	if	you	are	in	a	corner	of	Canada	with	only	one	bank,	it	probably	will	not	overcharge	you	because	other	Canadians	“could	be	listening,”	which	would	be	a	risk	to	the	bank’s	reputation.294			 His	colleague	was	similarly	firm,	but	more	accurate;	he	correctly	identified	the	figure	of	60%	for	the	current	interest	rate	limit	in	Canada,	referred	to	usury	as	a	religious	concept	that	is	used	in	Islam,	and	proceeded	to	say,	simply,	“The	economic	system	itself	determines	what	the	interest	rate	is”	and	that	there	will	always	be	people	who	are	outside	“the	normal	range	of	risk”	who	would	be	unable	to	get	a	loan	except	at	a	high	rate	of	interest.		 Another	Montréal-based	professor	paused	for	a	remarkable	length	of	time	before	answering:	“Ppph	.	.	.	When	.	.	.	[further	long	pause]	.	.	.	When	the	interest	the	lender	is	asking	is	above	the	market	price.”	I	asked	if	this	would	be	the	case	even	if	the	rate	is	higher	than	100%	and	he	responded	immediately,	“It’s	never	going	to	be	100%.”	When	I	raised	the	issue	of	the	compound	interest	of	payday	loans,	he	said,	somewhat	cryptically,	“Anything	I	cannot	explain	in	a	rational	fashion	is	unfair,	so	to	speak.”			 A	fourth	Montréal-area	professor	was	the	only	one	in	this	group	to	express	concern	about	usury	as	a	concept,	but	he	too	had	some	interesting	preconceptions	regarding	the	reasons	for	the	use	of	payday	loans.	The	industry	did	clearly	bother	him,	however;	he	guessed	that	credit	card	interest	rates	were	around	18%	and	that	payday	lending	operations	were	probably	charging			
way	in	excess	of	that.	Which	I	find	highly	depressing.	I	find	it	actually	exceedingly	depressing	that	there	is	this	industry.	[.	.	.]	I	mean,	I	understand	that	they’re	providing	a	social	service.	They’re	clearly	providing	a	social	service.	They’re	providing	a	social	service	that	I	think	is	unfortunately	in	demand.	And	I’d	like	to	live	in	a	world	where	that	wasn’t	in	demand.	That’s	very	pie-in-the-sky	and	fuzzy,	a	bit	naive	perhaps,	but	anyways.																																																										294	We	did	not	have	time	to	explore	that	scenario	further,	but	this	professor	did	not	mention	communities	with	no	bank	at	all	(including	a	substantial	proportion	of	First	Nations),	communities	with	a	financial	institution	that	does	not	have	a	national	franchise	(and	therefore	has	no	nation-wide	reputational	risk),	the	reality	of	a	payday	loan	industry	that	does	not	seem	overly	concerned	with	reputational	risks,	and	so	on.	
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He	initially	put	forward	the	idea	that	the	payday	lending	industry	existed	solely	because	people	do	not	have	bank	accounts	and	therefore	cannot	cash	cheques	at	all.	Although	this	probably	happens	sometimes,	and	indeed	3%	of	Canadians	are	estimated	to	be	“unbanked”	(MacKay,	1998),	there	were	surely	other	factors	in	many	cases:		 Professor:	“My	understanding	is	that	the	payday	loan	industry	exists	only	because,	basically,	people	who	have	a	payday	don’t	have	bank	accounts,	right?	Because	in	a	world	of	bank	accounts,	they	would	deposit	their	cheque	in	the	bank	account	or	it	would	get	deposited	automatically	or	they	would	deposit	their	envelope	of	cash	in	the	bank	account,	and	then	they	would	take	out	what	they	needed.	Which	would	completely	obviate	the	need	for	a	payday	loan.	So	in	my	view,	this	thing	can	only	exist	for	people	that	either	do	not	have	or	do	not	want	to	have,	cannot	have,	for	some	reason,	a	bank	account.	Which	strikes	me	as	just	a	terrible	situation.	And	I	don’t	understand	the	cause	of	it.	But	it	just	to	me	is	a	depressing	marker	for	society	that	we	have	payday	loans.	Unless	I	completely	misunderstand	them.	Have	I	misunderstood	them?”		 Me:	“Well,	I’m	not	sure	if	–	I	think	that’s	part	of	it,	and	then	I	think	also	it’s	usually	an	advance;	at	the	end	of	the	month	people	run	out	of	money	.	.	.”		 Professor:	“Yeah,	right.	So	let	me	add	the	second	thing.	So	the	other	thing	about	the	payday	loan	is	that	people	are	on	fumes	at	they	end	of	their	payday,	right?	That	means	they	have	zero	stock	of	money,	right?	They	don’t	have,	you	know,	two	paycheques	sitting	in	a	bank	account,	or	four,	or	half	–	they’ve	got	zero.	So	that’s	equally	depressing	in	my	view.”295				My	question	to	another	Montréal-area	professor	prompted	the	following	exchange:			 Professor:	Interest	comes	from	the	fact	that	people	value	things	that	they	can	get	now	more	highly	than	they	value	stuff	they	can	get	a	year	from	now.	Usury	I’m	not	too	worried	about	on	the	whole,	except	.	.	.	it	would	only	come	in	situations	of	monopoly,	imperfect	competition	of	some	kind,	monopoly	power.	[.	.	.]	So	the	question	there	is	are	these	nasty,	exploitative	people	who	should	be	banned,	or	do	they	serve	a	useful	social	purpose?	I	think	the	jury’s	kind	of	out	on	that.	[.	.	.]	So	if	you’re	willing	to	admit	that	degree	of	irrationality,	and	I	think	I	am,	it’s	probably	the	case	that	some	of	these	payday	loan	operations	basically	are	taking	advantage	of	some	kind	of	fundamental	individual	irrationality.	So	there	is	an	imperfection,	a	market	failure,	there	might	be	room	for	government	intervention	to	step	in	and	make	things	better,	but	[.	.	.]	can	you	really	be	sure	that	the	government	itself	is	going	to	make	things	a	lot	better?			 Me:	So	if	you	were	to	put	a	limit	in	place,	where	would	you	put	it?																																																									295	For	many	people	living	under	the	poverty	line	it	would	surely	be	unlikely	to	have	two	extra	paycheques’	worth	of	money	in	the	bank,	let	alone	four.	Indeed,	studies	have	demonstrated	that	a	significant	percentage	of	the	adult	population	would	struggle	to	manage	even	a	modest	unanticipated	expense;	a	recent	poll	shows	that	48%	of	Canadians	are	less	than	$200	away	from	being	unable	to	pay	their	monthly	bills	(Ipsos,	2016).		
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	 Professor:	A	number?	On	interest	rates?	I	wouldn’t	do	that.	Because	[.	.	.]	there	are	arbitrage	possibilities,	right?	The	bank	is	charging	you	too	high	an	interest	rate,	if	you’ve	got	any	kind	of	an	extended	family	you	might	be	able	to	turn	around	and	get	a	loan	from	your	cousin	.	.	.	so	it’s	only	in	situations	where	there’s	some	sort	of	really	binding	monopoly	power	is	in	effect,	for	geographic	reasons	or	whatever,	in	the	short	run,	that	I	think	it	would	be	problematic.		He	appeared	to	assume	that	most	people	had	extended	family	or	social	networks	with	resources	to	lend,	and	that	“monopoly	power”	was	a	rare	condition	within	the	market.	That	geographic	as	opposed	to	socioeconomic	factors	would	come	to	mind	first	was	also	notable.	He	was	surprised	that	there	was	an	interest	rate	limit	(“I	think	that	–	I’m	surprised	–	well,	I’m	not	surprised	that	the	government	thinks	it	knows	a	number,	but	I	wouldn’t	be	very	confident	about	the	number	that	they	come	up	with.”),	and	even	more	surprised	by	the	fact	that	it	was	60%,	which	he	seemed	to	try	to	justify	upon	hearing	it,	saying,	for	example,	“credit	card	debt	is	highly	risky”	so	the	lender	has	to	be	compensated	for	that	risk.	He	went	on	to	say:		 Once	again,	I	can	imagine	circumstances	in	which	you’re	faced	with	some	sort	of	unexpected	expense,	and	you’ve	got	all	your	savings	in	some	sort	of	illiquid	guaranteed	–	or	you	don’t	have	any	savings.	And,	I	don’t	know,	your	wife	has	just	died	and	you’re	not	going	to	get	any	of	her	inheritance	money	for	four	weeks	because	it’s	tied	up	at	the	notary	and	you	need	money	to	get	through	until	the	next	week.	Sixty	percent	a	year	might	be	a	reasonable	interest	rate	for	that	kind	of	circumstance.			His	examples	–	of	an	inheritance	held	up	at	the	notary,	or	savings	in	illiquid	form	–	were	quite	manifestly	unimaginable	for	many	people	living	in	poverty,	and	made	it	seem	as	though	he	had	not	thought	much	about	the	circumstances	of	payday	lending	customers.	Among	my	academic	conversants,	this	professor	took	some	of	most	laissez	faire	positions,	and	to	an	almost	unique	extent	he	had	found	ways	to	justify	his	pro-market	orientation	whenever	possible;	I	noticed	at	least	three	instances	in	the	interview	in	which	he	proposed	a	market	solution,	then	proceeded	to	re-labelled	it	a	government	intervention	when	it	was	shown	not	to	work.	For	instance,	this	professor	raised	the	example	of	the	price	of	generators	in	a	snowstorm:		 Professor:	Should	you	allow	prices	to	rise	to	clear	the	market?	There	you’re	really	faced	with	the	fundamental	trade-off	between	redistribution	and	efficiency.	By	allowing	prices	to	rise	in	order	for	the	market	to	clear,	then	you’re	ensuring	that	people	who	value,	at	the	margin,	generators	most	highly	are	the	ones	who	are	going	to	get	them.	But	they	might	also	be	highly	correlated	with	the	richer	people,	so	there	is	an	issue	of	redistribution.	I	don’t	even	want	to	pretend	necessarily	that	
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I’m	the	government,	but	if	I	were	to	do	so,	you	might	want	to	say	that	the	best	thing	to	do	would	be	to	step	in	and	give	people	lump-sum	transfers,	so	if	we	were	going	to	give	everybody,	say,	600	bucks	and	you	do	what	you	want	with	it,	and	that	could	include	going	out	and	renting	a	generator.			 Me:	But	wouldn’t	that	then	raise	the	price	of	it	by	about	600	bucks?			 Professor:	[Laughs]	Yes.	So,	this	is	the	old	law	of	unintended	consequences.	[Laughs	again]	So	that’s	probably	not	the	smartest	policy	you	could	come	up	with.	And	most	interventionist	type	of	policies	you	could	come	up	with	are	probably	going	to	have	unintended	side	effects	as	well.			 A	UCalgary	professor	also	used	the	example	of	generators	after	a	natural	disaster,	saying:			 Well,	here	I’m	influenced	by	my	discipline;	economics	tends	to	think	that	as	long	as	it’s	a	voluntary	transaction,	you	set	the	price	where	you	think	you	can	get	and	it	will	send	a	signal	to	the	market	that	we	need	more	generators,	or	we	need	more	of	this	or	that.	I	think	that	within	a	community,	for	example,	people	will	often	not	try	to	gouge	each	other,	because	there’s	more	at	stake	than	just	making	money	in	that	case,	but	if	you’re	talking	about	an	anonymous	market	I	don’t	see	any	reason	why	someone	who	I	don’t	know	wants	to	charge	me	a	high	price	for	a	generator	that	I	desperately	need	–	they’re	entitled	to	do	that.	I	don’t	have	to	buy	from	them.	So	I	don’t	really	see	a	moral	problem	with	that.	But	I	think	if	you’re	talking	about	within	a	community	[.	.	.]	there’s	reciprocity;	communities	do	all	kinds	of	things	for	each	other	[.	.	.]	that	are	not	market-based	transactions	and	anybody	who	doesn’t	recognise	that	and	would	try	to	gouge	someone	in	their	neighbourhood	in	a	crisis	situation	is	probably	not	really	thinking	it	through.		Interestingly,	he	cited	the	thinking	of	his	discipline	in	laying	out	his	reasoning,	and	seemed	to	hold	a	number	of	assumptions:	that	the	market	would	have	time	to	respond	to	an	increase	in	demand	for	generators	in	a	crisis,	for	example,	or	that	consumer	choice	would	come	into	play	in	an	emergency	(“I	don’t	have	to	buy	from	them”	–	but	what	about	an	emergency	situation?).296			 The	same	professor,	when	asked	about	payday	loans,	said:			 I	think	they’re	fine,	with	one	caveat,	which	is	that	if	people	are	very	uneducated	and	they	don’t	really	understand	what	they’re	getting	into,	what	they’re	buying	or	what	they’re	giving	away,	then	I	think	that	it’s	morally	problematic,	[.	.	.]	–	but	even	then,	I	think	that	you	can’t	push	that	argument	too	far	either,	and	you	don’t	want	to	assume	that	just	because	it’s	a	poor	neighbourhood	that	they	don’t	have	the	right	to	demand	cash	on	the	spot	even	at	a	high	interest	rate.	[.	.	.]	Presumably	it’s	a																																																									296	I	suspect	many	people	would	view	such	a	scenario	as	being	outside	the	realm	of	“market-based	transactions,”	and	indeed	in	the	case	of	floods	and	storms	in	Canada	there	tend	to	be	stories	of	sharing	and	mutual	aid	that	would	render	the	market	price	of	generators	largely	irrelevant.	
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competitive	market	so	if	it	really	is	a	terrible	deal,	why	isn’t	somebody	else	moving	into	the	neighbourhood	and	offering	a	better	rate?	So	I	don’t	really	see	big	problems	with	that.	But	I	can	imagine	situations	where	it’d	be	clearly	exploiting	people’s	naiveté.			 His	UCalgary	colleague	was	similarly	opposed	to	setting	a	limit	on	interest	rates,	but	was	clearly	uncomfortable	with	the	question.	He	began	by	saying,	after	a	pause:	“So	long	as	I	respect	the	law,	and	I	don’t	do	anything	immoral,	then	I	should	be	able	to	take	advantage	of	you	economically,”	provided	there	is	no	coercion	–	even	in	the	case	of	someone	selling	a	kidney.	“I’m	pretty	‘small-l’	liberal	in	a	British	sense	about	that,”	he	said.	When	I	asked	him	about	payday	loans,	however,	he	said,	“See,	there	are	always	those	areas	of	grey	–	so	interesting!”	He	went	on	to	say	that	“you	can’t	legislate	it	away	anyway”	and	that	attempting	to	do	so	just	drives	it	underground,	as	is	the	case	with	drugs,	which	are	“horrible,	horrible,	horrible”	but	should	nevertheless	be	legalised	and	regulated;	he	claimed	to	be	“pretty	sure	it	would	be	better”	for	governments	to	put	cartels	out	of	business	in	this	case.297			 A	Western	professor	was	similarly	uncomfortable	with	this	issue:			 Usury!	What	a	question	for	the	last	question!	Some	moneylenders	gouge	just	the	way	some	ice	cream	stores	gouge	kids	for	their	ice	cream	and	I	don’t	see	very	much	difference.	And	some	moneylenders	enforce	contracts	with	a	rather	terrible	degree	of	roughness	that	I	wouldn’t	want	to	see	any	kind	of	contract	enforced	with.	But	between	Smith	and	Bentham	I’m	on	Bentham’s	side.	Smith	was	very	much	in	favour	of	usury	laws.		He	went	on	to	say	that	usury	laws	had	been	very	influential	in	the	evolution	of	monetary	policy	in	the	UK,	where	there	had	been	a	5%	limit,	and	that	states	in	the	U.S.	had	low	interest	limits	when	he	was	there	as	a	student,	which	resulted	in	dubious	work-arounds	on	the	part	of	the	banks	–	“so	usury	laws	are	a	real	nuisance.”		 I	was	particularly	interested	in	hearing	from	the	bank	chief	economists	on	this	issue,	since	they	were	the	only	conversants	on	the	lenders’	side	of	the	equation.	One	of	them	said	firmly,	“I’d	default	to	the	markets	–	the	collective	wisdom	of	many	over	the	infinite	wisdom	of	one,”	and	that	the	interest	rate	is	based	on	the	“cost	of	borrowing,	the	default	risk,”	and	other	factors.	However,	he	went	on	to	say:		 Some	of	the	extremes,	like	that	payday	lending	stuff,	that’s	usury	because	they	quote	an	interest	rate	for	a	week;	if	you	were	to	annualise	that	it’s	in	the	hundreds																																																									297	If	we	had	had	time,	I	would	have	been	interested	in	exploring	the	issue	further;	interest	rates	limits	could	be	viewed	as	a	form	of	regulation	of	the	legalised	industry	of	payday	lending,	which	has	its	parallels	in	the	legalisation	and	regulation	of	drugs.	
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of	percent.	You	could	probably	talk	to	somebody	in	the	industry,	but	I’m	not	sure	that	it’s	related	to	the	credit	profile	of	the	individual,	[.	.	.]	whereas	if	you	look	at	lending	within	the	financial	community,	they	do	extensive	data	analysis	on	the	probably	of	repayment.298		This	conversant’s	counterpart	at	another	bank	said:		 I	think	it’s	extremely	unfortunate	that	people	have	to	use	those	services.	I	think	it’s	probably	over	the	line	in	terms	of	the	costs.	But	it	is	a	service	they’re	providing.	What	can	you	say?	It’s	better	than	loan	sharks.	Not	to	be	trite.	I	do	believe	they	should	be	heavily	regulated.	But	they	do	provide	a	real	service	that	obviously	some	people	do	need.			When	asked	what	he	thought	an	appropriate	limit	would	be,	he	said,	“I	think	maybe	we	should	look	at	credit	card	rates	as	a	sort	of	upper	limit,	[.	.	.]	maybe	with	a	service	charge	too”	–	around	20%	on	an	annualised	basis.	It	was	rare	that	any	economist	in	my	sample	was	willing	to	cite	a	number	they	were	comfortable	with,	and	interestingly	this	was	on	the	lower	end	–	quite	remarkable	for	a	bank	chief	economist.		 A	fellow	chief	economist	laughed	at	the	question,	saying,	“Talking	to	a	bank	chief	economist?	I	mean	usury	is	in	the	mind	of	the	beholder,”	the	more	relevant	question	being,	“Are	there	interest	rate	tipping	points	that	cause	economic	damage?”	It	is	a	“sad	fact”	that	many	people	in	the	U.S.	use	payday	loans	week	to	week,	he	said,	not	having	seen	data	on	Canada	or	Europe,	“but	that	goes	back	to	your	income	distribution	issue;	that	goes	back	to	the	poverty	issue”	as	these	services	are	a	symptom	of	these	problems,	and	they	exist	because	people	need	them.	When	I	asked	whether	there	was	a	rate	that	was	too	high,	the	response	was,	“There	are	many	things	that	can	be	regulated	in	that	particular	market	space.	And	in	fact	these	are	huge	organisations	now.	It’s	a	phenomenon	that’s	grown	very	dramatically.”	They	take	on	“exceptionally	high-risk	individuals	with	a	risk	of	losses	that	are	very	high”	and	they	are	“developing	that	market	niche,	as	economists	would	say.”	He	identified	alternatives	such	as	microfinance	and	crowd-funding,	but	acknowledged	that	it	was	a	problem.		 Although	there	were	some	exceptions,	in	general	most	of	the	COMER	members,	heterodox	economists,	CCPA	economists,	and	PEF-affiliated	academic	economists	I	spoke	with	took	an	even	more	dubious	view	of	high	interest	rates	than	the	aforementioned	economists.	One	COMER	member	seemed	to	view	all	interest	as	usury,																																																									298	This	was	an	interesting	point	–	that	interest	rates	may	not	be	based	on	risk	analysis	in	the	case	of	payday	loans.	In	other	words,	there	may	be	no	explicit	link	between	risk	level	and	interest	rate,	which	was	a	factor	several	conversants	cited	in	justifying	high	interest	rates.	
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while	a	heterodox	economist	said	that	usury	begins	anywhere	beyond	a	nominal	interest	rate	of	zero,	citing	Turkish	finance.	A	PEF-affiliated	academic	economist	said	that	“as	someone	who	looks	at	payday	lending,	it’s	relative	to	the	income	of	the	person	who	can	pay	it,”	referring	to	the	prohibition	on	usury	as	a	“core	principle	in	the	Koran,”	asking,	“do	we	have	to	go	over	20%,	ever?”	A	second	COMER	member	cited	Islamic	finance	as	well,	pointing	out	that	mortgages	are	illegal	in	Islam;	there	is	no	variable	interest,	but	rather	a	fixed	fee	at	the	beginning.	“The	insidious	thing	about	interest	is	that	it	never	stops.	It’s	a	mild	form	of	loan-sharking,”	he	argued,	proposing	instead	that	interest	not	exceed	increases	in	the	Consumer	Price	Index.		 A	third	heterodox	economist	said,	boldly,	“I’m	in	favour	of	a	permanently	low	interest	rate.	Let’s	always	leave	it	at	2%.	Let’s	never	move	it.”	I	asked,	“For	everything?”	He	responded,	“For	everything,	yeah.	[.	.	.]	Usury	is	exploitation,	that’s	what	it	is.”	He	then	back-tracked,	saying	that	the	rate	did	not	have	to	be	2%,	necessarily,	but	low,	and	the	loan	market	should	be	regulated.	I	asked	whether	that	would	prevent	high-risk	individuals	from	getting	loans,	and	he	raised	the	issue	of	the	subprime	mortgage	crisis,	saying,	“There	are	some	people	that	shouldn’t	be	getting	in	debt	that	much”299	and	that	these	issues	are	tied	to	inequality.		 Another	heterodox	economist	acknowledged	that	lenders	want	a	high	rate	of	interest	in	exchange	for	lending	to	a	high-risk	borrower.	But	he	said	of	the	views	of	his	fellow	Post-Keynesians:			 We	argue	that	if	the	real	rate	of	interest,	so	taking	inflation	into	account,	is	approximately	equal	to	the	rate	of	growth	of	labour	productivity,	then	what	you	have	is	a	fair	rate	of	interest.	And	the	reason	is	the	following:	if	the	wage	share	remains	roughly	constant,	then	the	rate	of	growth	of	labour	productivity	is	going	to	be	approximately	equal	to	the	rate	of	growth	of	real	wages.300			 But	the	lines	were	not	so	clearly	drawn	along	political	lines	or	those	of	economic	heterodoxy.	One	PEF-affiliated	economist	effectively	refused	to	engage	with	the	question,	saying,	without	disclosing	her	own	opinion:																																																											299	This	comment	was	notable	in	that	it	was	the	only	case	in	which	a	conversant	disputed	borrowers’	claims	to	credit	–	that	some	loans	simply	should	not	happen,	or	are	abusive.	300	The	idea	here	is	that	if	one	lends	the	equivalent	of	10	hours’	worth	of	work,	one	will	receive	10	hours’	worth	in	return	a	year	later	(even	though	the	wage	rate	per	hour	may	be	different	by	that	point).	“We	call	it	the	fair	rate	of	interest.	[.	.	.]	Roughly	speaking,	this	is	what	the	rate	of	interest	should	be,”	whereas	credit	card	rates	of	20%	seemed	to	him	to	constitute	“usury.”	
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I	don’t	have	any	views	on	that.	[.	.	.]	Usury	is	a	moral	term.	That’s	the	moral	prohibition	against	usury.	[.	.	.]	There’s	an	emerging	tradition	in	Islamic	economics,	banking	that	looks	at	alternative	ways	of	financing	[.	.	.]	but	is	there	a	line	in	the	sand?	This	is	something	that	was	legislated	historically	–	an	interest	rate	above	x	percent	is	usury,	right,	and	then	people	kind	of	gave	up	on	drawing	those	lines.			 A	similarly	ambiguous	response	came	from	a	CCPA	economist	who	questioned	whether	a	person	could	manage	the	debt	and	whether	it	was	eating	up	a	large	proportion	of	their	income,	“which	it	probably	shouldn’t,”	but	went	on	to	cite	a	study	showing	that	some	U.S.	payday	lenders	had	a	much	more	personal	relationship	with	customers,	and	much	greater	flexibility,	than	banks.	“This	isn’t	an	argument	for	payday	loans,	but	[.	.	.]	you	need	the	service.”	When	I	asked	whether	an	interest	rate	of	50%	would	be	usurious,	the	response	was	“probably,”	but	that	it	was	“a	more	difficult	question,”	wondering	aloud	whether	banks	could	be	forced	to	be	more	flexible	with	low-income	individuals	or	whether	credit	unions	could	accommodate	people	who	were	too	risky	for	the	traditional	banking	sector.		 A	centrist	think	tank	economist	had	clearly	considered	the	matter	deeply,	citing	the	example	of	his	nanny	paying	28%	on	a	car	loan	because	of	a	previous	bankruptcy	and	pointing	out	that	she	will	pay	two	or	three	times	the	cost	of	car	in	the	end	–	“that	kind	of	stuff	is	clearly	offensive,”	he	said,	especially	as	he	himself	was	borrowing	at	a	much	lower	rate	(3%)	on	many	hundreds	of	thousands	of	dollars	for	a	house.	“A	lot	of	people	don’t	have	the	framework	or	wherewithal	to	know	that,”	he	said,	especially	because	compound	interest	is	not	intuitive.	He	seemed	conflicted,	acknowledging	that	“thinking	like	an	economist	means	you	don’t	get	taken	advantage	of	–	if	you	don’t	have	those	skills,	it	makes	it	a	lot	easier	to	make	bad	decisions.	[.	.	.]	I	worry	about	that	.	.	.	we	should	be	teaching	people”	about	financial	literacy	and	the	like	(“basic	financial	literacy	–	there	are	huge	returns	to	that”),	and	“with	credit	cards	that’s	one	area	where	you	can	at	least	force	disclosure.”	He	said	payday	lending	was	“offensive,	but	it’s	also	offensive	for	the	government	to	tell	businesses	what	they	should	and	shouldn’t	be	doing.”	If	his	nanny	failed	to	take	the	time	to	check	out	other	offers,	if	someone	wants	to	sell	and	someone	wants	to	buy,	“I	don’t	put	100%	of	the	blame	with	the	person	who’s	lending	the	money.	[.	.	.]	There’s	some	scope	to	protect	people	from	flagrant	abuses,	but	there’s	also	general	responsibility	on	businesses	to	behave	ethically	and	also	on	people	to	look	at	their	options	and	read	the	fine	print.”	When	I	mentioned	that	the	current	interest	rate	limit	was	60%,	he	responded,	“see,	that’s	madness	–	it’s	basically	loan	sharking”	and	described	the	conundrum	of	running	out	of	food	in	advance	of	a	Friday	paycheque.		
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	 One	mainstream	economist	seemed	similarly	conflicted,	beginning	by	saying,	“I	think	what	people	worry	about	is	that	kind	of	exploitation,	when	people	in	vulnerable	positions	are	charged	way	more	than	other	people.	But	at	the	same	time,	it’s	perfectly	legitimate	to	charge	higher	rates	of	interest	to	people	who	have	a	higher	risk	of	default.”	He	then	pointed	out	that	it	was	difficult	for	small	businesses	and	low-income	people	to	get	loans	because	at	that	level	of	interest	it	is	harder	for	them	to	pay	the	loans	back,	further	compounding	the	problem.	He	added	that	profiteering	legislation	had	been	enacted	in	wartime	because	“when	everyone	is	making	a	sacrifice	for	the	common	good,”	profiteering	“really	offends	people.”			 Another	mainstream	professor	paused	for	a	long	time	before	citing	Islamic	finance	and	its	“funny	deals”	to	get	around	the	interest	prohibition.	“I	think	the	whole	notion	of	usury	got	into	religion,	which	I	guess	is	where	it	started,	as	an	unfair	taking-advantage	of	people	in	a	powerless	position.”	He	thought	that	usury	was	a	bad	idea,	and	that	it	did	not	make	people	happy	to	take	advantage	of	others	like	that,	but	that	there	was	not	a	specific	number	that	constituted	usury:	“If	you	see	it	as	usurious,	it	is.”	He	felt	that	people	should	not	be	forced	or	coerced	into	lending	other	people	money,	however,	although	there	are	probably	grounds	for	capping	rates	in	some	circumstances	despite	the	fact	that	regulations	in	this	area	did	not	seem	to	work	particularly	well.	He	finished	by	saying	that	payday	loan	rates	“can	be	monstrous”	and	that	in	conditions	of	scarcity	people’s	minds	do	not	work	very	well	–	all	in	all,	his	was	one	of	the	more	distinctive	approaches	to	the	question	I	had	heard.		 There	was	almost	universal	discomfort	with	this	question,	but	a	couple	of	economists	even	seemed	somewhat	offended	by	it.	One	mainstream	professor,	despite	going	on	to	comment	quite	explicitly	on	the	power	imbalance	issue,	said	directly,	“I	don’t	like	that	term,	usury.	It’s	very	value-loaded.	And	economists	try	to	steer	clear	of	normative	or	value-loaded	terms.	Which	is	not	to	say	usury	doesn’t	happen	–	sure	it	does.	Particularly	it	happens	when	you	have	people	in	an	unequal	power	position.”	He	went	on	to	say	that	payday	lending	did	constitute	usury;	“It	is	usurious.	But	it	is	legal.”	I	asked	him	whether	there	were	some	rates	that	are	legal	but	nonetheless	usurious	and	he	responded	almost	impatiently,	“Yes,	yes,”	going	on	to	say	that	a	Chicago	School	type	would	say	the	market	is	efficient	and	therefore	should	set	interest	rates;	“more	left-of-centre	people	would	say,	‘give	me	a	freakin’	break	–	the	market	is	not	efficient;	you	have	an	unequal	power	position,	and	one	person	is	ripping	off	another	person.’”	
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	 Another	mainstream	professor	expressed	some	minor	hostility	in	responding	immediately	to	my	question	as	to	what	level	of	interest	usury	began,	“Probably	at	about	10%.”	When	I	asked	why,	she	responded,	“You	asked	me	a	weird	question.	I	mean,	defining	usury	depends	on	who	you	are	and	where	you	stand,”	that	it	constitutes	usury	when	poor	people	pay	30%	a	year	because	they	do	not	have	a	choice,	and	that	it	matters	“whether	they’re	literate	or	numerate.”	She	then	paused,	saying,	“I	was	being	very	flippant	in	saying	10%.	It’s	a	very	complicated	question.”		 Finally,	the	question	elicited	a	more	visceral	response	from	one	Montréal	professor,	the	exception	among	his	colleagues	in	the	city	–	perhaps	due	to	his	modest	beginnings.	He	pointed	out	the	contextual	nature	of	interest	rates	and	risks	of	default,	yet	went	on	to	say:	“But	certainly	when	I	see	29.9%	on	my	credit	card	I	think	that’s	abusive	[laughs].	That’s	ridiculous.”	But	although	that	would	be	abusive	for	a	mortgage,	it	may	not	be	for	a	credit	card,	so	it	depends,	he	said.	He	then	guessed	correctly	the	current	interest	rate	limit	of	60%,	commenting	again,	“That’s	ridiculous.”			
Capital	Gains			 In	asking	conversants	for	their	views	on	capital	gains	taxation,	my	hope	was	two-fold:	to	determine	their	opinion	on	the	issue	itself,	but	also	to	identify	Canadian	economists’	social	norms	around	capital	gains	taxation.	The	former	was	straightforward;	the	latter	involved	noting	which	level	of	capital	gains	taxation	the	conversants	assumed	a)	to	be	the	proposal	under	consideration	or	b)	to	be	in	need	of	a	defence.301			 The	centre-right	think	tank	economists	were	the	most	obviously	uncomfortable	with	the	question,	and	gave	less	direct	answers.302	One	Conference	Board	economist	merely	said,	“Well,	I	think	we	want	incentives	for	people	to	invest	and	create	reasonable																																																									301	For	example,	a	conversant	might	a)	believe	that	capital	gains	taxes	should	be	eliminated	but	b)	think	that	the	Canadian	norm	is	capital	gains	taxation	at	the	reduced	rate	of	50%	(the	status	quo	policy).	Their	approach	to	this	question	will	be	to	justify	why	the	rate	should	be	lowered,	and	to	argue	that	the	current	rate	is	too	high.	Another	conversant	may	assume	that	other	economists	want	to	eliminate	the	capital	gains	tax	entirely,	and	s/he	may	want	to	retain	the	status	quo.	Therefore	s/he	will	defend	the	status	quo	and	argue	that	a	zero-taxation	policy	is	a	bad	idea.	Through	such	answers	it	is	therefore	possible	to	discern	a)	what	the	conversant	is	assuming	the	norm	to	be	and	b)	their	own	opinion.	302	This	was	true	of	think	tank	economists	in	general,	while	academic	and	bank	economists	displayed	a	remarkably	consistent	tendency	to	respond	directly	to	questions,	as	I	will	discuss	further	later.	
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returns	and	create	jobs,”	and	declined	to	elaborate	further,	instead	directing	me	to	a	colleague	for	an	answer.	His	colleague	elaborated	somewhat,	but	deflected	the	question	to	a	discussion	about	various	forms	of	taxation:	“We	need	a	fundamental	review	of	the	whole	tax	system”	because	of	low	growth	and	productivity;	“capital	gains	tax	is	just	one	of	many	many	tools.”	When	I	asked	what	he	would	recommend,	he	replied,	“Sales	tax	is	the	most	stable	base	[and	.	.	.]	also	the	least	distorting.	[.	.	.	We]	need	a	much	simpler	tax	system.”		 Conversely,	a	C.D.	Howe	conversant	invoked	a	consensus	among	economists	to	argue	for	the	status	quo	–	preferential	treatment	of	capital	gains,	with	taxation	at	50%.303	The	C.D.	Howe	conversant	in	question	seemed	to	hold	the	implicit	assumption	that	the	case	for	lower	capital	gains	taxes	was	the	side	of	the	argument	that	needed	defending,	detailing	that	case	before	setting	out	his	main	reason	for	opposing	the	elimination	of	capital	gains	taxes	altogether:		 Most	economists	who	look	at	the	effects	of	taxes	on	behaviour	and	growth,	I	would	say	–	I	said	most	economists,	but	certainly	there’s	a	large	number	that	think	that	taxing	saving	and	taxing	investment	is	not	very	helpful.	The	more	you	tax	saving	and	investment	the	more	you	incline	people	to	consume	in	the	present,	and	that’s	likely	to	be	a	problem	for	building	your	resources	over	time	and	if	you	go	too	far	down	that	road	then	you	worry	that	the	next	generation	might	not	live	as	well	as	their	parents	did.		This	conversant	noted	that	reduced	capital	gains	taxation	benefits	small	business	owners	and	that	it	is	preferable	to	be	in	sync	with	income	taxation,	but	in	general	he	was	in	favour	of	not	“discouraging”	people	from	investing	and	saving	in	Canada,	claiming	that	it	is	not	“efficient”	and	that	the	tax	system	should	be	“neutral.”	He	continued,	however,	“I	think	that	taxing	[capital	gains]	at	a	reduced	rate	makes	sense	[because]	people	would	find	a	way	to	turn	their	income	into	capital	gains”	if	they	were	not	taxed.	“A	lot	of	very	very	wealthy	people	own	small	businesses,	so	it	can	actually	be	quite	a	regressive	policy.”			 The	latter	concern	was	echoed	by	two	academic	conversants;	interestingly,	they	fell	near	the	opposite	ends	of	the	political	spectrum.	One	had	been	an	early	player	in	the	Chicago	School-esque	rise	of	Western’s	economics	department;	somewhat	surprisingly,	he	said	that	“the	trouble	with	not	taxing	them	is	any	smart	accountant	can	fit	a	lot	of	income	into	capital	gains.	That’s	the	real	problem.”	But	he	went	on	to	say	that	taxing																																																									303	This	is	as	opposed	to	taxing	capital	gains	at	the	full	100%,	exempting	them	from	taxes	entirely,	or	some	other	balance	between	the	two.	
	 293	
them	as	income	“treats	the	proceeds	of	risky	enterprise	the	same	as	a	stable	salary”	and	advocated	instead	for	consumption	taxes	with	perhaps	a	surcharge	for	high	incomes.	His	counterpart	on	the	PEF	end	of	the	political	spectrum	said	of	capital	gains	taxes:			 I’m	in	favour	of	taxing	capital	income	–	I’m	in	somewhat	of	a	minority	view	on	that.	But	I	think	there	are	lots	of	reasons	to	tax	capital	income.	One	of	the	reasons	is	that	if	you	don’t	tax	capital	income	there	are	too	many	possibilities	for	tax	avoidance	–	by	making	labour	income	look	like	capital	income.	[.	.	.	We]	should	have	some	taxes	on	capital	gains,	just	as	we	should	have	taxes	on	investment	income	in	general.		Her	further	concern	was	that	reduced	capital	gains	taxes	would	translate	into	an	increase	in	taxation	of	labour	income	and	consumption,	“which	has	undesirable	effects	on	the	economy.”	But	she	acknowledged	the	complexity	of	capital	gains	policy:		 In	an	ideal	world	you	would	wish	to	tax	real	returns	rather	than	nominal	returns,	so	you	have	to	find	some	way	of	dealing	with	inflation.	The	special	treatment	of	capital	gains	under	the	income	tax	system	can	be	thought	of	as	partly	a	way	of	dealing	with	inflation;	it	can	be	thought	of	partly	as	a	way	of	integrating	the	corporate	income	tax	and	the	personal	income	tax.	I	don’t	think	it	does	either	of	those	things	particularly	well.			 Strikingly,	the	latter	position	turned	out	to	be	the	dominant	view	of	the	bank	chief	economists	as	well.	Among	these	conversants,	there	was	a	general	acceptance	–	even	defence	–	of	the	status	quo;	one	chief	economist	stated	explicitly,	“I	agree	that	dividends	and	capital	gains	should	have	preferential	tax	treatment.”	For	another,	“I	think	we’re	about	okay	where	we	are	right	now,”	while	a	third	said,	“I	actually	think	that	how	they’re	treated	now	is	appropriate.”	This	individual	went	on	to	echo	the	concern	of	the	PEF-affiliated	academic,	saying,	“I	mean,	it’s	not	ideal;	I	do	think	that	if	you’ve	had	an	investment	for	a	long	period	of	time	there’s	a	pretty	strong	case	to	be	made	that	it	should	be	inflation-adjusted.”	This	position	was	echoed	by	several	of	the	others	as	well;	one	of	the	economists	in	favour	of	the	status	quo	believed	that	we	should	ideally	have	a	system	that	reflects	risk	and	allows	people	to	deduct	losses,	calculating	gains	in	real	as	opposed	to	nominal	terms,304	but	that	the	current	50%	inclusion	rate	is	“a	crude	balance	[	.	.	.	]	people	always	forget	that,	and	they	think	that	capital	gains	are	tax	favourable.”	But	if	you	bought	something	20	years	ago	and	are	taxed	on	gains	since	then,	“that	wouldn’t	be	very	fair	either.	[	.	.	.	]	We	did	have	a	100%	inclusion	rate	at	one	time,	and	we’ve	been	reducing	it	since.”		
																																																								304	“Real”	returns	take	inflation	into	account,	while	“nominal”	returns	do	not.	
	 294	
	 Two	of	my	conversants	seemed	keen	to	avoid	answering	directly.	One	launched	into	the	features	of	an	ideal	tax	system,	declaring,	“you	want	a	fair	structure,”	but	then	asked	the	question:	“Are	our	private	equity	firms	paying	their	fair	share?	Probably	not,”	going	on	to	explain	that	“you	want	government	to	be	as	neutral	as	possible”	and	not	pick	winners	and	losers,	although	“some	things	on	the	tax	side	are	probably	not	fair.”	After	contrasting	the	Canadian	attitude	towards	taxes	with	that	of	the	U.S.,	this	conversant	circled	back	to	their	bank’s	approach:	“We	try	to	stay	as	neutral	as	we	can.”	Despite	my	questioning,	I	never	did	uncover	this	conversant’s	opinion	on	capital	gains	taxation.	A	second	reluctant	conversant,	an	academic,	deployed	similar	tactics,	referring	to	the	“endless	amount	of	debate”	on	the	subject.	“Do	I	think	we	should	have	incentives	that	favour	capital	gains,	in	other	words	investment?	Absolutely.	The	question	is	how	much.”	When	I	asked	how	much,	however,	the	response	was	thus:	“I’ll	let	Jack	[Mintz]	answer	that	one.”		 From	the	two	remaining	bank	chief	economists	it	was	revealing	to	see	from	which	direction	they	thought	the	argument	would	come	–	that	capital	gains	taxes	should	be	raised	or	lowered	(or	even	eliminated).	When	asked	whether	the	rate	should	be	changed,	one	of	them	immediately	assumed	that	I	was	referring	to	their	elimination,	launching	in	to	defend	them	by	saying	that	if	we	did	not	have	capital	gains	taxes	we	would	have	to	raise	the	money	elsewhere.	He	claimed	to	be	comfortable	with	the	status	quo,	“unless	you	want	to	shrink	government,	which	I	don’t	necessarily	advocate.	[.	.	.]	Most	of	the	people	who	earn	capital	gains	are	wealthier	people.”	His	counterpart	at	another	bank	argued	that	capital	gains	should	be	taxed	at	a	lower	rate	than	income	taxes,	noting	that	the	U.S.	has	an	estate	tax	and	a	tax	on	capital	gains	from	residential	real	estate,	implying	that	this	might	be	a	good	idea	in	Canada	as	well.	She	seemed	shocked	when	I	asked	whether	capital	gains	should	be	eliminated,	however:		 No	–	that	would	just	widen	the	income	gap.	I	do	believe	that	in	a	country	as	rich	as	ours	or	the	United	States	that	it’s	unconscionable	that	you’d	have	child	poverty	or	terrible	public	schools	in	certain	districts,	in	the	U.S.	anyway,	no	access	to	good	healthcare.	So	all	of	that	has	to	be	paid	for.			 Among	mainstream	academic	economists,	there	was	general	support	for	the	status	quo,	often	seemingly	in	defence	of	the	idea	of	taxing	capital	gains	at	all.	When	I	asked	one	high-profile	conversant	whether	she	was	in	favour	of	capital	gains	taxes,	she	said,	“Yes,	sure.”	When	I	mentioned	that	this	was	somewhat	rare	among	certain	groups	of	economists	to	whom	I	had	spoken,	she	replied:	
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	 I	would	say	there’s	a	profit	there,	you	made	it	based	on	information	or	connections	or	whatever,	and	so	it’s	reasonable	that	it	should	be	taxed,	but	not	at	a	high	rate.	And	sure,	I	can	imagine	there	are	economists	who	say	it	shouldn’t	be	taxed	at	all,	because	that	inhibits	investment.	Given	what	I	learned	in	the	financial	crisis,	I	think	we	can	afford	to	impose	that	kind	of	taxation	at	a	reasonable	level.			 Another	mainstream	economist	thought	capital	gains	should	be	treated	as	income,	and	that	the	only	question	was	whether	there	was	double	taxation	–	but	that	the	current	system	adjusts	for	that,	which	“seems	to	me	it’s	a	fair	system.”	He	referred	to	Jack	Mintz	as	the	expert	on	the	matter,	but	went	on	to	say:	“But	regardless	of	how	you	earn	income,	you	should	pay	tax	on	it.	There’s	nothing	special	–	I	earn	a	wage	versus	John	who	just	lives	off	his	investment	income.”	A	mainstream	colleague,	when	asked	whether	she	supports	capital	gains	taxation	said	clearly,	“Yes.	I	haven’t	thought	very	deeply	about	it.”	Another	mainstream	colleague	concurred,	saying,	“I	think	it’s	an	essential	part	of	the	tax	system,”	as	did	a	PEF-affiliated	colleague	who	said,	“Yeah,	generally.”			 A	left-leaning	academic	economist	offered	a	critique,	however,	saying	“we	know	that	we	do	that	incredibly	stupidly.”	This	person	detailed	the	macroeconomics	and	public	economics	angle,	which	is	that	capital	gains	taxation	is	taxing	investment,	but	went	on,	“At	the	least,	we	should	tax	capital	income	the	same	as	we	tax	labour	income”	as	opposed	to	the	status	quo	in	Canada,	which	essentially	means	that	self-employed	people	are	taxed	at	half	the	rate	as	everyone	else	–	this,	he	said,	“seems	insane.”		 The	heterodox	economists	in	my	sample	were	yet	more	explicit.	One	said:			 Let’s	raise	‘em	–	up	up	up	up.	I	mean,	that’s	the	source	of	inequality.	If	you	have	money	you	can	make	a	lot	more	money	with	lower	taxes.	And	I	don’t	want	to	say	that	you	shouldn’t,	if	you’ve	worked	hard	and	made	good	money	and	you	want	to	invest	it,	you	know,	sure	–	but	let’s	not	give	away	the	store.				 One	of	his	heterodox	colleagues	went	a	step	further;	when	asked	whether	he	was	in	favour	of	capital	gains	taxes,	he	said:		 Sure.	Especially	now.	The	reason	for	which	capital	gains	were	not	fully	taxed	as	regular	income	was	the	argument	that	inflation	was	creating	these	“fake”	capital	gains,	that	they	were	not	real	capital	gains,	they	were	nominal	capital	gains	due	to	10%	inflation	and	so	on.	But	now	at	2%	or	near	0%,	capital	gains	should	be	taxed	at	100%.	It’s	not	capital	gains	–	once	again	–	it’s	not	capital	gains	that	induce	firms	to	invest	more	–	it’s	sales.			 In	the	end,	only	one	economist	I	asked	specifically	about	capital	gains	taxes,	an	academic	and	one	of	the	most	right-wing	economists	in	my	sample,	genuinely	
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entertained	the	idea	of	eliminating	the	tax	entirely.	Even	in	this	instance,	he	came	at	the	idea	from	an	oblique	angle,	first	noting	that	there	was	a	great	deal	of	literature	on	the	taxation	of	capital	income	before	going	on	to	say:		 It	depends	on	a	whole	bucket	full	of	assumptions,	but	a	lot	of	people	would	say	the	optimal	rate	of	taxation	on	capital	income,	or	wealth,	is	zero.	Because	the	demand	for	capital	is	so	elastic	in	the	long	run	that	basically	the	main	effect	that	you’re	going	to	get	from	a	wealth	tax	or	a	tax	on	capital	income	is	to	reduce	the	worldwide	capital	stock.			He	added	hastily:	“That	doesn’t	mean	–	you	can	still	have	progressive	taxation,”	then	reiterated	that	there	was	the	option	of	retaining	a	progressive	taxation	system	by	way	of	his	preferred	tax,	a	consumption	tax:	“You	can	have	a	progressive	consumption	tax,”	he	said,	because	at	the	margin	high	levels	of	consumption	can	be	taxed	at	a	high	rate.	Taxing	capital	is	“really	distortionary,”	however.	I	asked	him	whether	he	was,	indeed,	in	the	camp	of	economists	who	opposed	taxing	capital	gains.	“That’s	more	tricky,”	he	said,	later	declaring	he	is	uncomfortable	“with	a	very	high	rate”	of	capital	gains	taxation	–	“and	you	can	get	most	of	the	redistribution	you	want,	if	you	think	redistribution	is	important,”	by	applying	a	progressive	consumption	tax.		 On	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum,	non-academic	progressives	tended	to	adopt	a	power	analysis	in	explaining	their	views.	One	COMER	member	said	of	capital	gains	that	“generally	the	legal	provisions	for	things	like	that	benefit	the	better-off	much	more	than	poorer	folk.	And	that’s	a	trend	that’s	getting	worse	rather	than	getting	better.”	One	CCPA	economist,	in	recommending	that	we	tax	capital	gains	in	the	same	way	as	income	with	a	deduction	for	inflation,	echoed	that	sentiment,	asking	“if	you’ve	got	access	to	the	levers	of	power,	what	are	you	going	to	advocate	for?	You’re	going	to	advocate	for	your	own	benefit.”	Yet	another	PEF-affiliated	economist	concurred	immediately:	“Oh,	yeah.	I	would	oppose	any	preferential	tax	of	financial	investment	income.”	He	also	put	preferential	treatment	of	capital	gains	in	the	context	of	other	forms	of	tax	advantages	for	capital	income,	identifying	RRSPs,305	RESPs,306	and	the	like	as	tax	shelters	–	“and	now	TFSAs307	is	a	big	step	towards	just	eliminating	tax	on	capital	income,	which	is	shockingly	audacious.”																																																											305	Registered	Retirement	Savings	Plan,	a	tax-free	savings	vehicle	for	retirement.	306	Registered	Education	Savings	Plan,	a	tax-free	savings	vehicle	for	children’s	later	educational	expenses.	307	Tax-Free	Savings	Account	–	a	tax-free	savings	vehicle;	investment	income	from	this	is	not	taxed,	even	when	it	is	withdrawn.	
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Carbon	Tax			 Carbon	taxation	was	one	issue	about	which	there	was	near	unanimity,	with	minor	variations	mainly	according	to	sector	and	geography.	Almost	everyone	was	in	favour	of	pricing	carbon,	many	citing	economists’	preference	for	pricing	mechanisms	and	the	internalising	of	externalities	in	expressing	their	support.	Of	23	direct	responses	to	a	question	about	carbon	taxation,	only	two	conversants	expressed	real	reservations.	A	Fraser	Institute	conversant	laughed	nervously	before	responding:	“Ha.	Well,	the	easy	answer	is	conceptually,	on	a	blackboard,	I	am,”	but	that	“in	the	real	world	of	politics	it	doesn’t	stay	as	a	carbon	tax,”	including	in	B.C.,	where	he	claimed	it	was	unevenly	applied	and	therefore	misunderstood.	“I	don’t	know	an	economist	in	the	world	who	wouldn’t	agree	with	[a	carbon	tax],”	but	it	never	works	as	planned.			 A	conversant	from	C.D.	Howe	emphasised	that	he	was	offering	a	personal	opinion	before	saying,	“I	think	that	it’s	awkward	to	try	to	figure	out	the	carbon	content	of	things”	and	where	along	the	chain	the	tax	should	be	applied;	he	did	not	think	the	tax	should	“hit”	producers,	which	can	cause	them	to	agitate	as	a	lobby	group.	Instead	he	advocated	for	a	VAT;308	“that	way	you’ll	discourage	the	consumption	of	resources	of	all	kinds,”	we	can	avoid	incentivising	“silly	things”	like	biofuels,	and	it	would	be	more	“transparent”	and	fair.	He	thought	that	both	carbon	taxes	and	the	VAT	would	be	unpopular,	however,	as	they	are	“very	visible	to	consumers.”		 The	bank	chief	economists	gave	some	of	the	most	detailed	answers,	aside	from	one	who	simply	said,	“I	am	in	favour	of	a	carbon	tax.”	Two	others	expressed	concern	about	acting	without	matching	commitments	from	an	international	coalition.	One	said,	“you	don’t	want	to	run	too	far	ahead	of	the	pack,”	that	there	should	be	a	global	focus	and	an	emphasis	on	technology-sharing,	but	that	his	generation	(the	Baby	Boomers)	were	acknowledging	the	“damage	that	has	been	done,”	and	continued:	“We	all	get	accustomed	to	what’s	‘normal’	to	us	[.	.	.	but]	we	can’t	get	stuck	in	the	way	we	used	to	do	things	because	[we’ll	be]	a	dinosaur.	[.	.	.]	I	think	the	carbon	tax	is	the	easier,	simpler	way	to	go.”			 One	bank	chief	economist	who	had	otherwise	been	on	the	progressive	end	of	the	political	spectrum	relative	to	his	colleagues	took	a	surprisingly	negative	view;	he	said	that	“economists	are	big	fans	of	carbon	taxes”	and	“probably	95%	of	economists”	would	favour	them	over	specific	regulations.	This,	he	went	on,	would	be	society’s	cheapest	way																																																									308	The	Value	Added	Tax,	a	sales	tax	that	increases	at	each	stage	of	production	(according	to	improvements	to	the	value	of	the	item	in	question).	
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to	reduce	carbon,	but	the	drawback	was	that	if	only	one	country	did	it,	the	result	would	be	to	shift	oil	production	from	Canada	to	Venezuela,	for	example.	He	claimed	to	be	in	favour	of	a	carbon	tax,	ultimately,	but	he	did	not	like	the	“mishmash”	of	policies	among	the	provinces.	He	went	on	to	say	that	although	climate	change	is	a	problem,	and	the	science	is	right	(although	“highly	uncertain	on	the	magnitudes”),	Canada	should	only	act	when	others	do,	or	it	will	fail	to	make	any	difference	–	“this	is	one	area	where	I’ve	agreed	with	Stephen	Harper	all	along.”	He	spoke	of	the	success	of	ozone	pollutant	regulation,	saying	that	this	should	have	been	in	place	ten	years	ago	for	carbon.	He	added	that	the	U.S.	coal	sector	is	way	worse	than	the	Alberta	oil	sands,	but	we	view	each	coalmine	and	factory	as	separate,	whereas	we	lump	the	oil	sands	together	as	one.			 The	other	three	bank	chief	economists	came	out	more	or	less	unambiguously	in	favour	of	a	carbon	tax.	The	first	indicated,	“I	would	say	I	am	[in	favour	.	.	.]	I	think	we	at	least	need	to	be	seen,	if	not	in	fact,	to	be	playing	our	role,	and	I	do	think	it’s	a	relatively	efficient	way	to	do	it”	and	that	it	is	preferable	to	cap-and-trade	because	of	the	“potential	fraud”	associated	with	a	carbon	tax	and	the	difficulty	of	accounting	for	differences	in	the	provinces’	economies.	He	claimed	that	cap-and-trade	may	be	more	saleable	than	a	carbon	tax	because	it	is	not	“overt”	–	“although,	to	her	credit,	Kathleen	Wynne	said	if	you	want	to	call	this	[cap-and-trade	agreement]	a	tax,	this	is	a	tax.	[.	.	.]	But	I	just	think	a	straight	carbon	tax	is	a	fairer	way	to	do	it”	and	it	has	worked	well	in	B.C.		 A	second	bank	chief	economist	also	cited	B.C.	as	a	largely	positive	example,	saying,	“I	think	carbon	taxes	are	vastly	more	efficient	than	trading	credits	–	it’s	simpler,	less	prone	to	political	manipulation.”	He	worried	that	the	environmental	movement	was	becoming	“single-issue”	in	focusing	on	carbon	–	he	felt	water	was	the	big	issue,	although	less	so	in	Canada	–	but	suggested	that	“the	only	way	you	change	behaviour	is	to	change	relative	pricing.	Or	convenience.”	When	I	asked	whether	he	preferred	pricing	mechanisms	over	regulation,	he	said,	“It’ll	be	a	mixture	of	both.	I’m	an	economist	–	I	like	pricing	mechanisms.	But	we	know	that	there	are	certain	issues”	for	which	regulation	is	necessary	as	well.		 The	third	bank	chief	economist	was	more	unequivocal;	he	averred,	“Yeah.	We	should	definitely	be	pricing	[carbon],”	and	he	would	“prefer”	a	carbon	tax	as	it	is	“simpler.”	He	criticised	the	hypocrisy	of	the	federal	government	over	the	course	of	decades	of	international	climate	change	negotiations,	asserting	that	with	Kyoto	and	Rio	“we	were	running	the	greatest	deceit	in	the	world	[.	.	.]	and	again,	that’s	not	the	monopoly	of	the	Conservatives;”	the	Liberals	have	been	hypocrites	too.	
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	 Perhaps	most	surprising	was	that	two	academics	at	UCalgary,	a	major	beneficiary	of	oil	and	gas	industry	funding	located	in	an	oil-dependent	province,	brought	up	carbon	taxation	unprompted	and	clearly	came	out	in	favour	in	both	cases.	One	professor	even	had	a	history	of	consulting	for	the	oil	and	gas	industry,	yet	mentioned	signing	a	pro-carbon	tax	statement,	stating,	“I	would	say	the	overwhelming	majority	of	economists	in	Canada”	are	in	favour	“because	it	conforms	perfectly	with	the	economic	model	instead	of	tampering	in	many	ways.”	He	raised	the	concern	that	the	carbon	tax	is	currently	too	low	to	be	effective;	when	I	asked	whether	the	level	was	high	enough	in	Alberta,	he	felt	it	was	hard	to	know	and	that	we	should	study	the	effect	of	the	tax	over	time	–	but	that,	ultimately,	“it’s	consistent	with	economic	theory.”	His	colleague,	who	also	mentioned	carbon	taxes	unprompted,	claimed	that	most	economists	and	even	oil	companies	are	in	favour	of	carbon	pricing,	but	that	it	needs	to	be	clear	and	predictable	and	provide	certainty.	He	thought	that	the	carbon	tax	should	be	higher,	and	that	gas	taxes	should	increase	in	order	to	reduce	the	motivation	for	people	to	buy	big	SUVs.309		 Similarly,	a	professor	associated	with	the	rise	of	Chicago	School-style	macroeconomics	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	stated,	unprompted,	“I	find	[Harper’s]	discussion	of	things	like	carbon	taxes	to	be	absolutely	incompetent	or	dishonest.	[.	.	.]	It	may	be	that	he’s	such	a	prisoner	of	the	oil	industry	that	he	dare	not	tell	the	truth	about	that.	But	he	really	ought	to	know	better.”	When	I	asked	directly	whether	he	was	sympathetic	to	calls	for	a	carbon	tax,	he	exclaimed,	“Oh	sure!”	and	said	that	B.C.’s	tax	seemed	to	be	working	well.		 Given	that	multiple	conversants,	including	one	from	within	the	organisation	itself,	had	identified	the	Conference	Board	as	being	–	alongside	the	C.D.	Howe	Institute	–	slightly	right-of-centre,	it	was	somewhat	surprising	to	see	the	unanimity	and	lack	of	ambiguity	in	their	support	for	carbon	taxation;	all	three	Conference	Board	conversants	came	out	in	favour,	one	volunteering,	“I	would	also	put	a	price	on	carbon,	by	the	way.	And	I	would	do	that	through	a	carbon	tax.”	His	colleague	said,	“I	think	carbon	taxes	do	have	a	role”	and	have	worked	quite	well	in	B.C.,	“partly	because	of	the	mechanisms	they	put	in	place	to	redistribute	the	funds.	[.	.	.]	Carbon	is	something	we	have	to	be	worried	about.	No	question.	Transitioning	off	of	fossil	fuels,	from	a	scientific	perspective,	is	something	that	needs	to	be	done.”	The	third	Conference	Board	conversant	concurred,	saying	he	was	“all	in	favour	of	cleaning	up	the	environment”	and	that,	if	you	think	emissions	are	the	problem,	you	have	to	go	to	the	root	of	it,	although	he	did	not	think																																																									309	Sport	Utility	Vehicles	–	notoriously	gas-guzzling	vehicles.	
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government	should	get	too	involved	in	choices	because	“in	the	end	it’s	the	consumer	who	pays.”	He	was	ultimately	unequivocal,	however,	stating,	“I	think	a	carbon	tax	is	the	best	way	to	get	at	it”	and	that	it	should	be	incremental,	going	up	slowly,	“forever.”	As	might	be	expected,	professors	from	B.C.	expressed	support	for	carbon	taxes	across	the	board.	One	said	simply,	“We	have	a	carbon	tax,	and	I	am	in	favour	of	it.”	Another	declared,	“Oh	yeah,”	mentioning	some	work	he	had	done	on	it	and	identifying	it	as	“classic	Pigouvian	taxation	–	[.	.	.]	You	can	tax	working,	when	we	like	working,	or	you	can	tax	polluting	when	we	don’t	like	polluting.	What	do	you	choose?”	Carbon,	and	fossil	fuels	in	general,	he	pointed	out,	are	also	simple	to	calculate:	“You	buy	a	gigajoule	of	natural	gas,	it’s	very	easy	to	measure.	You’re	done!”		 A	third	B.C.	professor	asked,	“It’s	quite	clear,	right?	What’s	not	to	like	about	the	B.C.	tax,	right?”	It	makes	people	aware	of	which	things	are	carbon-intensive,	and	“takes	some	of	the	very	obvious	externalities	and	internalises	them.	But	it’s	not	enough.”	Carbon	taxes	and	other	such	solutions	are	“mechanistic,	self-centred;”	he	continued,	“the	really	big	changes	in	environmental	behaviour	are	going	to	happen	when	social	norms	change,	and	they	can	happen	very	big-time	when	the	social	norms	change.”		 The	conviction	that	carbon	taxes	were	just	one	aspect	of	the	solution	to	climate	change	was	repeated	by	a	heterodox	economist	at	the	other	end	of	the	country,	who	was	“absolutely”	in	favour	of	a	carbon	tax	but	maintained	that	we	could	also	raise	the	price	of	gas,	invest	in	public	transit,	and	a	lot	more.			 In	general,	however,	heterodox	economists	were	largely	quiet	on	the	environment.	One	heterodox	professor	gamely	responded	to	my	line	of	questioning	as	to	the	compatibility	between	Post-Keynesian	theory	and	the	reality	of	a	finite	biosphere;	he	admitted	that	this	was	a	source	of	tremendous	disagreement	among	heterodox	economists,	as	environmental	economists	tend	to	favour	zero-growth	models,	while	Post-Keynesians’	models	all	rely	upon	continuous	growth	to	offset	deficit	spending.	One	PEF-affiliated	economist	spoke	at	length	about	climate	change:	“If	you	think	like	an	economist	you	believe	incentives	matter,	and	so	if	carbon	is	more	expensive	people	will	use	less	of	it,	and	that	would	be	a	good	thing.”	Her	trouble	was	with	taxes	on	domestic	automobile	use	and	the	like;	“well,	those	taxes	are	regressive.	There’s	no	way	of	getting	around	that	–	carbon	taxes	are	regressive.”	The	government	could	issue	refunds,	as	they	
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do	in	B.C.,	but	they	tend	not	to	be	well-targeted.310	“If	you’re	thinking	about	where	it	would	really	make	a	difference,	the	really	horrendous	stuff	like	the	bitumen	in	Alberta	[.	.	.]	if	you	have	serious	carbon	taxes	you’re	going	to	kill	the	oil	sands,	right?	Is	there	a	political	will	to	do	that?	I’m	not	sure.”	Of	the	oil	sands	she	said:			 I	find	them	very	scary	–	the	environmental	damage,	the	tailing	ponds	–	we	haven’t	really	got	a	solution	for	those	tailing	ponds.	[.	.	.]	You’re	talking	about	major	potential	destruction	of	entire	ecosystems	–	think	about	the	consequences	of	that	for	agriculture,	think	of	the	consequences	of	that	for	food	sustainability	[and]	watersheds	[	.	.	.]	The	problem	is	people	can’t	imagine	the	scale	of	it.			 A	CCPA	economist	viewed	carbon	taxes	as	an	environmental	boon,	but	also	a	source	of	revenue	for	infrastructure,	healthcare,	and	other	public	goods;	“I	actually	would	argue	we’re	going	to	have	to	raise	revenues	to	move	into	the	21st	Century.”	As	a	rule,	carbon	taxes	enjoyed	support	across	the	board;	as	one	mainstream	academic	economist	asserted,	“These	are	ideas	that	I	think	are	good.	You	use	the	self-interest	of	individuals	and	you	guide	that	self-interest	into	a	public	direction.”	A	financial	economist	with	an	international	perspective,	remarking	on	Canada’s	inaction	on	climate	change,	put	it	succinctly:	“We’re	out	of	step	with	the	rest	of	the	world,	and	we’re	going	to	suffer	for	it.”																																																																								310	They	can	end	up	largely	going	to	university	students,	for	example,	who	have	relatively	low	incomes	but	who	were	not	emitting	much	carbon	in	the	first	place	and	are	therefore	unlikely	to	further	reduce	their	emissions.	
	 302	
Appendix	IV		I	intend	to	invite	a	panel	of	Canadian	economists	to	critique	my	thesis	after	submission.	I	have	selected	economists	from	a	variety	of	backgrounds,	with	an	eye	to	diversity	of	employment,	gender,	race,	and	ideology.	I	suspect	only	a	few	of	them	will	have	the	time	or	inclination	to	submit	feedback,	but	any	critiques	from	Canadian	economists	themselves	would	be	useful	in	the	extreme.	I	will	invite	the	following:		Bill	Watson	Frances	Woolley	Armine	Yalnizyan	John	Helliwell	David	Laidler	Jean-Francois	Wen	or	Ron	Kneebone	Jim	Davies	Jack	Mintz	Don	Drummond	Avery	Shenfeld,	Doug	Porter,	or	Craig	Wright	Stephen	Tapp	Marc	Lavoie	Angie	Redish	Krishna	Pendakur	Wendy	Dobson	Charles	Beach	or	Lorne	Carmichael	John	Chant	Chris	Ragan	Steve	Ambler	Sherry	Cooper	Jim	Stanford	Glen	Hodgson	Ben	Dachis										
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Appendix	V		People	I	wish	I	had	interviewed	(or	tried	unsuccessfully	to	interview)	and	whom	I	will	attempt	to	contact	for	interviews	after	my	final	submission	date:		Sylvia	Ostry		Kari	Polanyi	Levitt	Grant	Reuber	Jack	Knetsch	Mike	Veall	Professors	from	Waterloo,	Manitoba,	and	Dalhousie	Donald	Moggridge	Robert	Mundell	Paul	Hellyer	Beata	Caranci	Dick	Lipsey	Miles	Corak	An	economist	from	IISD			
